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Abstract 
In this thesis, I explore the political culture in Damascus during the 7th/13th and 8th/14th 
centuries by examining the symbolic practices through which sultanic rulers and their 
subjects negotiated local power relations.  
As my point of departure, I use a protest against Mamluk tax policies that took 
place in 711/1311. I argue that this protest should not be understood as a spontaneous 
outburst of popular anger, but as a meaningful political act that reflects the wider political 
culture of the period and lends itself to interpretation of multiple levels.  
First, I demonstrate how the 711 protesters engaged in a multi-layered form of 
visual communication by carrying objects that referenced local identity, contemporary 
politics and Islamic history. I then contextualise the protest within the urban landscape 
of medieval Damascus. By exploring the historical development of procession routes 
and parade grounds in Damascus, I argue that the choice of venue that characterised this 
and later protests was based on a desire to appropriate spatial nodes in the topography of 
sultanic power. I then turn to the Umayyad Mosque as the antithesis of the ceremonial 
culture of the military parade ground. I argue that the protesters of 711 used visual 
references to the mosque in their procession, especially by placing the khaṭīb (Friday 
preacher) as leader of the procession, but that his participation must also be understood 
in the light of his wider socio-political role. 
Finally, I examine the narrative sources through which we access this and other 
political events in Mamluk Damascus. I argue that the use of these narratives as a source 
for political history must be accompanied by a comparison of how individual authors 
frame the same events and critical reflection on how representations of historical events 
are shaped by and shape the overarching agendas of their respective works. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
I. Point of Departure 
i. The 711 protest: a scene from 8th/14th century Damascus  
On the morning of Monday the 13th of Jumādā I 711/27th of September 1311, two 
separate ceremonial processions collided in the city of Damascus. At daybreak, Sayf al-
Dīn Karāy al-Manṣūrī (d. 719/1319), the Mamluk governor of Damascus and viceroy of 
Syria, mustered his troops for the customary Monday inspection parade. Surrounded by 
his entourage, Karāy rode out from his lodgings near al-Maydān al-Akhḍar (The Green 
Hippodrome), which lay west of the walled city, and headed towards Sūq al-Khayl (The 
Horse Market), which lay north of the Barāda River across from the citadel and 
functioned as market place and parade ground.  
If we assume that this parade followed official Mamluk protocol, the arrival at Sūq 
al-Khayl would have been followed by an announcement of the ranks and privileges of 
the attending amirs as well as a presentation of their equipment and horses.1 However, 
on this particular Monday morning, the inspection parade did not run according to plan. 
At some point, a protest procession made up of local civilians set forth from the walled 
city towards Sūq al-Khayl. Their intention was to interrupt the assembly and divert the 
governor’s focus away from the army inventory toward the hardship brought on by 
current tax policies.  
The ‘clash of processions’ in Sūq al-Khayl was the outcome of a tax imposed on 
Damascus a month earlier (Rabīʿ II 711/July-August 1311) that was intended to fund an 
expansion of the local cavalry garrison. During Jumādā I/September, local merchants 
and notables had negotiated with the governor in an attempt to reduce the tax. These 
attempts proved unsuccessful, and in the week prior to the parade an unspecified group 
of Damascenes had asked for intervention from their religious leaders. On Friday the 
10th of Jumādā I/24th of September, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338), the imam and 
khaṭīb (Friday preacher) of the Umayyad Mosque, agreed to present a complaint about 
the matter to the governor. The protest procession on the following Monday morning 
constituted this complaint. On his way to seek out the governor, al-Qazwīnī led a group 
consisting of ʿulamāʾ (Islamic scholars), Qurʾān readers, muezzins and ordinary 
civilians. They walked from the Umayyad Mosque through the walled city through the 
northwestern gate, Bāb al-Faraj, and across the Barāda. From there they turned west 
                                                        
1 Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Kitābat al-Inshāʾ 14 Vols. (Cairo: Dār 
al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1914), vol. 4, 195–196. 
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through the area known as Taḥt al-Qalʿa (Below the Citadel) and ended in Sūq al-Khayl. 
We do not know exactly what the participants said or shouted during their march or upon 
arrival, but according to local contemporary sources, they brought with them the three 
most important symbolic artefacts available to civilian actors in Damascus: the Qurʾān 
of ʿUthmān, the Sandal of the Prophet and the black caliphal banners that hung in the 
Umayyad Mosque.  
The governor did not welcome the civilian procession; instead, he dismissed the 
complaints about the tax and had the crowd broken up by his club-wielding guards. 
During this commotion, the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān fell on the ground, which caused the 
civilian protesters to pelt the governor’s entourage with stones before retreating towards 
the walled city. The following evening, Governor Karāy summoned al-Qazwīnī along 
with ʿImād al-Dīn al-Tūnisī (d. 718/1319), a North-African grammarian and Qurʾān 
recital expert residing in Damascus, and Najm al-Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā (d. 724/1324), the Shāfiʿī 
Chief Judge (qāḍī) of Damascus. The governor verbally abused all three men for plotting 
against him. Al-Tūnisī was then beaten by the governor’s guards and later jailed 
alongside al-Qazwīnī, while Ibn Ṣaṣrā was released. 
On Tuesday, a group of professional witnesses (shuhūd) approached the governor 
and vouched for al-Qazwīnī and al-Tūnisī, after which both men were released. On the 
following Friday, threats of a new round of protest prompted the governor to reopen the 
negotiations about the tax. He eventually agreed to lower the amount and postpone the 
collection until the tax collectors from Cairo arrived in Damascus and demanded the 
money. Whether Karāy would have upheld his end of this bargain is impossible to know 
since he was arrested on accusations of treason approximately two weeks after the protest 
and sent off in shackles to prison in Jordan.   
The events of this Monday morning, which will henceforth be called ‘the 711 
protest’, constitute one of the rare cases where street politics in early Mamluk Damascus 
were captured in rich detail by contemporary authors, whose narratives have survived 
until today. This thesis unfolds the dense layers of meaning imbedded within the 711 
protest, and use it as a prism through which to explore political culture in Damascus 
during the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries.  
 
ii. Thesis statement  
The above description of the 711 protest comes from the Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān, a 
7th/13th – 8th/14th century annalistic chronicle focused on Syria and Damascus. It is one 
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of six contemporary and near-contemporary sources for the protest that are used 
throughout this thesis. (A comprehensive source overview is presented in Section III of 
this chapter).  
The rich though sometimes contradictory narratives found in these sources allow 
us to approach the 711 protest at an unusually high level of detail. More specifically, 
they give us the opportunity to explore the following four questions: what was the 
political context of the 711 protest on the local and imperial level? What did the 
protesters do and where did they do it? Who led the protest? And finally, who wrote 
about it and how? These specific questions related to the 711 protest will be answered 
over the course of the following four chapters. Simultaneously, each question will serve 
as a vantage point from which to examine political culture in 7th/13th and 8th/14th century 
Damascus. ‘Political culture’ in this context is defined as the forms of symbolic 
communication through which political power relations were asserted, negotiated and 
opposed.2 The 711 protest, I argue, ties together multiple elements of political culture 
that are found across the period in question, albeit in smaller and often much simpler 
constellations. By using the 711 protest as a prism, we are able to detect wider patterns 
and make new connections between such diverse phenomena as the cult of relics in 
Damascus, power and urban topography in Syro-Egypt, military ceremonial protocol 
and proto-patriotism in Damascene chronicles.  
This thesis provides a detailed, step-by-step examination of a single historical 
event and a series of thematic explorations that will hopefully lead to a broader 
understanding of political culture in Damascus during the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries. 
 
                                                        
2 There are many theoretical models for studying ‘political culture’ used in fields such as anthropology, 
sociology and psychology. My use of the term is broadly inspired by what Richard Wilson calls ‘the 
hermeneutic or interpretive approach’ that focuses on the role of symbolic communication, rituals and 
collective myths. Richard W. Wilson, 'Review: The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assesing Different 
Approaches', World Politics 52, no. 2 (2000): 246–73, 249. This approach is adopted by David I. Kertzer, 
among others. Kertzer argues that political processes across all types of societies consist primarily of 
communication through rituals, which are defined as ‘actions wrapped in a web of symbolism’, instead of 
the use of direct force. As he states ‘Political rites are important in all societies, because political power 
relations are everywhere expressed and modified through symbolic means of communication’. David I. 
Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 178. 
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iii. Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 unfolds the immediate local context of the 711 protest as well as its historical 
context, specifically the recurrent cases where the Mamluk Sultans, from Muẓaffar al-
Dīn Quṭuz (d. 658/1260) to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (d. 741/1341), demanded war taxes 
from their Egyptian and Syrian subjects. The chapter then explores the 711 protesters’ 
use of symbolic objects in the context of early Islamic history, Damascene devotional 
cultural and official Mamluk ceremonial practices. The chapter also connects the 
symbolic communication of the protesters with the contemporary juridical discourses on 
taxation, justice and the extent of the sultan’s discretion in governing during war- and 
peacetime.  
Chapter 3 examines Taḥt al-Qalʿa and Sūq al-Khayl, the two spaces where the 711 
protest took place. Through a comparative historical analysis that traces the emergence 
of citadels and ‘citadel zones’ in Damascus, Aleppo and Cairo between the 6th/12th and 
8th/14th centuries, this chapter argues that the 711 protesters consciously chose to 
confront the governor in a space designed for first, Ayyubid and later Mamluk 
performances of military and punitive power. The chapter then discusses how protesting 
in this space can be interpreted as a symbolic gesture of criticism and dissent.  
Chapter 4 begins by analysing the objects carried by the protesters as symbolic 
references to the Umayyad Mosque and the special political culture tied to this space. It 
then expands its scope to encompass the leader of the protest, the khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī. The 
involvement of the khaṭīb is analysed as a symbolic reference to the mosque, as an 
expression of a socio-political agency connected to the office of khaṭīb and finally as 
one of al-Qazwīnī’s personal strategies for navigating the politics of high office in 
Damascus.  
Chapter 5 compares nine different accounts of the political events of the year 
711/1311 in Damascus and Syro-Egypt at large. The chapter compares how each author 
approaches the 711 protest and the wider political situation of that year. The results of 
this comparison are then evaluated in the context of the available biographical 
information about each of the respective authors as well as the general trends in their 
respective works.  
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II. Conceptual Background and Thematic Approaches 
i. Mamluk Studies beyond dynastic history, ‘Cairo centrism’ and Mamluk 
exceptionalism 
In chronological terms ‘Mamluk Period’ or ‘Mamluk Era’ denote the period between 
death of the last Ayyubid Sultan al-Malik al-Muʿaẓẓam Tūran Shāh in 648/1250 and the 
Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Syria in 922/1516–1517. In the period between these 
two events, Egypt and large parts of Syria3 formed a polity ruled by Cairo-based sultans 
who were either mamluks (freed military slaves of non-Arab primarily Turkic descent) 
or descendants of mamluks.4 The field of study dedicated to this time and place in history 
is known today as ‘Mamluk Studies’.  
This thesis is concerned first, with studying an event in Damascus in 711/1311 
approximately fifty years after the city came under the rule of the Mamluk sultans, and 
second, with related developments in the 7th/13th and the 8th/14th centuries. In terms of 
chronological and geographical focus, it is therefore firmly entrenched within the 
scholarly tradition of Mamluk Studies. But what does it mean to practice Mamluk 
Studies? For David Ayalon, one of the scholars who pioneered the field in the 1940s and 
50s, it meant first and foremost to study the Mamluks themselves and their institutions, 
especially the army.5 In recent decades, however, Mamluk Studies has evolved into a 
much broader discipline concerned with the full breadth of Syro-Egyptian history 
between the 7th/13th and 10th/16th centuries. By focusing on the interaction between 
provincial taxpayers and the Mamluk state, this thesis contributes to this general 
broadening of the field. More specifically, in terms of its scope and methods, it connects 
with three trends that characterise Mamluk Studies today. 
The first trend regards the shift in source material and methodology that 
accompanied the broadening of the field of Mamluk Studies. The gradual expansion 
                                                        
3 In Mamluk Studies ‘Syria’ refers to the geographical region which is also known as bilād al-shām and 
not the Syrian Arab Republic of the 20th and 21st centuries. See C. E. Bosworth, J. Lentin, and V. Perthes, 
'Al-Shām', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 9, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1997), 261–81, pp. 261-262. 
4 When studying this period, modern researchers have tended to distinguish between the period of the 
Baḥrī Mamluk sultans of Turkic descent, who ruled from 648/1250 to 784/1382, and the period of the 
Burjī Mamluk sultans of Circassian descent, who ruled between 784/1382 and 922/1517. As this thesis is 
not concerned with the details of this shift, it does not use the terms Baḥrī and Burjī, but rather ‘early 
Mamluk’ and ‘late Mamluk'. 
5 See e.g., David Ayalon, 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army I', Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies 15, no. 2 (1953): 203–228 + Pt. II (BSOAS 15, no. 3 (1953): 448-476)  and 
Pt. III (BSOAS 16, no. 1 (1954): 57-90); David Ayalon, 'The System of Payment in Mamluk Military 
Society', Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1, no. 1 (1957): 37–65; David Ayalon, 
'The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society (Concluded)', Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 1, no. 3 (1958): 257–96.  
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beyond dynastic or institutional history and the conversion of Mamluk Studies into a 
field that covers all available facets of life in the Mamluk polity also included the 
incorporation of new forms of sources that shed light on more than courtly and military 
life. The Egyptian annalistic chronicles that once dominated the field and perhaps 
prompted researchers to focus on lives of sultans and amirs, are today studied in 
conjunction both with chronicles of a more provincial nature as well as new types of 
textual sources, such as literary anthologies, chancery manuals, fatwa collections and 
biographical dictionaries. In addition to this, material sources such as art objects, 
architecture, coins and archaeological data are also frequently used. In terms of 
methodology, the field is marked today by a remarkable willingness to combine what 
Winslow W. Clifford has called ‘the traditional research methods based on philology, 
chronology and historiography’6 with methods from fields as diverse as economics, legal 
and political history, art history, historical anthropology, archaeology and comparative 
literature.7 
This thesis is bound firmly to the traditional source type of the field – historical 
narratives from chronicles and biographical dictionaries. However, most of them are 
from Damascus and concerned with local affairs. Moreover, these historical narratives 
are analysed here in the context of other types of written sources including fatwa-
literature, political treatises, topographical descriptions and chancery manuals. In 
addition to this, material sources including architecture, infrastructure and numismatics 
are drawn in by way of secondary literature. This combination of diverse source material 
is analysed through a methodological approach that combines economic, legal and 
political history with performance theory, urban geography, literary analysis and even 
palaeography.  
The second current trend in Mamluk studies that this thesis connects with regards 
the issue of geographical focus. An almost exclusive focus on Egypt and Cairo used to 
be a natural side effect of the focus on sultans and their courtly world. However, the 
gradual shift towards a broader societal focus and a broader source base has generated 
an increased awareness of regional differences and stimulated an effort to do away with 
‘Cairo centrism’. The number of scholarly works focusing on Syria in the Mamluk 
                                                        
6 Winslow W. Clifford, 'Ubi Sumus ? Mamluk History and Social Theory', Mamluk Studies Review 1, no. 
1 (1997): 45–62, 46. 
7 The potential of this interplay across disciplinary boundaries has been demonstrated over the course of 
the last two decades, e.g., in the articles of the journal Mamluk Studies Review published by the Middle 
East Documentation Center at the University of Chicago and the book series Mamluk Studies published 
by the Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg of the University of Bonn. 
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period is growing, although it is still relatively modest compared to works on Cairo and 
Egypt. In terms of monographs, Michael Chamberlain’s Knowledge and Social Power 
in Medieval Damascus from 1994 still stands out as a ground breaking exploration of 
the political and social world of Damascus. Within the field of historiographical studies, 
Li Guo’s Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography from 1998 and Konrad Hirschler’s 
Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors from 2006 demonstrate the 
importance of studying the rich chronicle tradition of 7th/13th and 8th/14th century Syria.8 
By focusing its attention around a specific event in Damascus and a set of sources 
dominated by Damascene authors, this thesis inscribes itself within this emerging 
subfield of Mamluk Studies focused on Syria and Damascus. However, because this 
focus should not be allowed to overshadow the very real cross-regional connectivity that 
dominated Damascene politics in the early 8th/14th century, a non-local perspective is 
also brought in at several points. A case in point is Chapter 5, which examines 
Damascene politics through both Damascene and Egyptian sources. This chapter shows 
that each set of sources promotes its own form of centrism (Damascene vs. Cairene) that 
can only be accounted for through cross-regional comparison.  
The third trend that informs the thesis is an increasing scepticism about the 
exceptionality of Syro-Egyptian history between 1250 and 1517 and of the utility of 
‘Mamluk’ as a distinct analytical category. Earlier in 2017, this form of scepticism found 
its expression in a collaborative volume from the Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg titled The 
Mamluk-Ottoman Transition – Continuity and Change in Egypt and Bilād al-Shām in 
the Sixteenth Century.9 The editors of this volume, Conermann and Şen, argue for the 
need to replace ‘The Mamluk Era’ with a broader research framework such as the 
‘Middle Islamic Period’, defined as the period between the 6th/12th and 11th/17th 
                                                        
8 Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Li Guo, Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography- Al-Yūnīnī’s Dhayl 
Mirʾāt Al-Zamān 2 Vols. (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 1998); Konrad Hirschler, Medieval Arabic 
Historiography: Authors as Actors (London: Routledge, 2006). Beyond the world of Anglophone 
academia, French research on Medieval Syria has existed for much of the 20th century. See, e.g., the works 
of Jean Sauvaget, or more recently Anne-Marie Eddé and Anne Troadec. In terms of joint research 
initiatives, the 2015 conference at the Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg ‘Between Saladin and Selim the Grim: 
Syria under Ayyubid and Mamluk Rule’ assembled scholars from across the globe who discussed the 
region of Syria under thematic headings such as religion, archaeology, economy and military history. 
https://www.mamluk.uni-bonn.de/mamluk-events/archive/conferences/conference-bilad-al-sham-july-
bonn.pdf (last accessed 20/06 2017). 
9 Stephan Conerman et al., The Mamluk-Ottoman Transition – Continuity and Change in Egypt and Bilād 
Al-Shām in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Stephan Conermann and Gül Şen (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 
2017). 
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centuries.10 As they explain, the ‘Middle Islamic Period’ makes it possible to study the 
Mamluk polity in the context of the pre- and succeeding polities and to study 
developments ‘for which the establishment or demise of Mamluk rule do not establish 
an absolute starting block or endpoint’.11 Conermann’s and Şen’s focus is the 10th/16th 
century, a century that saw the end of Mamluk and the beginning of Ottoman rule. They 
argue that such a non-dynastic framework shows this period as marked by protracted 
political and cultural transitions and partial continuities rather than a sharp divide tied 
specifically to 922/1517, the year of the Ottoman conquest.12  
We focus here on the beginning rather than the end of the Mamluk Era. However, 
as previous studies have pointed out, questioning the importance of dynastic divides is 
equally relevant for the Ayyubid–Mamluk transition in the 7th/13th century.13 In the 
present thesis the importance of the Ayyubid legacy for political culture in the Mamluk 
period will be highlighted when we turn to the issue of symbolic communication 
between ruler and ruled in urban space. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, the Mamluks did 
not invent ceremonial spaces such as the Sūq al-Khayl, where the 711 protest took place, 
nor did they design the military ceremonies that took place there ex nihilo. Rather than 
innovation, the Mamluk methods of asserting their power in the urban landscape were 
marked by intensification and adaptation of Zangid and Ayyubid practices that trace 
back to the 6th/12th century and are related to the emergence of the citadel as the primary 
locus of urban politics. Therefore, while the present study examines political culture 
during the early Mamluk period, it does not argue for the existence of a fully separate 
‘Mamluk political culture’.  
 
ii. Protests as political events: a framework for analysing the 711 protest 
This thesis applies what might be called a ‘bottom-up’ approach to politics and political 
culture. It starts with a protest in the streets of Damascus and gradually demonstrates 
                                                        
10 R. Stephen Humphreys uses a similar term, the ‘Islamic Middle Period’, but points to the fragmentation 
of the Abbasid Empire and the rise of the Buyid Sultans in the 4th/10th century as its beginning and the 
10th/16th century rise of the Ottomans and Safavids as its end. R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History: A 
Framework for Inquiry (London: I. B. Taurus, 2009), 129. 
11 Stephan Conermann and Gül Şen, 'Introduction: A Transitional Point of View', in The Mamluk-Ottoman 
Transition – Continuity and Change in Egypt and Bilād Al-Shām in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Stephan 
Conermann and Gül Şen (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2017), 13–30, 16.  
12 Ibid., 22. 
13 For example, Michael Chamberlain suggests that it was the horror associated with the imagining of 
Mamluk slave soldiers usurping power from the Ayyubid Dynasty that prompted 18 th century European 
historians like Edward Gibbon (d. 1794) to distinguish sharply between the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods. 
Chamberlain, 1994, 44. Chamberlain specifically avoids the conventional periodisation by focusing on 
the period 1191–1350, i.e., the Ayyubid and early Mamluk periods as a continuum. 
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how this event connects with the political situation and the forms of symbolic 
communication that characterised early Mamluk Damascus. At the core of this approach 
lies the argument that protests are complex and meaningful political events, not simply 
spontaneous and unconscious outbursts of collective rage. This argument is inspired by 
several previous studies of protesting in the Mamluk and Ottoman period that are 
presented here followed by an outline of my own approach.  
Since the 1980s, Edward P. Thompson’s theory of the ‘moral economy’ has been 
frequently used in this type of studies because it proposes a framework for analysing the 
ideas of protesters outside the paradigm of 20th century capitalism. Thompson, a 
historian of pre- and early modern England, argues that when city dwellers in 18th 
century England took to the streets to demand grain and resorted to pillaging mills and 
bakeries, they were not simply driven by empty bellies but rather by a set of ideas. These 
ideas, he argues, revolved around a paternalistic vision of the king’s moral responsibility 
to ensure a fairly priced food supply. To describe this set of ideas, Thompson coined the 
term ‘the moral economy’, which he defines as:  
[…] a traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper 
economic functions of several parties within the community, which taken 
together can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor […]14   
In his study of grain protests in Mamluk Cairo from 1980, Boaz Shoshan borrowed 
Thompson’s approach. Instead of regarding the protesters storming grain storages as 
hunger-crazed, he interprets their actions as popular appeals to a form of sultanic 
paternalism, that is, the manifestation of a popular claim about how food ought to be 
distributed.15 In 1986, Edmund Burke III also picked up Thompson’s concept. Extending 
the scope beyond subsistence policies, Burke describes what he calls ‘the social 
programme’ of 18th century Arab protesters as a sharia variation on ‘the moral economy’: 
a set of norms covering all socio-political aspects of pre-modern life from food to 
criminal punishment inspired by the sharia although not expressed in the legalistic 
discourse of fiqh.16 In this thesis, I have used Burke’s broader reconceptualisation of the 
‘moral economy’ to tackle the problem of how to connect the behaviour of the 711 
protesters with their own goals and broader sharia-based norms around military taxation.   
                                                        
14 Edward P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', Past & 
Present, no. 50 (1971): 76–136, 79. 
15  Boaz Shoshan, 'Grain Riots and the ‘Moral Economy’: Cairo, 1350–1517', The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 10, no. 3 (1980): 459–78. 
16 Edmund Burke III, 'Understanding Arab Protest Movements', Arab Studies Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 
333–345. 
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With specific regard to the question of protester behaviour, this thesis draws 
inspiration from a number of studies that focus more on the practical acts of protesting 
and less on its underlying ideological programme. Two scholars of specific importance 
here are James Grehan and Konrad Hirschler, both of whom have studied protesters’ use 
of violence as a form of symbolic communication. Both argue that pre-modern Arab 
protesters’ use of violence was primarily affirmative (or in Grehan’s terminology 
‘deferential’); by imitating official forms of violence (corporal punishment, execution) 
they criticised the ruler for not living up to his responsibilities but simultaneously 
affirmed his legitimacy. Hirschler, moreover, distinguishes between these affirmative 
acts of imitation and negating acts of transgression where violence beyond the normal 
official repertoire (burning, corpse-mutilation and desecration of graves) was employed 
with intent of showing direct opposition to the political order.17 
While the present study is primarily concerned with non-violent protesting 
practices such as parading and displaying sacred objects, the imitative aspect of these 
practices will be highlighted through comparisons with official Mamluk ceremonies that 
make use of some of the same symbols. Moreover, the distinction between affirmative 
and negating protests will be employed for instance when comparing the 711 protest 
with 8th/14th century examples of protest through violence and lynching.  
In addition, the thesis also draws on a number of studies that analyse protests in 
their broader political contexts. Here, Lutz Wiederholdt and Ibrahim Mahmood stand for 
out combining close observations of local violent protest with political developments at 
the imperial level.18 In a similar fashion, my thesis also contextualises the 711 protest 
within the larger framework of early Mamluk fiscal policies and intra-Mamluk power 
struggles in Damascus and beyond.  
To my knowledge, the only scholar who has gone beyond the article format and 
subjected the phenomenon of protesting in Mamluk Syro-Egypt to the form of 
multifaceted analysis possible in a monograph is Amina Elbendary. In Crowds and 
                                                        
17  James Grehan, 'Street Violence and Social Imagination in Late-Mamluk and Ottoman Damascus', 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 (2003): 215–236; Konrad Hirschler, 'Riten Der Gewalt: 
Protest Und Aufruhr in Kairo Und Damaskus (7./13. Bis 10./16. Jahrhundert)', in Islamwissenschaft Als 
Kulturwissenschaft; 1: Historische Anthropologie. Ansätze Und Möglichkeiten, ed. S. Conermann, S. and 
v. Hees (Schenefeld (Hamburg): EB-Verlag, 2007), 205–233. 
See also Fumihiko Hasebe, 'Invocations from the Tops of Minarets : A Popular Uprising and Its Aftermath 
in Ottoman Cairo, November 1724', Memoirs of the Toyo Bunko 63 (2005): 89–105. 
18 Lutz Wiederhold, 'Legal-Religious Elite , Temporal Authority , and the Caliphate in Mamluk Society : 
Conclusions Drawn from the Examination of a "Zahiri Revolt" in Damascus in 1386', International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 31, no. 2 (1999): 203–235; Mahmood Ibrahim, 'The 727 / 1327 Silk 
Weavers’ Rebellion in Alexandria : Religious Xenophobia , Homophobia, or Economic Grievances', 
Mamluk Studies Review 16, 2012, 123–142. 
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Sultans: Urban Protests Late Medieval Syria and Egypt from 2016, Elbendary presents 
an extensive examination of 9th/15th century Mamluk history in order to explain why 
urban protests multiplied over the course of this century. On the basis of an impressively 
wide-ranging yet focused analysis, she concludes that urban protesting grew in 
frequency because economic, political, social and cultural transformations since the late 
8th/14th century had created a more open political field. Elbendary dismisses the common 
association of the late Mamluk period with decline and crisis, and argues that the period 
should be understood instead as one of transformation and flux that put the sultanic 
system under pressure and allowed the non-elites to enter politics, for example, through 
protesting.19 
The force of Elbendary’s macro-analytical approach is that she is able to challenge 
a dominant paradigm in the study of late Mamluk history and make a persuasive call for 
understanding protests as a serious political practice, a call that this thesis heeds. 
However, the breadth of her conclusions comes at the expense of detail. While she refers 
recurrently to protesting as a form of negotiation, she never goes into detail about what 
protesters did and how they formulated their demands through symbolic 
communication.20  
In contrast, my thesis adopts a micro-analytical approach that focuses on one 
particular protest. While this precludes paradigmatic conclusions akin to those of 
Elbendary, it makes it possible to observe the relationship between ideas and aims of 
protesters as they translate into practical acts. Moreover, it makes enables us to analyse 
how the behaviour of protesters was linked to the broader ceremonial practices and 
symbolic forms that characterised the period in question.  
 
       The studies surveyed above have provided general inspiration for this thesis 
and some of them are discussed in detail the individual chapters. While I have not 
followed any one of their approaches to the letter, these studies, in conjunction with the 
                                                        
19 Amina A. Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protests in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria (Cairo: 
AUC Press, 2016). Elbendary’s explanatory model is far too wide-ranging to be adequately summarised 
here. In very general terms, she argues that the Mamluk sultans of the late 8th/14th and 9th/15th centuries 
responded to decreasing tax revenues caused by the plague and dwindling imports of precious metals 
caused by regional power shifts by selling state assets and leasing out state functions. While these tactics 
generated immediate income, they gradually destabilised the sultanate and gave way to a multipolar 
political field where negotiation through protest became an efficient political tool. 
20 In Chapter 6, Elbendary argues that protesters reacted in defense of a ‘perceived higher order’ or in 
response to state transgression of ‘thin lines’ or as a way of ‘policing the ruler’, but she generally does not 
explain exactly how this defence or policing translated into practice. See Ibid., Chapter 6. 
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results of my own research, constitute the basis for the formulation of the following four 
thematic strands that guide my thesis. 
The first thematic strand is political contingency. A protest is always a contingent 
political event that should be examined on two levels: as a geographically and temporally 
specific response to a particular set of circumstances and as part of a protracted struggle 
of ideas. This theme is primarily explored in Chapter 2.  
The second theme is multiplicity of symbolic meaning. While the behaviours of 
pre-modern protesters can easily be boiled down to a seemingly static inventory of 
actions, their acts carry dense layers of meaning that are tied to, among other things, 
contemporary religious practices, collective memory and symbolic stagings of rulership. 
Through examination and contextualisation of protesters’ behaviour, we can bring some 
these layers to light. This theme is explored in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
The third theme is complexity of agency. Even if a protest conforms to a wider 
pattern, e.g., ‘ʿulamāʾ at the front, commoners at the rear’21, its composition cannot be 
explained simply as a pre-configured pattern. To be sure, groups like the ʿulamāʾ did 
hold a particular intercessionary role across time, but the way they chose to play this role 
was contingent upon other factors such as their personal background and their position 
within a local socio-political field. This theme is explored in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The fourth and final theme is partiality of representation. Medieval Islamic 
protests are not accessible to the modern observer as empirical phenomena, but as 
narratives. This means that all conclusions about protesters’ behaviour agenda and 
results must be accompanied by detailed discussion of the lens(es) through which we 
observe them. This theme is explored in Chapter 5.  
Although by no means exhaustive, these four thematic strands constitute what I 
conceive of as an operational preliminary framework for studying medieval Islamic 
protests through the prism of narrative sources. However, as stated at the beginning of 
this section, examination of the 711 protest itself also provides the base for analysing 
politics and political culture from other and far broader perspectives, most importantly 
the relationship between state and society and historiography as socio-political practice. 
 
                                                        
21 ʿUlamāʾ leadership of protests, which we also find in the 711 protest, has been portrayed by some 
scholars as a more or less static pattern in pre-modern Middle Eastern protesting. See, e.g., André 
Raymond, Artisans et Commerçants Au Caire Au XVIIIe Siècle 2 Vols. (Damascus: Institut Francais de 
Damas, 1973), vol. 2, 432.  
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iii. Mamluk politics: from structure to practice 
One of the questions that has occupied scholars in Mamluk Studies since the birth of the 
field is how we should conceive of and study the relationship between the Mamluk 
sultanate and the society over which it ruled. Since it takes as its point of departure a 
confrontation between the Mamluk rulers and their Damascene subjects22 over taxation, 
one of the fundamental aspects of rulership, this thesis also constitutes an exploration of 
this relationship.23  
The study of the relationship between the Mamluks and their subject populations 
began in earnest with the work of Ira M. Lapidus in the 1960s. Lapidus studied the social 
and political life of major Mamluk cities and their rural hinterland through the lens of 
structural functionalism. His work presents a state-society model characterised by an 
equilibrium ensured through the steady cooperation between the Mamluk elite and the 
ʿulamāʾ.24  
In the 1990s, Lapidus’s former student Michael Chamberlain, who was also 
mentioned earlier, replaced his mentor’s macro-analytical focus on cohesive social 
groups and inter-group cooperation with a micro-analytical focus on individual actors 
and intra-group competition. Chamberlain, who draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s post-
structuralist sociology of social practice, demonstrates how the Damascene ʿulamāʾ 
consisted of household formations that would compete amongst each other for influence 
and resources rather than cooperate for the preservation of an overarching social 
equilibrium.25 
In the late 1990s, William W. Clifford argued for a balance between macro-visions 
of a social order built on shared values à la Lapidus and micro-visions of a social-field 
dominated by self-interested strategic actors à la Chamberlain. His proposed solution is 
a focus on symbolic communication. Using the example of George Herbert Mead’s 
theory of symbolic interactionism, Clifford argues that society essentially consists of 
                                                        
22 I must underline that when using expressions like ‘Damascene subjects’, ‘the Damascenes’ or ‘the 
civilian population of Damascus’, I am referring to Muslims unless otherwise indicated. Mamluk 
Damascus had a community of both Christians and Jews, but since almost all of the contemporary narrative 
sources on Damascus were written by Muslims, these communities remain largely invisible to the modern 
observer. 
23 Pierre Bourdieu et al. have conceptualised the state as a process of establishing a legitimate monopoly 
within four areas, one of which is taxation, which necessarily begins as a form of organised robbery. Pierre 
Bourdieu, Lois J. D. Wacqaunt and Samar Farage, 'Rethinking the State: Genisis and Structure of the 
Bureaucratic Field', Sociological Theory 12, no. 1 (1994): 1–18, 5–7. 
24 Ira M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 
1984). For a detailed discussion of the connection between Lapidus and the Talcott Parson’s structural 
functionalism, see Clifford, 1997, 46–57. 
25 Chamberlain, 1994. 
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‘gestural communication’ between different parties that only works because of mutual 
recognisability. In other words, even the strategic actor who participates in the ‘social 
game’ in order to fulfil his own personal agenda must do so through shared symbols that 
reference a higher social order.26 
Clifford strikes this balance in his own doctoral dissertation on the history of the 
early Mamluk sultanate. Focusing on the Mamluk military class, Clifford argues that the 
members of the Mamluk military class balanced their own personal interests with a 
corporate attachment to the principle of niẓām (literally ‘system’) – a shared moral code 
that demanded the distribution of state titles and resources according to seniority.27 
Clifford conceptualises the early Mamluk period as a series of contained struggles 
between adherents of niẓām and those who wished to upend this moral code. He argues 
that these struggles were contained because they took the form of communication 
through mutually interpretable gestures of symbolic violence (e.g., military theatrics or 
temporary exile) that prevented full-scale bloodshed.  
This thesis does not focus exclusively on intra-Mamluk power struggles, nor does 
it subscribe to the theories of G. H. Mead. However, it emphasises the role of symbolic 
communication and mutual recognisability of symbols in politics. In practical terms, it 
employs Charles Tilly’s concept of contentious repertoires to place the behaviour of the 
711 protesters within a wider register of recognisable symbolic gestures shared between 
the sultanate and civilian society.28  
Since the 1990s, the shift towards ‘politics as social practice’ has further 
intensified. One example is the work of Jo Van Steenbergen, who demonstrates how the 
political field in the middle decades of the 8th/14th century was dominated not by the 
legitimate power vested in the sultan but the effective power of competing amirs, who 
managed to extend their patronage beyond their immediate household and take control 
of the realm. The resulting constellations of power, he argues, only existed temporarily 
                                                        
26 Clifford, 1997, 61–62. 
27 Winslow W. Clifford, State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk Syro-Egypt, 648–741 
A.H/1250–1340 C.E., ed. S Conermann (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2013). The idea of an underlying 
system of ‘seniority’ had dominated Mamluk studies for decades in the form of the concept of generational 
khushdāshiyya (solidarity among former barrack comrades) and ustādhiyya (loyalty to the master). In State 
Formation, Clifford, who criticised this concept as ‘rigid and instituionalized’, decreases the emphasis on 
specific generational ties and argues that Mamluk Amirs were not lodged in an all-out generational war, 
but supported an overarching system of resource distribution. For a discussion of khushdāshiyya, see also 
Clifford, 1997, 55. 
28 Charles Tilly, 'Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834', Social Science History 17, no. 2 
(1993): 253–280. 
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until conflict arose and new patronage constellation formed. 29  In recent years, 
Steenbergen has moved from privileging effective networks of power over static state 
structures to asking whether the Mamluk state as structure existed at all. He argues that 
what appears to modern historians as an objective Mamluk state positioned vis-à-vis 
society is in fact a constellation of the structural effects of multiple social practices (e.g., 
social reproduction, elite integration and political distinction). While these practices give 
off the semblance of coherency and structure, Steenbergen argues that they should be 
understood as processes within a field of power relations that constantly fluctuate 
between uni- and multipolarity.30  
This thesis does use terms like Mamluk state and state resources. However, it 
maintains a constant focus on the performative and processual aspects of statehood rather 
than on static structures. Each chapter presents detailed examinations of how the state, 
understood as the amirs and sultans who controlled the military and bureaucratic 
systems, ‘performed’ their claim to power and statehood, for example, by developing 
and monopolising specific sections of Damascene urban space or by managing the 
content of the Friday sermon. A specific focus is placed on how these performances were 
received, and at times co-opted by the Damascene people, as happened during the 711 
protest, where the Monday inspection parade, a weekly recurring practice of marking the 
distinct identity of the Mamluk army, was interrupted.  
By combining attention to symbolic communication with continuous focus on the 
processual aspect of Mamluk politics, this thesis is part of a continuous emphasis on 
more complex and comprehensive models for understanding the Mamluk state and its 
relationship with subject populations like the inhabitants of Damascus.   
 
iv. Mamluk historians: from ‘transmitters’ to ‘actors’ 
Recent decades have also seen a significant change in the way modern scholars 
understand the practice of writing history in the Islamic Middle Period, hereunder the 
Mamluk period. This thesis is shaped by this change and seeks to add to our 
understanding of the nature of the work of medieval historians through the examination 
of a range of 8th/14th chronicles and biographical dictionaries.  
                                                        
29 Jo Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos: Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture 
(Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2006). 
30  Jo Van Steenbergen, '"Mamlukisation" between Social Theory and Social Practice: An Essay on 
Reflexivity, State Formation, and the Late Medieval Sultanate of Cairo', ASK Working Papers (Bonn, 
Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg, 2015). 
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In the 1950s, Franz Rosenthal described the chroniclers of the post-Abbasid period 
as mere ‘transmitters of facts’ in whose works researchers could not hope to find 
originality but merely redacted versions of earlier texts that could be identified through 
source-criticism. 31  Criticising Rosenthal’s rather pessimistic conclusion, Konrad 
Hirschler explains that Middle Islamic historiographical research from the late 1990s 
became increasingly marked by attention to the voice and agenda of medieval historians: 
This interest in the chronicler’s voice included an interest in how an authorial 
decision was made to organise events and of how to endow them with new 
meanings. The increased textual room for manoeuvre allowed the chroniclers 
to craft texts more individually and a comparison of works that report the 
same events in the Middle Period suffices to show how these authors used 
this room.’32 
Hirschler’s own monograph, Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors (2006), 
provides an illuminating example of this approach by comparing two accounts of the life 
of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193) written by two 7th/13th century Damascene 
chroniclers, Abū Shāmā al-Maqdisī (d. 665/1268/) and Ibn al-Wāṣil (697/1298). 
Hirschler concludes that these two authors crafted two different narratives that contain, 
respectively, a reformist and an accomodationist view of ideal rule. In other words, these 
authors were writing political philosophy in annalistic form.33 Hirschler is far from the 
only scholar to have challenged Rosenthal’s approach in the last decades. The attention 
to historiography as a narrative craft can be seen in studies by scholars such as Boaz 
Shoshan and Tayyeb Hibri, albeit they are both concerned with works from the Abbasid 
rather than the Ayyubid and Mamluk eras.34 
As for the treatment of Middle Islamic historiography as a form of political thought, 
another example is presented by Tarif Khalidi in his Arabic Historical Thought in the 
Classical Period (1994). In chapter 5, titled ‘History and Siyasa’, Khalidi launches a 
wider discussion of how the historiography of the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods reflects 
a divergence between sharia- and siyāsa-oriented historians.35 This divergence overlaps 
                                                        
31 Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952), 48–58. 
32 Konrad Hirschler, 'Studying Mamluk Historiography: From Source-Criticism to the Cultural Turn', in 
Ubi Sumus? Quo Vademus?: Mamluk Studies–State of the Art, ed. S. Conermann (Bonn: Bonn University 
Press, 2013).  
33 For the discussion of historiography as political thought see Hirschler, 2006, Chapter 6. 
34 Boaz Shoshan, The Poetics of Islamic Historiography: Deconstructing Tabari’s History (Leiden: Brill 
Academic Publishing, 2004); Tayeb El-Hibri, Parable and Politics in Early Islamic History: The Rashidun 
Caliphs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
35 Tarif Khalidi, Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). For this model, see 195. 
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somewhat with Hirschler’s distinction between reformism and accomodationism, but 
unlike Hirschler, Khalidi adopts a deductive approach focused on showing how each 
author fits in to the two pre-established categories of sharia- and siyāsa-oriented 
historiography. While this approach certainly makes it possible for Khalidi to include a 
greater number of authors and thus present a wider picture of the historiographical 
landscape of the 7th/13th–9th/15th centuries, it also prevents him from engaging with the 
individual author and his text in the detailed fashion which characterises Hirschler’s 
work. 
This thesis approaches the sources for the 711 protest and its broader political 
context primarily from the angles proposed by Hirschler and Khalidi, thereby adding 
further weight to the argument that studying the socio-political history of the Mamluk 
and other Medieval Islamic societies must include discussion of how historical events 
are turned into narrative, by whom and for what ends.  
 
III. The Sources of the Present Thesis 
As stated above, this study relies primarily on six accounts of the 711 protest drawn from 
8th/14th century narrative sources. This section introduces these sources and the authors, 
and also presents three sources that are used to contextualise the protest within the wider 
political landscape of 711/1311.  
Four of the six narratives of the 711 protest used here are written by members of 
what Li Guo calls ‘the Syrian school of medieval Muslim historical writing’36, which he 
claims existed between the first half of the 7th/13th and the second half of the 8th/14th 
centuries. Since the notion of a Syrian school itself is also discussed at length in this 
thesis, it is worth noting some general features about it before introducing the individual 
members.  
The chroniclers identified as part of this school were typically members of the 
Damascene branch of either the Shāfiʿī or Ḥanbalī law school. More importantly, they 
were all muḥaddithūn, scholars whose primary field of study was the science of ḥadīth. 
Their connection through ḥadīth studies was reinforced by personal connections and 
collaboration within the field of historical writing; thus we see these authors appearing 
as sources as well as compilers or editors of the works of their colleagues. Moreover, the 
collegial spirit was cultivated through book titles, as they often named their own works 
                                                        
36 Li Guo, Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography–Al-Yunīnī’s Dhayl Mir'āt Al-Zamān Vol. I & II (Leiden: 
Brill Academic Publishing, 1998), vol. 1, 83. Similarly, Stephen Humphreys calls it a ‘long-lived school 
of Damascene historians’. See Humphreys, 1991, 241. 
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as continuations (sing. dhayl, pl. dhuyūl) of the works of their predecessors, thus 
embedding in their works a sense of continuity across generations of scholars.  
From a formal perspective, this group of authors organised their works as 
variations on a shared model that combined the annalistic scheme of the classical tārīkh 
(e.g., al-Tabarī’s Tārīkh al-Rusūl wa-al-Mulūk) with the biographical scheme of a work 
of the ṭabaqāt genre (pl. of ṭabaqa – generation). In the works from the Syrian school, 
each year is typically divided into a ḥawādith (events) and a wafayāt (obituaries) 
section.37 This historiographical model was originally used by the 6th/12th century by 
Ḥanbalī jurist and muḥaddith, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Abū al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) 
in his universal history al-Muntaẓam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa-al-Ummam. The model was 
transferred to Syria by his maternal grandson Yūsuf ibn ʿAbd Allāh Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī (d. 
654/1256), a Ḥanbalī and later Ḥanafī scholar who moved from Baghdad to Damascus. 
Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī used his uncle’s organisational principle in his own universal chronicle 
Mirʾāt al-Zamān fī Tārīkh al-Aʿyān, which then became a model for later Damascene 
chroniclers.38 Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī is regarded as part of the first generation of the Syrian 
school, along with the Shāfiʿī muḥaddith Shihāb al-Dīn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ismāʿīl Abū 
Shāma al-Maqdisī (d. 665/1267). Two chronicles from Abū Shāma’s hand have come 
down to us: Kitāb al-Rawḍatayn fī Akhbār al-Dawlatayn al-Nūriyya wa-al-Ṣāliḥiyya, a 
chronicle of the lives and deeds of Nūr al-Dīn Zangī (d. 569/1174) and Salāḥ al-Dīn ibn 
Ayyūb (d. 589/1193), and al-Dhayl ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn, a diary-like chronicle of local 
events and scholarly life in Damascus running from 590/1194 to 665/1267. 
While both Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī’s and Abū Shāma’s works are used occasionally in 
the coming chapters, the main focus is placed on members of the 2nd and 3rd generation 
of the Syrian school.  
 
i. Al-Yūnīnī's Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān & al-Jazarī's Ḥawādith al-Zamān 
The source for the introductory description of the 711 protest presented in Section I is 
introduced here along with another chronicle because recent scholarship has shown the 
two to be directly connected. Since they are two of the most important sources for this 
thesis, the issue of their connectivity deserves to be addressed at length.  
                                                        
37 George Makdisi has argued that medieval muḥaddithūn wrote ‘research notes’ that recorded events and 
the deaths of scholars in order to control the validity of isnād (chains of transmission). According to 
Makdisi, some of these notes were transformed into what he calls ‘tāʾrīkh ʿalā al-sinīn’ – chronicles 
arranged by year where each year is divided into a separate ḥawādith and a wafayāt section. Makdisi, 
1986, 185. 
38 Guo, 1998 vol. 1, 83. 
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The chronicle titled Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān is ascribed to Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā ibn 
Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī (d. 726/1325-26). Al-Yūnīnī was a Ḥanbalī muḥaddith and 
chronicler who was born in Damascus in 640/1242 into a family of prominent Ḥanbalīs 
from the village of Yunīn near Baalbek in modern day Lebanon. Throughout his life, al-
Yūnīnī worked on an abridgement of Ṣibt Ibn Jawzī's Mirʾāt al-Zamān fī Tārīkh al-Aʿyān 
and hereafter wrote a continuation of it that became the Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān. Like its 
percursor, the Dhayl is an annalistic chronicle arranged according to the 
ḥawādith/wafayāt scheme. 
At the time of my research for this thesis, I did not have access to the combined 
edition of Ṣibt Ibn Jawzī's Mirʾāt al-Zamān and al-Yūnīnī's Dhayl that was published in 
Beirut in 2013. Therefore, I have relied on two earlier partial editions of the Dhayl. First, 
I consulted the Hyderabad edition from 1954, which covers the years 654/1256– 
670/1272.39 Since this edition does not cover the year 711, it is used primarily for short 
references and verification of information from other sources.  
The second edition of the Dhayl is, however, much more central to the thesis. It 
contains a text which has been regarded as the final part of al-Yūnīnī's Dhayl Mirʾāt al-
Zamān. It covers the years 697/1297–711/1312 and was published in Abu Dhabi in 2007  
under the title Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān: Tārīkh al-Sanawāt m1312–1297/ h711–697.40 
This edition of the Dhayl contains the longest and most detailed account of the tax 
conflict and protest in Damascus in 711/1311 that I have been able to identify. 
However, I subscribe to Li Guo’s theory that the authorship of the 691–702 and 
702–711 sections of the Dhayl is questionable at best.41 With regard to the 691–702 
section of the Dhayl, Guo argues that this part of the chronicle consists of a al-Yūnīnī’s 
synthesis of the corresponding section of the Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Anbāʾihi 
wa-Wafayāt al-Akābir wa-al-Aʿyān min Abnāʾihi, an annalistic chronicle covering the 
years 586/1191–738/1338 written by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Abū 
Bakr al-Jazarī (738/1338), a Shāfiʿī muḥaddith and chronicler who lived his whole life 
in Damascus. Two sections from al-Jazarī’s Ḥawādith that cover the years 689–699 and 
                                                        
39 Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān Min Sanat 654 Ilā Sanat 670 H, 
ed. N. N. (Hyderabad, 1954). 
40 Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān: Tārīkh al-Sanawāt m1312– 
1297/ h711– 697, ed. Ḥamza A. ʿAbbās (Abu Dhabi: Hayʾat Abū Ẓaby lil-Thaqāfa wa-al-Turāth, al-
Majmaʿ al-Thaqāfī, 2007). 
41 For Guo’s discussion of this issue, see Li Guo, Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography–Al-Yūnīnī’s Dhayl 
Mirʾāt Al-Zamān 2 Vols. (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 1998), vol. 1, 55–59 and Li Guo, 'Mamluk 
Historiographic Studies: The State of the Art', Mamluk Studies Review 1 (1997): 15–43, 38. 
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725–738 have come down to us. This thesis makes recurrent use of the combined edition 
of these sections published in Beirut in 1998.42   
As for the final section of the Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān, which covers the years 702–
711 and includes the lengthy description of the 711 protest, Guo argues that this section 
was almost certainly written by al-Jazarī without al-Yūnīnī’s involvement. Guo argues 
that this section of al-Jazarī’s work must have been mistakenly attributed to al-Yūnīnī 
after both authors had died. According to Guo, this mistake is most likely a result of the 
fact that they had the same editor and copyist, ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Qāsim al-Birzālī (d. 
738/1338). Al-Birzālī was a lifelong acquaintance of both authors, who also frequently 
cite him as a source. Moreover, according to Guo, he is the person who most likely 
supplied al-Yūnīnī with al-Jazarī’s draft for the 691–702 section. Guo suggests that al-
Birzālī might have confused the two manuscripts; either that, or a later scribe copying 
from al-Birzālī’s manuscripts could have made the mistake.43  
Guo’s conclusions about the Dhayl have been incorporated here in the following 
manner: Al-Jazarī is regarded as the author behind the 702–711 section of the Dhayl, 
including the narrative of the 711 protest; whenever the author of this section of the 
Dhayl is mentioned in the main text he therefore identified as ‘al-Jazarī*’. Meanwhile, 
the authorship of the 691–702 section of the Dhayl, which includes the lengthy 
description of the Mongol occupation of Damascus in 699–700/1299–1300, is regarded 
as shared between al-Yūnīnī and al-Jazarī, and the author is identified in the main text 
as ‘al-Yūnīnī/al-Jazarī’. In the footnotes, however, I refer to the Dhayl simply as ‘al-
Yūnīnī, Dhayl, x’, in keeping with the 2007 Abu Dhabi edition and in order to avoid 
confusion between the Dhayl and the 1998 Beirut edition of al-Jazarī’s Ḥawādith.  
 
ii. Al-Birzālī’s al-Muqtafī ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn  
Besides being the editor and copyist of the al-Yūnīnī and al-Jazarī, ʿAlam al-Dīn Qāsim 
al-Birzālī was a muḥaddith and a chronicler in his own right. As a historian, he had 
extensive influence and is quoted numerous times by contemporaries and successors in 
and outside Damascus; his colleagues call him both ‘the historian of the age’ and ‘the 
historian of Islam’.44  
                                                        
42 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Abū Bakr al-Jazarī, Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Anbāʾihi 
wa-Wafayāt al-Akābir wa-al-Aʿyān Min Abnāʾihi 3 Vols., ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Ṣaydā - 
Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1998). 
43 Guo, 1998, vol. 1, 58. 
44 See al-Dhahabī, Dhayl ʿalā tārīkh al-Islām, 449 and Guo, 1998 I, 78 n. 183. 
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Al-Birzālī began studying ḥadīth with his father as a child in the 670s/1270s. 
During much of his adult life, he held the chair of ḥadīth studies at the Dār al-Ḥadīth al-
Nūriyya and Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Nafīsiyya in Damascus.45 Although we know from other 
sources that he authored several works, the only one that has come down to us is al-
Muqtafī ʿalā kitāb al-Rawḍatayn, a chronicle of his own lifetime focused on Damascus, 
which is also referred to in Medieval sources as al-Muqtafī or Tārīkh al-Birzālī.46 It is in 
this work that we find al-Birzālī’s account of the 711 protest that is used throughout this 
thesis.  
Even though the title would have us believe that it is a continuation of Abū 
Shāma’s al-Rawḍatayn47, al-Muqtafī is in fact a continuation of Abū Shāma's other 
chronicle, the diary-like Dhayl ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn. Al-Birzālī states that he decided after 
having read and copied Abū Shāma's Dhayl to continue it by writing the al-Muqtafī.48 
The work thus begins with 665/1267, the year of Abū Shāma’s death and coincidentally 
also the year of al-Birzālī’s birth. It seems to have ended with 738/1338, the year of al-
Birzālī’s own death, although the 729–738/1329–1338 section has only survived in the 
form of qutations in other works.49 In thematic terms, the al-Muqtafī is similar to Abū 
Shāma's Dhayl: it is concerned with daily life in Damascus and the careers and deeds of 
Damascene scholars, not rulers. 
 
iii. Ibn Kathīr’s al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh 
Ismāʿīl Ibn ʿUmar Ibn Kathīr (d. 773/1373) was a Damascene Shāfiʿīte who authored 
numerous works on history, biographies, jurisprudence and theology. This thesis makes 
use of his universal history, al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh.50 This multi-volume 
work covers history from creation and ends with 772, two years before the author’s 
                                                        
45 ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad al-Nuʿaymī, al-Dāris fī Tārīkh al-Madāris 2 Vols., ed. Ibrahīm Shams 
al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d.),vol. 1, 83. 
46 ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Birzālī, Muqtafī ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn al-Maʿrūf Bi-
Tārīkh al-Birzālī 4 vols., ed. ʿUmar A. S. Tadmurī (Ṣaydā - Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 2006). 
47Muqtafī is derived from the root ‘q f w’ – to follow. Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 
ed. J. M. Cowan (New York: Spoken Language Services, 1994), 915. 
48 Muriel Rouabah, 'Une Édition Inattendue: Le Ta’rīkh D’al-Birzālī', Arabica 57, no. 2 (2010): 309–318, 
310. 
49 The printed edition of Tadmurī is based on two manuscripts from Istanbul and Leiden that cover the 
years 665/1268 through 720/1320. After this, Tadmurī inserts a short appendix consisting of Birzālī quotes 
from other works covering parts of the period 721–729/1321–1329. In this thesis, al-Birzālī's al-Muqtafī 
is used primarily as a source for the events of the year 711/1311; a thorough discussion of the section 720–
729/1320–1329 section is beyond the scope of this presentation. For Tadmurī’s explanation, see al-Birzālī, 
Muqtafī vol. 1, 121. See also Rouabah, 2010, 316. 
50 Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh 20 pts. in 11 Vols. 
(Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 2010). 
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death. The vast al-Bidāya contains several theological/ideological trajectories that have 
been mapped by modern scholars. This thesis is only concerned with the part of al-
Bidāya that covers the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries, where Ibn Kathīr maintains a 
continuous focus on event in Damascus and the deaths of his Damascene compatriots. 
In these sections, he draws on the earlier generations of the Syrian school, quoting from 
both Abū Shāma, al-Yūnīnī and al-Jazarī. His primary source, however, is al-Birzālī, 
whose work he quotes extensively when writing about the first four decades of the 
8th/14th century. Ibn Kathīr’s connection to al-Birzālī and his work was so strong that he 
even calls the 738–768/1338–1368 section of al-Bidāya a dhayl of al-Birzālī’s work.51 
As for the section of the al-Bidāya that overlaps with al-Birzālī’s al-Muqtafī (i.e., the 
years 665–738/1267–1338), Ibn Kathīr uses al-Birzālī’s work extensively with and 
without naming him as source. One example of this is Ibn Kathīr’s description of the 
711 protest that appears to be a slightly extended adaptation of al-Birzālī’s version.  
 
iv. Al-Dhahabī’s Dhayl al-ʿIbar  
Along with Ibn Kathīr, al-Dhahabī (d. 747/1347) can be regarded as the third generation 
of the muḥaddith chroniclers of the Syrian school. Al-Dhahabī worked for most of his 
life as the shaykh of ḥadīth studies at the Madrasa of Umm Sāliḥ in Damascus.52 As a 
historian, al-Dhahabī is most famous for his Tārīkh al-Islām wa-Wafayāt al-Mashāhīr 
wa-al-aʿlām, a history of Islam divided into ḥawādith and wafayāt starting with 
Muhammad and ending with the year 700/1299–1300. Al-Dhahabī later wrote a Dhayl 
for this work that ends in 750/1349–1350.53 However, this continuation consists almost 
exclusively of obituaries of Damascene scholars, which makes it largely irrelevant as a 
source for events. Therefore, this thesis makes only occasional use of Tārīkh al-Islām 
and the associated Dhayl for referencing, while another of al-Dhahabī’s works is used 
as a source for the 711 protest. The work in question is Dhayl al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man 
Ghabar – a short account of events and obituaries from the 1st half of the 8th/14th century 
which al-Dhahabī wrote as a continuation of his own works on broader Islamic history 
called al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar.54  
                                                        
51 See al-Bidāya vol. 8, Pt. 16, 285 and Mirza, 2012, 103–105. 
52 Mirza, 2012, 38. 
53 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Dhayl Tārīkh al-Islām Lil-Imām al-Ḥāfiẓ Shams al-
Dīn al-Dhahabī, ed. Māzen Bin Sālim Bāwazīr (Riyyad: Dār al-Mughnī lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 1998). 
Since al-Dhahabī died in 747/1347, this Dhayl must have been taken over by someone else at some point. 
54 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, 'Dhayl Al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar', in al-ʿIbar 
fī Khabar Man Ghabar + al-Dhuyūl (al-Dhahabī - al-Ḥusaynī) 4 Vols., ed. Abū Hājir Muḥammad al-Saʿīd 
b. Basyūnī Zaghlūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, 1985), vol. 4, 3–118. As the title of the book 
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Like the Tārīkh al-Islām, al-ʿIbar is composed of short ḥawādith and extensive 
wafayāt sections and also ends in 700/1299–1300.55 However, unlike the Dhayl Tārīkh 
al-Islām, the Dhayl al-ʿIbar includes both events and obituaries and covers the years 
700–740. The description of the 711 protest found in the Dhayl al-ʿIbar, like the one 
found in Ibn Kathīr’s al-Bidāya, appears to be an adapted version of al-Birzālī’s account 
from al-Muqtafī. 
 
v. Al-Sạfadī’s Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ wa-Aʿwān al-Nasṛ 
While the bureaucrat and litterateur Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Sạfadī (d. 1363/764) was 
connected with the Syrian school, we cannot strictly speaking consider him a member 
of it. Al-Sạfadī was born in the Syrian city of Safad and studied and worked in different 
cities in Syria and Egypt throughout his life. In his youth he studied with the ʿulamāʾ of 
Damascus, identified as a Shāfiʿīte and remained in contact with scholars such as al-
Birzālī and al-Dhahabī all his life. However, instead of becoming a professional scholar, 
he entered the ranks of the chancery clerks and worked in the chanceries of Safad, Cairo 
and Damascus.  
Al-Sạfadī’s literary ouvre is extensive – it spans several genres – but he is most 
famous for his biographical dictionaries. The first is al-Wāfī bil-Wafayāt, a work of some 
5500 entries spanning Islamic history from the Prophet Muḥammad until al-Sạfadī’s 
own day. The second is Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ wa-Aʿwān al-Nasṛ, a shorter work of 1800 entries 
focused solely on his contemporaries.56 The Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ constitutes a vast gallery of 
the personalities who dominated the first half of the 14th/8th century in the fields of 
scholarship, administration, war and politics. Moreover, his biographies are not simply 
repositories of biographical facts; each biography is a condensed literary narrative that 
includes vivid descriptions of situations in the life of the biographee. The entry from the 
Aʿyān used most extensively in this thesis is the biography of Governor Karāy, the man 
responsible for extracting the 711 tax. The biography includes a description of the 711 
protest that borrows from both al-Jazarī* and al-Birzālī.  
 
                                                        
suggests, there is more than one Dhayl of al-ʿIbar. In this edition, al-Dhahabī’s own Dhayl is followed by 
one written by a scholar named Abū Maḥāsin al-Ḥusaynī al-Dimashqī (d. 765/1365) that ends with the 
year 764. 
55 al-Dhahabī states that he wrote al-ʿIbar as an abridgement of the Tārīkh, but closer examination shows 
that al-ʿIbar contains information not found in the Tārīkh, and vice-versa. See al-Dhahabī, al-ʿIbar, vol. 
1, page marked ‘م’. 
56 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Sạfadī, Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ wa-Aʿwān al-Nasṛ 6 Vols., ed. ʿAlī Abū Zayd 
et al. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998). 
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vi. Al-Nuwayrī’s Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab  
Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Nuwayrī (d. 732/1332) came from a professional background 
similar to that of al-Ṣafaḍī. He was a bureaucrat who worked for the Mamluk treasury in 
different parts of Egypt and Syria. His last appointment was as nāẓir al-jaysh (inspector 
of the army, in practice the inspector of the distribution of fiefs to the army) in Tripoli, 
a post from which he retired in 716/1316 in order to dedicate his attention to writing.57 
Al-Nuwayrī authored a work called Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab, which includes 
a description of the 711 protest and other events in Damascus around that time.58 The 
Nihāya is not a chronicle in the ordinary sense but an encyclopedia containing 
knowledge that al-Nuwayrī deemed relevant to the learned bureaucrat. This knowledge 
is divided into five disciplines (funūn): cosmology, human biology, fauna, flora and 
history. In the section on history, which takes up far more space than the other four 
disciplines combined, al-Nuwayrī presents a dynastic history of the known world, ending 
with the history of the Mamluk Sultanate up to 721/1321.59 Unlike the authors of the 
Syrian school, al-Nuwayrī does not use the annalistic model or the ḥawādith/wafayāt 
scheme; instead, he arranges his narrative by event. Al-Nuwayrī was obviously 
acquainted with the works produced by the Syrian school; his account of the 711 protest 
draws heavily on the one provided by al-Jazarī*.  
 
Apart from the six authors whose accounts of the 711 protest are used throughout 
this thesis, we must note three additional authors who are all from Egypt and tied to the 
military and the court rather than to scholarly milieus or the bureaucracy. These authors 
do not provide any information about the 711 protest, but elaborate on the wider political 
context of the protest that is sometimes omitted, particularly in the Damascene sources. 
They are used primarily in Chapter 5.  
 
vii. Ibn al-Dawādārī’s Kanz al-Durar 
The first of these Egyptian chroniclers is Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Dawādārī (d. 
after 736/1336), who was the son of a Mamluk officer and himself a holder of a military 
                                                        
57 M. Chapoutot-Remadi, 'Al-Nuwayrī', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 8, ed. C. E. Bosworth 
et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 156–60. 
58 Shihāb al-Dīn Ahṃad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab 33 Pts. in 15 
Vols., ed. Najīb M. Fawwāz et al. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004). 
59 Chapoutot-Remadi, 1995, 158–159. 
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appointment. Ibn al-Dawādārī’s chronicle Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmiʿ al-Ghurar 60 covers 
the history of the central Islamic lands from the 4th/10th century, ending in 736/1336. 
This work is annalistically organised, but al-Dawādārī often disregards the division 
between two years for the sake of presenting a continuous narrative. In the context of 
this thesis, the most valuable aspect of Ibn al-Dawādārī’s chronicle is the fact that the 
author claims to have been stationed in Damascus along with his father from 710/1310. 
Therefore, he constitutes the only direct observer of the events pertaining to Sayf al-Dīn 
Karāy’s governorate and arrest apart from the local chroniclers affiliated with the Syrian 
school. 
 
viii. Baybars al-Manṣūrī’s Kitāb al-Tuḥfa al-Mulūkiyya Fi al-Dawla al-Turkiyya 
The next Egyptian whose chronicle is used is the Mamluk Amir Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 
725/1325). Baybars al-Manṣūrī was a high ranking Mamluk officer originally pertaining 
to the guard of the sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (d. 689/1290). He continued to hold 
military appointments in the army under the sucessors of his master. In 711/1311, al-
Manṣūrī was appointed to the office of viceroy of Egypt by the Sultan al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad; however, he was deposed from this post and incarcerated the following 
year due to .accusations of treason. Parallel to his military and political career, Baybars 
al-Manṣūrī had a keen interest in history; this thesis refers to his short chronicle of the 
Mamluk Empire ending in 711/1311, Kitāb al-Tuḥfa al-Mulūkiyya fī al-Dawla Al-
Turkiyya.61  The relevance of al-Manṣūrī’s work in the present context is primarily 
related to the fact that it contains a vivid description of the political situation in Cairo 
around 711/1311.  
 
xi. Al-ʿAynī’s ʿIqd al-Jumān/al-Yūsufī’s Nuzhat al-Nāẓir  
The last chronicle presented here is the work of the Ḥanafī jurist and chronicler Badr al-
Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 1453/855), ʿIqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān.62 Al-ʿAynī was born 
in northern Syria but settled in Cairo where he commanded several offices, including the 
                                                        
60 Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Dawādārī, Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmiʿ al-Ghurar 9 Vols., ed. Ulrich 
Haarmann (Cairo: Hans Robert Roemer, 1971). 
61 Baybars al-Manṣūrī, Kitāb al-Tuḥfa al-Mulūkiyya fī Al-Dawla Al-Turkiyya: Tārīkh Dawlat al-Mamālik 
al-Baḥriyya fī al-Fatra Min 648–711 Hijriyya, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Sạ̄lih ̣ Hạmdān (Cairo: al-Dār al-
Miṣriyya al-Lubnāniyya, 1987). 
62 Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān 5 Vols. (647–712 AH), 
ed. Muhạmmad Muhạmmad Amīn (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa-al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, 2010). 
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post of muḥtasib (market inspector) and Ḥanafī chief judge.63 While al-ʿAynī’s work is 
referenced occasionally throughout this thesis for corroboration of information from 
other sources, our primary interest in the ʿIqd relates to the fact that it gives us partial 
access to an earlier work: an early 8th/14th century chronicle of the rule of al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad, Nuzhat al-Nāẓir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir, which was written by an 
Egyptian officer in the auxiliary forces by the name of Mūsa Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā 
al-Yūsufī (d. after 755/1355). The Nuzha was circulated anonymously, most likely 
because it contained a scathing critique of al-Nāṣir.64 This critical approach makes the 
account of the events of 711/1311 in Nuzha an interesting alternative to the accounts of 
al-Manṣūrī and Ibn al-Dawādārī, both of which are very positive towards the sultan.  
The Nuzha is now lost, but 9th/15th century chroniclers such as Al-ʿAynī had access 
to it. Al-ʿAynī does not seem to have known the identity of the author behind the Nuzha, 
but when he cites it, and he does so extensively, he calls his source ṣāḥib kitāb sīrat al-
Nāṣir (the master of the biography of al-Nāṣir) ṣāḥib al-Nuzha (the master of the al-
Nuzha) or al-rāwī (the narrator). By collating the few surviving passages of al-Yusufi’s 
Nuzha with the corresponding sections of al-ʿAynī’s ʿ Iqd, Donald P. Little has concluded 
that all of these monikers refer to al-Yūsufī, and that al-ʿAynī’s has a habit of quoting 
long passages from him without introducing significant changes.65  
 
In addition to these nine sources, all of which are used extensively, this thesis 
makes occasional use of a long list of other primary sources spread over different genres, 
including chronicles, fatwa collections, political treatises, topographical works, 
chancery manuals and biographical dictionaries. Since each of these sources is used on 
a limited scale, they are introduced briefly as they are brought up in each
chapter.
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
63 William Marcais, 'Al-’Aynī', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 1, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al. 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), 790–91. 
64 Donald P. Little, 'The Recovery of a Lost Source for Bahri Mamluk History: Al-Yūsufīs Nuzhat Al-
Nāẓir Fi Sīrat Al-Malik Al-Nāṣir', Journal of the American Oriental Society 94, no. 1 (1974): 42–55.  
65Ibid., 43–44. 
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IV. Transliteration Table 
 
 
ا = ā / a 
 
ب = b 
 
ت = t 
 
ث = th 
 
ج = j 
 
ح = ḥ 
 
خ = kh 
 
د = d 
 
ذ = dh 
 
ر = r 
 
ز = z 
 
س = s 
 
ش = sh 
 
ص = ṣ 
 
ض = ḍ 
 
ط = ṭ 
 
ظ = ẓ 
 
ع = ʿ 
 
غ = gh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ف = f 
 
ق = q 
 
ك = k 
 
ل = l 
 
م = m 
 
ن = n 
 
ه = h 
 
و = ū / w 
 
ي = ī / y 
 
ى = ā 
 
ة = t (only in iḍāfa) 
 
ء = ʾ (excluded at beginning of 
word) 
 
 
Diphthongs:  
 
ي +   َ  = -ay 
 
و +   َ  = -aw 
 
 
Fem. nisba: 
 
ةّي = -iyya 
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Chapter 2 – The 711 protest: making sense of a Monday’s events 
I. Introduction 
The tax protest that took place in Sūq al-Khayl on the 13th of Jumādā I 711/27th of 
September 1311 stands out as one of the best described processes of negotiation between 
a ruling figure and a large group of civilians in Damascus during 7th/13th and 8th/14th 
centuries. In fact, it is the only regular protest march in the city during this period that is 
described in more than a few lines and by more than one or two chroniclers. Thanks to 
the accounts of al-Jazarī* (d. 738/1338), al-Birzālī (738/1338), al-Dhahabī (d. 
748/1349), Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373), al-Nuwayrī (733/1333) and al-Ṣafadī (d. 
764/1364), which were presented in the previous chapter, this case provides us with an 
exceptional opportunity to explore the practical negotiations between civilians and their 
rulers, including their use of symbolic communication.66 This is, in short, what we will 
do in the present chapter: We begin with a close examination of the protest in its 
immediate local context, we analyse and interpret the protesters’ use of symbolic objects 
and we then contextualise the protest within the wider history of early Mamluk taxation. 
The 711 protest has attracted a few scattered references in the scholarly literature 
to date.67 Most of these references have focused on the three symbolic objects wielded 
                                                        
66 Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī*, Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān: Tārīkh al-Sanawāt m1312– 
1297/ h711–697, ed. Ḥamza A. ʿAbbās (Abu Dhabi: Hayʾat Abū Ẓaby lil-Thaqāfa wa-al-Turāth, al-
Majmaʿ al-Thaqāfī, 2007), 143–1440; ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Birzālī, 
Muqtafī ʿ alā al-Rawḍatayn al-Maʿrūf bi-Tārīkh al-Birzālī 4 Vols., ed. ʿ Umar A. S. Tadmurī (Ṣaydā - Beirut: 
al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 2006) vol. 4, 21; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, 'Dhayl al-
ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar', in al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar + al-Dhuyūl (al-Dhahabī - al-Ḥusaynī) 
4 Vols., ed. Abū Hājir Muḥammad al-Saʿīd b. Basyūnī Zaghlūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1985), 
vol. 4, 3–118; Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh 20 pts. in 
11 Vols., (Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 2010), vol. 8 pt. 16, 88; Shihāb al-Dīn Ahṃad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab 33 pts. in 15 Vols., ed. Najīb M. Fawwāz and Hikmat K. 
Fawwāz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), vol. 15 pt. 32, 136–139; Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Aybak 
al-Sạfadī, Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ wa-Aʿwān al-Nasṛ 6 Vols., ed. ʿ Alī Abū Zayd et al. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), 
vol 4, 150–155. 
*As explained in Chapter 1, I subscribe to Li Guo’s theory that the 697–702 section of the Dhayl Mirʾāt 
al-Zamān is al-Yūnīnī’s synthesis of al-Jazarī’s chronicle entries for this period, while the 702–711 section 
of the Dhayl is written by al-Jazarī* and misidentified by a later copyist as belonging to the Dhayl. In the 
maintext, I identify the author of the 697–702 section as al-Yūnīnī/al-Jazarī, while the author of the 702–
711 section is identified as al-Jazarī*. In footnotes, the Dhayl is referred to as al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, x in 
keeping with the Abu Dhabi edition from 2007. See above, 25–27. 
67 The case is briefly mentioned in Seeger A. Bonebakker’s article on al-Qazwīnī in the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam. See Seeger A. Bonebakker, 'Al-Kazwīnī', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 4, ed. E. van 
Donzel et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 863–864. The case is also described briefly in the following 
articles: Henri Laoust, ‘La Biographie dʿIbn Taimiya Dʿapres Ibn Katir’, Bulletin Dʿétudes Orientales 9 
(1942): 115–62; Joseph W. Meri, 'Relics of Piety and Power in Medieval Islam', Past & Present, no. 
Supplement 5 (2010): 97–120. 
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in the protest without any serious treatment of the economic and political aspect of the 
case. For instance, Josef Meri briefly describes the protest as an example of how the 
Sandal of the Prophet and the Qurʾān of ‛Uthmān were wielded as symbols ‘in the fight 
against injustice and oppression’.68 I generally agree with Meri’s point, but this chapter 
makes clear that the protest in which these symbolic objects were wielded was not simply 
against an arbitrary and individual act of abuse.  
First, I argue that the protest needs to be understood as a part of local politics, and 
that when placed in its proper context, it can shed light on how power relations were 
negotiated in 8th/14th century Damascus. Second, I argue that the lack of parallel cases 
of protest in early Mamluk Damascus does not mean that the 711 protest was an isolated 
event. In fact, it was connected to a longer and more intricate series of tax conflicts 
between the Mamluk sultans and their subjects that had flared up at several points during 
the preceding 50 years, but apparently without developing into protests before we reach 
711/1311. These were essentially conflicts about how to finance the Mamluk Sultans’ 
wars against the Mongol Ilkhāns of Iraq and Persia and their regional allies. The risk of 
open hostility between the two neighbours was more or less permanent between the 
Mongol invasion of Syria in 658/1260 and the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (d. 741/1341) and the Ilkhān Abū Saʿīd (d. 
736/1335) in the 720s/1320s.69 Between these two points in time, the need for money to 
fight campaigns created a recurrent cycle of imposition–resistance–abolishment–and re-
imposition of war taxes. 
The first precursor to the 711 tax conflict presented in this chapter is the tax 
campaign in Egypt in 658/1259–1260 conducted by sultan Muẓaffar al-Dīn Quṭuz (d. 
658/1260). In this year, the Ilkhān Hülegü (d. 663/1265) launched an invasion of Syria 
and succeded in conquering both Aleppo and Damascus. Quṭuz’s tax was intended to 
finance the Egyptian army that eventually defeated Hülegü’s forces at the battle of ʿAyn 
al-Jalūt in the early fall of 658/1260.  
The second precursor is Sultan al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars’s (d. 676/1277) tax 
campaigns in Egypt and Syria during the 670s/1270s. Specific focus is placed on a tax 
claim imposed on Damascus in 675/1276–77 that was intended to finance the sultan’s 
military campaign against the Christian kingdom of Armenian Cilicia.  
                                                        
68 Meri, 2010, 111. 
69 For a detailed examination of this relationship, see Anne F. Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology in the 
Islamic and Mongol Worlds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chapter 4. 
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The third precursor is the tax campaign initiated by the generals of the adolescent 
sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in 699–700/1300 called Muqarrar al-Khiyāla (the Cavalry 
Tax). In the winter of 699/1299, a new Mongol invasion of Syria was launched by the 
Ilkhān Ghazān (d. 704-1304). Ghazān initially succeeded in defeating the Mamluk 
armies, and as they fled to Egypt, the Mongols took Damascus. The Muqarrar al-Khiyāla 
was imposed in Egypt after this defeat in order to finance the reconquest of Syria. In the 
late summer of 700/1300, once Syria had been brought back under Mamluk rule, a new 
version of the tax was imposed in Damascus. This time the purpose was financing a local 
cavalry force charged with preventing the Mongols from retaking the city.  
However, before we get to these historical precursors, we begin by examining the 
711 protest in its wider local political context. As we saw in Chapter 1, Amina Elbendary 
has argued that protesting was an integral part of politics in Mamluk urban centres during 
in the 9th/15th century. Elbendary underlines what she sees as the three primary 
characteristics of this practice.70 First, protests were premeditated, and protesters acted 
rationally by adopting repertoires of action designed to optimise impact, for example, by 
choosing the right time and place. Second, protesting was simply one among many tools 
of negotiation (intercession, long-distance diplomacy, etc.) that were combined 
strategically according to the demands of the situation. Third, protests did not erupt ex 
nihilo, but relied on pre-existing urban social networks instead of fixed institutions such 
as guilds. 71  In this chapter’s initial discussion, I follow Elbendary’s example and 
contextualise the 711 protest with the economic challenges that the Damascenes faced 
in this particular year and the other negotiating strategies through which they responded. 
I also demonstrate that a protest must be examined not simply as a strategic response to 
an immediate political problem, but also as an act related to a wider political culture. By 
this I mean that the protesters responded to the specific economic grievance through acts 
of symbolic communication, specifically, the presentation of important local relics and 
banners.  
In order to make the connection between the tax conflict and the wielding of these 
objects, it is helpful to look to Charles Tilly’s concept of reading protests as contentious 
performances. Tilly’s field of study was collective political action such as protest 
marches, coordinated public violence and demonstrations. In his studies of the ways 
                                                        
70 Amina A. Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protests in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria (Cairo: 
AUC Press, 2016), 125–126. 
71 Ibid. See Chapter 5, especially 127–131. 
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people, primarily English crowds in the 18th and 19th centuries, voiced their claims 
through collective action, Tilly observed that people involved in collective action revert 
to more or less defined sets of limited behaviours such as the wielding of special 
symbols, the chanting of specific slogans and so forth. To describe these sets of 
behaviours, Tilly coined the term repertoires of contention, which he defines as ‘the 
established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each 
other’s interests’.72 With regard to the 711 tax conflict, the contention clearly consists of 
the fiscal claim on the Damascenes as well as their resistance to it. But what of the 
repertoire? Tilly understands this term as the practices that make up collective action 
within a given time and place: ‘The word repertoire identifies a limited set of routines 
that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice’.73 
In this chapter, the term repertoire is used to examine the Qurʾān, the sandal and the 
banners that the protesters used. With Tilly, I argue that the protesters chose this 
particular set of objects because they were already endowed with connotations of local 
identity, hierarchies of power and political legitimacy.  
I then examine the potential connections between the ‘message’ of the 711 protest 
and the broader conflict about war taxes. Some scholars of Mamluk economic history 
have been acutely aware of the recurrent pattern of taxation intended to cover immediate 
defense expenditure. For example, we can point to David Ayalon’s work on Mamluk 
army finances, as well as the work of Subhi Labib and Hassanein Rabie on the Mamluk 
economy in general.74 These works, however, are mostly focused on the structure of the 
military economic system and do not provide detailed examinations of the discourses 
which surrounded taxes. The third section of this chapter approaches the taxation pattern 
identified by Ayalon, Labib and Rabie from a philosophical and legal angle, examining 
the strategies of legitimisation through which Mamluk rulers sought to ratify their tax 
policies and the counter-arguments presented by Islamic jurists (faqīh pl. fuqahāʾ). On 
this background, I argue that not only was the 711 tax part of a broader pattern, the 
display of symbolic objects that characterised the 711 protest can be understood as a 
                                                        
72 Charles Tilly, 'Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834', Social Science History 17, no. 2 
(1993): 253–280, 265. 
73 Ibid., 264. 
74 E.g., David Ayalon, 'The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society', Journal of Economic an 
Social History of the Orient 1, no. 1 (1957): 37–65; Subhi Y. Labib, Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens Im 
Spätmittelalter (1171–1517) (Wiesbaden: Frantz Steiner Verlag, 1965), 248; Hassanein Rabie, The 
Financial System of Egypt A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 117–
118. 
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symbolic extension of this ongoing and protracted discussion about taxation, legitimate 
rule and justice. 
 
II. The 711 Tax – Negotiating Sultanic Demands in Damascus 
The 711 protest occurred one and a half years into the third reign of Sultan al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad, who would continue to rule until his death in 741/1341. Since the 
contextualisation of the protest within both the local and regional political contexts 
touches upon developments related to the political life of al-Nāṣir, a brief summary is in 
order.  
During his first and shortest reign in 693–694/1294, al-Nāṣir had been an eight-
year old child under the guardianship and control of the Manṣūriyya corps, the former 
Mamluks of his father, Sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (d. 689/1290). After less than a year 
one of the leading amirs around the child sultan, Sayf al-Dīn Kitbughā (d. 702/1302) 
took over the sultanate. Kitbughā remained in power until 696/1296 when he was driven 
off the throne and replaced by Ḥusām al-Dīn Lājīn (d. 698/1299).  
Al-Nāṣir’s second rule lasted from 699/1299 until 708/1309. During this time, the 
adolescent sultan was still under the guardianship of two Manṣūrī amirs, Sayf al-Dīn 
Salār (d. 710/1310) and Baybars al-Jāshankīr (d. 709/1310). In 708/1309, al-Nāṣir 
abdicated, left the throne to al-Jāshankīr and went into exile at Karak, Jordan. Ten 
months later, in 709/1310, al-Nāṣir left his exile and returned to Cairo to reclaim the 
throne. During his return journey through Syria and Egypt, more and more leading 
Manṣūrī amirs came out in support of him. When al-Nāṣir reclaimed the throne from al-
Jāshankīr, the amirs who had shown him their support were rewarded with high posts 
such as governorships in Syria.  
One of the amirs who had supported al-Nāṣir was the antagonist of the 711 
protesters, Sayf al-Dīn Karāy al-Manṣūrī (d. 719/1319). Karāy had previously served as 
the governor of Safad, but in 709/1310 he was living in Jerusalem. When al-Nāṣir left 
his exile, Karāy offered him his assistance and was charged with conquering and holding 
Gaza to aid the advance on Cairo. After al-Nāṣir’s return to the throne, Karāy was given 
various military assignments in Syria until he was appointed as the governor of 
Damascus in the spring of 711/1311.  
The rest of this section determines what form of tax Karāy attempted to impose on 
the Damascenes in the fall of 711/1311 and how it was negotiated before and after the 
protest. It shows that the 711 protest was part of a wider process of negotiation rather 
 40 
than a spontaneous outburst of popular frustration. The section also includes a proposed 
typology for dealing with Mamluk taxes that allows us to proceed to a comparison 
between the 711 tax and earlier taxes.  
 
i. What kind of tax was imposed in 711/1311? 
The only author who informs us about the motive behind the tax is al-Nuwayrī, who 
writes that Sultan al-Nāṣir decided to augment the cavalry forces of Damascus in the late 
summer of 711/1311 upon receiving reports of renewed Ilkhānite troop movements.75 
Extraordinary taxes imposed in preparation for a military campaign was a recurrent 
feature of Mamluk rule. As David Ayalon explains, launching campaigns required the 
payment of nafaqa, a field-bonus to pay for equipment and provisions that were not 
covered by the annual salary soldiers received through the system of iqṭāʿ’s (fiefs).76  
The Damascene sources do not comment on the background for the tax claim of 
711/1311, but both al-Jazarī* and al-Birzālī note that a sultanic decree (marsūm) 
demanding a sizeable expansion of the local garrison reached Damascus on the 10th of 
Rabīʿ II 711/26th of July 1311.77 Al-Jazarī*’s version of this decree contains instructions 
for each Mamluk amir who commanded between ten and one hundred horsemen (fāris 
pl. fawāris/fursān) to double the troops under his command.78 Meanwhile, the civilian 
population of Syria is instructed to provide mares (khiyyal al-hijjar) for the army.79  
Because this mare-claim is not mentioned by any other sources and is not repeated 
in al-Jazarī*’s account, it is unclear whether it was in fact included in the complaint 
lodged by the protesters. Instead, we get the clear impression that the claim that fueled 
the protest was a claim of funds to pay for 1500 horsemen. Except for this number, none 
of the sources specify exactly what the tax was supposed to fund, but al-Birzālī does 
mention that the amount raised for each horseman was 500 dirhams, which brings the 
total claim to 750.000 dirhams.80  
                                                        
75 al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 136. 
76 Ayalon, 1957, 56–59. 
77 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21; al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1431. 
78 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1431 ‘[…] inna kull amīr maʿhu min mīʾat fāris ilā ʿashara yastakhdim ʿ alā khāṣatihi 
bi-mithla mā kān maʿhu min al-ajnād’. 
79 Ibid., 1431 ‘[…] an yaṭlub min ahl Dimashq wa-min barrahā wa-bilād al-shām khiyyal al-hijjar […]’. 
See the almost identical description in al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 180. 
80 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21. Al-Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr quote the same amounts but without 
specification. See al-Dhahabī, ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 27 and Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 80. 
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The portions of 500 dirhams per horseman indicate that the tax was not supposed 
to cover full salaries,81 but nafaqa, the field-bonus described by Ayalon. Referring to the 
work of Ayalon, Rabie states that the typical nafaqa distributed in the 8th/14th century 
ranged between 1–3.000 dinars for the most prominent Mamluk amirs to 1.000 dirhams 
for officers of the ḥalqa (non-Mamluk auxiliary forces).82 A sum of 500 dirhams per 
man would suggest that the 1500 horsemen were low-ranking troops of the ḥalqa who 
would be mobilised in order to defend Syria against the suspected Ilkhānite attack. We 
lack precise economic data to determine exactly how much value the sum of 750.000 
dirhams represented in Damascus in 711/1311. However, the comparison with earlier 
tax claims shows that the tax was significantly higher than the most recent example, a 
tax of 480.000 dirhams that was imposed in 700/1300. Moreover, regardless of how 
heavy the burden was in economic terms, the process of negotiating the tax shows that 
the Damascenes clearly felt that both the tax and the manner in which it was imposed 
were oppressive.  
 
ii. Negotiations and collection attempts prior to the protest 
Al-Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr, al-Dhahabī and al-Nuwayrī simply mention the claim of 1500 
horsemen and proceed straight to descriptions of the protest. Al-Jazarī*, however, gives 
us a more detailed view of the preceding negotiations.83 According to his account, the 
governor convened the local elites (al-akabīr wa-al-ruʾasāʾ) to a meeting at the Madrasat 
Ibn Manjā on the 1st of Jumādā I/14th of September, roughly six weeks after the decree 
arrived in Damascus.84 This meeting lasted a full day and included the discussion of a 
sub-claim on 300 people from among the assembled elites. The sub-claim demanded that 
this group pay for 800 out of the 1500 horsemen.85 No agreement was reached during 
the meeting; instead, the assembled would-be taxpayers asked the governor to expand 
the tax base so as to lessen the burden on each individual. Al-Jazarī* gives an account 
of a two-stage expansion: First, the governor allowed the tax to be expanded to include 
                                                        
81 According to the numbers provided by Sato Tsugitaka, the annual salaries of even the low-ranking 
auxiliary troops at the beginning of the 8th/14th century ranged between 10–20.000 dirhams. See Sato 
Tsugitaka, State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam – Sultans, Muqta’s and Fallahun (Leiden: Brill 
Academic Publishing, 1997), 133. 
82 Rabie, 1972, 34. 
83  The different ways in which the authors choose to frame the protest vis-à-vis the preceding and 
succeeding negotiations is not examined in this chapter; below in Chapter 5 I deal explicitly with questions 
of framing and authorial agency.  
84 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1434. 
85 Ibid., 1434. See also al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 136. 
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the markets of Damascus, which was agreed to during a meeting at the al-Madrasa al-
Qulayjiyya on the 5th of Jumādā I/18th of September. Hereafter, the markets remained 
closed for two days while the collectors of the treasury (al-maḥāzim min bayt al-māl) 
made their rounds.  
However, even with the inclusion of the markets, the collectors still came up short. 
On the 8th of Jumādā I/22nd of September, a second expansion was declared that ordered 
taxes imposed on all real estate in Damascus, including the awqāf (pl. of waqf, or pious 
endowment). The properties were taxed through a method known as taṣqīʿ, which 
consisted of demanding a sum for each property calculated on the basis of the rent that 
it brought in.86 Employees from the treasury and the office of the chief judge (qāḍī al-
quḍāt) as well as the secretaries of the wālī (prefect) began registering all properties and 
rents (al-amlāk wa-kirāʾātihā) quarter-by-quarter.87  
It seems to have been this particular shift towards a universal tax on property that 
provoked the protest procession on the following Monday. Moreover, we can speculate 
that the taxation of the property of the awqāf in particular was an important mobilising 
factor.  
The term waqf/awqāf refers to the traditional Islamic pious foundations through 
which a legally capable person donates part of his or her estate either to his or her 
descendants (waqf ahlī) or to a public purpose (waqf khayrī). The latter category could 
range from building and financing madrasas to feeding the poor. The amounts charged 
on the properties of Damascus are not quoted, but according to al-Jazarī*, one of the 
complaints presented to Karāy during the protest came from a group of blind 
beneficiaries of a waqf that had been charged a sum equivalent to four months’ rent.88  
           In principle, awqāf were beyond the reach of the state treasury, and taxation or 
confiscation of waqf funds was considered illegal according to sharia law.89 However, 
state violations of the awqāf were common occasions for demonstrations and even riots 
in pre-modern Middle Eastern societies. According to Miriam Hoexter, these riots were 
motivated not only by economic grievances that befell those who subsisted on waqf 
funds, but also by the fact that infractions on the sanctity of the awqāf were seen as a 
                                                        
86 Rabie, 1972, 107. See also al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 136. 
87 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435. 
88 Ibid., 1435. 
89 Rudolph Peters, 'Wakf I', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 11, ed. P. J. Bearman et al. (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 2002), 59–63. 
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violation of one of the basic principles of good rulership.90 Given this background, it 
seems reasonable to suspect that Karāy’s decision to tax the awqāf produced a similar 
mix of economic grievances, and that moral outrage was at least one of the factors that 
caused the Damascenes to lose their patience and decide to march on Sūq al-Khayl.  
 
iii. The aftermath of the 711 protest 
According to Jazarī*, a second round of negotiations took place four days after the 
protest, on 17 Jumādā I/Friday the 1st of October. On this day, the governor was sought 
out by the Sufi shaykh, ʿAlī Ibn ʿAlī al-Ḥarīrī (d. 715/1315), who made a slightly veiled 
threat that the protest led by al-Qazwīnī might not be the last display of malcontent that 
the governor should expect: 
 He [al-Ḥarīrī] talked to him [Karāy] about the situation of the people of 
Damascus and about easing the claim on them and among other things he 
said: I love the House of Qalāwūn and I don’t want anyone to curse them (an 
yadʿū ʿalayhim), and he exerted himself in speech (bālagha fī al-qawl).91 
While covering his own bases with a statement of loyalty, al-Ḥarīrī seems to have 
suggested that the governor should change his fiscal policy lest he end up with a general 
uprising against the sultan on his hands. At this point, it should be noted that this shaykh 
was one of the leaders of the Ḥarīriyya Sufi order, which had been founded by his father 
ʿAlī al-Ḥarīrī (d. 645/1248) in the first half of the 7th/13th century.92 The biographers of 
al-Ḥarīrī the younger describe him as a man who was famous and revered among the 
people (mashhūran, mukarraman ʿinda al-nās) and respected by members of the state 
establishment (lahu ḥurma ʿinda al-dawla).93 The shaykh could have spoken to Karāy 
as someone who enjoyed the respect of the Mamluk establishment, or he could have 
been threatening the governor with renewed protest and disorder staged by the Ḥarīriyya 
of Damascus and their sympathisers amongst the common population. In any case, the 
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words of the shaykh apparently had some effect on the governor, who, according to al-
Jazarī*, answered by exculpating himself in the affair of the tax: 
I am not to blame, they told me that the claim was 700 horsemen and the 
decree that reached me instructed me to double what had been stipulated 
[…].94  
At this point, the amir Sayf al-Dīn Ṭūghān al-Manṣūrī (d. 724/1324), who was the shadd 
al-Dawāwīn (military head of the treasury)95, interrupted and argued that he used to 
collect funds for only 200 horsemen from Damascus: 
In the time of the martyred sultan, I extracted from the city 200 horsemen and 
from its hinterland 300, in the period where I held the two wālīships (al-
wilāyatayn) […].96  
According to al-Birzālī, Ṭūghān was appointed as wālī of Damascus proper by Sultan 
al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn in 683/1284 at the same time as he was relieved from the office of 
wālī al-birr (prefect of the hinterland).97 This suggests that a tax of funds for 200 
horsemen existed in the early 680s/1280s. While I have not been able to find any further 
references to the tax-collection activity of Ṭūghān, the chronicles suggest that nafaqa-
taxes of the same type as the 711 tax had been imposed in both Syria and Egypt in the 
preceding decades. The connection between these cases will be explored in the final 
section of this chapter.  
Upon hearing Ṭūghān’s statement, Karāy invited representatives of the city to 
another meeting where he promised to lower the number from 1500 to 400 horsemen 
(i.e., double the claim described by Ṭūghān).98 The readjustment of the tax, which was 
agreed upon on Friday afternoon, seems also to have included a return to the original 
tax base consisting of the fortunes of the Damascene elites. Al-Jazarī* describes how 
between the 20th and 23rd of Jumādā I/7th and 10th of October, a group of local elites 
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were detained at the al-Madrasa al-Qulayjiyya under the obligation to agree on a 
payment plan for the renegotiated sum.99 However, their qualms about coming up with 
a new plan seem to have been relieved by outside interference, as Karāy was arrested 
and relieved of his command on the third day of their confinement. Soon hereafter the 
tax was abolished. (This final turn of events is also treated in the concluding section of 
this chapter.)  
 
iv. The position of the 711 protest within the tax conflict 
We can summarise the case at this point by saying that the 711 protest was a conscious 
and premeditated response to administrative changes, and that it should be understood 
as part of a longer process of negotiation that stretched over a period of two months. 
There are several elements to this case that seem to support Amina Elbendary’s view of 
protests as an integral part of urban politics characterised by premeditation, strategy, 
reliance on networks and combination with other forms of negotiation. First, we find 
contours of both strategy and premeditation in the action of the 711 protesters: they did 
not act spontaneously, but upon an agreement made three days prior. Moreover, they 
chose their time of departure in coordination with the existing Mamluk parade protocol. 
Second, the initiators, who sadly remain nameless in the sources, used the networks 
surrounding the Umayyad Mosque to organise the protest, the khaṭīb of the mosque took 
on the leadership and was followed, it seems, by many people employed in the mosque. 
The protest seems to have been coordinated on Friday, which suggests that the mosque 
also served as the physical framework for the coordination. Third, the protest occurred 
at a particular low point in the wider negotiation process, and apart from being itself a 
form of negotiation featuring the delivery of a complaint, the protest was also integrated 
into the subsequent negotiations which led to the adjustment of the tax level and tax base. 
As noted above, al-Ḥarīrī made use of the protest to make thinly veiled threats of 
additional protests with a wider destabilising effect as leverage against Karāy. We cannot 
tell whether this Sufi shaykh had coordinated with al-Qazwīnī, but the accounts 
definitely show that negotiators were willing and able to integrate the protest into their 
wider strategies. As stated in the introduction, Elbendary considers urban protesting as 
a form of political participation that became a widespread phenomenon as part of the 
flux and transformations of the 9th/15th century. The fact that the 711 protest is one of 
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the only detectable cases of organised protest in Damascus from the early 8th/14th century 
compared to the frequent recurrence of protests in later periods supports this conclusion. 
However, this case also shows us that the patterns of protesting behaviour found in the 
9th/15th were not an invention of that century but a form of political participation 
available to civilian actors of earlier centuries, although they might have exercised it less 
frequently.  
While Elbendary presents a persuasive framework for studying protests in a wider 
socio-political context, she does not explore the layers of meaning produced by 
protesters through their inventories of props or the choice of protesting venues. She 
argues in several places that protesters seem to have acted upon a form of moral 
economy, but she does not examine the symbolic forms through which defence of such 
a moral economy was articulated.100 These are exactly the questions that we delve into 
now as we shift focus from the position of the protest within the tax conflict towards the 
‘inner semantics’ of protesting with special items such as a Qurʾān linked to one of the 
‘rightly-guided caliphs’, a sandal linked to the Prophet and a set of banners linked to the 
great caliphal Dynasty of the Abbasids.  
 
III. The 711 Protest as ‘Performance’ 
In his explanation of his theory of contentious performances, Tilly states that we should 
see all available forms within repertoires of collective action as means of 
communication. Underlining the importance of reciprocity and mutual understanding, 
he argues that each action in a repertoire:  
[…] takes its meaning and effectiveness from shared understandings, 
memories, and agreements, however grudging, among the parties. In that 
sense, then, a repertoire of actions resembles not individual consciousness 
but a language […]101  
The question we must begin with is: how can we think of the display of relics and banners 
or the disruption of the Monday inspection parade in 711/1311 as part of a repertoire? 
The lack of description of earlier protest marches in Mamluk or Ayyubid Damascus, 
which could have included the same objects, means that we cannot simply explain the 
actions of al-Qazwīnī and his co-protesters as if they were following an established 
playbook of protest behaviour. However, by examining the function of symbolic objects 
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in religious and socio-political practice beyond the narrow category of protesting, we 
can understand these items as part of a wider repertoire of communication and tease out 
part of the message that the protesters wished to send by using them.  
 
i. What to bring to a protest? Part one: the Qurʾān and the sandal  
The first relic registered by the chroniclers is called ‘the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān’, the 
‘Blessed ʿUthmānī Qurʾān Codex’ (al-muṣḥaf al-karīm al-ʿuthmānī) or the ‘Qurʾān of 
the Imām’. As implied by the name, this is a special Qurʾān codex associated with the 
3rd of the ‘rightly-guided caliphs’ (al-khulafāʾ al-rashīdūn), ʿUthmān Ibn ʿAffān (d. 
47/656).102 ʿUthmān is usually credited with being the Caliph who commissioned the 
harmonisation of Muhammad’s revelations and its rendition into a one-volume version 
of the Qurʾān during the 630s/640s, and therefore a Qurʾān tied to his particular reign 
would constitute a direct material link with the formation of Islam. 
The association of a specific Qurʾāns with ʿUthmān was not limited to 8th/14th 
century Damascus. Another version comes up in the Iraqi court bureaucrat Hilāl al-
Ṣābīʾ’s (d. 447–48/1056) guide to Abbasid court protocol, the Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa. 
Al-Ṣābīʾ describes how a Qurʾān of ʿUthmān was one of the ceremonial objects placed 
in front of the caliph during audiences in the 4th/10th century.103 On the western side of 
the Mediterranean, the Almohad rulers of the 5th/11th and later the Marinid rulers of the 
7th/13th century claimed that a splendid Qurʾān kept in the Grand Mosque in Cordoba 
had in fact been sent to Damascus by ʿUthmān and had come to Andalusia with the 
Umayyads in the 130s/750s.104 ʿUthmān is said to have either written these Qurʾāns 
personally or to have commissioned them for personal use. With regard to the copy in 
Damascus, some have even held that the Caliph had been reading it when he was 
assassinated and that his blood was smeared on its pages.105  
Later generations saw the rule of ʿUthmān and the other rightly guided Caliphs as 
an age of justice and piety when rulers displayed a humble and conscientious attitude 
towards their political mandate. This made the Qurʾān codices tied to ʿ Uthmān a valuable 
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source of legitimacy for rulers in the medieval Islamic East and West. Therefore, we can 
speculate that the protesters of 711/1311 wished to reference the purity and just 
government associated with the early Caliphate as they marched against the fiscal 
oppression inflicted by the rulers of their own age.  
Moving from the general use of ʿ Uthmānī Qurʾāns across the region, we now focus 
on the background of the Damascene version. The Qurʾān of ʿUthmān used in the 711 
protest was kept in Damascus from around the year 490/1100. The Burid prince of 
Damascus brought the codex from Tiberias and installed it in a special shrine (khizāna) 
in the Umayyad Mosque.106 In the 8th/14th century, the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān was still kept 
in its shrine, which was located in the Maqṣūrat al-Khiṭāba, the central prayer enclosure 
of the Umayyad Mosque.107 The shrine was covered by an elaborate veil and under the 
auspices of an appointed guardian selected from among the local ʿulamāʾ.108  
From the time it arrived in Damascus, the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān became one of the 
city’s central relics, revered as a protective object capable of averting all sorts of danger 
from harming the city.109 The 6th/12th century Damascene historian Ibn al-Qalānisī (d. 
555/1160) writes in his chronicle Tārīkh Dimashq that during a conflict with the 
crusaders in 506/1113, the prince of Damascus assembled his officers and ‘they 
performed the Friday prayer together and sought blessing [tabarrakū] by looking at the 
Qurʾān, which ʿUthmān Ibn al-ʿAffān carried to Tiberias’.110  
Here, al-Qalānisī connects the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān with an important medieval 
religious practice, that of seeking baraka (blessing). In the Qurʾān, baraka is used mainly 
in the plural barakāt and denotes the blessings which God bestows on the believers on a 
par with raḥma (mercy).111 In medieval Islam, it was believed that prophets and other 
holy persons living or dead, as well as objects or places associated with such persons, 
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could act as channels through which divine baraka was transmitted to the believer. While 
seeking baraka from relics and persons was not incorporated into Sunni Islamic doctrine, 
this practice constituted an important part of religious practice in both the Ayyubid and 
Mamluk periods, a practice that brought together people from across the social and 
sometimes even the confessional spectrum.112 As the story of the crusader assault shows, 
the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān was revered as a powerful transmitter of baraka capable of 
guarding the entire city. The protective powers of this relic were also invoked in a similar 
fashion at several points during the following centuries. In 543/1148, the Qurʾān was 
taken out once again to avert a crusader army from taking Damascus.113 In 680/1281, a 
procession departed from the Umayyad Mosque with the leader holding the Qurʾān over 
his head praying that the armies of Cairo would defeat the Ilkhānite Mongols who had 
just crossed over the Euphrates and into Mamluk territory.114 When the 711 protesters 
brought out the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān, they could also have been seeking the same form of 
protective baraka that had hitherto kept the city safe as a defence against the economic 
hardship of Karāy’s tax policies.  
We now turn to the second relic paraded by the protesters, a sandal, which is called 
either ‘the Sandal of the Prophet’ (qadam al-nabī) or ‘the Prophetic Relic’ (al-athr al-
nabawī). This sandal had been housed in Damascus since the 620s/1220s and was, as the 
name suggests, believed to have been worn by the Prophet Muhammad himself. Like the 
multiple Qurʾāns of ʿUthmān, prophetic sandals appear several times over the course of 
medieval Islamic history, and their origin is the subject of a diverse body of stories and 
prophetic lore. According to one such story, it was even believed that the sandal housed 
in Damascus had been worn by Muḥammad during his night journey (al-miʿrāj) from 
Jerusalem to God’s seat in the seventh heaven, and that the prophet had touched God’s 
throne with his sandal-clad foot.115  Like the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān, the sandal would 
therefore also have been a powerful source of baraka when wielded in the protest.  
Before it came to Damascus, the sandal had been in the possession of one Nizām 
al-Dīn Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 625/1228), who had spent his adult life travelling from court 
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to court presenting the relic to different rulers.116 Shortly before his death, he displayed 
the sandal at the court of the Ayyubid prince al-Ashraf Mūsā (d. 635/1237) in Eastern 
Anatolia. The prince was apparently taken with the relic and after briefly considering 
cutting off a piece of it for himself as a keepsake, he decided to make Nizām al-Dīn part 
of his courtly entourage.117 When the latter died a few months later, he left the sandal to 
al-Ashraf, and when al-Ashraf was appointed prince of Damascus in 626/1229 as a result 
of internal struggles in the Ayyubid federation, he brought the sandal with him.118 The 
arrival of al-Ashraf constituted a major shift in religious policy in Damascus in which 
the sandal played a pivotal role.  
 Al-Ashraf’s immediate successors, al-Nāṣir Daʿūd (d. 656/1258) and al-
Muʿaẓẓam ʿ Isā (d. 624/1226), adhered to the Ḥanafī school of law and had supported the 
study of rationalist theology, logic and philosophy. In contrast, al-Ashraf was a staunch 
Shāfiʿī traditionalist who leaned more towards the conservative Ḥanbalī school.119 The 
major symbol of al-Ashraf’s traditionalism was his concerted effort to aid the study of 
ḥadīth through the founding of two colleges: the Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya al-
Birāniyya (extramuros) in the suburb of al-Ṣāliḥiyya and the Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya 
al-Juwayniyya (intramuros) inside the walled city immediately east of the citadel. Al-
Ashrafiyya al-Juwayniyya was completed around 630/1228 and it was here, in close 
proximity to his palace, that al-Ashraf placed the Sandal of the Prophet.120 The relic was 
stored inside an elaborate shrine where it would remain until it disappeared during 
Tīmūr’s (d. 805/1402) conquest of Damascus in 803/1401. When we consider the 
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Damascene protesters’ use of the sandal in 711/1311, we should mark not only its 
inherent baraka, but also the special role it assumed in the religious life of Damascus 
once it was placed in the Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya. 
The Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya became the leading Damascene institution for 
ḥadīth studies and counted many prominent Shāfiʿī scholars among its shaykhs and 
students. Its first shaykh (in this context, headmaster) was Ibn al-Ṣalāh al-Shahrazūrī (d. 
643/1245), a renowned Shāfiʿī jurist and muḥaddith (ḥadīth scholar) whose profile 
matched the traditionalism of al-Ashraf. Ibn al-Ṣalāh headed the college for more than a 
decade until his death.121 
The role of the Ashrafiyya College in Damascus extended far beyond full-time 
scholars and their circles of students. As Eerik Dickinson argues, the Ashrafiyya was the 
center of a broader public cult of proximity (qurb) to the Prophet cultivated through 
veneration of the Prophet’s Sandal and reciting ḥadīths. As Dickinson explains, the 
emergence of authoritative ḥadīth collections like the Ṣaḥīḥs of al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) 
and Muslim (d. 261/875) in the 3rd/9th century lessened the need to study ḥadīths for the 
purpose of authentication. Instead, what made the study of ḥadīths popular among 
ordinary medieval Muslims and caused people flock to institutes like al-Ashrafiyya was 
the search for ḥadīths with the shortest possible chain of transmitters (silsilat al-isnād), 
since they were believed to give elevation (ʿulūw). In its simplified form, elevation 
describes the degree of separation between the individual transmitter and the prophet 
Muhammad, that is, the shorter the chain through which he or she has received a 
prophetic saying, the closer he or she is to the prophet.122 This logic fueled popular 
demand for old transmitters who had started reciting in their childhood and consequently 
rulers, including the Ayyubid princes, sponsored tours of geriatric shaykhs around their 
lands. The Ashrafiyya College had a special provision that bestowed a generous stipend 
for visiting transmitters with elevation.123  
Like the ḥadīths, which were transmitted at the institute, the Sandal of the Prophet 
was also believed to grant proximity to the prophet and was revered accordingly, for 
                                                        
121 Ibn al-Ṣalāh was followed by the Shāfiʿī judge and khaṭīb al-Ḥarastānī (d. 662/1264), who was followed 
by the historian Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī (d. 665/1267), who again was followed by the jurist al-Nawawī 
(d. 676/1277). In the 8th/14th century, Ibn Kathīr’s mentor al-Mizzī (d. 742/1341) held the post for 23 years. 
Apart from being a student at the institute, Ibn Kathīr was himself briefly appointed as head of the college 
and his colleague al-Dhahabī was also in play for the position at one point. Ibid., vol. 1,15–37. For the 
8th/14th century, see also Yunus Y. Mirza, 'Ibn Kathir (D. 774/1373): His Intellectual Circle, Major Works 
and Qur’anic Exegesis', (Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 2012). 
122 Dickinson describes six different forms of elevation. See ibid., 492–494. 
123 Ibid., 490. 
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example, by visitors who transferred the contours of the sandal on to sheets of paper for 
talismanic use.124 By incorporating this sandal into their symbolic repertoire, the 711 
protesters were also referencing a defining form of local worship that spanned beyond 
the circles of professional scholars: the belief that proximity to the prophet was attainable 
for the public through veneration and recital at the Ashrafiyya.  
However, the question is whether the incorporation of these two items, the Qurʾān 
and the sandal, into the repertoire of the protesters of 711/1311 was simply an attempt 
to reference the reign of ʿUthmān or to transfer divine blessing and prophetic proximity 
to the protest.  
 Another aspect of the relics worth noting is the fact that by the 8th/14th century, 
they had become localised and less tied to ruling figures. Remember that both objects 
were brought to Damascus by 6th/12th and 7th/13th century, and local rulers also took part 
in the cult that surrounded the relics. In contrast with these earlier practices, the Mamluk 
sultans do not seem to have had a particularly strong connection to these items. To be 
sure, all royal visitors who attended prayer in the Umayyad Mosque would automatically 
be close to the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān since its shrine stood in the central prayer enclosure 
where visiting rulers would typically pray. But according to the chronicle of Ibn Kathīr, 
it seems that only one Mamluk sultan before 711/1311 actively pursued the strategy of 
associating himself publically with these relics as their Burid, Zangid and Ayyubid 
predecessors had done. Thus, in Dhū al-Qaʿda 695/September 1296, the sultan al-ʿĀdil 
Kitbughā (d. 702/1302) prayed in the Maqṣūrat al-khiṭāba and visited the shrine where 
the Qurʾān of ‛Uthmān was kept as part of his first official visit to Damascus.125 He 
returned to the city in Muḥarram 696/October 1296 and prayed in the Maqṣūra two 
weeks in a row before leaving for Egypt.126 However, Kitbughā also visited a range of 
holy places in Damascus, so the Qurʾān might simply have been one item on his list of 
local sacred spots to visit.127  
Based on this information, we should also see the use of these items in the 711 
protest as a very local, perhaps even local-patriotic, gesture. In other words, by 
presenting the deputy of the sultan in Cairo with items tied to the specific religious 
                                                        
124 Ibid., 484. Dickinson describes a particular conflation of the practices of ḥadīth transmission and the 
veneration of the sandal through the example of a travelling scholar who recited the Ṣaḥīḥ of Abū Muslim 
in front of the sandal. See Ibid., 502. 
125 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 15, 593. 
126 Ibid. vol. 8 pt. 15, 597. 
127 Ibn Kathīr mentions two additional places – qabr hūd (the grave of Hūd) and maghārat al-damm (the 
cave of blood). Ibid. 
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landscape of Damascus, the protesters could have been bolstering their resistance to the 
imposition of a tax policy communicated from the distant capital by wielding specifically 
local symbols of piety and rulership.  
Furthermore, apart from extraordinary crises such as impending invasions, Joseph 
Meri notes that the Qurʾān of ‛Uthmān was used in everyday practices such as letting 
debtors swear on it in order to hold them accountable for settling their debts128. Richard 
McGregor also suggests that this particular Qurʾān played a part in what he calls ‘simple 
acts of social regulation’ against, for example, the selling of hashish and other morally 
objectionable practices.129 Such invocations of accountability or social regulation could 
also be at play in the present case if we conceive of the tax as somehow breaking with a 
set of perceived moral principles regulating the relationship between ruler and ruled. 
Later in this chapter, this set of possible connotations is explored in further detail by 
comparing the 711 case with earlier cases of nafaqa taxation. First, however, we turn to 
the second category of employed items, which have more clear-cut connotations relating 
to political legitimacy and Mamluk ceremonial practices. 
 
iii. What to bring to a protest? Part two: the mosque banners 
The sources employ different terminology when describing the banners used in the 
protest. Al-Jazarī* calls them ‘the mosque banners’ (sanājiq al-jāmiʿ), al-Birzālī simply 
calls them ‘the banners’ (al-sanājiq),130  al-Dhahabī calls them ‘the khuṭba banners’ 
(aʿlām al-khuṭba)131 and Ibn Kathīr calls them ‘the caliphal banners’ (al-sanājiq al-
khalīfiyya).132 On the basis of these descriptions, we can conclude that we are dealing 
with the set of black banners that adorned the minbar (pulpit) of the Umayyad mosque, 
under which the khaṭīb would perform the Friday sermon. Remembering that the leader 
of the protest, al-Qazwīnī, was in fact the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque, the use of 
these banners could be seen partially as a gesture underlining his authority as the leader 
of the protest.133 However, in addition to their customary placement in the mosque, we 
also need to keep in mind that caliphal banners and the concept of the caliphate in a 
                                                        
128 Meri, 2010, 116. 
129 Richard McGregor, 'Networks, Processions, and the Disruptive Display of Religion', in Everything Is 
on the Move, ed. S Conermann, (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2014), 311–324. 
130 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435 and al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21. 
131 al-Dhahabī, ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 27. 
132 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 88. 
133 The office of the khaṭīb, the nature of his authority and al-Qazwīnī’s use of his office in the 711 protest 
are discussed in more detail below in Chapter 4. 
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broader sense also played a role in Mamluk official ceremonies. In other words, the 
banners were already part of a political repertoire which could also have motivated the 
protesters to use these banners when making their case to the governor. 
However, in order to explore the use of the banners, we need to move beyond the 
immediate confines of the Umayyad Mosque and the city of Damascus and take a brief 
look at the position of the Abbasid caliphate within political discourse of the period.  
Black banners had been part of the Abbasid ceremonial since the 2nd/8th century 
when the second Abbasid Caliph al-Manṣūr (d. 158/775) claimed that the Prophet 
Muhammad had appeared to his predecessor the Caliph Abū ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ (d. 
136/754) in a dream and had handed him the right to the Caliphate in the form of a black 
banner.134 While the political power of the Caliph was eclipsed by that of the Buyid and 
later Saljuq sultans as early as the 5th – 6th/10th-11th centuries, the Abbasid Caliphate of 
Baghdad continued to exist until 656/1258 when the Mongols stormed Iraq and killed 
the caliph al-Mustaʿṣim Billāh. In 661/1262, the caliphate was moved to Cairo by Sultan 
Baybars, who installed an Abbasid descendant as Caliph under the regal title of al-Ḥākim 
bi-Amr Illāh (d. 701/1302).135  
Neither Baybars nor his successors were interested in restoring any power to the 
person of the Caliph; rather, they were interested in reaping the political benefit from 
being associated with this historic institution. The continued existence of the caliphate 
in Cairo allowed the Mamluk sultans to promote an important but wholly fictitious 
claim: that the power claimed by consecutive Mamluk sultans was based on a formal 
delegation of military power from the Caliph.136 As for the Caliph himself, he was 
relevant only insofar as he could solidify the sultanate; he is usually mentioned only by 
way of his relation to the sultan.137 Stephan Heidemann points this out in reference to 
                                                        
134 Khalīl Athmina, 'The Black Banners and the Socio-Political Significance of Flags and Slogans in 
Medieval Islam', Arabica T. 36 Facs, 1989, 307–326, 317. 
135 Stefan Heidemann suggests that Baybars’ primary motivation for re-establishing the caliphate might 
have been to consolidate his alliance with the newly converted leader of the Golden Horde, Berke Khān 
(d. 665/1266), and to persuade him to fight his brother, the Ilkhān of Iraq and Persia, Hülegü (d. 664/1266) 
under the banner of jihād. Heidemann, 1992, 202. Anne Broadbridge adds to this that the Caliph was 
personally present at the first round of negotiations between Baybars and Berke, but excluded thereafter. 
She also casts doubt on whether this propaganda strategy in fact worked on Berke. See Broadbridge, 2008, 
56 and 58. 
136 Albrecht Fuess, 'Mamluk Politics', in Ubi Sumus? Quo Vademus?: Mamluk Studies–State of the Art, 
ed. S. Conermann (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2013). 
137 Heidemann, 1992, 174. In this regard, Heidemann makes a special reference to sikka: the ruler’s right 
to have his name engraved on coins. Heidemann states that the caliph was not mentioned on Egyptian 
Mamluk coins either with his name or the title amīr al-muʾminīn (prince of the faithful). Instead, the sultan 
was mentioned as qāsim amīr al-muʾminīn (partner of the prince of the faithful). 
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Sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn’s endorsement of his son al-Ashraf Khalīl (d. 693/1293) as 
heir to the throne. In the endorsement, the sultanate is described as an office bestowed 
by the Caliph, but it does not mention the name or title of the Caliph. Moreover, this 
endorsement came after Qalāwūn had kept the Caliph away from the public for more 
than a decade. 138  Al-Ashraf Khalīl brought the Caliph back into his own public 
appearances and also re-employed the symbols of the caliphate, such as the black robes 
and banners, and expanded his own regnal title with the honorific muḥyī al-dawla al-
ʿabbāsiyya (reviver of the Abbasid state).139 The active and public use of the Caliph was 
continued under later sultans but his position rarely exceeded that of a ceremonial office 
bound by protocol.140  
During the 8th/14th century, we also see that symbols of caliphal legitimacy were a 
standard feature of a plethora of less important official Mamluk ceremonies, both at the 
court in Cairo and in the provincial cities such as Damascus. At these ceremonies, it was 
not the Caliph but simply the black color synonymous with his office that was employed. 
One example of this is found in the description of a sultanic procession orchestrated by 
the governor of Damascus, Amir Sayf al-Dīn Quṭlūbughā al-Fakhrī (d. 742/1342), in 
741/1342. According to Ibn Kathīr, as the Sultan entered the city, the governor stood 
flanked by the chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of each of the four law schools surrounded by 
various pieces of ceremonial paraphernalia, including the caliphal and sultanic 
banners.141  
Appeals to the caliphate and employment of its signature colour were thus already 
part of a repertoire of official symbolic actions in the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries. Even 
more clearly than the use of the relics mentioned above, the protesters’ use of this 
specific piece of politico-religious paraphernalia lodged itself within the framework of 
a much wider field of public political communication. This could be a gesture akin to 
what James Grehan has called deferential appropriation of official forms of violence, 
that is, confronting the ruling order with its own symbols not as an outright challenge, 
but as a way of ‘prodding and exhorting the social order to honor its professed ideals’.142 
                                                        
138 Ibid., 183. 
139 Ibid., 186. See also Broadbridge, 2008, 45 n. 87. 
140 Heidemann, 1992, 194. 
141 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 300. 
142 James Grehan, 'Street Violence and Social Imagination in Late-Mamluk and Ottoman Damascus', 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 (2003): 215–36, 230. 
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In the present case, the professed ideals could have been some form of promise to treat 
the Damascene subjects with justice.  
However, apart from simply mirroring the symbolic communication of the 
Mamluk sultanate, the use of the banners could also have expressed an appeal to a form 
of higher justice embedded within the idea of the caliphate itself. We have some cases 
that suggest that the idea of the caliphate was endowed with a critical potential vis-à-vis 
injustice and tyranny. For example, in one protest, which took place in Cairo against a 
corrupt Ḥanafī judge, participants wielded the banner of the Caliphs taken from a 
congregational mosque.143  
In order to understand the use of the caliphal banner in 711/1311 in Damascus, 
however, we also have to understand the specific role of the caliphate in Syria and in 
Damascus in particular. Heidemann argues that one reason for the Mamluk re-
establishment of the caliphate Cairo might have been to prevent a rebellion from forming 
in Syria around a self-proclaimed Abbasid Caliph.144 As an indication of Baybars’s 
awareness of a stronger Syrian attachment to the caliphate, Heidemann points out that 
the Syrian mint, unlike its Egyptian counterpart, continued to produce coins bearing the 
Caliph’s name and title until the death of Baybars in 676/1277.145 Furthermore, seven 
decades after the 711 protest, we do in fact see the caliphate in play as part of a revolt 
emanating from Damascus. In a study of this revolt, Lutz Wiederholdt demonstrated that 
plot to undermine the sultan Barqūq (d. 801/1399), which included both members of the 
Mamluk military elite and local scholars, was partially formed around the idea of a 
political restoration of the caliphate in Syria. According to Wiederholdt this suggests 
that:  
[…] the caliph, despite his marginal influence on the political affairs of the 
day, was still a prominent religious-political figure among the scholarly elite 
and the populace of the two urban centers of the Mamluk empire Cairo and 
                                                        
143 Konrad Hirschler, 'Riten Der Gewalt: Protest Und Aufruhr in Kairo Und Damaskus (7./13. Bis 10./16. 
Jahrhundert)', in Islamwissenschaft Als Kulturwissenschaft; 1: Historische Anthropologie. Ansätze Und 
Möglichkeiten, ed. S. Conermann and v. Hees (Schenefeld (Hamburg): EB-Verlag, 2007), 205–33, 218. 
The signature colour of the Mamluk sultans was usually yellow. For more details on the use of yellow in 
Mamluk ceremonies, see below, 108. 
144 Heidemann, 1992, 174. 
145 Ibid., 174. 
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Damascus – and that faithfulness to the caliphate in their circles was regarded 
as a sign of outstanding piety.146  
With regard to the 711/1311 case, the evidence is too meagre to conclude whether there 
was a rebellious streak attached to the employment of the black banners. But this later 
case should nevertheless be remembered, since it suggests that caliphal banners could 
be wielded as a symbols of an imagined legitimate and proper government beyond the 
Mamluk political order.  
A detail worth noting with regard to the use of banners is that the only author who 
identifies the banners used in 711/1311 as the ‘banners of the caliphate’ is Ibn Kathīr. 
As Mohammad Gharaibeh has pointed out, Ibn Kathīr’s chronicle, al-Bidāya wa-al-
Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh, can be read as a vehement defense of the institution of the caliphate 
even after its 661/1262 ‘revival’ in Cairo.147 As noted above, the black banners were 
indeed tied to the caliphate, but by identifying the banners as such, Ibn Kathīr might 
have sought to underline this connection even further.148  
The sources for the protest are not very explicit about what the protesters said to 
the governor and there are almost no ascribed comments that make reference to these 
items or what they meant specifically. The one exception is al-Ṣafadī, who reports that 
one of the comments made by the protesters when the governor dismissed their claims 
was ‘al-muṣḥaf mā yuradd’149 (‘the Qurʾān cannot be disregarded/rejected’). Generally 
speaking, we should not take the direct speech in an 8th/14th century source as solid 
evidence for the ideological programmes of the people described therein. Yet, the 
suggestion that the protesters presented a claim that they saw as sanctioned by the objects 
they carried, (the Qurʾān, in particular), is fully compatible with the inherent meaning of 
these objects as symbols of justice and piety from the Islamic past.  
While the use of these items clearly shows that the protesters wanted to manifest 
their claims in unambiguous Islamic terms, we are not told whether they simply insisted 
on some notion of ideal Islamic justice represented by these objects or whether they 
                                                        
146 Lutz Wiederhold, 'Legal-Religious Elite, Temporal Authority, and the Caliphate in Mamluk Society : 
Conclusions Drawn from the Examination of a "Zahiri Revolt" in Damascus in 1386', International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 31, no. 2 (1999): 203–235, 215. 
147  Mohammad Gharaibeh, 'Geschichtsschreibung Im Dienste Des ʿabbāsidischen Kalifats – Das Al-
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148 The political and theological layers of Ibn Kathīr’s 711 protest narrative and their relationship to his 
chronicle as a whole are explored in further detail below in Chapter 5. 
149 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 153. As explained below in Chapter 5, al-Ṣafadī is particularly fond of inventing 
dramatic dialogues in his biographies. See below, 209. 
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formulated their claims in Islamic legal terms. We shall see later in this chapter that 
earlier efforts at imposing nafaqa taxes were recurrently met with criticism formulated 
on the basis of the sharia and that there was an already existing framework of Islamic 
legal thought about the legality of taxation that the protesters in 711/1311 could have 
invoked, either vocally or indirectly through their display of relics and banners.  
 
IV. Contextualising the 711 Tax 
i. Mamluk nafaqa-taxes in the 7th/13th century 
Throughout the second half of the 7th/13th century, recurrent campaigns were launched 
from Cairo to prevent attacks from the Ilkhānite Mongols and their regional allies such 
as the Christian kingdom of Armenian Cilicia. Every campaign launched from Egypt 
required a new round of nafaqa, which was usually raised through taxation. In 657–
658/1259, when the armies of the Hülegü were on the verge of entering Syria, the 
Mamluk sultan Muẓaffar al-Dīn Quṭuz began preparing for the campaign that would 
eventually lead to the defeat of the Mongols at the battle of ʿAyn al-Jalūt on the 26th of 
Ramaḍān 658/3rd of September 1260. In order to cover the nafaqa for the campaign, 
Quṭuz initiated a wide-ranging tax programme all over Egypt. He imposed an inheritance 
tax of 33% (thulth al-tarak al-ahliyya), a two-fold increase in the payments of zakāt 
(alms tax) and a per capita tax of 1 dinar on all adults in Egypt. On top of this, he also 
ordered a taṣqīʿ imposed on all property in Cairo. The total revenue from these taxes is 
assessed by al-Nuwayrī at 600.000 dinars.150 Quṭuz was murdered on his return from 
ʿAyn al-Jalūt and replaced as sultan by Baybars, who abolished the tax programme 
immediately after his return to Cairo.  
Baybars made a grand show of abolishing Quṭuz’s tax programme, which was 
proclaimed from minbars all over Egypt.151 However, in the 670s/1270s, he reverted 
back to the policies of his predecessor and began to levy large sums for military 
expeditions from the civilian populations of both Egypt and Syria. In 672/1274, he 
                                                        
150 al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, vol. 14 pt. 30, 5. It is difficult to discern whether Quṭuz envisioned an annually 
recurring tax or a one-time levy, since he only ruled for a little under a year. For the same estimate, see 
also Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Dawādārī, Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmiʿ al-Ghurar 9 Vols., ed. Ulrich 
Haarmann (Cairo: Hans Robert Roemer, 1971), vol. 8, 63; Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, al-
Mawāʿiẓ wa-al-Iʿtibār fī Dhikr al-Khiṭṭat wa-al-Athār al-Maʿrūf bi-Khiṭṭat al-Maqrīzī 2 Vols., (Cairo: 
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Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk 4 Vols., ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1997), vol. 1, 521. 
151 al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, vol. 14 pt. 30, 5 and al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk, vol. 1, 521. 
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imposed a tax aimed at bringing in 1.2 million dirhams divided into three annual 
instalments. The tax was supposed to pay for 1000 horsemen.152  
According to the chroniclers, this tax seems to have been abolished, but only two 
years later, in 675/1276–77, the sultan attempted to reintroduce military taxes 
specifically on Damascus when he passed through the city on his way north to fight in 
Armenian Cilicia.153 The new tax was supposed to be a one-time levy, but later, while 
fighting the campaign, he raised the tax and extracted an additional 1 million dirhams.154 
Al-Malik al-Saʿīd (d. 678/1280), Baybars’s son and brief successor, publicly revoked 
his father’s taxes,155 but the relief felt by the Damascenes was to be brief, since al-Saʿīd 
was deposed in 677/1279 and replaced by al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn. As we saw in the 
statement of Amir Ṭūghān, the shadd al-dawāwīn and former wālī of Damascus, similar 
tax measures were re-imposed again under the rule of Qalāwūn in the 680s/1280s.  
All of this shows that the tax of 711/1311 was clearly not a new phenomenon, but 
rather the repetition of what seems like a pattern of sultanic tax policies found throughout 
the second half of the 7th/13th century. Despite official abolition of taxes and recurring 
statements of noble intentions, sultan after sultan apparently still resorted to shifting the 
fiscal burden of fighting the Mongols onto the civilian population. Even though we can 
find some information about the amount of the claims imposed on Damascus, the first 
instance of a mobilisation tax, which looks like a direct precursor to the tax of 711/1311, 
was the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla (the Cavalry Tax) of 699–700/1300.156  
 
ii. The Muqarrar al-Khiyāla of 699–700/1299–1300 
This name does not refer to a single tax, rather it seems to have been introduced as an 
umbrella term covering various types of levies that were imposed in order to rebuild the 
                                                        
152 It is unclear whether the annual levy of 1.2 million was supposed to pay for 1000 horsemen, in which 
case the price per unit would be 1200 dirhams, or whether each instalment of 400.000 was supposed to 
pay for 1000 horsemen, in which case the price per unit would be 400 dirhams. ʿIzz al-Dīn Muḥammad 
ibn ʿAlī ibn Shaddād, Tārīkh al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, ed. Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (Wiesbaden: Frantz Steiner Verlag, 
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153 Louis Pouzet argues that Baybars tended to regard Damascus as a convenient resource for financing 
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Pouzet, 1991, 276. 
154 al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 14 pt. 30, 233. According to al-Nuwayrī, Baybars set the heightened levy at 
200.000 dirhams to be collected from the city, 300.000 from its hinterland, another 300.000 from its 
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155 Ibid., vol. 14 pt. 30, 247. 
156 Subhi Labib argues that the term Muqarrar al-Khiyāla was introduced as early as 658/1260. I have not 
found any specific uses of this term in the sources he cites, and suspect that he is extrapolating the name 
from 1299/1300 to cover similar levies in past. See Labib, 1965, 248, n. 63 and 64.  
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Mamluk army after their defeat against the Mongol forces led by the Ilkhān Ghazān at 
Wādī Khazandār in Rabīʿ I 699/December 1299.The first installments of the Muqarrar 
al-Khiyāla were imposed in Egypt in orderto cover nafaqa for the re-conquest of Syria. 
According to al-Nuwayrī, the owners of wealth and property in Cairo were first 
summoned and taxed according to their capacity; levies were imposed thereafter all over 
Egypt on both city dwellers and peasants, including a tax of one dinar on all adults, 
which is akin to the tax imposed by Quṭuz forty years earlier.157 According to Rabie, the 
per capita tax was combined with extra taxes on specific occupations, such as a tax on 
mercantile brokers and a tax on professional legal witnesses and notaries.158  
The Muqarrar al-Khiyāla hit Damascus in Muḥarram 700/September 1300, some 
five months after the Mamluk army had regained control of the city and Amir Aqūsh al-
Afram (d. 720/1320) had been installed as governor. While the Ilkhānite armies had 
retreated across the Euphrates, they were expected to attempt a return and the taxation 
of Damascus was intended to repel such an attempt. As in 711/1311, the tax was 
collected via taṣqīʿ; all property in Damascus including the awqāf was taxed the 
equivalent of four months’ rent, in addition to an extraordinary agricultural tax imposed 
on the hinterland.159 At this point, Damascus was still reeling from the plundering and 
destruction caused by the occupation, and the levy seems to have provoked desperate 
reactions from the already war-weary inhabitants. We read of landowners cutting down 
their fruit trees and selling the wood in order to raise the requested sums, as well as a 
widespread flight to Egypt of people seeking to evade the tax.160 The problem of tax 
evasion through flight soon became so critical that al-Afram banned people from leaving 
the city without his permission.161 Despite this problem, the governor could eventually 
report to Cairo that he had extracted 480.000 dirhams from the Damascenes, which he 
had spent on the nafaqa of 800 mercenary horsemen of Kurdish and Turcoman stock, 
each of whom received 600 dirhams.162 In the end, the revenue from Damascus seems 
to have been spent in vain; as soon as news arrived that Ghazān was launching another 
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162 Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad al-ʿAynī, ʿ Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān 5 Vols. (647–712 AH), 
ed. Muhạmmad Muhạmmad Amīn (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa-al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, 2010), vol. 4, 126. 
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push across the Euphrates, the new mercenaries fled with their nafaqa. Meanwhile, the 
rest of the intake was allegedly lost through corruption.163 To make the whole affair seem 
even more pointless, the Ilkhānite army was hit by rough weather outside Aleppo and 
retreated across the river, and as the threat of invasion diminished, the tax was 
abolished.164  
 
iii. 700 versus 711: comparing numbers and reactions 
When describing the 711 tax, the Egyptian historian al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442) calls it by 
the same name, muqarrar al-khiyāla.165 Al-Jazarī* uses the term taqrīr al-khiyyal, which 
is a close morphological variant.166 Moreover, both the use of taṣqīʿ as the method of 
extraction and the division of the revenue into nafaqa portions of 600 dirhams 
corresponds roughly with the information we have on the tax of 711/1311 where each 
horseman would have received 500 dirhams. Thus, it would seem that the 711 tax was 
in fact a reactivation of a previous tax policy imposed a decade earlier.  
Unlike the case of 711/1311, there is no reference in the accounts of the 700/1300 
tax about an initial wealth tax on the fortunes of the Damascene elite; instead, general 
taṣqīʿ seems to have been imposed straightaway. This was likely because there was very 
little monetary wealth left in the city at this point. First, a large portion of well-to-do 
Damascenes had left the city for Cairo immediately after the Mamluk army withdrew 
from Wādī Khazandār. Second, apart from widespread plundering, the Mongol occupiers 
had imposed taxes on the remaining population, such as a wealth tax of up to 20 percent, 
taxes on markets ranging between 100.000 and 60.000 dirhams and specific claims on 
wealthy families, such as the Banū Qalānisī, which ran into the tens of thousands.167  
These differences might also explain why the 711 tax sparked a protest march, 
while the 700 tax apparently did not. First, the Damascenes of 700/1300 might have felt 
                                                        
163 Unknown, Beiträge Zur Geschichte Der Mamlūkensultane in Den Jahren 690–741 Der Higra Nach 
Arabischen Handschriften, ed. Karl V. Zetterstéen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1919), 83; Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa-Wafayāt al-Mashāhīr wa-al-Aʿlām 15 Vols., ed. 
Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, Sạ̄lih ̣Mahdī ʿAbbās, and Shuʿayb Arnaʿūt ̣ (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
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164 According to Ibn Kathīr, none of the extracted money was refunded, but all outstanding claims, e.g., 
those evaded by people who had disappeared from the city, were exempted. Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 8 
pt. 15, 634. 
165 al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk vol. 2, 328. 
166 Taqrīr al-khiyyal is a variation on the same two roots as Muqarrar al-Khiyāla, i.e., q r r and kh y l. See 
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ʿalayhim min istikhdām al-khiyāla. See al-Nuwayrī Nihāyat, vol. 15 pt. 32, 136. 
167 al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh Islām, vol. 15, 710. 
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that the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla was the lesser of two evils compared to the prospect of 
renewed Ilkhānite conquest, which would likely have meant a new round of plundering 
and taxation. By 711/1311, Damascus had not seen any conquests or intense house-to-
house combat for more than a decade. Even though the conflict over the sultanate 
between the exiled al-Nāṣir and Baybars al-Jāshankīr in 710/1309 had rekindled the fear 
of war, no harm befell the city in connection with al-Nāṣir’s return to the throne. Thus, 
after years of relative calm, the claim for a new mobilisation tax could have seemed less 
compelling in the eyes of the locals.  
Second, the protest could have been motivated not by the tax itself but by the 
increase from the 480.000 dirhams for 800 troops that was extracted in 700/1300 and the 
750.000 for 1500 troops, which was Karāy’s initial claim in 711/1311. Third, the lack of 
a coordinated protest march in 700/1300 could stem from the fragmentation and 
weakening of local society caused by the destruction and flight that resulted from the 
Mongol occupation. When comparing these public reactions, we should note that tax 
evasion could also be understood as a form of protest. Unlike the petition march of 
711/1311, however, all accounts suggest that those who fled in 700/1300 did so 
individually and not as part of the type of coordinated acts of resistance that we find in 
several cases from the 9th/15th century.168  
The Muqarrar al-Khiyāla also provides us the opportunity to compare reactions in 
Damascus and Cairo. Al-Maqrīzī and al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1453) report that the common 
population lost a great deal of respect for the vanquished army when it retreated from 
Syria in 699/1299 and that the demand for a new round of nafaqa-taxes immediately 
after their defeat led to tensions. With a long passage allegedly borrowed from the 
Nuzhat al-Nāẓir fī Sirat al-Malik al-Nāṣir, the chronicle of al-Nāṣir’s rule written by the 
ḥalqa officer Mūsa Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā al-Yūsufī (d. after 1355/755), al-ʿAynī 
describes how Cairene commoners openly abused the sultan’s soldiers in public: 
It was said that the soldiers had no respect (ḥurma) left with the commoners. 
If one them came to buy what he needed for soldiering, they would abuse him 
with rude words and say: Are you not ashamed for God’s sake, today you talk 
and yesterday you fled, and now you want to play tricks on us? If one of them 
                                                        
168 Resistance to taxation through collective flight of entire villages was a feature of Mamluk-peasant 
power relations in 9th/15th century Jordan. See Bethany J. Walker, 'The Role of Agriculture in Mamluk-
Jordanian Power Relations', Bulletin dʿEtudes Orientales 57 (2007): 79–99, 97–98. In addition to this, 
Amina Elbendary describes several instances from the 15th century where small-time market vendors 
evaded taxes. She asks whether such evasions can be interpreted as a form of negotiation, but does not 
give a conclusive answer. See Elbendary, 2016, 141–143. 
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approached one of the commoners with a whip in his hand, he [the 
commoner] would stand up and snatch it from his hand and say: Why didn’t 
you assert your respect towards those who did this and that to you [i.e. 
Ghazān’s army] instead of fleeing from them? […]169 
These abuses apparently continued until the tax collectors allied themselves with an amir 
who had sufficient respect with the commoners and inspired awe (hayba) in them to the 
extent that none dared speak in his presence. At the same time, the soldiers’ demand for 
respect was reinforced by a sultanic decree that prohibited civilians on pain of death and 
confiscation from any interaction with soldiers whatsoever.170  
It seems that the Cairene public in 699/1299 reacted to unpopular fiscal policies in 
a more scattered and disorganised fashion than what we find in Damascus in 711/1311. 
However, this might not necessarily be because they lacked the intent to protest, but 
because the stakes of protesting in Cairo were higher. Both Lapidus and Elbendary argue 
that the intensity of sultanic control over Cairo increased the risk of violent crackdowns, 
which made protesting a dangerous endeavour.171 This view would seem to be confirmed 
by the issuing of official death threats against potential troublemakers.  
That said, the absence of organised protests during the preceding nafaqa conflicts 
does not mean that there was no resistance towards these policies whatsoever. The 
following section demonstrates that some similarities can be found when we turn from 
street protesting to the discussions between Islamic jurists and sultans or other holders 
of authority about these policies. These discussions outline the contours of an ongoing 
debate about the legitimacy of nafaqa tax claims from a legalistic sharia-based 
perspective. And while we have no evidence that the protesters of 711/1311 engaged in 
this debate verbally, their employment of key symbols of piety and political legitimacy, 
the Qurʾān, the sandal and the banners, can be interpreted as an extra-legal attempt to 
connect with the debate about the justice of taxation from a sharia-based perspective.  
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 64 
V. Taxation and Legitimacy: Juridical Approaches  
i. War taxes in Ibn Jamāʿa’s Taḥrīr al-Aḥkām 
When we turn to the long-term pattern of debates that surrounded nafaqa taxes, we see 
that they all revovle around the following question: how and under what circumstances 
is the ruler allowed to tax his subjects for defence purposes? Before looking at these 
discussions as represented in the contemporary sources, a short sketch of the juridical 
approach to this question is required. According to the contemporary sources, most of 
the scholars who engaged in the conflicts about nafaqa taxes were Shāfiʿīs. Therefore, I 
shall summarise for the purpose of discussion a Shāfiʿī answer to the above question 
based on a contemporary Damascene source: The Shāfiʿī jurist Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa 
(d. 733/1333), who was chief judge of Damascus (693–697/1294–1296 and 699–
702/1300–1303) and later in Cairo (702–727/1303–1327).  
          Ibn Jamāʿa wrote a treatise on government titled Taḥrīr al-Aḥkām fī Tadbīr Ahl 
al-Islām, which deals extensively with public finances including the correct way to 
finance a standing army. The second chapter of his treatise, which deals with the nature 
of the caliphate, the sultanate and their respective mandates, includes a list of ten rights 
(ḥaqq pl. ḥuqūq) that the caliph or sultan can claim from his subjects, and a list of ten 
rights that the subjects can claim from their ruler. We focus here on the 10th right of the 
ruler and the first right of the subjects:  
The 10th right [of the ruler]:  
Defence of him in word and deed, and with wealth, person and kinfolk (bil-
māl wa-al-nafs wa-al-ahl) in the disclosed and closed [manner], and secretly 
and publicly.172 
The first [right of the subjects]:  
Protection and defence of the territory of Islam, either in all areas if he be the 
Caliph or in a designated district if he be an authorised delegate173, [he is 
obliged to] perform jihād against the unbelievers and defend against enemies 
and rebels (al-bāghīn), lead the armies, enroll soldiers, fortify seaports with 
elements of hindrance and defence, inspect the training of all types of soldiers 
                                                        
172  Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Jamāʿa, Taḥrīr al-Aḥkām fī Tadbīr Ahl al-Islām (Doha: Riʾāsat al-
Maḥākim al-Sharʿiyya wal-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyya, 1988), 64. 
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according to need and assess their fiefs (iqṭāʿihim), their salaries and the 
probity of their condition.174  
Now, we could interpret the constellation of these two rights to mean that the ruler has 
a right to demand his subjects’ aid in terms of resources and manpower for defensive 
needs, while the subjects have the right to demand that their ruler organise and maintain 
the army. While this could be seen as opening the door for discretionary drafting and 
taxation for military purposes, Ibn Jamāʿa explains over the course of chapters 4–9 that 
the ruler has in fact very little right to demand the aid of his subjects for military 
purposes. Under normal circumstances, defence is the business of a standing army 
consisting of salaried soldiers, and payment for this standing army must come from the 
bayt al-māl (public treasury). The bayt al-māl is administered by the ruler according to 
maṣlaḥa (common interest of the community), and has six designated categories of 
income: khums al-ghanīma (1/5 of war booty), kharāj (landtax), property with heirs, lost 
property without owners, jizya (poll tax on dhimmis) and finally, tolls of 10% on non-
Muslim merchants.175 As we can see, none of these categories includes taxation of 
ordinary Muslims through practices such as taṣqīʿ or per capita taxes such as those 
imposed by Quṭuz. Furthermore, this is spelled out clearly in the following prohibition:  
But as for what is taken of tolls (min al- dạrāʾib wa-al-uʿshūr) on the 
merchandise that Muslims transport from region to region and on all forms 
of property which is sold, these are forbidden according to sharia (muḥarram 
sharʿan) and impermissible according to sharia and justice (lā yubiḥuhu sharʿ 
wa-la yujīzuhu ʿadl), for they are a special form of illicit tax and flagrant 
tyranny (mukūs muʿayyina wa-zạlāmāt bayyina).176 
In the event that the public funds in the bayt al-māl are inadequate to meet the required 
expenses, it is instead incumbent first on the sultan and then on whomever is under him 
in command to cover the deficit.177 Ibn Jamāʿa does not state who is next in line, but 
again the point is clear: normal civilians should not be forced to pay into the bayt al-māl, 
even when it is empty. Seen in this light, what are we to read into the 10th right of the 
ruler – the subjects’ obligation to defend him in word and deed, and with property, wealth 
and kinfolk? Ibn Jamāʿa returns to this obligation in chapter 10, which discusses the rules 
of participation in military jihād. Here, he repeats that defence is a collective 
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176 Ibid., 145. 
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responsibility (farḍ kifāya) carried by the ruler and his army, However, he adds that it 
becomes an individual responsibility (farḍ ʿayn) incumbent on all Muslims only when a 
regular army is not present, i.e., when the army has either fled or broken down. 
Moreover, the moment a new army arrives, the obligation of defence immediately reverts 
from the individual to the collective.178  
To summarise Ibn Jamāʿa’s point on defence and taxation: as long as some form 
of organised defence force exists, the ruler has no sharia-based rights to demand money 
or manpower from his civilian subjects. 
However, one relatively modest loophole that Ibn Jamāʿa presents involves using 
money collected from Muslims in the form of zakāt. Paying zakāt is a religious duty of 
all Muslims who own property above a certain level. Zakāt is designated to be distributed 
as ṣadāqa (alms) for a set of specific purposes identified in the Qurʾān (9:60):  
 Alms are for the poor and the needy and those employed to administer the 
(funds); for those whose hearts have (recently) been reconciled (to truth); for 
those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of God; and for the wayfarer […]179 
In the present context, it is the words ‘in the cause of God’ (fī sabīl illāh) that are relevant. 
This is commonly taken by exegetes to mean those who fight for God’s cause, i.e., those 
who fight the jihād.180 On the basis of this formulation, one could argue that the zakāt 
could be used for military purposes; as we shall see, this argument is made several times 
in the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries. However, Ibn Jamāʿa argues that because zakāt is 
already assigned to these eight specific purposes, it cannot be added to the bayt al-māl 
and used for the general purposes of securing maṣlaḥa.181 This means that even the 7th 
category of zakāt recipients—those who fight the jihād—comes to mean voluntary and 
unsalaried fighters and not professional soldiers who are paid from the bayt al-māl. 
Again, Ibn Jamāʿa makes sure that no claim for paying the upkeep of the army can be 
made against the civilians through sharia arguments.  
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ii. Shāfiʿī jurists as tax critics 657/1259–700/1300 
While the practical negotiations of taxes in the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries did not 
follow the juridical literature to the letter, the debates that we can follow through the 
chronicles were often structured exactly around the two questions discussed by Ibn 
Jamāʿa: whether a given situation was critical enough to make defence spending an 
individual obligation incumbent on all civilians, and whether a certain group of fighters 
were worthy of receiving zakāt as part of those who fight for God’s cause.  
The chronicles give the impression that the Mamluk sultans and their advisors tried 
repeatedly to obtain ratification of their fiscal policies from the ʿulamāʾ by arguing that 
a tax on civilians was in fact the only option available to them, or that they were 
demanding money specifically for jihād. The jurists for the most part would refute these 
claims, or at least set down specific conditions before they gave their blessing. 
In 657/1259, when the Mongol armies were approaching Syria, the Shāfiʿī jurist 
and khaṭīb ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām al-Sulamī (d. 660/1262) was summoned to the 
court in Cairo and asked for a fatwa that would allow for an extraordinary tax to finance 
the counter-campaign. Al-Sulamī was famous as a vocal critic of rulers, a quality that 
had forced him from Damascus and into exile in Egypt in the 640s/1240s.182 Once in 
Cairo, he became popular for his Friday sermons and Sultan al-Muẓaffar Quṭuz and his 
generals were most likely hoping that an endorsement from such a prominent shaykh 
would help smooth the extraction process. According to Ibn Kathīr, al-Sulamī replied 
that the fatwa they wanted would be valid only when the well-established criteria would 
be fulfilled, i.e., once the sultan and his amirs had spent all their personal wealth along 
with that of their wives and their mamluks:  
[…] to such an extent that the soldier has nothing more than the horse he rides 
on. At that point it is permissible for the ruler to seize some of the wealth of 
the people in order to push back the enemy, for if the enemy invades the 
country the people are obliged to defend it with their wealth and their 
person.183 
                                                        
182 al-Sulamī fell from grace in Damascus by criticising the Ayyubid prince al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl (d. 643/1245), 
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al-Sulūk vol. 1, 507 and al-ʿAynī, ‘Iqd vol. 1, 218. 
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As reflected in the writings of Ibn Jamāʿa, it is the determination of the circumstances 
under which defence becomes an individual responsibility that constitutes the crux of 
the argument: as long as the sultan has any wealth whatsoever, ordinary civilians cannot 
be called upon to contribute. Quṭuz might have partially heeded the shaykh’s words; at 
least, according to al-Maqrīzī, he began his 600.000 dinar tax campaign by confiscating 
wealth from prominent Mamluk amirs, including the jewellery belonging to their 
wives.184  
A similar discussion concerning the justification and hence legitimacy of 
extraordinary tax levies arose several times in the following 40 years. In these cases, the 
gauntlet was picked up by two of al-Sulamī’s former students, Muḥiyy al-Dīn al-Nawawī 
(d. 676/1277) and Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd (d. 702/1302), both of whom follow the line of al-
Sulamī with regard to taxation.  
During the reign of Baybars, we see several contradictory attempts at legitimising 
and delegitimising taxes through reference to jihād. Ibn Shaddād (d. 684/1285), a Syrian 
chancery secretary who became a member of Baybars’s retinue and his semi-official 
biographer, deliberately framed the sultan’s 672 tax of 1.2 million dirhams per year not 
only as a legitimate demand for help in conducting holy war, but also as a potential 
blessing on the taxpayers. The preamble to his account of the tax reads as follows: ‘Our 
lord the sultan had deemed it proper that his subjects (raʿiyyatahu) share with him the 
merit of the jihād (thawwāb al-jihād) […]’.185 To ‘share the merit’ is, of course, a 
euphemism for sharing the costs, and Baybars’s decision to tax the populace is thus 
cloaked as a sincere wish to give his subjects access to the divine reward of co-financing 
the jihād.  
As far as we can tell, such religious arguments were not accepted by the Shāfiʿī 
jurists of Damascus. The 9th/15th century Egyptian chronicler al-Suyūtī (d. 911/1515) 
presents a letter of refusal ascribed to the Shāfiʿī jurist and muḥaddith al-Nawawī, who 
was headmaster of the Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya from 665/1267 until his death. While 
the letter cannot be tied specifically to the 672 tax, it nevertheless turns directly against 
the notion that Baybars’s tax claims could be justified with reference to the individual 
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obligation to support jihād through wealth or personal participation. The individual 
obligation (farḍ ayn), al-Nawawī explains in this letter, cannot be evoked in order to pay 
for the army because jihād remains a collective obligation (farḍ kifāya), as long as there 
is a standing army and a treasury with the means to finance it:  
If the jihād is fought by soldiers who receive a stipulated stipend, it is not 
permitted to take anything from the people, as long as the bayt al-māl has any 
money or goods or land or estates to sell or other [valuables] than this. The 
ʿulamāʾ in the land of the sultan, may god bless his victory, agree on this.186  
Thus, while al-Nawawī does not question the legitimacy of taxing the people as a last 
resort, he points out that the circumstances under which Baybars made his claim far from 
qualified for this solution. In 675/1276–77, Baybars’s specific tax claims on Damascus 
reignited this discussion, and again al-Nawāwī stood up and criticised the tax. 187 
According to al-Suyūṭī, this time Baybars had in fact secured a fatwa from the ʿulamāʾ 
of Egypt authorising the tax, but al-Nawawī challenged the applicability of the fatwa, 
just as al-Sulamī had done, by pointing out that the sultan’s mamluks and slave girls still 
wore splendid clothes and jewellery that should be sold before he could impose any tax 
on Damascus.188  
We should note here that al-Suyūṭī was describing this event from a 9th/15th century 
perspective, and that he was renowned as a staunch critic of rulers in his own time, a bias 
that could have coloured his report of al-Nawawī’s conflict with Baybars.189 However, 
a report of the meeting is also presented in the Nihāyat al-Arab of al-Nuwayrī and the 
biographies of al-Nawawī written by his near contemporaries also portray him as a 
tireless opponent of injustice and illegal taxes.190 Moreover, in the Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn 
wa-ʿUmdat al-Muftīn, the fatwa collection ascribed to al-Nawawī, we find a fatwa that 
echoes his alleged critique of Baybars’s demands for nafaqa taxes during the 
670s/1270s. In the section dealing with zakāt, al-Nawawī states that a salaried army 
cannot lay claim to zakāt, and that even in an emergency where the ruler has no funds 
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with which to pay the army, it would be incumbent only on the wealthiest (aghniyāʾ al-
muslimīn) to support them financially.191 Note that al-Nawawī opens a narrow window 
for imposing taxes for defence purposes, but only when the ruler’s funds are depleted 
and only on a small and specific section of the population. 
Judging from these cases of negotiation, Mamluk rulers seem to have found the 
jurists’ seal of approval a preferable but by no means mandatory basis for their fiscal 
claims. In the event that no legal approval could be obtained, they resorted to coercion, 
which can be seen in the fact that these disputed taxes were imposed regardless of the 
scholars’ protests.  
The mere cosmetic quality of legal approval is presented in a very matter of fact 
fashion in the case of the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla of 699–700/1299–1300. As noted above, 
one of the taxation methods on the table in these years was the reintroduction of the per 
capita tax of 1 dinar per adult that Quṭuz had introduced in 658/1260. During one 
meeting at the citadel, Ibn al-Khashshāb (d. 711/1311), the deputy muḥtasib (market 
inspector) of Cairo, produced what he claimed was a copy of al-Sulamī’s 657 fatwa 
allowing the per capita tax. The document was brought to Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd, who was at 
that time the Shāfiʿī chief judge of Egypt, for confirmation. As we could expect based 
on the previous cases, the judge refused to ratify the fatwa by arguing, as al-Nawawī 
had, that the fatwa was not applicable because neither the sultan nor the amirs had 
depleted their personal fortunes or sold the jewellery of their wives. However, Ibn Daqīq 
al-ʻĪd’s response also included an element of pragmatism not found in the previous 
cases. According to al-ʿAynī, Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd stated that the amirs did not need a fatwa 
since they had the military power to push their policy through regardless of the jurists’ 
opinion. This attitude is summed up in the following quote which al-ʿAynī ascribes to 
Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd: ‘O amirs, there is no hindrance when you decide something and no 
one will object’.192 In this sense, Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd flatly acknowledged the fact that the 
Mamluk state had the power to impose the taxes it saw fit, while at the same time 
refusing to lend such policies the fig leaf of sharia-based legitimacy.  
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iii. Ibn Taymiyya’s approach to the 700 and 711 taxes  
Apart from this group of Shāfiʿī jurists, one other scholar, the Ḥanbalī jurist and 
theologian Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), is also reported to have interfered 
with two of the nafaqa tax campaigns of the early 8th/14th century, but with a different 
perspective than the one presented above. Ibn Taymiyya’s socio-political role and his 
position vis-à-vis the scholarly community of Damascus in general will be revisited in 
Chapters 4 and 5. At present, we confine ourselves to taking a short look at his stance on 
military taxes in light of his legal and political writings. 
According to al-Birzālī and Ibn Kathīr, this shaykh did not argue against the 
Muqarrar al-Khiyāla in 700/1300, as his Shāfiʿī colleagues had done when earlier sultans 
had asked the Damascenes for nafaqa funds.193 Nor did he attempt to distance the sharia 
from this tax campaign, as Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd had done in Cairo a few months before. 
Instead, Ibn Taymiyya actively sought to legitimise the taṣqīʿ imposed on Damascus by 
the governor al-Afram. While people were fleeing Damascus in droves, desperate to 
avoid paying the tax, Ibn Kathīr and al-Birzālī report that Ibn Taymiyya publicly urged 
people to stay and pay the tax as a good deed for the cause of God (fī sabīl illāh).194  
Before going into further detail about Ibn Taymiyya’s statement of support for the 
Muqarrar al-Khiyāla, we should note that this was but one example of his multi-faceted 
personal involvement in the struggle against the Ilkhānite Mongols as jurist, negotiator 
and combatant. During Ghazān’s occupation of Damascus in 699/1299–1300, the shaykh 
had negotiated the release of Mamluk prisoners with both the Ilkhān and his generals, 
had personally tried to prevent Mongol troops from looting the suburb of al-Ṣāliḥiyya 
and had worked to broker a peace between the Ghazān’s forces and the Mamluk garrison 
stationed in the citadel of Damascus.195 In 702/1303, when the Mamluk and Ilkhānite 
armies clashed in a series of battles from which the former would emerge victorious, Ibn 
Taymiyya participated both as a combatant in the field and through his famous ‘anti-
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Mongol fatwas’, which called to jihad against Ghazān and his forces even though they 
had formally converted to Islam.196 
In this light, we should keep in mind that Ibn Taymiyya’s ratification of the 
Muqarrar al-Khiyāla was part of the shaykh’s wider engagement in rescuing Damascus 
from the ravish of Ghazān’s occupation of Syria and not simply a permissible stance 
towards discretionary taxes. However, we can also examine his endorsement of the tax 
from the perspective of fiqh, as an example of Ibn Taymiyya’s pragmatic approach to 
combining sharia and raison d’état. Here we should remember that one of the zakāt-
worthy categories listed in Qurʾān 9:60 is expenditure ‘in God’s cause’ (fī sabīl illāh), 
which is interpreted as those who fight in the jihād, as we saw above. By using this 
particular formulation for justifying the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla, Ibn Taymiyya 
demonstrates that he regards the taṣqīʿ demanded by the governor as an obligation of all 
Damascenes based on sharia.  
It could be argued that when al-Afram imposed his tax on Damascus, it was indeed 
an act of last resort that Ibn Jamāʿa’s Taḥrīr would also have recognised. At this point, 
the Ilkhānite armies were returning to Damascus, and because the Mamluk army lacked 
the strength to defend the city, the Mamluk governor could legitimately demand that the 
Damascenes give up their possessions to aid the defence. On the other hand, we should 
also view Ibn Taymiyya’s defence of the tax in light of his juridical writings on zakāt. 
First, there is the question of who can receive funds from the zakāt. Henri Laoust argues 
that Ibn Taymiyya’s general interpretation of ‘fī sabīl illāh’ was more flexible than that 
of his Shāfiʿī colleagues insofar as he viewed not only voluntary fighters but also the 
soldier of a standing salaried army as worthy recipients of zakāt money, which both Ibn 
Jamāʿa and al-Nawawī denied.197  
Second, there is the question of what can be considered as zakāt and who is 
allowed to define it. In this respect, Ibn Taymiyya’s willingness to declare al-Afram’s 
ṭaṣqīʿ a form of zakāt concurs with several of the shaykh’s fatwas, which state that 
money taken by the sultan for an expenditure like defence can be considered as a form 
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of zakāt, provided that it is spent in the pursuit of maṣlaḥa.198 In other words, Ibn 
Taymiyya seems to have been a proponent of a more pragmatic approach to zakāt than 
Ibn Jamāʿa, who, as we saw in the Taḥrīr al-Aḥkām, demanded strict differentiation 
between zakāt, which he argued should be used in strict accordance with the Qurʾanic 
stipulations, and the funds of the bayt al-māl, which he argued should be used for 
purposes that promoted general maṣlaḥa for example building an army.  
In addition, Abdul Azim Islahi identifies another place in Ibn Taymiyya’s juridical 
writings that could explain why he would have been open to accepting methods of 
taxation such as the taṣqīʿ of 700/1300.199 Islahi mentions a fatwa by Ibn Taymiyya on 
what he calls al-maẓālim al-mushtaraka (collective tyranny). This fatwa states that even 
though taxes on wealth and property, including fixed per capita taxes, were essentially 
tyrannical, they should be handled justly by the tax collectors, who should make sure to 
divide the burden evenly among the taxpayers. At the same time, the taxpayers 
themselves should pay what was required of them lest they inadvertently increase the 
burden on the rest of their community and become guilty of tyranny themselves.200 This 
point is especially relevant in relation to the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla because tax evasion 
through flight was indeed increasing the tax burden on the remaining population of 
Damascus. Ibn Taymiyya might then have interfered in order to prevent what he saw as 
tyranny not by the state, but by members of the Damascene community against their 
peers. As we saw above, Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd accepted a politics of brute force, but refused 
to compromise the purity of the sharia by giving his blessing to the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla. 
In contrast, it seems that Ibn Taymiyya actively sought to make room for a sharia-based 
approach to taxation of civilians for military purposes, not only for the sake of making 
sharia seem relevant but also as a way to limit injustice in society.  
However, in a further reference provided by Ibn Kathīr, we see that Ibn 
Taymiyya’s approval of the 700 tax was not without conditions, since he demanded that 
the money was spent according to the stated intent. When Egyptian forces left Syria and 
the reinforcement of the Damascene garrison failed to materialise, Ibn Taymiyya 
personally sought out the governor al-Afram and even proceeded to follow the Egyptian 
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army until it reached Cairo, apparently in an attempt to hold the commanders 
accountable for the taxes they had collected. This insistence on accountability is also 
present in Ibn Taymiyya’s theoretical writings on the relationship between rulers and 
their subjects. As Caterina Bori argues, Ibn Taymiyya’s view of public finance in his 
politico-juridical treatise al-Siyāsa al-Sharʿiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-Rāʿī wa-al-Raʿiyya is 
permeated by the idea of trusteeship (amāna). In the case of economic politics, public 
revenue does not become the property of those who collect it; rather, the collectors are 
to behave as agents or trustees and are responsible for spending it accordingly.201 Ibn 
Taymiyya’s approval of the extraction of the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla should be seen in the 
context of an equally important conviction that the governor and the Mamluk generals 
should live up to the responsibility that accompanied the funds they had been entrusted 
with.  
When we turn from the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla in 700/1300 to the 711 tax, we get 
the impression that Ibn Taymiyya’s willingness to allow rulers more flexibility in 
taxation had limits that he actively sought to impose. Ibn Taymiyya was in Cairo at the 
time of the protest. Between 707/1307 and 709/1310, he had been imprisoned in 
Alexandria because of complaints lodged against him by an Egyptian Sufi group. 
However, he was released in 709/1310 on the personal order of the sultan al-Nāṣir when 
the latter returned from his ten-month exile in Jordan and ousted the new sultan, al-
Jāshankīr. 202  Ibn Taymiyya remained in Cairo until 712/1312; during this time, he 
corresponded with his relatives, friends and disciples in Damascus and also had some 
personal contact with the sultan.  
According to Ibn Kathīr, Ibn Taymiyya was alerted by his connections to the 
situation in Damascus in the late summer of 711/1311, which led him to take up the case 
with the sultan:  
It was said (wa-qīla) that the shaykh Taqī al-Dīn had heard about the matter 
[the taxes or Karāy’s behaviour?] from the people Syria and had informed the 
sultan of it, and so he immediately send for him to be forcefully seized.203  
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I have found no other evidence of Ibn Taymiyya’s involvement than this short notice. 
There is reason to be sceptical of it because it is reported only by Ibn Kathīr, and because 
he initiates it with the phrase and it was said, instead of simply writing it as a fact. 
Moreover, even if such an encounter did take place, there is reason to be sceptical of the 
direct connection that Ibn Kathīr makes between Ibn Taymiyya’s advice to the sultan 
and the arrest of the governor. In chapter 5, we examine in closer detail how this report 
about Ibn Taymiyya fits with Ibn Kathīr’s general portrayal of the shaykh and compare 
it with alternative portrayals crafted by other people who were part of his circles.204 
However, if we regard this report in light of the discussion tied to the Muqarrar al-
Khiyāla, it seems plausible that he would have intervened. As we saw above, Ibn 
Taymiyya sought to combine sharia law with the needs of the state without rendering the 
former irrelevant or constricting the latter through a more flexible interpretation of 
maṣlaḥa and the principle of trusteeship (amāna). Given that the situation in 711/1311 
seems to have been much less dire than in 700/1300, it should not surprise us if Ibn 
Taymiyya felt that the 711 tax of 750.000 dirhams, a much higher sum than what had 
been demanded in earlier years, could not be defended as a necessary claim. 
Furthermore, the fact that Karāy chose to respond to the protest with dismissal, violence 
and arrests could certainly also be seen as a violation of his office, if we regard it through 
Ibn Taymiyya’s eyes, as an entrusted mandate to promote the general welfare of the 
community.  
 
VI. Conclusion: the Message and Effect of the 711 Protest 
i. A moral economy of taxation? 
As we have just seen, the legitimacy of nafaqa taxation was a contentious issue. On the 
one hand, successive Mamluk sultans attempted to secure stamps of sharia-ratification 
by seeking fatwas that supported their tax plans. While some jurists were apparently 
willing to sign such fatwas, at least three prominent Shāfiʿīs, al-Sulamī, al-Nawawī and 
Ibn Daqīq al-ʻĪd, resisted. Meanwhile, Ibn Taymiyya adopted a more flexible approach, 
permitting nafaqa taxation when he regarded the purpose as sound, and resisting it when 
he did not. What emerges from these debates is the impression that the question of 
whether a tax was just cannot be answered unequivocally with reference to the sharia. 
Rather than resulting in a fixed answer, the appeal to sharia opens up a discursive field 
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with contending positions. The question, then, is whether we can regard this discursive 
field as wide enough to include the largely non-verbal communication of the protesters 
on the 13th of Jumādā I/27th of September 1311.  
In his article ‘Understanding Arab Protest Movements’ (1986), Edmund Burke III 
examines street protests in the Middle East and North Africa in the 18th–20th centuries 
as expressions of a wider set of Islamic notions of justice that he calls ‘the moral 
economy of Islam’. 205  Under this conceptual heading, Burke groups Qurʾānic 
prohibitions on usury and non-canonic taxes together with injunctions on the ruler to 
govern justly, for example, by ensuring fair prices on foodstuffs, into ‘an Islamic social 
compact, which provided the moral basis of society’.206 Burke specifies that this moral 
economy was not a fixed code, but rather a set of symbols that could be employed by 
different parties, protesters as well as rulers, in accordance with their specific interests. 
Burke also specifies that while this moral economy was partially expressed in the 
legalistic language of the jurists, it could also be expressed ‘[…] in the language of 
Islamic notions of justice available to all […]’.207  
Burke’s concept is a fruitful prism for viewing the nafaqa conflicts of the 7th/13th 
and 8th/14th centuries. From the legal debates surveyed above, we get the clear 
impression that taxes were a moral issue, and that each contestant would present himself 
as the party defending justice. Furthermore, if we think about the sharia as a form of 
moral economy that is only partially expressed through fiqh (jurisprudence), we could 
see the fact that the 711 protesters chose to meet the governor with items evoking the 
purported period of just rule under the rightly-guided Caliphs, the figure of the prophet 
and the institution of the caliphate, as a non-legalistic appeal to an Islamic moral 
economy, presented either in lieu of or as a supplement to demands formulated in the 
language of fiqh. In other words, the protesters might have thought of these particular 
objects as embodying wider Islamic notions of justice that they felt were being violated 
by the 711 tax as a result of the tax in general and perhaps as the particular result of 
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Karāy’s decision to extend the tax to include the awqāf. In this light, the expression that 
al-Ṣafadī ascribes to the protesters, ‘al-muṣḥaf mā yuradd’, could reveal a conviction 
that they were invoking a foundational Islamic notion of just taxation that they 
understood to be embodied in the special Qurʾān codex housed in the Umayyad Mosque.  
The wielding of the banners, the Qurʾān and the sandal as non-verbal calls for 
Islamic justice, does not, however, exclude the possibility that they were also intended 
to bestow baraka on the protesters or to represent local Damascene patriotism in the face 
of Mamluk rule, as argued above. Rather, we should think of these items as endowed 
with multiple layers of meaning, all of which could have been put into play by the 711 
protesters in order to bolster their claims against what they saw as excessive taxation. 
 
ii. Did the 711 protest work? 
Earlier in this chapter, we saw that the protest appears to be part of a wider process of 
negotiation. The question that has not yet been answered is how effective it was. Looking 
at the immediate aftermath, as described in the Damascene sources, the protest seems to 
have been very effective. Using a combination of negotiation, protest and more 
negotiation, the Damascenes apparently prompted Karāy to lower the claim from 
750.000 to 200.000 dirhams and restrict the tax base to a smaller group of wealthy 
individuals. 
However, as mentioned above, the case does not stop there. Ten days after the 
protest, on Thursday the 23rd of Jumādā I/7th of October, governor Karāy was deposed 
and arrested by Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn (d. 731/1330–31), the sultan’s dawādār (inkwell-
bearer, or master of ceremonies). The governor was brought in chains to exile at the 
Jordanian fortress of Karak where he remained for several years. Three weeks after the 
arrest, the 711 tax was officially abolished by a sultanic decree, which was read out in 
the Umayyad Mosque on Friday the 16th of Jumādā II/29th of October. According to al-
Jazarī*, this declaration included the following words:  
Verily when we [the sultan] learned of the weakening (ḍaʿf) of the city and 
of its people we forfeited what we had demanded, out of consideration and 
kindness towards them (min al-raʿiyya wa-al-iḥsān ilayhim) and out of 
objection against what had come from Sayf al-Dīn Karāy.208  
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In light of this decree, the protesters seem to have been successful not only in affecting 
tax policies on the local level, but also in their ability to affect politics on the imperial 
level, leading the sultan to arrest the governor and abolish the tax. It is exactly this image 
of a successful protest with imperial effect that several Damascene chroniclers strive to 
promote.209 However, before we buy into the conclusion of the local contemporary 
sources, it is necessary to take a brief look at the contextual information about the 
position of Sayf al-Dīn Karāy al-Manṣūrī in Mamluk politics around 711/1311. 
As mentioned above, Karāy was part of a wider group of Manṣūrī amirs who had 
supported al-Nāṣir’s return to the throne in 709/1310, and who had been rewarded 
accordingly with high positions. However, in the fall of 711/1311, parallel with the 
unfolding of the tax conflict in Damascus, al-Nāṣir initiated an arrest campaign among 
the higher echelons of the Mamluk establishment. This purge was concentrated around 
the Manṣūrī amirs he had promoted during the previous year. The official reason for the 
purge was that al-Nāṣir suspected an imminent coup. Whether or not his concerns were 
justified, the purge led to the deposition and imprisonment of the accused coup leader, 
the viceroy (nāʾib al-salṭana) of Egypt, Baktamur al-Jūkandār al-Manṣūrī (d. 711/1311). 
Al-Jūkandār’s arrest was followed by the arrest of several Manṣūrī governors in Syria 
who, like Karāy, had originally come out in support of al-Nāṣir in 709/1310. 
Looking at the wider political context beyond Damascus, it is very likely that 
Karāy had already been singled out for deportation as part of this purge, and that his 
arrest simply coincided with the tax conflict. In this light, we should perhaps ascribe 
only a partial role to the protesters in causing Karāy’s downfall. The protest and 
especially Karāy’s violent handling of it might then have betrayed his strained relations 
with the civilian population of Damascus, which could have made him an easier target 
for the sultan’s arrest campaign.  
As for the tax itself, cases from previous decades indicate that mobilisation taxes 
were malleable and frequently subject to renegotiations and exemptions when the 
political situation changed. For example, in 700/1300, property and agricultural taxes in 
Damascus were abolished once the imminent threat of invasion had abated.  
Thus, we can speculate that the rumours of Ilkhānite troop movements reported by 
al-Nuwayrī had simply failed to materialise, and that the 711 tax was deemed 
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unnecessary from a military perspective.210 In this case, the lofty words of the sultanic 
decree that was read out on the 16th of Jumādā II 711 /29th of October 1311 could thus 
have been no more than a case of sultanic propaganda: an attempt to gloss over a 
pragmatic administrative decision to abolish the tax while at the same time heightening 
the sultan’s local popularity at the expense of a governor, who had already been singled 
out as a political enemy and a candidate for deportation.  
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Chapter 3 – Taḥt al-Qalʿa: a medieval Islamic ceremonial space 
I. Introduction 
This chapter adds an additional facet to one of the main the arguments presented in 
Chapter 2: that the protest of 711/1311 was not a haphazard spontaneous incident, but a 
coordinated strategy of urban politics that connected with broader patterns of political 
culture. While the previous chapter explored the symbolic meanings associated with the 
objects used by the protesters, this chapter explores their choice of venue and through it 
the connection between political culture and urban space.  
Three of the accounts of the 711 protest used in Chapter 2 identify the destination 
for the protest march as the extra-mural suburb of Taḥt al-Qalʿa (Below the Citadel), 
which was located north of the Barāda River across from the northern ramparts of the 
citadel. According to the three authors, al-Nuwayrī (d. 733/1333), al-Ṣafadī (d. 
764/1363), and al-Jazarī* (d. 738/1338), the 711/1311 protesters left the walled city via 
Bāb al-Farraj and marched to Sūq al-Khayl, the horse market of Damascus, which was 
located in the centre of Taḥt al-Qalʿa. It was here that they met the governor and his 
entourage and here that the protest procession escalated into violence.211  
I argue in this chapter that the choice of Sūq al-Khayl as the destination of the 
march was not coincidental but premediated and charged with symbolic meaning. As I 
demonstrate below, the history of this particular area between the 6th/12th and 8th/14th 
centuries shows that Taḥt al-Qalʿa had been the subject of the attention of local rulers 
since the emergence of the urban citadel as a political centre in the 6th/12th century. Lying 
just below the citadel walls, the Taḥt al-Qalʿa was gradually cultivated into a royal 
ceremonial zone designed to represent the power of the ruling prince or sultan. This 
made Taḥt al-Qalʿa a highly significant choice as protest venue for groups that sought to 
present their claims to the political order.  
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Abū Zayd et al. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), vol. 4, 153; .Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, 
Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān: Tārīkh al-Sanawāt m1312–1297/ h711 - 697, ed. Ḥamza A. ʿAbbās (Abu Dhabi: 
Hayʾat Abū Ẓaby lil-Thaqāfa wa-al-Turāth, al-Majmaʿ al-Thaqāfī, 2007), 1435. As explained in Chapter 
1, I subscribe to Li Guo’s theory that the 697–702 section of the Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān is al-Yūnīnī’s 
synthesis of al-Jazarī’s chronicle entries for this period, while the 702–711 section of the Dhayl is written 
by al-Jazarī* and misidentified by a later copyist as belonging to the Dhayl. In the maintext I identify the 
author of the 697–702 section as al-Yūnīnī/al-Jazarī while auhtor of the 702–711 section is identified as 
al-Jazarī*. In footnotes, the Dhayl is referred to as al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, x in keeping with the Abu Dhabi 
edition from 2007. See above, 25–27. 
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Earlier scholars of both Europe and the Islamic world have already established the 
argument that space mattered when medieval people staged official ceremonies, 
negotiations or even popular protests.212  This chapter draws particularly on Konrad 
Hirschler’s 2007 article on protests and violence in the Mamluk period: ‘Riten der 
Gewalt: Protest und Aufruhr in Kairo und Damaskus (13./7. bis 10./16. Jahrhundert)’. 
Hirschler’s main argument is that protests in Damascus as well as Cairo followed 
consciously chosen patterns of behaviour, which he calls ‘the rites of violence’ (Riten 
der Gewalt).213 An important part of these rites, he argues, was the patterned use of 
specific urban spaces: ‘Protest processions followed geographical patterns that had 
developed on the basis of an awareness that certain spaces were suited for and worthy of 
protest’.214 This chapter follows Hirschler’s argument and seeks explore the protest 
worthiness inherent in Taḥt al-Qalʿa and Sūq al-Khayl.  
However, the chapter will also contradict some of Hirschler’s central conclusions 
about the geography of ceremonies and protests in Damascus. In Cairo, Hirschler argues, 
the geographic patterns of protest centred on the open space of the Cairene Sūq al-Khayl 
in al-Rumayla south of the citadel. In contrast, he states, the centre of the ceremonial 
geography of Damascus was the Umayyad Mosque. As for the surroundings of the 
citadel of Damascus, Hirschler looks only at the area within the walled city and 
concludes that this area was irrelevant for protests because it did not afford space for 
larger gatherings.215  
                                                        
212 In one of many studies that have examined protests and urban topography in Medieval Europe, Joelle 
Rollo-Koster and Alizah Holstein have shown that the message of Roman protesters in the 14th century 
can be decoded by examining their choice of procession routes. See Joelle Rollo-Koster and Alizah 
Holstein, 'Anger and Spectacle in Late Medieval Rome: Gauging Emotion in Urban Topography', in Cities, 
Texts, and Social Networks, 400–1500: Experiences and Perceptions of Medieval Urban Space, ed. C. 
Goodson, A. E. Lester, and C. Symes (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 149–74. 
For the Islamic context, I recommend E. G. Heilman, whose 1978 Ph.D. thesis Popular Protest in 
Medieval Baghdad, 295–334 argues convincingly that protesting groups in Baghdad during 4rd/10th and 
5th/11th centuries carefully chose the venue of their assemblies according to the nature of their grievance. 
See Elizabeth G. Heilman, 'Popular Protest in Medieval Baghdad, 295–334 AH' (Princeton University, 
Princeton, 1978). Likewise, Nimrod Luz has demonstrated in The Mamluk City in the Middle East – 
History, Culture and the Urban Landscape that manipulating the venue of negotiations was an 
indispensable part of power struggles between different confessional groups in 8th/14th century Jerusalem. 
See Nimrod Luz, The Mamluk City in the Middle East – History, Culture and the Urban Landscape 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
213 Konrad Hirschler, 'Riten der Gewalt: Protest und Aufruhr in Kairo und Damaskus (7./13. Bis 10./16. 
Jahrhundert)', in Islamwissenschaft Als Kulturwissenschaft; 1: Historische Anthropologie. Ansätze Und 
Möglichkeiten, ed. S Conermann, S. and v. Hees (Schenefeld (Hamburg): EB-Verlag, 2007), 205–233. 
214 Ibid., 211. NB: My translation from the original German. 
215 Ibid., 212–213. 
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Hirschler is right to highlight the significance of the Umayyad Mosque. However, 
I argue that we cannot understand the 711 protest or the geography of Medieval 
Damascene politics in general without widening the scope of our examinations beyond 
the walled city to include the extra-mural area of Taḥt al-Qalʿa, the customary scene of 
military and religious parades, executions and consequently protests in the 7th/13th and 
8th/14th centuries.  
Examining this space also has implications for how we understand not only the 
711 protest but also the strategies of self-representation employed by the Mamluk regime 
within Damascene urban space. This allows us to modify Michael Chamberlain’s 
description of Mamluk rule in Damascus as an audience state, where representatives of 
the sultan abstained from ceremonial stagings of their own power, preferring instead to 
appear as prominent spectators of traditional performances. 216  We return to 
Chamberlain’s statement at several points in this chapter to see how the Taḥt al-Qalʿa 
and the practices that were tied to this place reflect on the concept of an audience state. 
 
II. Urban Citadels: a 6th/12th to 8th/14th Century Perspective 
The overarching aim of this section is to show that the protest worthiness of Damascus’s 
Taḥt al-Qalʿa was not based solely on the ceremonial practices that the Mamluk rulers 
staged in the area in the 8th/14th century. Rather, our examination needs to begin with a 
longer historical perspective extending from the 6th/12th century onward that relates how 
the surroundings of the citadel, hereunder the area that became known as Taḥt al-Qalʿa, 
emerged as part of a ‘royal space’ cultivated by successive rulers. Because this process 
of cultivation was not unique to Damascus but rather a part of a general reorientation of 
urban space in the cities under Zangid and Ayyubid rule from the 6th/12th century 
onwards, this section adopts a regional rather than a local perspective.  
Nasser Rabbat mentions building activities on citadels in Aleppo, Homs, Hama, 
Baalbek and Damascus under Nūr al-Dīn Zangī (d. 569/1174), the most prominent 
examples besides Damascus being Cairo and Aleppo.217 By the 8th/14th century, each of 
the three cities had a specific zone designated as Taḥt al-Qalʿa, which were the settings 
of similar ceremonial practices. The three cities illustrate that the emergence of a 
particular ceremonial space known as Taḥt al-Qalʿa has its roots in the rise of the citadel 
                                                        
216 Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 48–49. 
217 Nasser O. Rabbat, The Citadel of Cairo (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 1989), 14. 
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and its surroundings as the actual and symbolic centre of ruling power on a regional 
level. By comparing the development of these citadels and their surroundings, we can 
see that the ceremonial geography of Damascus was less exceptional and less dominated 
by the Mosque than we would immediately think. Moreover, its development resembles 
that of Cairo and Aleppo even though the pre-existing built environment of Damascus 
and the natural features of the landscape imposed specific limitations on urban 
development that made its ceremonial geography less coherent than in the other two 
cities.  
 
i. Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo: three cities, three citadels 
As the term Taḥt al-Qalʿa implies, this space owes its importance first to the fact that it 
was an area that lay below the citadel. Both the Zangid and especially the early Ayyubid 
rulers initiated major development projects aimed at making the citadel the active 
political and administrative centre of their respective cities. The Citadel of Damascus 
(see Figure 1) lies at the north-western corner of the walled city, and its northern and 
western fortifications form an integral part of the course of the city wall. It was originally 
constructed in the 4th/10th century as a small defensive structure on the ruins of an ancient 
Roman castrum, but during the later 5th/11th and early 6th/12th century, it was gradually 
converted into a political and administrative centre, first by the Saljuq ruler Ṭurṭūsh I (d. 
487-88/1095) and later by members of the Burid dynasty.218 When Nūr al-Dīn conquered 
Damascus and ousted the Burids in 549/1154, he began a major urban development 
project aimed at making the city the capital of his realm; one of the major foci of this 
effort was the conversion of the Saljuq citadel into an abode suitable for a ruler. Without 
changing the original size, he fortified the walls and fitted the inner courtyard with a 
small palace and other amenities such as a ḥammām, a congregational mosque and a 
market. Nūr al-Dīn also added two gates to the city wall next to the citadel: Bāb al-Faraj 
at its north-eastern corner and Bāb al-Naṣr at its south-western corner. With Nūr al-Dīn’s 
project, the citadel of Damascus effectively became a small city within the city.219  
                                                        
218  R. Stephen Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols – The Ayyubids of Damascus 1193–1260, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 148. 
219 Its self-sustainability was further increased by the fact that the Banias stream, which brought water to 
the walled city, entered via the citadel, thus making it possible to control the water resources from within 
its walls. For general information on the citadel, see Ross Burns, Damascus. A History (London: Routledge, 
2005), 164. For particular information on the water resource, see Sophie Berthier, 'La Citadelle de Damas: 
Les Apports D’une Étude Archéologique', in Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria – From the 
Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period, ed. Hugh Kennedy (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2006), 
151–64, 158. 
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However, the citadel of the Mamluk period owes little to Nūr al-Dīn’s design. It  
was instead the result of a protracted reformation of the citadel initiated in 604/1207–8 
by the Ayyubid sultan al-Malik al-ʿĀdil (d. 615/1218), who was the younger brother of 
the famous Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193). In 598/1202, al-ʿĀdil had definitively 
out-manoeuvred his nephews, the sons of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, in the struggle for the title of 
sultan of the Ayyubid federation.220 Although he appointed his son al-Muʿaẓẓam ʿIsā (d. 
624/1227) as amir of Damascus, al-ʿĀdil personally took up residence in the city for a 
number of years and embarked on several major construction and renovation projects 
that included the citadel, the Umayyad Mosque and the open-air prayer grounds of al-
Muṣallā south of the walled city.221 Al-ʿĀdil’s changes to the citadel were extensive: the 
ground plan was expanded to its present 220 x 150 metres and the walls were razed and 
built anew. Furthermore, 11 imposing towers more than 30 metres high were built along 
its perimeter. The entire construction was finished in 613–14/1217.222  
Like its Damascene counterpart, the citadel of Aleppo (See Figure 2) is an older 
fortified position on the edge of the medieval city, which was turned into an impressive 
palatial and administrative stronghold in the late 6th/12th and early 7th/13th century. As in 
Damascus, the citadel of Aleppo was not the geographical centre of the Ayyubid city. It 
lay instead on a natural hill formation east of the city centre, and constituted an elevated 
interruption of the course of the city wall.223 A palatial structure was built on the site by 
the Mirdasid dynasty in the 5th/11th century, and Nūr al-Dīn added fortifications to the 
hill after he inherited the city in 541/1146.224  
                                                        
220 The title ‘sultan’ in this period did not connote the centralised power of the Mamluk period. The 
Ayyubid sultan should rather be regarded as the head of a federation of princedoms with varying degrees 
of independence. For a detailed account of these struggles, see chapter 3 in Humphreys, 1977. 
221 Lorenz Korn argues that even though Cairo was the capital of the federation, Damascus remained its 
symbolic centre. As an example, he points to the fact that many Ayyubid princes built both representative 
palaces and family mausoleums here, even though they were based in other cities. See Lorenz Korn, 
'Ayyubidische Architektur in Agypten Und Syrien – Bautatigkeit Im Kontext von Politik Und Gesellschaft 
564–658/1169–1260' (University of Tübingen, Tübingen, 1999), 153. 
222 Jean Sauvaget, 'La Citadelle de Damas', Syria 1 (1930): 59–90, 79–80. 
223  The Ayyubid walls were destroyed by the Mongols in 658/1260. When they were rebuilt in the 
790s/1390s, the wall was extended east around the citadel, thus adding the suburban areas behind the 
citadel to the walled city. See Jean Sauvaget, Alep: Essai Sur Le Développement D’une Grande Ville 
Syrienne, Des Origines Au Milieu Du XIXe Siècle. Texte (Paris: Geuthner, P., 1941), 166–167; Anne-Marie 
Eddé, 'Alep', in Grandes Villes Méditerranéennes Du Monde Musulman Medieval, ed. J.C. Garcin (Rome: 
Ecole Francaise de Rome, 2000), 157–175, 166. 
224 Julia Gonella, 'The Citadel of Aleppo: Recent Studies', in Muslim Military Architecture in Greater 
Syria – From the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period, ed. Hugh Kennedy (Leiden: Brill Academic 
Publishing, 2006), 165–75, 168–169 and Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth, Aleppo: Historische Und 
Geographische Beiträge Zur Baulichen Gestaltung, Zur Sozialen Organisation Und Zur Wirtschaftlichen 
Dynamik Einer vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole, (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert, 1984), 172. 
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It was, however, during the rule of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s eldest son al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī (d. 
613/1216) that the major development took place. Al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī ruled Aleppo from 
581–82/1186 until his death; during this time, he invested immense sums in the 
renovation of the citadel. On top of the hill he built a new palatial structure known as 
Dār al-ʿIzz (The House of Honor/Power), and in order to highlight the way the complex 
towered over the city, he had the sides of the hill covered in white limestone slabs. 
However, his most monumental contribution was the construction of a majestic access 
ramp that rose above the hillside and ended in an imposing portal tower at the top. The 
palace, portal tower and access ramp of al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī became part of an east–west axis 
that connected the citadel with the city as a new processional road starting at the Dār al-
ʿIzz and leading through the portal to the foot of the citadel, past Aleppo’s Umayyad 
Mosque at the city center and ending at the western city gate of Bāb Anṭākiā.225  
The case of the citadel of Cairo (See Figure 3) differs from that of Damascus and 
Aleppo in so far as there was no pre-Zangid citadel to transform. Its construction was 
initiated ex nihilo by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in the 570s/1170s as part of his effort to unify and 
integrate the old Fatimid palatial city of al-Qāhira with the popular quarters of al-Fusṭāṭ. 
As part of this unification project, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn began building a long city wall that 
would encompass both al-Qāhira and al-Fusṭāṭ, the latter of which had no previous 
fortifications. As in Damascus and Aleppo, the citadel was erected as an ‘interruption’ 
of the course of the city wall. It was located on the eastern flank in between the two 
former city centres on a natural hill formation known as al-Muqaṭṭam. Henceforth, the 
areas west of this hill would be the centre of the Ayyubid and Mamluk city of Cairo. 
Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn did not live to see his wall and citadel finished; it was al-Malik al-Kāmil 
(d. 635/1238), al-ʿĀdil’s son and successor, who completed it in the 2nd decade of the 
7th/13th century. It appears that the ambitious, all-encompassing wall project was dropped 
after the death of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn; his successors concentrated on fortifying the citadel and 
developing the surrounding areas.226 
The citadels, which towered over the Ayyubid cities of the 7th/13th century, 
fulfilled more than a defensive or administrative function. As Rabbat puts it, the princes 
who inhabited them regarded them as: 
                                                        
225Gaube and Wirth, 1984, 172 and 162. 
226 Rabbat, 1989, 75–76. 
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 […] the physical manifestation of their power and dominion which was 
emphasized by the trappings of sovereignty such as the royal insignia and the 
gilded titulatures carved or inscribed on their surfaces or the banners and flags 
hanging from their ramparts and towers.227 
Jere L. Bacharach and Yasser Tabbaa have developed this argument further by arguing 
that the citadel can be interpreted as a way to cultivate a ruling culture in the 5th/11th– 
6th/12th centuries based on the visible but demarcated presence of the ruler within the 
urban sphere. Whereas earlier ruling groups distanced themselves horizontally from their 
subjects in secluded palatial complexes, the new citadels signalled that the new ruling 
house was at the same time an integrated part of the urban fabric and vertically raised 
above it.228 When we discuss the ceremonial zones called Taḥt al-Qalʿa that emerged 
immediately below the walls of all these citadels during the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries, 
we should understand them essentially as extensions of these symbols of the ruler’s 
presence within the urban fabric.  
Before turning our focus to Taḥt al-Qalʿa, we should note the following shift in the 
status of citadels. The end of the Ayyubid period and the beginning of the Mamluk period 
brought a shift from a federation of princedoms towards a centralised sultanate, which 
was also reflected in the changing functions of the urban citadels. The citadel of Cairo 
remained the palace of the Mamluk sultan until the beginning of the 10th/16th century, 
and as such retained both its administrative functions and symbolic position as the seat 
of sultanic power. Meanwhile, the role of the citadels of Damascus and Aleppo changed 
drastically, as these cities were reduced to mere provincial capitals.  
When Sultan Baybars (d. 676/1277) consolidated Egyptian control over Syria after 
the defeat of the Ilkhānite Mongols in 658/1260, he introduced a division of power in 
Damascus and Aleppo between the two military officers: the nāʾib al-salṭana, the 
governor of the city and the surrounding province, and the nāʾib al-qalʿa, the 
commander of the citadel, who was given complete authority over the citadel and its 
resident garrison. In practical terms, the citadels of Damascus and Aleppo became 
independent entities isolated from the local urban fabric and outside the control of the 
                                                        
227 Ibid., 83. 
228 Jere L. Bacharach, 'Administrative Complexes, Palaces and Citadels: Changes in the Loci of Medieval 
Muslim Rule', in The Ottoman City and Its Parts – Urban Structure and Social Order, ed. Irene A Bierman, 
A. Abou-El-Haj Rifa’at, and Donald Preziosi (New York: New Rochelle, 1991), 111–128; Yasser Tabbaa, 
'Defending Ayyubid Aleppo: The Fortifications of Al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī (1186–1216)', in Muslim Military 
Architecture in Greater Syria – From the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period, ed. Hugh Kennedy 
(Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2006), 176–183. 
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governor. They were intended as advanced bases of sultanic power able to withstand a 
local rebellion or hostile takeover of the surrounding city. In symbolic terms, they ceased 
to represent the power of a local independent ruler, and became instead a symbol of the 
authority of the remote Mamluk sultan of Cairo.229  
The new role of the citadel as symbol of sultanic power becomes visible in 
descriptions of the ceremonies that played out around it. On certain occasions, both the 
governors of Damascus and Aleppo would march to a specific gate of the respective 
citadels to signify their submission and loyalty to the sultan.230 However, these gates 
were just one element in an increasingly complex network of ceremonial spaces that 
came to surround the urban citadel.  
 
ii. The surroundings of the citadel and their ceremonial function 
The imposing structure of the citadel alone provided a strong manifestation of the ruler’s 
power in the city, be he an independent local prince or a remote sultan. However, as 
Yasser Tabbaa argues, we also need to consider the symbolic significance of the citadel’s 
surroundings from the Zangid period onward:  
[…] though impregnable and separate from the city, these citadels had to be 
linked with it through various physical and ceremonial ways. This linkage 
was quite often manifested in public squares beneath the citadel.231  
In Aleppo as well as in Damascus and Cairo, Nūr al-Dīn and his successors did indeed 
cultivate the areas adjacent to the citadel and made them flourish as zones of interaction. 
Between the 6th/12th and 8th/14th centuries, the areas south and east of the citadel of 
Damascus became dotted with a hospital, numerous madrasas and ḥadīth-colleges, as 
well as mausoleums endowed by the rulers. In Aleppo, several madrasas were also 
                                                        
229 Sauvaget, 1941, 167; Gaube and Wirth, 1984, 172. In the case of Damascus, a temporary division had 
already been introduced in 643/1245 when the Ayyubid Sultan in Cairo al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (d. 647/1249) took 
control of the city and divided the power over Damascus between a wālī al-madīna (the commander of 
the city) and a wālī al-qalʿa (the commander of the citadel). This division of power was suspended in 
649/1250 when al-Nāṣir Yūsuf (d. ?), the prince of Aleppo, exploited the turmoil in Egypt that followed 
al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s death in order to take over Damascus. He held the city for a decade until the arrival of 
the Mongols. See Humphreys, 1977, 290 and Cyril Yovitchitch, Fortresses Du Proche-Orient – 
L’architecture Militarie Des Ayyoubides (Paris: Presse de l’universite Paris-Sorbonne, 2011), 63. 
230 For Aleppo, see Sauvaget, 1941, 169. For Damascus, see, e.g., Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm 
ibn Abū Bakr al-Jazarī, Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Anbāʾihi wa-Wafayāt al-Akābir wa-al-Aʿyān min 
Abnāʾihi 3 Vols., ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Ṣaydā - Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1998), vol. 
2, 463. Henri Sauvaire, 'Description de Damas: ‛Oyūn et-Tawārīkh (Les Sources Des Chroniques) Par 
Moḥammad Ebn Chāker / Toḥfat El Anām fī Fadāïl Ch-Chām Par Chams Ed-Dīn Aboul ‛Abbās Aḥmad 
Ebn Moḥammad El Bosrāwy', Journal Asiatique 7, no. Mai-Juin (1896): 369–459, 426. 
231 Tabbaa, 2006, 178. 
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constructed on the western and southern side of the citadel, which gave the area a clear 
politico-religious character. 232  The maydān (hippodrome) also became an early 
important feature of the citadels’ surroundings, where rulers could demonstrate their 
military might through polo games and military parades. 
 In particular, the image of the ruler as the just arbiter and punisher of wrongs also 
found its expression near the citadels with the so-called Dār al-ʿAdl (House of Justice). 
Structures bearing this name were built south of the citadel in Damascus, and in Aleppo 
and Cairo between 544–45/1150 and 658/1260, and were designed as the seat of the 
weekly or twice-weekly maẓālim (grievances) court, where the ruler or a trusted deputy 
reviewed the grievances of the subject population outside the normal framework of the 
sharia courts of the judge (qāḍī). While the actual observance of the maẓālim tradition 
differed from ruler to ruler, the physical presence of the Dār al-ʿAdl marked and 
identified an area adjacent to the citadel as an intermediate zone where the justice of the 
ruler was available to his subjects.233 After Baybars’s division of power in Aleppo and 
Damascus in 658/1260, the Dār al-ʿAdl was renamed Dār al-Saʿāda (the House of 
Felicity) and became the palatial seat of the governor of the city and province. The 
buildings continued to be used for maẓālim sessions with the governor acting as 
deputised arbiter.  
          
iii. The formation of the Taḥt al-Qalʿa 
When examining the ceremonial importance of the 8th/14th century areas known as Taḥt 
al-Qalʿa, it is important to keep in mind that they were partially the product of a long-
term process of creating a spatial representation of the authority, benevolence, piety and 
military power of the ruling sovereign in connection to the citadels, which began with 
the founding of the citadels themselves.  
 
a. Aleppo and Cairo 
Because the zones in both Aleppo and Cairo where the maydāns and the Dār al-ʿAdl 
were located were part of what became Taḥt al-Qalʿa, we can speak of the development 
of a coherent ceremonial space for the manifestation of the ruler’s authority in these two 
                                                        
232 Edde, 2000, 162. 
233
 Nasser O. Rabbat, 'The Ideological Significance of The Dar Al-Adl in The Medieval Islamic Orient', 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 27, no. 1 (1995): 3–28. The maẓālim phenomenon can be 
traced back in Islamic political culture at least to the 8th century. However, the designation of independent 
physical structures as the House of Justice is an innovation of the 6th/12th century. Ibid., 6. 
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cities. The area identified as Taḥt al-Qalʿa in Aleppo was the stretch of land that extended 
between the citadel’s main gate and the middle of its southern ramparts (See Figure 4). 
As early as the 540s/1140s, Nūr al-Dīn constructed a maydān at the southern foot of the 
Aleppo citadel immediately beyond the eastern city wall. But the ceremonial 
development of this area really picked up speed under Al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī, who singled out 
the area around Nūr al-Dīn’s maydān to create a special zone of interaction between the 
citadel and the city. The two main structures that made up this zone were the joint 
Shāfiʿī/Ḥanafī madrasa, Madrasat al-Sulṭāniyya (perhaps a statement of Al-Ẓāhir 
Ghāzī’s ambition to head the Ayyubid federation) and the Dār al-ʿAdl. Al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī 
also added a second wall behind the Dār al-ʿAdl, which together with the city wall and 
the southern flank of the citadel created a closed-off pocket as a form of appendix to the 
citadel. 234  In this way, Al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī had created a smaller controlled zone of 
interaction beneath the citadel that would become the centre of the Aleppan Taḥt al-
Qalʿa.  
However, the establishment of a wider open space that included facilities for the 
army beneath the citadel did not happen before the Mongol assault on the city in 
658/1260 and the subsequent establishment of Mamluk rule. The Mongols razed the city 
walls, destroying al-Ghāzī’s confined zone of interaction, and burned down both the 
Madrasat al-Sulṭāniyya and the Dār al-ʿAdl. The Mamluks quickly rebuilt the Dār al-
ʿAdl and renamed it Dār al-Saʿāda, making it, as previously noted, the seat of the local 
governor.235 At some point between 658/1260 and 710/1310, Sūq al-Khayl (the Horse 
Market), was moved from the south-western suburb of al-Ḥāḍir to the area between the 
main citadel gate and the Dār al- Saʿāda.236  
Over the course of the following century, the Dār al-Saʿāda, the Sūq al-Khayl and 
the main gate of the citadel of Aleppo made up the ceremonial setting for the local 
Mamluk governor´s twice-weekly inspection parades. During these parades, the 
governor would muster his troops in Sūq al-Khayl and march them to the gate of the 
citadel as a sign of respect for the sultan, after which the troops would return to the Dār 
                                                        
234 Yasser Tabbaa, 'Circles of Power: Palace, Citadel, and City in Ayyubid Aleppo', Ars Orientalis 23 
(1993): 181–200. The access from the city to this pocket was facilitated via a gate called Bāb al-Saghīr; 
from the citadel, a covered walkway reserved for the ruler led down the southern ramparts, which allowed 
him to observe without being seen or appear without warning. Tabbaa, 1993, 183 and Rabbat, 1995, 9–10. 
235 Sauvaget, 1941, 169. 
236 Ibid., 170; Glaube and Wirth, 1984, 96; Julien Loiseau, Les Mamelouks – XIIIe–XVIe Siecle (Paris: 
Editions du SEUIL, 2014), 222. 
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al-Saʿāda where the governor would hold the maẓālim court. 237 By the end of the 8th/14th 
century, the ceremonial importance of this zone was further heightened with the 
construction of the Congregational Mosque of Aqbughā Utrush (d. 806/1404), which 
was built on the southern edge of the Sūq al-Khayl around the end of the 8th/14th century. 
Henceforth, this mosque became the official ceremonial setting for the inauguration of 
new governors as well as the site where the governor would celebrate the two annual 
eids.238 
The development of a ceremonial area called Taḥt al-Qalʿa in Cairo can also be 
traced back to the beginning of the 7th/13th century, but it followed a different pattern. 
As in Aleppo, the name came to cover an area immediately south of the citadel near the 
main entrance, but in Cairo, the maydān and Sūq al-Khayl came first. In 609–10/1213, 
al-Kāmil had the Sūq al-Khayl moved to the southern foot of the citadel east of the main 
gate to a square called al-Rumayla, which was henceforth known as both Sūq al-Khayl 
and al-Rumayla.239 South of al-Rumayla, he founded the maydān, which would become 
the site for, among other things, the annual celebration of the pilgrimage departure to 
Mecca (See Figure 5).240 From the time of al-Kāmil, but especially during the rule of 
Baybars, stables for the army were built around the Sūq al-Khayl, and later in 
730s/1330s, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (d. 741/1341) erected several palaces for his trusted 
amirs in the area. These were called ‘stables’ even though they were palatial complexes 
attached to stables.  
According to Loiseau, the names Sūq al-Khayl, al-Rumayla and Taḥt al-Qalʿa 
were used interchangeably in the late 7th/13th and early 8th/14th centuries, whereas the 
use of Taḥt al-Qalʿa became more frequent as amirs began to settle there.241 A dār al-
ʿadl was not constructed in this area before 660/1262, when Baybars ordered an existing 
structure close to the main citadel gate renovated for the use of the maẓālim court.242 
This became known as Dār al-ʿAdl al-Ẓāhirī and functioned as a courthouse until 
Baybars’s death. During the rule of his successor, Sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (d. 
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Rabbat, 1995, 11. 
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689/1290), it fell into disuse and the public royal receptions were moved into a new 
grand iwān (vaulted hall) in the southern enclosure of the citadel.  
Later, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad built a similar iwān in the same place for use as a dār 
al-ʿadl.243 However, even though the maẓālim court was now separated from the Taḥt 
al-Qalʿa, both the iwān of Qalāwūn and that of his son were constructed so that they had 
visual contact with the Sūq al-Khayl, thus retaining the sense of a coherent ceremonial 
space on the southern side of the citadel. 
To summarise, we can say that in both Cairo and Aleppo the area that became 
known as Taḥt al-Qalʿa was the area at the southern foot of the citadel that had been 
developed since the early Ayyubid period. In both cities, it was here that the Dār al-ʿAdl 
as well as the maydāns and the Sūq al-Khayl were built, albeit in a different order, which 
created a coherent zone that fulfilled practical purposes for the army and a space for 
representation of the ruler’s justice as well as his military might.  
 
b. Damascus    
In the case of Damascus, we can see that it lacks such a coherent zone. The southern and 
eastern flanks of the citadel of Damascus (See Figure 6), which faced the historical urban 
center, simply did not have space for all the institutions present in the Taḥt al-Qalʿa of 
Cairo and Aleppo. The area was too urbanised and the confines of the walled city too 
restrictive to allow the construction of a wider parade and manoeuvre grounds that could 
constitute a coherent zone of power and interaction. Instead, the same institutions found 
in the other two cities were separated and dispersed in a wider and more fragmented 
ceremonial space inside and outside the city walls. In the 550s/1150s, Nūr al-Dīn built 
two maydāns in Damascus, but placed them at some distance from the city walls: the al-
Maydān al-Akhḍar (the Green Hippodrome) was located west of the walled city below 
the Barāda River and the Maydān al-Ḥāsa (the Gravel Hippodrome) was placed south of 
the city along the road that led to Jordan and the Hijaz. 
 Al-Maydān al-Akhḍar was encircled by a wall; in the Mamluk period, it seems to 
have been a space for equestrian exercises of the military closed to the general public. 
The Maydān al-Ḥāsa, on the other hand, was a larger open area used for citywide 
celebrations such as the departure of the annual Hajj caravan. The Dār al-ʿAdl of 
Damascus was built by Nūr al-Dīn in the 550s/1160s across from the south-western 
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section of the citadel and separated from it only by the road leading to the adjacent Bāb 
al-Jinān, Nūr al-Dīn’s new western city gate, which Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn eventually rebuilt as 
Bāb al-Naṣr. 
 In the ‘post-al-ʿĀdil’ citadel, a small gate named Bāb al-Sirr (literally, ‘the secret 
gate’) was placed in the southern citadel wall right across from the Dār al-ʿAdl, thus 
facilitating immediate access between the two structures.244 The Dār al-ʿAdl functioned 
as a maẓālim court from the rule of Nūr al-Dīn until the early 7th/13th century, but at 
some point, the original building merged with the bigger private palace and the joint 
structure was renamed Dār al-Saʿāda.  
As Rabbat explains, the details of the Dār al-ʿAdl’s physical transformation and 
ownership during the Ayyubid period are very vague; all we can say is that it became 
the palace of the governor of Damascus at the beginning of the Mamluk period when it 
resumed its function as the seat of the maẓālim court.245 Both the Dār al-Saʿāda and the 
Bāb al-Sirr became significant elements in the Mamluk topography of official 
ceremonies, which also included Taḥt al-Qalʿa and especially Sūq al-Khayl (Part Two 
of this chapter provides more detail about this development.). The area northwest of the 
citadel, which came to be known as the Taḥt al-Qalʿa of Damascus, is only vaguely 
described in the sources before the beginning of the 8th/14th century, but it seems to have 
been an open meadow until the first quarter of the 7th/13th century. The chronicler Ibn 
al-Qalānisī (d. 555/1160) calls the area Marj Bāb al-Ḥadīd (the meadow of the Iron 
Gate). The name indicates that the area bordered the gate called Bāb al-Ḥadīd (the Iron 
Gate), which was located at the middle of the Northern wall of the ‘pre- al-ʿĀdil’ citadel, 
and served as its main exit. 
 It is clear that the marj already at this point was closely tied to the citadel and the 
needs of its masters: Ibn al-Qalānisī describes several occasions when military 
commanders set up camp in the area when they reached Damascus so as to be in 
immediate contact with the citadel.246 After al-ʿĀdil’s reconstruction of the citadel, we 
get the impression that the area came to function as a regular military manoeuvre and 
parade ground, a function that it retained into the Mamluk period. Its use for such 
activities is suggested by the tradition of constructing ṭārimas (covered wooden 
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pavilions) on top of the towers overlooking the north-western flank of the citadel (See 
Figure 7).  
The first such ṭārima was built on top of the tower of Bāb al-Ḥadīd in the 2nd 
decade of the 7th/13th century by al-Muʿaẓẓam ʿIsā (d. 624/1227).247 From descriptions 
by the contemporary Damascene chronicler Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī (d. 665/1267), we 
get the distinct impression that this ṭārima was related to parade activities in Taḥt al-
Qalʿa, which were also attended by the wider public. In the 618 entry of his diary-like 
chronicle known as the Dhayl ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn, Abū Shāma describes how he 
witnessed a parade staged by the prince and his brother al-Ashraf Mūsā (d. 635/1237) 
before a campaign against the crusaders:  
The armies paraded below the citadel of Damascus while he [al-Ashraf] and 
his brother al-Muʿaẓẓam were in the ṭayyāra248 of the citadel and they went 
to Egypt on the first day of Jumādā II [July 22nd 1221]. I said: I was present 
below the citadel while these armies passed by amir after amir and people 
implored them and pronounced blessings for their victory. The strength of the 
Muslims was solidified and they were assured of victory.249 
The building of similar ṭārimas was repeated several times during the later 7th/13th and 
early 8th/14th centuries. In 658/1260, all towers of the citadel suffered heavily during the 
Mongol siege of the city. After capturing the city, the Mongols had the upper part of the 
towers dismantled in order to prevent any resisting groups from staging a rebellion from 
within the citadel.250 In the same year, after the Mongols had been driven from Syria, 
Sultan Baybars entered the city and ordered a restoration of the citadel, which included 
building a new large ṭārima. Unlike that of al-Muʿaẓẓam, Baybars’s pavilion was built 
on the corner tower (burj al-zāwiyya), which as the chancery secretary Ibn Shaddād (d. 
684/1285), his court chronicler, describes in his chronicle of Baybars’ rule, the Tārīkh 
al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, ‘had an overview of both Sūq al-Khayl and the maydāns’.251 On the 
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basis of this reference, we can conclude that some form of marked location known as 
Sūq al-Khayl must have emerged in Taḥt al-Qalʿa before the arrival of Baybars, and that 
it already at this point enjoyed some measure of ceremonial importance.  
In the 8th/14th century, there are several references to sultans appearing at the 
ṭārima to observe events that took place in Taḥt al-Qalʿa. We can note as an example 
that according to Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373), Sultan al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ (d. 746/1345) sat 
there when he oversaw the execution of seven amirs in Taḥt al-Qalʿa on Monday 3rd of 
Shawwāl 745/7th of February 1345. 252  We can conclude that successive rulers of 
Damascus since the early 7th/13th century had consolidated the status of Taḥt al-Qalʿa as 
part of the ceremonial space that surrounded the citadel by ensuring the ruler a privileged 
panoramic view of what took place there. However, Baybars’s relocation of the ṭārima 
also testifies to his wider interest in the developing the stretch of land extending 
westward from the citadel along the Barāda and the Banias. During his rule, he initiated 
a number of other building projects in Taḥt al-Qalʿa and further west. 
Information on some of these projects is scattered over several pages of Ibn 
Shaddād’s chronicle. The following is a list the most important developments: between 
the Barāda and Banias rivers, Baybars converted an older mansion into his private 
palace, Qaṣr al-Ablaq (the Checkered Palace). The eastern gate of this palace opened up 
to the hippodrome built by Nūr al-Dīn, al-Maydān al-Akhḍar, around which Baybars 
erected a wall. He also connected al-Maydān al-Akhḍar to the northern bank of the 
Barāda with a wooden bridge fitted with shops. According to Ibn Shaddād, this bridge 
stretched from the northern gate of al-Maydān al-Akhḍar toward Sūq al-Khayl. Baybars, 
it seems, was very interested in developing the connection between his palace, the 
Maydān and the Sūq al-Khayl.253 In between these places, on the northern bank of the 
Barāda, he renovated three stable-complexes and around the Suq al-Khayl, he added a 
number of guesthouses, stables and storage facilities designated for envoys and Mongol 
warrior immigrants (al-wāfidiyya).254  
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Modern examinations of the area have shown that the building activity noted by 
Ibn Shaddād also coincided with a wider relocation of workshops and markets that 
catered specifically to the army, markets for leatherwork, weapons and provisions. These 
were henceforth also centred around Sūq al-Khayl.255 We get the clear impression that 
Baybars sought to continue and intensify the cultivation of Taḥt al-Qalʿa to form a 
practical military zone, but also a zone of sultanic representation. From the northern foot 
of the citadel through Taḥt al-Qalʿa and westward, the banks of the rivers were dotted 
with buildings bearing the sultan’s architectural fingerprints. Moreover, Ibn Shaddād 
also informs us that Baybars made sure to include references around this area to his son 
and heir, Muḥammad Baraka Khān (d. 678/1280), who succeeded him as sultan for a 
short period between 676 and 677/1277 and 1279 under the regnal title al-Malik al-Saʿīd. 
The author states that Baybars erected a palatial complex and a ḥammām dedicated to 
his son outside the Bāb al-Ḥadīd and built another ḥammām further south outside Bāb 
al-Naṣr that was likewise dedicated to his son.256 
However, when we move beyond the reign of Baybars, we see that the Taḥt al-
Qalʿa and its surroundings was not simply a space where sultans created their own 
buildings side-by-side with those of their predecessors. The fact that Mamluk sultans did 
not constitute one dynasty but rather a succession of rulers from competing households 
is reflected by their alterations of urban space that often aimed to erase the legacy of 
earlier rulers or at least foregrounding that of their own household.257  
With regard to the Taḥt al-Qalʿa of Damascus, we see this exemplified in 
690/1291, when the sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl (d. 693/1293) initiated a campaign 
apparently aimed at clearing away parts of Baybars’s architectural legacy in the area. 
Al-Ashraf had been appointed sultan after the death of his father, al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn, 
in the fall of 689/1290. In the following spring, the new sultan undertook his first official 
visit to Damascus, and with him he brought the new governor of the city, the Amir ʿ Alam 
al-Dīn al-Shujāʿī (d. 694/1294). Al-Shujāʿī had held influential posts, such as vizier and 
treasurer, during the rule of Qalāwūn, and had also accumulated extensive experience as 
leader of large-scale building projects such as Qalāwūn’s burial complex in Cairo.258 In 
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Damascus, this experience was put to good use in 690/1292 when on the order of the 
sultan, al-Shujāʿī started a far-reaching process of demolition and renovation within and 
around Taḥt al-Qalʿa. This process was described as follows in the chronicler al-Jazarī’s 
account of the year 690/1291–92:  
On the third of Shawwāl [September 28th 1291] the governor ʿAlam al-Dīn 
al-Shujāʿī ordered the destruction of the Bridge of al-Zalābiyya259 and the 
stores that were on it as well as the destruction of what was built on the Banias 
river and the diverted creek beginning from Taḥt al-Qalʿa until the borders of 
Bāb al-Maydān al-Akhḍar […].260 
 Listing the buildings destroyed in the process, al-Jazarī goes on to include: 
 […] dwellings, shops, three bazaars and two khāns and guesthouses, and the 
ḥammām built for al-Malik al-Saʿīd which had no equal in Damascus or on 
its outskirts. And the value of what they destroyed equaled 500.000 dirhams 
[…]261  
Al-Jazarī also records that al-Shujāʿī began demolishing and expanding the wall 
surrounding al-Maydān al-Akhḍar. Meanwhile, Ibn Kathīr reports that in the same 
period, a project of developing the citadel, which included building a new a ṭārima, was 
also undertaken.262 
What the chroniclers describe here seems like a concerted and far-reaching sultanic 
effort to clear the entire north-western flank of the citadel. Moreover, it seems this effort 
was at least partially designed to eradicate much of Baybars’s legacy from Taḥt al-Qalʿa. 
Some of the structures that were torn down, such as the ḥammām of al-Malik al-Saʿīd 
and the wall around al-Maydān al-Akhḍar, can be traced directly back to Baybars, while 
others, such as the guesthouses and khans, could also be identical to those referred to 
decades earlier by Ibn Shaddād. Neither Ibn Kathīr nor al-Jazarī tell us specifically what 
al-Shujāʿī built or intended to build in the cleared space, but one reference from the end 
of the 8th/14th century indicates that 100 years later, he was still associated with buildings 
around the Taḥt al-Qalʿa. The Damascene chronicler Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 
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Ṣaṣrā (d. after 801/1399) states that al-Shujāʿī was ‘[…] he who built those buildings 
above Burj al-Ṭarīma in the days of al-Malik al-Ashraf Khalīl’.263  
The 690s/1290s were a politically tumultuous decade for the Mamluk Empire. In 
this period, further large-scale development projects in Damascus were prevented by 
internal struggles for power among former members of the Manṣūrī corps.264 Moreover, 
the decade ended with the occupation of Syria by the Mongol Ilkhān Ghazān (699/1299–
1300). Despite the brevity of this occupation, the destruction in Damascus was extensive: 
the intra-mural quarter around the citadel was badly damaged and the northern suburb 
of al-ʿUqayba was almost completely destroyed.265  
Apart from the immediate damage to the city, the political situation in Syria 
remained unstable for the better part of the following decade: little building activity is 
recorded in this period as we approach 711/1311. This changed under the third reign of 
al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, especially between 712/1312 and 738/1338, when the 
governorship in Damascus was in the hands of an ambitious urban planner, the amir Sayf 
al-Dīn Tankiz (d. 740/1340), a favourite confidant of sultan (until the sultan had him 
incarcerated and killed on conspiracy charges). Tankiz’s personal impact on the urban 
landscape in Damascus was significant: it included large monuments, such as the Jāmiʿ 
Tankiz – a Friday Mosque located between Bāb al-Naṣr and Maydān al-Akhḍar.  
Ellen Kenney has examined Tankiz’s urban development programmes in detail 
and has demonstrated his interest in also improving the road network of Damascus.266 
Kenney shows that in the years 730–32/1330–32, Tankiz’s development projects 
focused on clearing and expanding the major roads in the extra-mural quarters and 
creating a ‘ring road’ leading around the city.267 This project included clearing away 
shops in the area between Bāb Jābiyya and Bāb al-Naṣr and further north to Sūq al-
Khayl. A wide avenue was created that connected Sūq al-Khayl with the processional 
road leading south from Bāb Jābiyya through the suburb of al-Muṣallā and past the 
Maydān al-Ḥāsa. This avenue was called al-Ṭarīq al-ʿUẓmā (the grand road); at Sūq al-
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Khayl; it met with al-Ṭarīq al-Sulṭānī, another main traffic artery that Tankiz built at the 
same time. 268 This second road ran along the northern wall of the city and connected 
Taḥt al-Qalʿa with the areas east of Bāb al-Faradīs. The project also included renovating 
the facades which faced the avenues: in Ṣafar 732/November of 1331, all facades from 
Sūq al-Khayl to Bāb al-Faradīs were whitewashed, and later in Shaʿbān 732/April-May 
of 1332, the same was done to the facades between Sūq al-Khayl and al-Muṣallā.269 
Upon completion, al-Ṭarīq al-ʿUẓmā and al-Ṭarīq al-Sulṭānī created a wide road system 
that connected the north-eastern outskirts of the city with the citadel area and led south 
to al-Muṣallā, where the two annual eid ceremonies took place, and further along, the 
departure route of the annual pilgrimage caravan. At the critical intersection between the 
two roads lay Taḥt al-Qalʿa.270  
Over the further course of the 8th/14th century, Taḥt al-Qalʿa continued to receive 
the attention of patron builders. In 746/1346, Sayf al-Dīn Yalbughā al-Yaḥyawī (d. 
648/1347), the governor of Damascus, commissioned a Friday Mosque known as Jāmiʿ 
Yalbughā. This was a square mosque with a north-facing courtyard placed immediately 
west of Sūq al-Khayl.271 Further east, Yalbughā commissioned a bazaar complex that 
also bore his name.272 Toward the end of the 8th/14th century, the area sustained several 
rounds of heavy damage that seems to have affected its character as a military/royal 
space. During the civil war between the rebellious amir Minṭāsh (d. 795/1393) and 
Sultan Barqūq (d. 801/1399), a large area west of Yalbughā’s mosque was apparently 
razed as a consequence of fighting, and further damage was inflicted during Tīmūr’s 
siege of the citadel in 803/1400 – 01.273  
As the city recouped from these wars and the suburbs were rebuilt in the early 
9th/15th century, Taḥt al-Qalʿa seems to have lost much of military character. A new Sūq 
al-Khayl was moved to the southern suburbs: in the Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Kitābat al-Inshāʾ, 
al-Qalqashandī’s (d. 821/1418) manual on the art of the secretaries that also describes 
Mamluk provincial protocol, we read that by the end of the 8th/14th century, parades had 
ceased to be held in the old Sūq al-Khayl of Damascus, save for special occasions such 
                                                        
268 Ibid., 113. 
269 Ibid., 113; al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 517 and 525. Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 244. Ibn Kathīr 
reports that the whitewashing was continued southward all the way to Maydān al-Ḥāsa. 
270 Fansa, 2000, 122.               
271 Burns, 2005, and C. Watzinger and K. Wulzinger, Damaskus: Die Islamische Stadt (Berlin: W. de 
Gruyter, 1924), 52. 
272 Loiseau, 2014, 223. 
273 Gerard Degeorge, Damas: Des Origines Aux Mamluks (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994), 274. 
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as visits by foreign dignitaries.274 The same impression of a normal, busy but by no 
means distinctly military suburb can be found in the description of Taḥt al-Qalʿa 
provided by the litterateur Taqī al-Dīn al-Badrī (d. 894/1489). In his laudatory 
topography of Damascus, Kitāb Nuzhat al-Anām fī Maḥāsin al-Shām, al-Badrī describes 
this area as place for socialising, which was open into the night and filled with so many 
vendors, entertainers and shoppers that it was impossible to see the ground.275 
To summarise, we can say that between the 620s and 730s/1220s and 1330s, the 
area of Taḥt al-Qalʿa in Damascus had experienced successive development projects that 
tied it closer to the citadel and integrated it with the rest of the city. Furthermore, what 
happened in Damascus was part of a wider tendency in urban development in the 
Ayyubid and early Mamluk periods that resulted in the emergence of ceremonial spaces 
in close proximity to the citadels of Cairo, Aleppo and Damascus. We have also seen 
that Mamluk use of these areas for ceremonial purposes was in fact a partial continuation 
of the practices of the Ayyubids, whose development projects had already designated 
the Taḥt al-Qalʿa as a political space.  
 We now shift from the brick and mortar aspect of Taḥt al-Qalʿa in order to focus 
on the ceremonial activities that took place here, especially within the smaller designated 
space of Sūq al-Khayl. While the previous section of this chapter underlines the strict 
connection between Taḥt al-Qalʿa and representations of rulership, the following 
sections also examine how other social groups used this space. We shall see that exactly 
because this area was cultivated as a space for the representation of sultanic power, it 
became at the same time a key space for protests by local groups. These groups would 
include relatively peaceful protesters like those of 711/1311, who simply intended to 
present a complaint to the governor, but also more violent groups, who intended to 
challenge the Mamluk monopoly on punitive violence that was also tied to this area. 
  
III. The Ceremonial Uses of the Taḥt al-Qalʿa in Damascus 
The place of Taḥt al-Qalʿa within the ceremonial topography of Mamluk Damascus must 
be understood in relation to the wider zone located north, west and south of the citadel, 
including the governor’s palace. The Sūq al-Khayl constituted an important ‘node’ 
                                                        
274 Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Kitābat al-Inshāʾ 14 Vols., (Cairo: Dār 
al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1914), vol. 4, 195. 
275Abū al-Baqāʾ ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Badrī, Nuzhat al-Anām fī Maḥāsin al-Shām (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1980), 36–37. 
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within a multitude of ceremonial practices that played out in this area. Many of the 
examples of ceremonies presented here are from the long third reign of al-Nāṣir between 
709 and 741/1310 and 1341, and feature governor Tankiz as the procession leader. This 
is because the chronicler al-Jazarī, who was very active in this period, shows a unique 
tendency in his writing to describe these ceremonies, the participants and the routes that 
were followed. In addition, the concentration of ceremonies in and around Sūq al-Khayl 
in this period might also betray a particular emphasis on manifestations of power through 
parades during the rule of this sultan and his closely connected governor.  
 
i. Honorific processions 
From the chronicle of al-Jazarī, we have descriptions of a number of annual military 
parades led by Tankiz between 730 and 736/1330 and 1336. We start with these parades 
in particular because they provide a clear example of how Sūq al-Khayl was integrated 
in the larger citadel zone. Every year during this period, the Sultan bestowed khilʿa 
(honorific robes or gifts) on Tankiz, including items such as a richly embroidered hat 
and a pearl-studded sword.276  The chronicler al-Jazarī notes that the arrival of the 
sultanic gift was followed each year by a special procession in which Tankiz would wear 
his newly acquired treasures. For example, on Saturday the 4th of Rajab 731/12th of April 
1331, al-Jazarī records the following procession: 
On the morning of Saturday the 4th he [Tankiz] dressed in the sultanic khilʿa 
and went out from Dār al-Saʿāda and the amirs and the hujjāb (chamberlains) 
and the muqaddamīn (officers and the soldiers) walked to the gate of the 
citadel. The bridge of Bāb al-Sirr (basāṭ Bāb al-sirr) was lowered for him and 
he kissed the sultanic threshold (al-ʿutba al-sulṭāniyya). Then he rode to Sūq 
al-Khayl and the amirs rode with him, then he returned to Dār al-Saʿāda, and 
the amirs dismounted as was the custom. It was a an amazing and awesome 
procession.277  
The order of this ritual is repeated exactly in 733,278 while in other years the sequence of 
places differed. Despite the changes, however, the visits to Sūq al-Khayl are explicitly 
                                                        
276 See, e.g., al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 379. According to al-Jazarī, Tankiz went to Cairo and returned 
with the sultan’s gifts in the years 730/1329, 731/1331, 732/1332 and 734/1334. In the years 733/1332, 
735/1334 and 736/1335, he did not visit Cairo and similar sets of honorific items were sent to Damascus 
by courier instead. 
277 Ibid., vol. 2, 463. 
278 Ibid., vol. 3, 590. 
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mentioned in four out of seven of these parades.279 The processions connected Sūq al-
Khayl with the two most important centres of Mamluk power in Damascus: the Dār al-
Saʿāda and the Citadel. As explained above, the former was the seat of the governor, 
while the latter was under separate command and represented the power of the sultan 
himself. During Tankiz’s processions, this hierarchy of power is marked by his kissing 
of the threshold of the Bāb al-Sirr known as the al-ʿutba al-sulṭāniyya (The Sultanic 
Threshold).280 A further aspect of this ritual, which can be said to hold ‘submissive’ 
connotations, is the fact that the bridge that gave Tankiz access to Bāb al-Sirr seems to 
have been lowered from inside the citadel. This meant that the governor, whose authority 
extended over all matters pertaining to the city, could not approach the gate without the 
permission of the commander of the citadel. This is also suggested in a description of a 
similar ritual provided by the aforementioned al-Badrī, who mentions a custom 
according to which every new governor appointed to Damascus would pray outside Bāb 
al-sirr:  
Towards the end of the reign of the son of Qalāwūn [i. e. al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad] it was the custom that whoever was appointed to the 
governorship of Damascus would pray at this gate performing two rakʿas 
facing the qibla so that the gate was on his left. The soldiers of the citadel and 
the office holders (arbāb al-waẓāʾif) and the Turks would stand in their usual 
place carrying weapons until he was done with his prayers and blessings 
(duʿāʾs). If he was wished harm (in urīda bihi sharr) he would be seized and 
they would take him out through this gate and block the bridge between him 
and his people, for it is a drawbridge281 which separates them. If he was 
wished well they would ride in his honour and the elites of the state (wujūh 
al-dawla) would be in his service until he descended at the Dār al-ʿAdl of the 
late martyr Nūr al-Dīn. This is what is today called Dār al-Saʿāda.282  
                                                        
279 These four are 731, 733, 735 and 736. Judging from al-Jazarī’s description of the 730 parade, Sūq al-
Khayl does not seem to be included in this year. With regard to 732 and 734, the descriptions are too sparse 
to determine whether it included Sūq al-Khayl. 
280
 It is common to find examples in Medieval Islamic chronicles of subjects who kissed the ground 
between the ruler’s hands as a sign of submission and loyalty. The Arabic expression frequently used to 
describe this practice is wa-qaballa al-arḍ bayna yadayhi (he kissed the ground between his hands, i.e., 
in front of him). Furthermore, the Bāb al-Sirr seems to have been reserved for the use of sulṭans. According 
to Ibn Ṣaṣrā, the Sultan Barqūq (d. 801/1399) entered the citadel via Bāb al-Sirr in two processions, which 
marked his return to the city in 1391/793 and 1394/796. See Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus vol. 1, 
128 and 213. 
281 The Arabic text refers to jisr bi-lawālib (a bridge with axles). 
282 al-Badrī, Nuzhat, 18. 
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Al-Badrī does not state his source for this ritual, but his description implies that by 
crossing the bridge of Bāb al-Sirr, the governor was essentially temporarily at the mercy 
of the commander and garrison of the citadel, who answered directly to Cairo.283 To 
these considerations about the use of spaces and their hierarchical connotations, we 
should add that the honorific objects that Tankiz displayed on these occasions not only 
underlined his own importance, but also underlined his allegiance and submission to al-
Nāṣir. As Jo Van Steenbergen has shown, al-Nāṣir’s efforts to consolidate his power by 
tying high-ranking amirs to him consisted of an extensive distribution of honorific items 
such as robes, helmets and caps bearing his name, regal titles and emblems.284 
Returning to al-Jazarī’s descriptions and the subject of space, we should note that 
the honorific parades of the 730s/1330s took place around the area most heavily affected 
by Tankiz’s extra-mural road clearings that occurred around 730/1330. As with his urban 
planning projects, Tankiz’s parade practices integrated the Sūq al-Khayl within the 
topography of Mamluk power. These parades afford a striking example of how rulers’ 
efforts to change the built environment with new patterns of movement connecting 
specific spaces coincided and interlocked with a specific pattern of ceremonial practices 
aimed a consolidating these patterns.  
Moreover, the same ritual was imitated by other members of the Mamluk elite both 
before and after Tankiz’s death. Tankiz’s own son ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn (d. ?) made the same 
processional tour in 732/1332 after having received the title of amir;285 in the following 
year, the amirs arriving from Egypt marked their arrival in Damascus by walking to Bāb 
al-Sirr and proceeding to ride to Sūq al-Khayl.286 Later, in 763/1363–64, Sayf al-Dīn 
                                                        
283 There is some confusion with regard to the location of the Bāb al-Sirr, which suggests that over time 
there might have been more than one gate bearing this name. In the plan of Damascus presented by Brinner 
and reproduced by Ira M. Lapidus, the Bāb al-Sirr is located in the southern wall of the citadel opposite 
the Dār al-Saʿāda. In contrast, the Bāb al-Sirr mentioned by al-Badrī and al-Jazarī must have been located 
in the western or northern wall of the citadel. Al-Badrī states that the Bāb al-Sirr where this ritual took 
place was located west of the Bāb al-Ḥadīd, and that it was given this name ‘[…] because the Turks used 
it to exit and enter secretly […]’. Moreover, the presence of a drawbridge suspended over a moat also 
excludes the southern Bāb al-Sirr from consideration. See al-Badrī, Nuzhat, 18 and compare with the map 
in Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus, 345 and the map in Ira Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle 
Ages (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1984), 47. 
284 Willem Flinterman and Jo Van Steenbergen, 'Al-Nasir Muhammad and the Formation of the Qalawunid 
State', in Pearls on a String: Art in the Age of Great Islamic Empires, ed. A. Landau (Washington, DC: 
The Walters Art Museum and University of Washington Press, 2015), 87–113. 
285 al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 528. 
286 Ibid. vol. 3, 596. 
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Qashtamur (d. 783/1381–82), the newly appointed governor of Damascus, also initiated 
his period in office by repeating this pattern.287  
These honorific parades between 730/1329 and 763/1363–64 were but one of the 
multiple ceremonies in and around Taḥt al-Qalʿa described by al-Jazarī. Another annual 
ceremony, which began in Sūq al-Khayl, was the preparatory ceremony leading up to 
the departure of the annual caravan of the Hajj. The Hajj was surrounded by a cluster of 
rituals intended to highlight the protective power offered by the Mamluk sultan and his 
army towards those who undertook the strenuous pilgrimage journey to the Hijaz. Here 
again, we can see Sūq al-Khayl at the center of a ritual manifestation of sultanic power.  
 
ii. The maḥmal presentation parade 
Hajj, the 5th pillar of Sunni Islam, is a ritual tied to the religious duty of the individual 
Muslim to perform pilgrimage (or provide financial aid to help others perform it). 
However, it is evident from Hajj processions described by al-Jazarī and similar 
processions in Cairo described by the 9th/15th century secretary Khalīl al-Ẓāhirī (d. 871–
72/1467–68) that the phenomenon of Hajj in the Mamluk period also revolved around 
the display of the power of the sultan as protector of Muslims and patron of Islamic 
religious practice.288 This section discusses the processions in Damascus that centred on 
Taḥt al-Qalʿa and Sūq al-Khayl in particular and testify to the intrinsic connection 
between these spaces and public manifestation of sultanic power. First, it should be noted 
that Taḥt al-Qalʿa was also tied to Hajj for practical reasons: its stables as well as many 
of its markets catered directly to the needs of travelers. Furthermore, at least by the end 
of the 8th/14th century, the authorities had also erected a special watering tank (sabīl) in 
Taḥt al-Qalʿa, presumably in order to provide water for the pilgrims who came to 
Damascus from Northern Syria and Anatolia to join the caravan heading south from 
Damascus.289  
Taḥt al-Qalʿa played a central role in one of the ceremonies that led up to the 
departure of the caravan. The annual departure of the pilgrims was a momentous event; 
because it was a huge logistics operation encompassing at times several thousand 
individuals, certain ceremonies were required to see it off. On the day of departure, the 
                                                        
287 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 434. This could be an example of the inauguration ceremony 
described in al-Badrī, Nuzhat, 18. 
288 Ghars al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Ẓāhirī, Zubdat Kashf al-Mamālik wa-Bayān al-Ṭuruq wa-al-Masālik, 
ed. Paul Ravaisse (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1894), 87. 
289 Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus vol. 1, 98–99. 
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caravan would begin to move south along Ṭarīq al-ʿUẓmā to Bāb al-Muṣallā. Here, a 
special sermon was held and at times, some of the inhabitants who were not embarking 
on the full journey would escort the pilgrims south for several days before turning back 
to Damascus.290  
However, during the month of Rajab (approximately four months before the actual 
departure of the pilgrims), Sūq al-Khayl served as a rallying point for a ceremony 
focused on the presentation of the most iconic element of the caravan, al-maḥmal al-
sulṭānī (the sultanic litter), a richly embroidered camel litter that was dispatched along 
with the pilgrims.291 Throughout the Mamluk period, two maḥmals were sent to the 
Hijaz, one from Cairo and one from Damascus. Both were made from embroidered 
yellow silk, the official colour of the Mamluk sultanate.292 Although some Medieval 
European observers believed that the maḥmal contained a copy of the Qurʾān, it was by 
all accounts empty, serving as a purely symbolic expression of the Sultan’s power.293 In 
a sense, the maḥmal represented the sultān in absentia on a par with the threshold of Bāb 
al-Sirr and the empty throne in the Dār al-Saʿāda, which are discussed below.  
When it was not in use, the maḥmal of Damascus was stored in the citadel, but in 
the first half of Rajab, either on a Monday or Thursday, according to al-Jazarī, it was 
placed on display in Sūq al-Khayl as part of a ceremony that also included the official 
appointment of amīr al-hajj, the military commander in charge of the security 
detachment of that year’s caravan. The presentation of the maḥmal was followed by a 
grand procession that included the governor and his guard as well as the four chief judges 
and other civilian office holders. In al-Jazarī’s chronicle entries for the 720s/1320s and 
730s/1330s, the maḥmal presentation ceremonies in Sūq al-Khayl are presented as very 
pompous events with a clear focus on the display of military power. Al-Jazarī presents 
the following description of the ceremony on the 12th of Rajab 730/1st of May 1330:  
                                                        
290 See, e.g., al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 3, 873. 
291 The choice of Rajab, the seventh month in the Islamic calendar, for this ceremony should be seen in 
the context of its status as a month of religious celebration. In pre-Islamic Arabia, Rajab was the holy 
month of peace and sacrifices. While some Islamic scholars found celebrations during Rajab reprehensible, 
it was held to be a month replete with God’s grace, which people sought through fasting and prayer 
ceremonies such as the raghāʾib (wishes) prayers on the first Friday of Rajab. Meir J. Kister, 'Radjab', in 
Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 8, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 373–75. 
For jurists’ views of the raghāʾib prayers, see Marion H. Katz, Prayer in Islamic Thought and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 160–162.  
292 Doris Behrens-Abouseif, 'The Mahmal Legend and the Pilgrimage of the Ladies of the Mamluk Court', 
Mamluk Studies Review 1, (1997): 87–96, 89.  
293 Degeorge, 1994, 276 n. 197.         
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The maḥmal was taken out from the citadel to Sūq al-Khayl and this was 
overseen by the governor and the judges and the master (al-ṣāhib)[?] and 
prominent men of the state (aʿyān al-dawla) and the imams and the readers 
and the muezzins and who else used to attend. The judges and those who we 
have mentioned went in front of the noble maḥmal and most of the army went 
behind it. The wālī of the town and his men had been requested and the wālī 
of the province (al-birr) and his soldiers and followers and he had boys who 
played with nafṭ [flammable oil substance] and thrusted with spears […]294  
Al-Jazarī describes at least eight ceremonies of this kind during the 730s/1330s, though 
not always with the same amount of detail.  
That the Hajj ceremonies in Sūq al-Khayl were connected to the displays of the 
power of the Mamluk sultanate is even more clearly reflected later in the 8th/14th century 
through the descriptions that Ibn Ṣaṣrā provides of the Hajj preparations in Damascus in 
792/1390. This was in the middle of the civil war between Sultan Barqūq and the amir  
Minṭāsh; at this point Minṭāsh and his partisans had just fled Damascus, while Barqūq’s 
rule of the city was in the process of being restored. Ibn Ṣaṣrā reports that the situation 
in Syria was so unstable at this time that no water tank had been erected in Taḥt al-Qalʿa 
and no amīr al-hajj was appointed. Furthermore, when the maḥmal was finally presented 
it seems to have been a sorry sight: 
Then on Thursday the 19th of the month [September 29th], the maḥmal went 
out as though it were the funeral procession of a stranger; no one went behind 
it or before it, nor was there any provision train or banner of the sultan, only 
the maḥmal and a few people. An enlisted trooper went as amir of the caravan, 
and they set out, relying on God the Exalted.295 
Ibn Ṣaṣrā’s account of the Hajj ceremony is interesting because it is included in a general 
description of the political situation, perhaps to emphasise the feeling of uncertainty at 
the time. There is no sultanic banner, no procession and the appointed amīr al-hajj, a 
title that would usually be bestowed upon an important amir, is given to a low-ranking 
soldier. The description of the pitiful sight of the maḥmal in Sūq al-Khayl becomes a 
symbol of how fragile Barqūq’s hold of Damascus and Syria still was. In the chronicles 
of Ibn Ṣaṣrā and al-Jazarī, the maḥmal ceremony is thus presented as a ‘political 
                                                        
294 al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 391. A similar display is described in Ibid., vol. 3, 597. Less detailed maḥmal 
parades are described in Ibid., vol. 2, 74–75 and 464 and Ibid. vol. 3, 765 and 933. 
295 Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus, vol. 1, 98–99. A similar situation is described with regard to the 
year 796/1394 where reports of the approach of the armies of Tīmūr (d. 807/1405) are blamed for a 
shrinking turnout for the procession. See ibid., 210. 
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barometer’ that indicates the strength of the state and the security level that it can extend 
to its subjects. In the 10th/16th century, the patronage of the Hajj was taken over by the 
Ottomans for geo-political considerations, but also as a strategy for displaying their 
legitimacy as Muslim rulers. Moreover, the Ottomans continued to display their 
connection with the Hajj through the tradition of presenting a sultanic maḥmal in 
Damascus’s Sūq al-Khayl.296  
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, when Michael Chamberlain describes 
the Mamluk state as an ‘audience state’, it is with specific reference to these Hajj 
ceremonies. In his view, the Mamluk rulers of Damascus fit themselves into what he 
calls:  
 […] its existing ceremonial geography and ritual idioms. They made 
appearances at the major religious festivals, especially the maḥmal, the 
inauguration of religions foundations and the funerals of scholars and 
Sufis.297  
What we see from al-Jazarī’s descriptions in particular is that with regard to the Hajj 
ceremonies, the governor and his troops were clearly not merely a visiting audience to a 
traditional local performance. Rather, the heavy use of military symbols clearly shows 
that this was a customary show of sultanic presence and a direct framing of the Mamluk 
sultanate as the provider of regional security. The military ‘air’ of this ceremony is also 
underscored by the fact that it took place within a specific section of the urban landscape 
that had long since been cultivated by Tankiz, in particular, as space for the 
representation of power.  
We should also note that Tankiz’s patron, the sultan al-Nāṣir, displayed a particular 
interest in tying the Hajj to his own representation of power. Apart from sponsoring the 
caravan and maḥmal-ceremonies in Cairo, he undertook the pilgrimage himself no less 
than three times, in 712/1312, 720/1320 and 732/1332. As Steenbergen explains, there 
was a message in these endeavours directed at both the Ilkhānites of Iraq and potential 
internal enemies. The sultan was effectively stating that his hold of the reins of power 
was so strong as to permit his absence from his realm for months at a time.298 Thus, the 
                                                        
296 Lutz Berger, Gesellschaft Und Individuum in Damaskus, 1550–1791 (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2007), 
74. Andrew Petersen, 'The Ottoman Hajj Route in Jordan: Motivation and Ideology', Bulletin D’études 
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297 Chamberlain, 1994, 48. 
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Damascene maḥmal parades charged with military splendour could be seen as a 
particularly important element of political communication in this specific period.  
 
iii. The Mamluk governor’s weekly parades 
We now turn our attention away from the splendid and towards more mundane versions 
of these parades to demonstrate that the ceremonial uses of Taḥt al-Qalʿa did not only 
mark special occasions. Parades were also part of the normal rhythm of urban life and 
thus a frequently recurring opportunity for local groups to approach their governor. The 
most common form of parade was the twice-weekly inspection parades, and as 
mentioned in the introduction, it was this type of parade that the protesters of 711/1311 
interrupted.  
Al-Qalqashandī writes that Sūq al-Khayl in Damascus used to be the scene of two 
weekly military parades. These took place on Mondays and Thursdays at daybreak, the 
same days as the annual maḥmal parade, which might then have been simply a 
particularly splendid version of a routine parade. We can find several references in the 
local chronicles from the 8th/14th century that suggest that the governor of Damascus did 
in fact hold army inspections in Sūq al-Khayl on a weekly or twice-weekly basis. The 
exact regularity of these ceremonies is hard to determine since the chronicles usually 
only refer to this sort of routine event when something extraordinary happened. Some of 
these extraordinary cases will be examined below, but we start by looking at al-
Qalqashandī’s description of this procession:  
It was the custom of the governor there [Damascus] to ride in a procession 
consisting of the amirs and the officers and soldiers of the ḥalqa (non-
Mamluk auxiliary forces) every Monday and Thursday. They would ride out 
to Sūq al-Khayl below the citadel and run their horses, and the horses on sale 
would be presented to them as well as other things such as weapons and the 
like, and the properties (al-ʿaqār) such as houses, landed estates and other 
forms of property would be declared among them. They would not ride 
further than to Sūq al-Khayl.299  
With regard to the proclamations of property described in this statement, it seems al-
Qalqashandī is referring to proclamations of the iqṭāʿ’s held by the attending amirs and 
soldiers. The whole affair seems like a combination of a military inspection of horses 
                                                        
299 al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ vol. 4, 195. 
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and equipment, an arms bazaar and a salary overview.300 In addition to the activities in 
Sūq al-Khayl, the return to Dār al-Saʿāda seems to have had a special symbolic function. 
Al-Qalqashandī informs us that on some occasions the parade was followed by a banquet 
(samāṭ), and so the amirs would follow the governor back to the Dār al-Saʿāda. The 
ordinary soldiers would dismount and walk from Sūq al-Khayl, while the amirs would 
gradually dismount according to their rank so that only the most prominent amirs rode 
all the way to the governor’s palace. When the procession reached the outer gate of Dār 
al-Saʿāda, the last amirs would dismount, and only the governor himself entered the 
palace on horseback. The procession would end in a grand hall of the palace where an 
empty throne stood draped in yellow silk, the signature colour of the Mamluk sultan. 
This throne had a sword resting on its seat in lieu of the monarch himself.301 When 
arriving here, everyone, even the governor, would have dismounted, thus ending the 
inspection parade that manifested internal military hierarchies, with a gesture of 
collective submission to the sultan. Apart from the plurality of occasional ceremonies, 
which passed by the area around the western and northern side of the citadel on special 
celebratory occasions, the flank of the citadel including Sūq al-Khayl was a space where 
the local garrison could stage a twice-weekly performance of the power structure of the 
army.  
 
iv. Popular interventions in the governor’s parade: 711/1311 and beyond 
At a first glance, the weekly ceremonies seem to be an intra-Mamluk affair that dealt 
solely with the concerns of the military. However, the contemporary chronicles indicate 
that these inspection parades could also become an occasion for confrontations between 
the governor and groups of civilian plaintiffs.  
Let us begin by considering once again the 711 protest. As mentioned above, 
several contemporary authors note that the protest happened on a Monday while the 
governor, his ḥājib al-ḥujjāb (master chamberlain) and other amirs were present in Sūq 
                                                        
300 After this description, al-Qalqashandī adds that in his own time (the late 8th/14th and early 9th/15th 
centuries), these processions no longer took place in Sūq al-Khayl, but in other locations further afield. 
The Sūq al-Khayl was still used on special occasions such as the arrival of foreign embassies. Even so, 
the more recent parades would also pass by the gates of the citadel (most likely the Bab al-Ḥadīd), where 
the proclamation of properties would be made. Ibid., 195–96. This fits somewhat with Loiseau’s argument 
that the Taḥt al-Qalʿa of Damascus was slowly demilitarised and turned in to a regular suburb in the 9th/15th 
century. It also shows that even though the Sūq al-Khayl was decommissioned, the areas around the gates 
of the citadel retained their role as a ceremonial assembly point. See Loiseau, 2014, 225. 
301 al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ vol. 4, 195. 
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al-Khayl.302 Even though these authors do not clearly say so, the concordance between 
al-Qalqashandī’s description and the circumstances pertaining to the 711 protest 
suggests that protesters, led by the khaṭīb (Friday preacher) Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 
739/1338), intended specifically to make their case at the governor’s Monday inspection 
parade. This assumption can be further confirmed from three cases that occurred in 
subsequent decades. In Rajab, 743/December 1342 a group of commoners (ṭāʾifa min 
al-ʿāmma) approached the governor during the Monday parade and asked him not to 
change the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque despite his having received instructions from 
Cairo to do so. According to Ibn Kathīr, the governor ignored the plea and did not even 
turn towards the supplicants.303  
A few years later, another case following the same pattern is reported. Here, the 
plaintiffs received a direct response from the governor, although not the one they had 
hoped for. According to the Shāfiʿī jurist and chronicler Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba (d. 851/1448), 
when the beneficiaries of a local madrasa304 did not receive their ration of wheat in 
Jumādā II 749/August–September 1348, a large group of them sought out the governor 
in Taḥt al-Qalʿa to complain about this mistake. As in 711/1311, the governor responded 
by having them all beaten severely in Sūq al-Khayl.305 
The case with the most striking similarities to the march of 711/1311, however, is 
from 754/1353; it concerns the transformation of a neighbourhood mosque (masjid) into 
a congregational mosque (masjid jāmiʿ). On 28th of Rabīʿ I 754/Friday the 3rd of May 
1353, the first Friday service was held in a mosque known as al-Mazāz in the southern 
suburb of al-Shaghūr. This caused some quarrels in the city about whether the mosque 
had status as an officially designated Friday Mosque. The following is Ibn Kathīr’s 
description of the locals’ response to the situation:  
The matter reached the point where people of the quarter went to Sūq al-
Khayl on the day of his procession306. They carried the Caliphal banners from 
                                                        
302 al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 33, 181; al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān, vol. 4, 153; al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435. 
303 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 314. The group unsuccessfully campaigned for the khaṭīb Tāj al-
Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 749/1350). Tāj al-Dīn was the son of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338), the leader 
of the 711 protest. This case will be discussed briefly in Chapter 4. See below, 151. 
304 Madrasat Abī ʿUmar / al-Madrasa al-ʿUmariyya - a Ḥanbalī madrasa in the suburb of al-Ṣāliḥiyya. See 
ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad al-Nuʿaymī, al-Dāris fī Tārīkh al-Madāris 2 Vols., ed. Ibrahīm Shams al-
Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d.), vol. 2, 77. 
305 Taqī al-Dīn Abī Bakr ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāḍī Shuhba al-Asadī al-Dimashqī, Tārīkh Ibn 
Qāḍī Shuhba 4 Vols., ed. ʿAdnān Darwīsh (Damascus: Maʿhad al-Faransī lil-Dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya, 1994), 
vol. 1, 548. 
306 The Arabic text says yawm mawkibihi. It is unclear who –hi, the possessive suffix (3rd pers. m. sing.) 
refers to, but it is most likely the governor. 
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their mosque (min jāmiʿihim) and Qurʾāns and they gathered around the 
governor and asked him to allow their khuṭba to be continued […]307  
We are not told whether this petition had any effect, but simply that the Ḥanbalī Judge 
subsequently ruled that the khuṭba (Friday sermon) be continued at al-Mazāz. In this 
case, it is not only the time and place that correspond with the 711/1311 protest, the 
protesters also carried the Caliphal banners and Qurʾāns, the very same type of items as 
in 711/1311.  
These coincidences in terms of time, place and mode of expression suggest that 
appearing at the weekly inspection parades in Sūq al-Khayl was a premeditated strategy 
of civilian plaintiffs who were willing to interrupt the military inspection process to 
present their case to governor even if it meant running the risk of violence. The obvious 
practical reason for choosing this venue is that they could be sure of the governor’s 
presence, and the fact that the parade happened in an open space where they would not 
be barred from getting at least visual contact with the governor. Such an informed and 
strategic use of space and time is perhaps characteristic of protesting at any given time 
and space, but in the case of Damascus, there are several examples from the 9th/15th 
century where protesters also went specifically for parade days in order to address or 
even attack the governor in the open.308  
In addition to the approachability of the governors (which seems involuntary), 
there is at least one more practical factor that might have informed the choice of 
protesters to choose the weekly parade days for making their claim. Al-Qalqashandī 
notes that the weekly inspection parades could be followed by a maẓālim session held at 
the Dār al-Saʿāda upon the return of the procession. For these sessions, the chief judges 
of the four law schools sat beside the governor while the petitions were read out and the 
governor’s verdict was written down.309 But before a specific case was handed to the 
governor, a number of intermediary clerks would screen the individual petitions. It might 
be that civilian groups used the preceding inspection parade as an option for lodging a 
                                                        
307 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 371. See also a shorter version of this account in Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, 
Tārīkh vol. 2, 46. However, according to al-Nuʿaymī, a man named Taqī al-Dīn al-Jawkhī (d. 833/1429–
30), who was born in 749/1349, headed the conversion of al-Mazāz from masjid to masjid jāmiʿ. This does 
not fit with the previous two accounts. See al-Nuʿaymī, al-Dāris vol. 2, 325. 
308 Amina A. Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protests in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria (Cairo: 
AUC Press, 2016), 145–146 and 154. 
309 al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ vol. 4, 196. 
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complaint directly to the governor, circumventing the formal procedure of the maẓālim 
court that took place on the same days.310  
Apart from considerations of timing and visibility, the specific choice of 
intervening in Sūq al-khayl on parade days must however also be regarded as a highly 
significant symbolic statement in itself. As we have seen, this particular space was 
integrated neatly into what we might call the ‘spatial repertoire’ for performances of 
sultanic power. Entering this area in an overtly assertive fashion wielding banners and 
props was also a way of co-opting its forms of expression. Remember that Taḥt al-Qal’a 
and Sūq al-Khayl were developed as zones of interaction between ruler and ruled and 
for the manifestation of the rulers’ power through numerous parades and displays of 
weapons and manpower. The 711 protesters not only interrupted official Mamluk 
protocol, they did so by staging their own parade laden with symbolic objects referencing 
the religious and historical identity of Damascus in the space which the Mamluk state 
and its predecessors regarded and cultivated as the official stage for manifestations of 
their power. Apart from its being a pragmatic decision based on approachability, the 
choice of confronting the governor in Sūq al-Khayl should be read as a challenge or 
critique directed towards the political system which this space represented. 
We now turn to a discussion of how spectacles of punitive violence, another 
manifestation of Mamluk power that took place in Sūq al-Khayl, also lent themselves to 
forms of co-option if not occupation through which local groups expressed either 
disappointment with or downright hostility towards the sultanic order.  
 
IV. Taḥt al-Qalʿa and the Mamluk Monopoly on Violence 
As seen above, the Mamluk sultans and their deputies eagerly asserted their claims of 
protecting society from outside threats through military power in Taḥt al-Qalʿa. This 
section demonstrates that they were equally eager to promote themselves as protectors 
against inside threats through the exercise of punitive power. Max Weber argues that 
once it asserts itself as a state, the modern political community reserves for itself the 
exclusive right to create rules along with ‘[…] the monopoly of power to compel by 
physical coercion respect for those rules’.311 In the case of pre-modern polities like the 
                                                        
310 With regard to 9th/15th century Cairo, Elbendary mentions a somewhat similar case in which a group of 
protesters positioned themselves on a specific hill from where they were sure to be seen by the sultan, who 
was hosting a maẓālim session at the citadel. Elbendary, 2016, 134–135. 
311 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 
1968), vol. 2, 904. 
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Mamluk sultanate, the concept of a monopoly of physical coercion or violence must be 
regarded as an aspiration that was realised temporarily and unevenly through specific 
relations of power, rather than as a permanent omnipresent state of affairs. Just as foreign 
invasions, internal schisms or marauding bedouins threatened the monopoly of military 
power, the right to exercise punitive violence was also subject to constant negotiation 
between different actors. The performances of punishment must therefore also be 
understood as a practice of political communication similar to parades and honorary 
ceremonies. 
 
i. Official executions in Sūq al-Khayl  
The chronicles convey numerous descriptions of gruesome physical punishments carried 
out in Sūq al-Khayl and occasionally elsewhere, such as on the bridge of al-Zalābiyya 
in Taḥt Qalʿa.312 The use of Sūq al-Khayl for executions was a feature well known in 
Cairo, Aleppo and in Damascus during the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries.313 Places such 
as the square of al-Kharāb south of the Umayyad Mosque, which Konrad Hirschler has 
identified, as an official execution place in the 9th/15th century, was apparently not used 
for this purpose in the previous century.314  
There are examples of executions taking place in Taḥt al-Qalʿa since the early 
decades of the 7th/13th century. The chronicler Abū Shāma reports executions taking 
place to the north of the citadel and around Bāb al-Faraj as far back as the end of the 
6th/12th century. One example is a description of the crucifixion of a Mamluk accused 
of killing an amir in 646/1248. Abū Shāma describes that the condemned was crucified 
on the bank of the Barāda River below the citadel on the edge of the Sūq al-Dawwāb 
(market for pack animals).315 The cases reported by Abū Shāma refer to the same general 
area, but the exact locations differ from report to report. These cases might be precursors 
of the more fixed institutionalised practice of executing people in Sūq al-Khayl 
specifically, which we see later in the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries.  
                                                        
312 Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus, vol. 1, 139–140. 
313 For the 14th/8th century, I have found 20 cases where executions and severe physical punishment were 
carried out in Sūq al-Khayl/Taḥt al-Qalʿa. In addition to these cases, there are a few examples where a 
criminal was executed and displayed at the scene of his/her crime. There are a few cases where the site of 
the execution is not mentioned by the author. What I have not found is any references to officially 
designated execution sites other than Sūq al-Khayl/Taḥt al-Qalʿa. For executions at the scene of the crime, 
see, e.g., al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 386 and vol. 3, 939. 
314 See Hirschler, 2007, 213. 
315 Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī, Tarājim, 278–279. For similar reports, see Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī, Tarājim, 25, 
329 and 338. 
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As for Sūq al-Khayl proper, it appears as the designated execution square as early 
as 680/1281–1282. In this year a sultanic decree ordered all Christians and Jews working 
in the administration to convert to Islam on pain of death, and according to Ibn Kathīr, 
several Damascenes who refused were executed in Sūq al-Khayl.316 According to the 
same author, some years later, in 687/1288, a Christian man was caught drinking wine 
with a Muslim woman during Ramaḍān. As a punishment for this offence, the governor 
had the man burned alive in Sūq al-Khayl while the woman was flogged.317 This case is 
highly unusual, since execution by fire was a form of punishment that the Mamluk state 
normally only imposed on rebellious Bedouins, not on criminals from within the urban 
setting.318 However, the fact that the perpetrator was Christian and that his crime could 
be viewed as a religious offence (drinking and corrupting a Muslim woman during the 
month of Ramaḍān) could suggest a connection between this case and several cases from 
the 8th/14th century when the bodies of Christians/apostates were burned by angry lynch 
mobs after their execution. These cases are discussed below.  
Over the course of the 8th/14th century, Sūq al-Khayl was used for executions of 
high-ranking Mamluk amirs, soldiers and ordinary civilians. Of the Mamluk amirs, the 
majority was accused of conspiring to overthrow or kill either the sultan or the governor. 
The governor decided these cases and the punishment was usually to be cut in half 
(tawṣīṭ), sometimes after being crucified, and paraded around the area (tasmīr). Heresy 
is the most frequently cited crime of civilians that resulted in execution in Sūq al-Khayl. 
A judge decided these cases and the usual verdict was decapitation.319 The most frequent 
type of crimes for which the same form of punishments was imposed was theft combined 
with murder. This crime could result in both Mamluk soldiers and civilians being cut in 
half in Sūq al-Khayl.320  
The high frequency of reports about executions in Sūq al-Khayl presents the 
question of whether these were spectacles designed for a wider audience such as Hajj 
ceremonies. The chronicles suggest some connection between executions and the twice-
weekly parades of the governor and his troops. Seven of the executions I have found 
                                                        
316 See Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 15, 492. 
317 Ibid., vol. 8 pt. 15, 529. 
318 Hirschler, 2007, 224. 
319 In heresy cases, the verdict of a judge seems to have been sufficient for the sentence to be imposed. 
However, in one case from 725/1325 the scholars disagreed as to whether the accused was a heretic. The 
final decision to implement the death penalty was taken by the governor. See al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 
106. 
320 See, e.g., Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, vol. 1, 451 and vol. 3, 614; al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith, vol. 2, 275. 
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take place on a Monday, more than on any other single weekday.321 The clearest example 
of such a connection is found in a report that describes a large number of convicts who 
were brought to Sūq al-Khayl and punished as part of the governor’s procession. 
According to Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, this happened in 779/1377. On a Thursday night, a group 
of commoners had stoned a detachment of Mamluk soldiers on the suspicion that they 
were attempting to rape a local woman (according to the author, they in fact were 
censoring her for improper conduct). The culprits were apprehended and brought out as 
part of the governor’s morning parade the following day. Initially, they were to have 
their hands cut off, but thanks to an intervention by a group of amirs, the sentence was 
reduced to flogging, which was carried out in Sūq al-Khayl.322  
Cases like this suggest that the ceremonies in Sūq al-Khayl were connected and 
flexible enough to allow the incorporation of an execution into the weekly inspection 
parades of the military. In some cases, the public nature of executions in Sūq al-Khayl 
is emphasised by the fact that the punishment was accompanied by the proclamation of 
the crime. In the case of two Mamluks who were cut in half for conspiring against the 
sultan in 741/1340, the following announcement was given while the punishment was 
carried out: ‘this is the lot of anyone who rise against the sultan’. 323 
 This type of executions was clearly meant to be witnessed by people other than 
those responsible for implementing the punishment, and we can infer that Sūq al-Khayl 
in its function as execution place was open to spectators. However, at times these 
spectators might also attempt to co-opt the punitive performance. In these cases, angry 
mobs usually identified by the chroniclers as al-ʿawāmm (the commoners) swarmed Sūq 
al-Khayl and took control of an execution.  
 
ii. Interventions and lynchings in Sūq al-Khayl 
Al-Jazarī reports that in Shawwāl 730/August of 1330, a Christian man entered the 
Umayyad Mosque during the Friday ceremony and proclaimed that he wished to convert 
                                                        
321 By comparison, one execution took place on a Saturday, one on a Sunday, three on a Tuesday, three on 
a Wednesday, one took place on a Friday and four took place on unspecified days. 
322 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh vol. 2, 550. According to Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba the stoning incident happened on 
a Thursday which means that the morning parade the following day would have taken place on a Friday 
and not on a Thursday as usual, that is unless Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba really means to say that the group was kept 
in jail until Monday morning. 
323 Ibid., vol. 1, 118. See also Ibid., vol. 2, 128 for the proclamation used in connection with the killing of 
a heretic. 
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to Islam with the blessing of the khaṭīb.324 As the khaṭīb approached him, he changed his 
mind and refused to convert. The people present in the mosque considered his initial 
statement as a binding conversion and argued that his retraction equaled apostasy. This 
indictment was confirmed by a judge and the man was taken to Sūq al-Khayl and 
decapitated the following Wednesday. Some members of the audience, whom al-Jazarī 
describes as al-ʿawāmm, were not satisfied with the verdict. They seized the corpse and 
burned it in Sūq al-Khayl and threw the ashes into the Barāda River. Al-Jazarī notes that 
he himself was walking through Sūq al-Khayl on this day, and that it was nearly 
impossible to get through because of the number of people who had gathered for the 
burning.325 
 In 756/1356-57, the exact same fate befell a man from a village near Baalbek. He 
had been convicted by a local judge in Baʿlbak of insulting the Prophet Muhammad and 
was subsequently sent to Damascus where the Mālikī chief judge sentenced him to 
death.326 As in the case of the repentant Christian 26 years earlier, the spectators seized 
and burned his body after the sentence had been carried out.  
What both of these cases show is that parts of the local civilian population were 
sometimes prepared to take matters into their own hands in cases where the crime 
constituted an affront to Islam. In this light, we can speculate that the burning of the wine 
drinking (and womanising?) Christian during Ramaḍān in 686/1288 was meant to 
prevent uncontrollable violence from a similar group of lynchers.  
There are other examples from the Mamluk period of civilian groups ‘expanding’ 
the official punishment by seizing and burning the corpse of the condemned, which 
indicate that this did not only occur in heresy and apostasy cases.  
Hirschler mentions the example of a 8th/14th century amir whose remains were 
burned by angry Cairenes after his execution and an early 10th/16th century case in which 
a Mamluk soldier convicted of banditry in Damascus was seized and burned alive by the 
                                                        
324 al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 400. Al-Jazarī also reports a similar case of a repentant convert who mocked 
Islam in the Mosque and was executed. See Ibid., vol. 2, 108. For reports of sincere as well as mock 
‘Friday conversions’ from Mamluk Cairo, see Linda G. Jones, 'Islam Al-Kafir Fi Hal Al-Khutba: 
Concerning the Conversion of "Infidels" to Islam during the Muslim Friday Sermon in Mamluk Egypt', 
Anuario de Estudios Medievales 42, no. 1 (2012): 53–75. Tamer el-Leithy has examined numerous cases 
from the 8th/14th century of Egyptian Copts seeking martyrdom through mock conversion in what he calls 
a ‘movement of symbolic resistance against Mamluk regulation’. His cases also include the use of Friday 
Prayer as backdrop for mock conversions. See Tamer El-Leithy, 'Coptic Culture and Conversion in 
Medieval Cairo, 1293–1524 A . D .' (Princeton University, Princeton, 2005), 111. 
325 al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 400. 
326 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 387. 
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mob after the official executioner had cut off his arm and leg.327 In the case of the 
Mamluk bandit, the mob also chose to carry out the burning in a space designated for 
official executions, the square of al-Kharāb, exactly like the mobs of 730/1330 and 
756/1354 chose Sūq al-Khayl.  
In both of Hirschler’s cases, the mob’s actions were punished severely, whereas 
the cases from 730/1330 and 756/1356 include no repercussions following the lynching. 
This discrepancy might be explained by two factors. First, the two cases described by 
Hirschler concerned the execution of two individuals from the Mamluk military class, 
while the two cases examined above involved one provincial village dweller and one 
local Christian, both of whom were declared apostates. It is possible that the authorities 
were somewhat indifferent to the treatment of individuals of such a marginal status, as 
opposed to people from within their own ranks. Second, in the two cases described by 
Hirschler, the mob infringed directly on the state’s privilege to condemn and execute, 
while in the cases described above, the victims had been condemned by a judge. Given 
this background, we could also speculate that the Mamluk power holders may have felt 
less challenged by mob burnings of heretics/apostates, since these cases were usually 
decided by the judge and not the governor. Interfering in the execution of these 
punishments was therefore perhaps not seen as a challenge to the governor. Whether or 
not such cases caused retaliation, they give us clear examples of the fact that popular 
groups made conscious use of urban space in political communication. Moreover, by 
occupying Sūq al-Khayl or any other location associated with public executions, they 
effectively challenged the state by infringing on its monopoly on violence.  
There is, however, one case from the end of the 8th/14th century where the term 
infringement does not seem to cover what happened in Sūq al-Khayl. This case regards 
the 799/1397 stoning, decapitation and burning of the prominent grain merchant, 
Muḥammad Ibn Nashū. 
 
iii. Some spatial considerations regarding murder of Ibn Nashū 
Ibn Nashū had recently been awarded the exclusive title of amir, despite being of modest 
civilian and even Christian background. He can be regarded as an early example of the 
civilian ‘upstarts’ who rose through patronage and purchased titles to assume offices 
                                                        
327 Hirschler, 2007, 226 and 214. 
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hitherto reserved for Mamluk officers.328 For years, Ibn Nashū had been despised by the 
common population of Damascus for exploiting his monopoly on grain import in order 
to set prices at his own discretion. On several occasions, he narrowly escaped being 
stoned by angry crowds, but on 24th of Jumādā II 799/Saturday the 24th of March 1397 
he was killed while attending a rain prayer ceremony. Afterwards his estate was looted 
and his body burned.329  
Brinner has already given a thoroughly detailed account of the social dynamics 
behind the rise and fall of Ibn Nashū, and Hirschler has examined the burning as a violent 
ritual.330 In this light, there is not much to add about the why or how of Ibn Nashū’s 
murder. Nevertheless, where the killing and desecration took place remains an 
unexplored issue. It turns out that Taḥt al-Qalʿa also plays a central role in this case, 
something that Brinner but not Hirschler mentions in passing.331 According to both Ibn 
Qāḍī Shuhba and Ibn Ṣaṣrā, the mob did not simply burn Ibn Nashū’s corpse where they 
killed him, they paraded his corpse around, ending up in Taḥt al-Qalʿa.332 Moreover, 
according to Ibn Ṣaṣrā, each member of the crowd brought wood for the fire from Ibn 
Nashū’s plundered house in the suburb of al-Nayrāb, located several kilometers west of 
Taḥt al-Qalʿa, thus adding another spatial twist to the murder.  
As much as the murder of Ibn Nashū reflects a premeditated choice of method, it 
also shows a conscious choice of venue in order to emphasise that the killing was meant 
as a challenge to the authorities. Furthermore, the reaction of the authorities to this case 
signals that this message was understood, and we could say, answered accordingly. 
According to Ibn Ṣaṣrā, no Mamluk amir intervened to save Ibn Nashū during the 
lynching, but on Wednesday the 19th of Rajab/17th of April, around 20 people who had 
been charged with participating in the murder of Ibn Nashū were crucified and later cut 
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329 The case is covered in detail in William Brinner, 'The Murder of Ibn An-Našū: Social Tensions in 
Fourteenth-Century Damascus', Journal of the American Oriental Society 77, no. 3 (1957): 207–210. 
The case is also mentioned in Hirschler, 2007, 225. With regard to sources, the case is mentioned by 
several 8th/14th–9th/15th century chronicles. I have primarily consulted Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, vol. 3, 
614 and 640–641 and Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus vol. 1, 273–276. 
330 Hirschler argues that the burning of Ibn Nashū’s corpse was a symbolic negation as a form of protest: 
rather than imitating the usual punishments meted out by the state, the burning of Ibn Nashū, an amir and 
wealthy businessman, was meant as a direct criticism of the state for failing to handle the food shortage. 
See Hirschler, 2007, 225. 
331 Brinner, 1957, 210. 
332 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, vol. 3, 640 and Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus vol. 1, 275. 
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in half in Taḥt al-Qalʿa.333 In the end, the state took serious measures in an attempt to 
reassert its monopoly on exercising violence in the space that since the 6th/12th century 
had come to represent the official zone for the manifestation of sultanic power emanating 
from the urban citadel.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In conclusion, let us first return briefly to Chamberlain’s concept of the audience state. 
This is the inverse version of the concept of the theatre state coined by the anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz to describe the royal ceremonies of 19th century Bali. In Bali, Geertz 
argues, sacred ceremonies and dramas centred around the king did not simply represent 
politics, they were politics in so far as the sacred theatre was the primary means of 
defining and imposing political order.334 Chamberlain is certainly correct to note that the 
Mamluk sultans did not create a single centralised and continuous sacred drama around 
their own person. In addition to this, there is evidence to support his claim that sultans 
and their deputies inserted themselves within an existing ceremonial geography. (The 
following chapter illustrates this in a discussion of the Umayyad Mosque).  
Nevertheless, this chapter has argued that it is a mistake to disregard Mamluk 
attempts at asserting their own power in more independent terms. It has shown that once 
we move beyond concepts of a particular Damascene ceremonial geography determined 
and confined by the dense built environment inside the walls, as presented by Hirschler, 
we can look at Mamluk ceremonial practices in a new light.  
First, the example of the Taḥt al-Qalʿa, and the Sūq al-Khayl in particular clearly 
indicates that some Mamluk sultans and their deputies in the 7th/13th and 8th/14th 
centuries were actively involved in creating ceremonial geography that was detached 
from the sacred geography of the city centred around the Umayyad Mosque. Second, by 
examining the practices that took place within the framework of this extra-mural 
ceremonial geography, we can see that the Mamluk governors of Damascus did engage 
in performances centred around themselves and what they saw as the foundations of the 
sultanic political/military prowess and punitive authority as well as the protection of 
pilgrimage and travel. Furthermore, we have also seen how the power relationship 
                                                        
333 Ibn Ṣaṣrā, A Chronicle of Damascus vol. 1, 294; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh vol. 3, 614. According to Ibn 
Ṣaṣrā, some of the convicts were instead killed outside the shop of Ibn Nashū in near Bāb Jābiyya, which 
had seen most of the looting and destruction during the lynching. 
334 See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in 19th Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), Chapter 4.  
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internal to the sultanic order found repeated expression within Taḥt al-Qalʿa, for 
example, through the performance of internal hierarchies within the resident armed 
forces, especially the power-relations between the city, citadel and capital.  
However, this chapter has also shown us that while Mamluk rulers continuously 
developed the Taḥt al-Qalʿa and the Sūq al-Khayl, they did so as an intensification of 
pre-existing Zangid and Ayyubid practices of cultivating the citadel and its surroundings 
as symbols of power bordered by zones of interaction. While a more or less uniform 
protocol for Sūq al-Khayl ceremonies across Damascus, Aleppo and other provincial 
cities was certainly a product of Mamluk rule, the very ceremonial forms through which 
the rulers of this polity staged their power were adopted from their predecessors. 
Last, the exploration of the formation and use of Taḥt al-Qalʿa in the two centuries 
leading up to the 711 protest yielded further proof of the strategic nature of this and later 
protests. Taḥt al-Qalʿa and the Sūq al-Khayl afforded the opportunity for explicit 
representations of sultanic power, but as such they also, by default, opened up the 
opportunity for resistance against it. By intervening within this area, any group could 
explicitly show that their grievance was directed against the ruling order. Moreover, the 
interventions within this space could range from a complaint or an attempt to engage in 
negotiation over occupations as a way of expressing disappointment all the way to 
openly defiant acts such as lynchings of regime loyalists in times of particular tension. 
The reception that many of these unwelcome interventions were met with demonstrates 
that the agents of the ruler were intent upon maintaining their claim of control over this 
particular space to such a degree that opposition would be answered with violence if 
need be. 
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Chapter 4 – The Mosque as Political Space, the Khaṭīb as Political 
Figure 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that when the 711 protesters interrupted the governor’s 
parade in Sūq al-Khayl, they confronted the Mamluk state on its own turf —a parade 
square that was intrinsically linked to the citadel and the governor’s palace by way of 
ceremonial processions and served as the stage for repeated performances of power 
through the display of military splendour and, occasionally, violence. The present 
chapter explores what is arguably the other primary political space in 8th/14th century 
Damascus: the Umayyad Mosque.  
The first argument presented in this chapter is that even though the Umayyad 
Mosque of Damascus did not provide a determining physical frame for the 711 protest, 
it was permeated by symbolic references to the mosque, the Friday communal prayer 
ceremony (ṣalāt al-jumʿa, hereafter referred to as the Friday Ceremony) and the other 
devotional and socio-political practices that were tied to this spatiotemporal setting. The 
symbolic references to the mosque consisted of the use of objects, which belonged there 
such as the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān and the caliphal banners. It was also conjured up by the 
fact that the protest leader Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338) was the leading imam335 
and khaṭīb (Friday Preacher) of the Umayyad Mosque (hereafter he is referred to by 
name or simply as the khaṭīb).  
The chapter begins by explaining the symbolic role of the Umayyad Mosque 
complex in local and regional political culture, both before and during the Mamluk 
period. Hereafter we move to examining a number of cases from the early Mamluk 
period demonstrating that the Friday Ceremony constituted a primary public forum not 
only for collective worship, but also for socio-political activity around the time of the 
protest.  
Since the idea of viewing the mosque as a socio-political space is not new, we 
discuss several studies of the medieval uses of mosques, the Umayyad Mosque in 
                                                        
335 The Moroccan traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 768–9/1368), who visited Damascus in 726/1326 and met Jalāl 
al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, reports that a total of thirteen imams were attached to the Umayyad Mosque, al-
Qazwīnī being the most prominent among them and the one charged with leading prayer as part of the 
Friday Ceremony. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Riḥlat Ibn Baṭūṭa – Tuḥfat al-Nuẓār fī Gharāʾib 
Al-Amṣār wa-ʿAjāʾib al-Asfār, ed. M. ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-ʿAryān (Beirut: Dār Ihyāʾ al-ʿUlūm, 1987), 109. 
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particular.336 However, this chapter does more than simply affirm the existing scholarly 
consensus about the socio-political importance of congregational mosques. It shows how 
specific agendas were promoted and specific political problems were negotiated within 
the Umayyad Mosque, including the negotiations that followed the 711 protest. It also 
shows how these practices were imbedded within the liturgy and tied to specific 
subsections of the mosque. Based on this examination, I argue that both the symbolic 
and practical political roles of the Umayyad Mosque must be taken into consideration 
when explaining why the protest of 711 featured both recognisable objects and leading 
liturgical personnel from the mosque.  
The specific discussion of the khaṭīb as a symbolic figure leads into the second 
main argument of this chapter, which is that Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī was not only a 
symbolic figure, but also a living person who acted through his office within a dynamic 
socio-political field. In order to avoid essentialising the role of the khaṭīb as a purely 
symbolic figure, his actions must therefore also be understood as a complicated interplay 
between the official mandate and symbolic heritage of the institution of khiṭāba, personal 
agency and local politics.  
The examination of the figure of the khaṭīb is motivated, of course, by Jalāl al-
Dīn’s involvement in the 711 protest. It is also motivated by the fact that the khaṭīb in 
Medieval Islamic history has attracted little attention from modern scholars despite his 
liturgical and socio-political centrality.337 Khaṭībs of large congregational mosques were 
some of the highest-ranking office holders among the ʿulamāʾ in terms of prestige and 
salary; moreover, their weekly performances in the Friday Ceremony were a pivotal 
practice of symbolic communication within the wider political culture of Medieval 
Islam. The 711 protest allows us to discuss this important yet understudied office in 
                                                        
336Linda Jones discusses how individual audience members used the ‘the prime-time of the Friday khuṭba’ 
for making public statements. See Linda G. Jones, 'Islam Al-Kafir Fi Hal Al-Khutba: Concerning the 
Conversion Of "Infidels" to Islam during the Muslim Friday Sermon in Mamluk Egypt', Anuario de 
Estudios Medivales 42, no. 1 (2012a): 53–75, 65. With direct reference to Syria, Yeshoua Frenkel calls 
congregational mosques the ‘common loci for public encounters with rulers’. Yehoshua Frenkel, 'Public 
Projection of Power in Mamluk Bilad Al-Sham', Mamluk Studies Review 11 (2007): 40–53, 50. 
337 The most extensive treatment of the medieval khaṭīb to date can be found in Linda G. Jones's The 
Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012b). 
Besides Jones, other scholars have devoted shorter chapters to discussions of the khaṭīb within wider 
studies of Medieval Islamic prayer practices and religious culture. From among these, I refer primarily to 
Marion H. Katz, Prayer in Islamic Thought and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
Chapter 4 and Daniella Talmon-Heller, Islamic Piety in Medieval Syria: Mosques, Cemeteries and 
Sermons Under the Zangids and Ayyūbids (1146–1260) (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2007), 
Chapter 3.  
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general terms in an attempt to discern what being khaṭīb meant in terms of socio-political 
agency and status, especially in the eyes of the Damascenes.  
 
II. The Umayyad Mosque and its Ceremonies 
i. The Umayyad Mosque in local and imperial culture 
The term mosque is derived from the Arabic term masjid (place of prostration or prayer). 
Medieval Islamic cities typically had two types of mosques, the masjid and the masjid 
jāmiʿ (congregational mosque). Masjid refers to the local mosque that was found in every 
quarter and used its inhabitants for their daily prayers. Masjid jāmiʿ refers to the large 
congregational mosque where larger sections of a city’s population would gather for the 
Friday Ceremony. Unlike the quarter mosque, the congregational mosque was 
considered a public space. It was regarded as belonging  to the domain of the sultan, who 
decided when to confer the title of masjid jāmiʿ onto a mosque, although medieval jurists 
disagreed about how present the sultan should be in weekly ceremonies.338  At the 
beginning of the 7th/13th century, congregational mosques had emerged in several of 
Damascus’s extra-mural suburbs, which had their own khaṭībs, but the Umayyad 
Mosque remained the primary site of congregational worship.339  
For the most part, this chapter focuses on the ceremonies that took place in the 
Umayyad Mosque and the people charged with leading them. However, this should not 
lead us to regard the building simply as a neutral frame for religious and socio-political 
life in Mamluk Damascus. This section begins with a brief overview of the history of the 
mosque complex and its role in local Damascene and imperial Mamluk culture.  
The Umayyad Mosque complex was regarded as one of the artistic wonders of the 
Muslim world, one of the most important places of Islamic worship, a physical 
connection to the early Islamic past and a key site in Islamic eschatology. The mosque 
complex covers some 16.000 m2 of the north-western sector of the walled city of 
Damascus. It consists of a domed prayer hall, a large north-facing courtyard and a 
number of smaller shrines (mashhad, pl. mashāhid) that are built into the walls that 
surround the courtyard. Three minarets rise from the northern, eastern and western 
                                                        
338 For a discussion of these disagreements, see, e.g., Norman Calder, 'Friday Prayer and the Juristic Theory 
of Government: Sarakhsī, Shīrāzī, Māwardī', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49, no. 
1 (1986): 35–47. 
339 According to Abdelkhadir al-Rihawi, four congregational mosques had been built in the suburbs during 
the Zangid and Ayyubid periods, while another 17 were built during the Mamluk period. See Abdelkadir 
Rihawi, Damascus: Its History, Development and Artistic Heritage (Damascus: Dar al-Bashar, 1977), plan 
9 and legend.  
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corners of the complex, and in the western section of the courtyard stands the treasury 
of the mosque, a small octagonal structure raised on eight columns.340 The outer walls 
of the complex line up with the antique themenos (temple area) that previously enclosed 
the Byzantine Basilica of St. John that was built at the end of the 4th century.341  
When the Arab Muslim forces conquered Damascus in 14/635, a portion of the 
Basilica was initially converted into a place for Muslim prayer. But at the beginning of 
the 2nd/8th century, it was razed to make way for the mosque commissioned by the 
Umayyad Caliph al-Walīd I (d. 96/715).  
The new structure was finished around 96–97/715. 342  With its gilded mosaic 
friezes, marble-clad interior and its towering leaded dome called the Qubbat al-Naṣr 
(Dome of victory), al-Walīd’s mosque won fame for its size and beauty across the 
Islamic world. But aside from being recognised as an architectural gem, the mosque 
would also come to constitute a symbol of the victories won by the early Muslim armies 
and the spread of Islam. The site where the mosque stands today is inextricably linked 
to the conquest of Damascus in 14/635. This connection is represented in stories of how 
the legendary Muslim general Khālid Ibn al-Walīd (d. 21/641), who participated in the 
conquest of Damascus, performed his first post-victory prayer where the eastern miḥrāb 
of the Mosque stands today.343 
The Umayyad Mosque also stands as the strongest architectural reminder of 
Damascus’s heyday as capital of the Umayyad Caliphate. However, when the seat of 
power was moved to Iraq by the Abbasid Caliphs in the 130s/150s, the imperial rulers 
lost interest in Damascus and the Umayyad Mosque. Until the emergence of independent 
princedoms in Syria in the 5th/11th century, the mosque was primarily a space used by 
the local civilian population. On the basis of a number of chronicle entries between the 
3rd/9th and the 5th/11th centuries, Thierry Bianquis demonstrates that the Umayyad 
Mosque functioned in this period as the communal space par excellence in the public 
life of Damascus. Apart from its being the central site of worship, Bianquis analysis also 
shows it to be the primary venue for encounters with and even opposition to regional 
rulers, a site of local identification (lieu de identification) and a space of refuge in 
                                                        
340 Ross Burns, Damascus. A History (London: Routledge, 2005), 131. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid., 111–116. 
343 Finbarr B. Flood, The Great Mosque of Damascus: Studies on the Makings of an Umayyad Visual 
Culture (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2001), 169. 
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troubled times.344 Bianquis ends his examination of the role of the mosque by stating 
that it lost its place as a privileged communal space in the late 5th/11th century when the 
first madrasas were built in Damascus.345 The emergence of multiple venues of teaching 
and worship intra- and extra-muros between the 5th/11th and 7th/13th centuries afforded 
the Damascenes many new spaces of interaction and loci for identification along law 
school or quarter lines. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 711 protesters’ use of the holy 
sandal from the Dār al-Ḥadtīh al-Ashrafiyya testifies to local attachment and 
identification with such institutes and the culture of worship and teaching that took place 
there. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to say that the Umayyad Mosque lost its 
importance entirely. Admittedly, the fact that the protesters in 711/1311 combined 
artefacts from the Dār al-Ḥadīth and the mosque seems to indicate that these places 
shared the position of primary loci of local identification.346 Moreover, an example of 
the continued status of the Umayyad Mosque as a communal site of identification can 
be seen in the biographical dictionary of Damascus, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, written 
by the Damascene historian Ibn ʿAsākir (d. 571/1176).  
Ibn ʿAsākir devotes several chapters of the topographical introduction to the 
Umayyad Mosque, its history and status within Islam. These chapters tell stories of al-
Walīd’s efforts to finance the project and the struggle to obtain building materials such 
as the lead for the Qubbat al-Naṣr that was collected throughout Syria. Ibn ʿAsākir also 
sheds light on the sacredness of the Mosque. He declares that the mosque will stand 40 
years after judgement day and that one prayer in the Umayyad Mosque is worth 30.000 
prayers performed in private, and reports that the eminent jurist al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) 
declared the mosque the 4th wonder of the world. Ibn ʿAsākir also recounts a number of 
marvellous stories connected to the founding of the mosque, including that the pre-
Islamic themenos was originally built by the prophet Hūd, that the builders hired by al-
Walīd found an ancient clay tablet in the southern wall of the themenos that traced back 
                                                        
344 T Bianquis, 'Derrière Qui Prieras-Tu, Vendredi? Reflexions Sur Les Espaces Publics et Privés, Dans 
La Ville Arabe Médiévale', Bulletin D’études Orientales 37/38: (1985–1986): 7–21.  
345 Ibid., 19–20. 
346 To this we should also add that the Umayyad Mosque never ceased to function as a venue of teaching 
and study, despite the emergence of the madrasa and the Dār al-Ḥadīth. Both the main prayer hall and the 
mashāhid that surrounded the courtyard housed teaching circles in the 8th/14th century. 
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to King David and that al-Walīd encountered the mythical being al-Khiḍr praying in the 
mosque one night.347  
Ibn ʿAsākir’s ‘biography’ of the Umayyad Mosque relies on a wealth of oral and 
written sources that attest to the fact that the mosque was still very much at the centre of 
local Damascene imagination about their city and its past in the 6th/12th century. 
Furthermore, from the following century the mosque became once again an object of 
patronage for local rulers. The Ayyubid sultan al-Malik al-ʿĀdil (d. 615/1218), who was 
the driving force behind the reconstruction of the citadel, also ordered several major 
renovations of the mosque between 602 and 614/1205–6 and 1216–17. Al-ʿĀdil even 
tried to highlight the solemnity of the Friday sermon by reducing noisy traffic around 
the mosque.348 The rulers’ focus on the mosque increased significantly with the advent 
of the Mamluk sultans, who used the Umayyad Mosque as a cornerstone of their ruling 
ideology.  
By tracing stylistic elements from the Umayyad Mosque in early Mamluk 
architecture across the empire, Finbarr B. Flood has shown that the Mamluk sultans from 
Baybars (d. 776/1277) to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (d. 741/1341) adopted the aesthetics of 
the Umayyad Mosque and integrated it into their own building projects in an attempt to 
create a connection between their own rule and early Islamic history.349 
 Bethany Walker continues Flood’s line of argument, but with a stronger focus on 
the restoration projects that these sultans commissioned within the mosque itself.350 She 
also provides more detail than Flood about the ideological programme behind these 
efforts. She argues in particular that it was the link between the Umayyad Mosque and 
the 1st/7th century jihād against the Byzantines and the conquest of Syria that made the 
Mosque a potent symbol for the Mamluk sultans, who asserted their claim to power 
                                                        
347 See Chapter 2 in ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Hibat Allāh ibn ʿAsākir, La Description De Damas, ed. Nikita 
Elisséef (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1959). al-Khiḍr is also called al-Khaḍir – the green (man). 
He is a mythical being who is the subject of many Islamic legends and stories. He is sometimes identified 
as a prophet, sometimes as a saint (wālī) and is often associated with the ‘Spring of Life’. See Arent J. 
Wensinck, 'Al-Khaḍir', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 4, ed. E. van Donzel et al. (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1997), 902–905.  
348 R. Stephen Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols – The Ayyubids of Damascus 1193–1260 (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1977), 148–149. 
349 Finbarr B. Flood, 'Umayyad Survivals and Mamluk Revivals', Muqarnas 14 (1997): 57–79. 
350
 Bethany J. Walker, 'Commemorating the Sacred Spaces of the Past: The Mamluks and the Umayyad 
Mosque at Damascus', Near Eastern Archeology 67, no. 1 (2004): 26–39, 34–36. Walker highlights 
Baybars’s restorations of the marbles and mosaics, Qalāwūn’s restorations of the glass mosaics, al-Nāṣir’s 
reconstruction of the qibla-wall and his long-term governor Tankiz’s work on the qibla-wall and 
replacement of the tiles in the main prayer hall. For Governor Tankiz’s work on the mosque, see also Ellen 
Kenney, 'Power and Patronage in Mamluk Syria: The Architecture and Urban Works of Tankiz Al-Nasiri, 
1312–1340' (New York University, New York, 2004), 121–145 and 378–387. 
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through reference to their military victories first over the crusaders and subsequently the 
Ilkhānite Mongols.351 Walker also suggests that the cultivation of the mosque was meant 
to appeal to popular religious sentiment in Damascus as well as a way to cultivate a space 
for Sufi-worship.352  
These recurrent restoration projects and transpositions of stylistic features show 
that by the Mamluk period, the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus had become a symbol 
within sultanic strategies of legitimisation directed towards both the population of 
Damascus and the population of their empire at large. If we add to this the importance 
of the mosque as a communal space that had been cultivated over centuries, we can see 
that this building complex was in fact a central symbolic site to both the local civilian 
population as well as their rulers, unlike the Taḥt al-Qalʿa and the Sūq al-Khayl, which 
were primarily used for military representations of state power.                
In the previous chapter, we concluded that Michael Chamberlain’s concept of the 
audience state of Mamluk Damascus is an inadequate explanation for the emergence of 
the Taḥt al-Qalʿa and its associated rituals. 353  When we consider the Mamluk 
restorations of the Umayyad Mosque, it certainly makes more sense to say, as 
Chamberlain does, ‘that the rulers of the city fit themselves into its existing ceremonial 
geography’.354 However, if we follow Flood’s and Walker’s argument that the interest 
of these sultans in the Umayyad Mosque was not only a gesture of benevolence towards 
the Damascenes but also a way to consolidate their own ruling ideology on an imperial 
scale, we can again argue that Chamberlain underestimates the degree to which Mamluk 
sultans and amirs invested themselves in spaces like the Umayyad Mosque. Transposing 
its symbols onto one’s own mausoleum or personally participating in its restoration, as 
Governor Sayf al-Dīn Tankiz (d. 740/1340) did in 740/1340, certainly goes beyond 
simply ‘observing, supporting and applauding the others’ performances’.355 
Both the successive restoration efforts and the custom of transposing the 
iconography of the mosque onto other buildings seems to have ended with the death of 
al-Nāṣir. But the space of the mosque continued to be regarded by later Mamluk sultans 
as a prime location for communication well into the 9th/15th century. This is indicated by 
                                                        
351 Walker, 2004, 34. 
352 Ibid., 37–38. 
353 See above, 118–119. For Chamberlain’s discussion of the audience state, see Michael Chamberlain, 
Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 48–49. 
354 Ibid., 48. 
355 Ibid., 49. Tankiz’s involvement in restoration works is noted by Ellen Kenney. See Kenney, 2004, 379. 
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the wealth of decrees engraved on the columns of the courtyard during the late Mamluk 
period. These inscriptions relate to matters of government – especially the abolition of 
vices and non-sharia taxes – that typically followed the ascension of a new sultan in the 
later Mamluk period.356  
One inscription that explicitly underlines the importance of the mosque was 
commissioned by Sultan al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Khushqadam (d. 871/1467) in 868/1464 and 
placed on a column at the entrance to the prayer hall. Khushqadam’s inscription contains 
a decree that orders a ban on alcohol and prostitution and the abolition of illegal taxes 
demanded by the muḥtasib (market inspector). These demands are nothing out of the 
ordinary in and of themselves: similar injunctions can be found in other places in 
Damascus and in Syria in general. However, what is remarkable about the 868 
inscription is that the text itself contains a specific instruction about where it should be 
placed: 
[…] what it [the decree] stipulates shall be inscribed on a marble slab at the 
door of the ḥājib al-ḥujjāb357 and carried with courier (bil-barīdiyya) to the 
Umayyad Mosque and plastered onto one of its columns in order for this to 
prevent all remaining illegal taxes (mukūs) in Islam and in order for this good 
deed (ḥusna) to be present in the noble registers (al-ṣaḥāʾif al-sharīfa) for 
eternity […]358  
The wording of this instruction clearly shows that the placement of the inscription in the 
Umayyad Mosque had a dual purpose. First, the choice of location seems to be motivated 
by a wish to ensure that the decree would receive maximum exposure within Damascus 
and attests to an awareness of the centrality of the Umayyad Mosque as a communal 
space among the staff of the Mamluk Chancery in Cairo. Second, Jean Sauvaget has 
argued that the ‘noble registers’ (al-ṣaḥāʾif al-sharīfa) must refer ‘to the registres that 
                                                        
356 While this intriguing corpus of inscriptions lies beyond the scope of this thesis, their emergence towards 
the close of the 8th/14th century could be explained as an aspect of what Amina Elbendary has called the 
‘social and political transformation of the long 15th century in the Mamluk Empire’. Elbendary argues that 
the economic and consequent socio-political changes of this century brought on by, among other factors, 
the plague of the 750s/1350s fostered a new and more dynamic culture of communication between sultans 
and their ordinary urban subjects. Amina A. Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protests in Late 
Medieval Egypt and Syria (Cairo: AUC Press, 2016). See especially chapter 5. 
357 ‘Master chamberlain’: an officer of the Mamluk establishment whose function was to regulate access 
to the governor, organise ceremonies and judge disputes among soldiers. From the middle of the 8th/14th 
century, his judicial mandate was extended to civil cases. Unknown, 'Ḥādjib Iv. – Egypt and Syria', in 
Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 3, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 48–49. 
358
 #10349 in Thesaurus d’Epigraphie Islamique (http://www.epigraphie-islamique.org) (last accessed 
30-05-2017). See also Jean Sauvaget, 'Decrets Mamelouks de Syrie (Troisieme Article)', Bulletin D’études 
Orientales, 12 (n.d.): 5–60, 18–24. 
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record all the acts of men and which will be presented to them on Judgement Day’.359 
The decree thus suggests that placing proof of the sultan’s good deed (ḥusna) within the 
mosque complex will not only aid its earthly but also its transcendental visibility. In 
other words, the Umayyad Mosque is identified as both a primary platform for political 
communication and a sacred space where the connection with the divine powers is 
particularly strong, no doubt with reference to its history and sacredness.  
While there are no similar inscriptions dating back to the early 8th/14th century, the 
mosque also played significant role in framing the communication between ruler and 
subjects and the publication of sultanic decrees during the early Mamluk Period. The 
available evidence in the chronicles, however, suggests that this was done through the 
spoken rather than the written word, and primarily in connection with the Friday 
Ceremony. The next step in trying to understand how the Umayyad Mosque functioned 
as a pivotal space in political culture requires us to examine how Mamluk rulers as well 
as local civilian actors used this ceremony for specific purposes. We begin with the 
customary political reference found in the weekly sermon of the khaṭīb. 
 
ii. Politics from the minbar: the uses of al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān  
The Friday Ceremony was an institutionalised break from the toil and chores of daily 
life and offered a space for communal introspection and piety. However, this space also 
lent itself to a variety of forms of communication between rulers, khaṭībs and ordinary 
worshippers. We begin with exploring how Mamluk sultans and their deputies made use 
of the Friday Ceremony in Damascus. As Yeshohua Frenkel puts it, congregational 
mosques and the Umayyad Mosque in particular, served as a ‘common loci for public 
encounters with rulers’. 360  Occasionally, these encounters took the shape of direct 
contact, as when governors or visiting sultans received supplications after the ceremony 
or demonstrated their benevolence by having coins distributed to the attending 
crowds.361  
However, the most common form of encounter was the indirect contact created 
between the congregation and an absent ruler through al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān (the blessing of 
the ruler), a formulaic blessing of the reigning sultan that acknowledged his right to rule, 
                                                        
359 Ibid., 23. NB: Sauvaget translates the original Arabic text into French. I have translated it from French 
into English. 
360 Frenkel, 2007, 50. 
361 Ibid., 50–51 and James Grehan, 'Street Violence and Social Imagination in Late-Mamluk and Ottoman 
Damascus', International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 (2003): 215–236, 217–218. 
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which was pronounced by the khaṭīb. As the title implies, the primary function of the 
khaṭīb was to preach the khuṭbat al-jumʿa (Friday sermon) from the minbar (pulpit), 
which stood at the qibla wall of the mosque immediately to the left of the central miḥrāb 
(prayer niche). The sermon usually consisted of one long, and one short sermon divided 
by the performance of the collective prayer. Al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān was customarily 
pronounced as part of the second and final sermon.  
In the political culture of the medieval Islamic world, al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān was one 
of the two primary markers of rulership, on a par with sikka (minting), a term that 
referred to the ruler’s right to have his name and regal titles struck on coins.362 While the 
custom of blessing the ruler seems to have roots in the 1st/7th or 2nd/8th century, there is 
no direct justification for it within the Qur’ān or ḥadīths. The only partial exceptions are 
two disputed ḥadīths that instruct worshippers not to curse rulers in their prayers but to 
pray for their righteousness.363 As Marion H. Katz explains, these two ḥadīths do not 
command the khaṭīb to praise rulers in flowery terms, but rather suggest that one should 
‘assume the likelihood of tyranny, and encourage prayer for the reform of the ruler, 
rather than the endorsement of his rule’.364As Katz argues, medieval jurists were well 
aware of the disjuncture between the instruction to pray for the justice of rulers in the 
optative sense and the medieval practice of al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān. As a compromise, they 
agreed for the most part to accept al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān (if only to avoid incurring the wrath 
of rulers and causing fitna), but disallowed the use of unnecessary salutary titles and 
superfluous praise.365  
Despite its ambiguous justifications and the reservations of jurists, the blessing 
became an omnipresent institutionalised form of political communication in the 
medieval Islamic world, and changes in the blessing reflected real political change. The 
Mamluk sultans and their contemporaries were no exception to this rule. According to 
the Damascene chronicler Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373), the duʿāʾ in Damascus changed four 
                                                        
362 It should be mentioned here that al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān originally did not refer to an individual bearing the 
personal title sulṭān. Originally, it was meant as blessing of the Caliph as the person who held sulṭān 
meaning, i.e., ‘power’ in the abstract sense. As for the introduction of sulṭān as the title of a military ruler 
whose power was (theoretically) delegated to him from the Caliph, this development took place in the 
4th/10th century. J. H. Kramer and C. E. Bosworth, 'Sulṭān', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 9, 
ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 849–851. 
363 Katz, 2013, 132. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid., 133. 
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times during 658/1260 as a result of the shift from Ayyubid to Mongol rule, from Mongol 
rule to Mamluk vassalage and finally to direct rule by Baybars.366  
During longer periods of stable rule, where we can assume that the duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān 
remained a relatively neutral formal announcement, the chroniclers usually do not 
comment on it. However, in uncertain times of transition and political crisis, the 
chronicles show us how this customary blessing became an important ritualised method 
of negotiating the power relations that governed cities, provinces and the Mamluk polity 
at large. This becomes especially clear in periods of conflict and frequent regime changes 
such as the 690s/1290s. This decade was marked by recurrent internal disputes within 
the Mamluk military elite and ended with the temporary Mongol occupation of Syria in 
699/1299–1300. With regard to the local situation in Damascus, the Damascene 
chronicler al-Jazarī (d. 738/1338) provides vivid descriptions of how the duʿāʾ lil-sultan 
was used to manage these frequent changes of power beginning with the shifts that 
followed the assassination of sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl Ibn al-Qalāwūn in 693/1293. Al-
Jazarī reports that when al-Ashraf was assassinated outside Cairo in Muḥarram 
693/December of 1293, the Damascenes were not immediately informed of what had 
happened. Instead, on Friday 24th of Muḥarram/ 24th of December, a courier arrived from 
Cairo with a fabricated letter from al-Ashraf, who was already dead at this point. The 
letter declared that the sultan had appointed his eight-year old brother al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad as his heir apparent (wālī al-ʿahd). It also ordered the khaṭīb of the Umayyad 
Mosque to incorporate al-Nāṣir into the Friday sermon, but only as the heir to al-Ashraf’s 
throne.367  
According to al-Jazarī’s chronicle, news of al-Ashraf’s death spread on the 
following day, but he continued to be blessed as sultan in the Friday sermon for nearly 
two months, until al-Nāṣir was finally blessed independently as sultan on Friday the 21st 
                                                        
366 See, e.g., Ibn Kathīr’s use of al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān as a trope in his description of Damascus’s transition 
from Ayyubid to Mongol and then Mamluk rule in 658/1260. Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar ibn Kathīr, 
al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh 20 Pts. in 11 Vols. (Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 2010), vol. 8 pt. 15, 
358. 
367 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Abū Bakr al-Jazarī, Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Anbāʾihi 
wa-Wafayāt al-Akābir wa-al-Aʿyān min Abnāʾihi 3 Vols., ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Ṣaydā – 
Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1998), vol. 1, 195–196. See also Shihāb al-Dīn Ahṃad ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab 33 Pts. in 15 Vols., ed. Najīb M. Fawwāz and 
Ḥikmat K. Fawwāz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), vol. 14, pt. 31, 169. 
The Damascene chronicler al-Birzālī (d. 738/1338) does not mention the letter, but does mention that the 
khaṭīb was given instructions to continue mentioning al-Nāṣir as heir to al-Ashraf for two months. See 
ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Birzālī, Muqtafī ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn al-Maʿrūf bi-
Tārīkh al-Birzālī 4 Vols., ed. ʿUmar A. S. Tadmurī (Ṣaydā - Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 2006), vol. 2, 
347. 
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of Rabīʿ I 693/18th of February 1294.368 On that day, the khaṭīb also acknowledged the 
death of al-Ashraf by moving his name to the posthumous mercy prayer (al-taraḥḥum), 
which also included the name of their father the sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn, who died in 
689/1290.369  
Al-Jazarī states that the forged letter from al-Ashraf had been written on the advice 
of al-Shujāʿī (d. 693/1294), a Mamluk amir who acted as vizier to the child sultan. Al-
Shujāʿī and two other amirs, Kitbughā (d. 702/1302) and Baybars al-Jāshankīr (d. 
710/1310), made up the shadow cabinet which held the de facto reins of power after al-
Ashraf’s death. The forged letter suggests that this group took personal charge of 
regulating the duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān in Damascus in order to promote an official narrative that 
excluded the details al-Ashraf’s murder and made the pro-forma instalment of al-Nāṣir 
as sultan look like a planned transition of power along the Qalāwūnid line. Al-Jazarī 
goes on to describe how the same manoeuvre was repeated shortly thereafter to pave the 
way for the deposition of al-Nāṣir and the appointment of one member of the shadow 
cabinet, Amir Kitbughā, as sultan. Kitbughā’s sultanate was declared in Muḥarram 
694/December of 1294, but six months earlier, in Rajab 693/June 1294, a decree arrived 
in Damascus that ordered the amirs of Syria to reaffirm their allegiance to al-Nāṣir with 
a new oath, which included Amir Kitbughā as his peer and heir apparent. Moreover, on 
the following Friday, Kitbughā was mentioned after al-Nāṣir in the blessing exactly as 
al-Nāṣir had been added to the blessing of his brother al-Ashraf the year before.370 When 
Kitbughā’s sultanate was finally declared in Muḥarram/December, he was thus already 
attached to the Qalāwūnid house, even though the young al-Nāṣir was not dead but 
merely deposed.  
According to al-Jazarī, the Qalāwūnid connection was even further emphasised 
after the sermon when the congregation blessed Kitbughā and ‘proceeded as usual to the 
aforementioned prayer for mercy on the sultan al-Malik al-Manṣūr and his two sons, al-
Ashraf and al-Ṣāliḥ’. 371  Kitbughā ruled for two years until he was overthrown by 
supporters of another amir, Ḥusām al-Dīn Lājīn (d. 698/1299) in 696/1296. Lājīn died 
in 698/1299, at which point al-Nāṣir was reinstalled as sultan. The descriptions of al-
Jazarī suggest that in 693–94/1294, al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān was not simply a statement of 
                                                        
368 al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 1, 200. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Ibid., 200–202. 
371 Ibid., 248. 
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political facts formulated by the local khaṭīb according to the situation. Rather, it was a 
tool of governance, a form of political communication through which the power holders 
in Cairo could intervene locally from a distance and re-frame a tumultuous political 
process as a pre-conceived and legitimate continuation of Qalāwūnid rule.  
It was, however, not only direct orders from Cairo that could cause the khaṭīb to 
change al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān. In some situations, changes could also reflect pragmatic 
decisions by local civilian elites seeking to steer the city safely through war and/or 
occupation. An example of this can be found in connection with the three-month 
occupation of Damascus five years later in 699/1299–1300 by the armies of the Mongol 
Ilkhān Ghazān (d. 703/1304).  
In the chronicle Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān372 by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Yūnīnī (d. 726/1325-
26), we are presented with a detailed account of the occupation that is by all accounts 
borrowed and adapted from his colleague al-Jazarī.373 In Rabīʿ II 699/December 1299, 
the Mamluk army suffered a crushing defeat by Ghazān’s forces at Wādī Khazandār near 
Ḥoms and began retreating toward Egypt. When hearing this news, the military and 
civilian elite of Damascus packed up and headed for Egypt in anticipation of the Mongol 
advance on their city. This group included the city’s governor, treasurer and market 
inspector, and their exodus left Damascus without any formal Mamluk leadership. Only 
the commander of the citadel, Amir Sanjar Arjwāsh al-Manṣūrī (d. 701/1301–02), had 
remained, and now prepared to defend his stronghold against the Mongols. Arjwāsh 
ordered the town criers to declare to the townspeople that al-Nāṣir was still their sultan. 
But despite this, the population quickly prepared to surrender to the advancing Mongol 
armies and negotiations were initiated on Friday the 7th Rabīʿ II 699/1st of January 1300 
when a small group of envoys arrived in Damascus.374  
The negotiation process was acknowledged in the Friday sermon later that day as 
the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque, Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa (d. 727/1327), mentioned 
                                                        
372 Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān: Tārīkh al-Sanawāt m1312– 
1297/ h711 – 697, ed. Ḥamza A. ʿAbbās (Abu Dhabi: Hayʾat Abū Ẓaby lil-Thaqāfa wa-al-Turāth, al-
Majmaʿ al-Thaqāfī, 2007). 
373 As explained in Chapter 1, I subscribe to Li Guo’s theory that the 697–702 section of the Dhayl Mirʾāt 
al-Zamān is al-Yūnīnī’s synthesis of al-Jazarī’s chronicle entries for this period, while the 702–711 section 
of the Dhayl is written by al-Jazarī* and misidentified by a later copyist as belonging to the Dhayl. In the 
maintext, I identify the author of the 697–702 section as al-Yūnīnī/al-Jazarī, while author of the 702–711 
section is identified as al-Jazarī*. In footnotes, the Dhayl is referred to as al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, x in keeping 
with the Abu Dhabi edition from 2007. See above, 25–27. 
374 al-Yunīnī, Dhayl, 258–259. 
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no sultan in his sermon.375 As far as we can tell from the sources, not mentioning a sultan 
in the Friday sermon occurred very rarely. Under normal circumstances, such a decision 
would be tantamount to rebellion; however, in the volatile situation after Wādī 
Khazandār, it was a strategic move. At this point, the breach of al-Nāṣir power in Syria 
was a fact, but negotiations with Ghazān would still have to be conducted. Thus, the 
deliberate omission of reference to any sultan in the Friday sermon seems to have been 
a way to underline the transitory nature of the situation and to signal to the Mongols that 
while the city recognised the defeat of al-Nāṣir, it would not recognise Ghazān’s 
sovereignty before a guarantee of safety had been issued.  
On the following Friday, when a truce had been all but ratified, Ibn Jamāʿa 
included the Ilkhān Ghazān in the sermon with the following titles: ‘Our master the 
sulṭān the most powerful, the sulṭān of Islam and the Muslims, The victor of the earthly 
world champion of faith Maḥmūd Ghazān’.376 In this case, the typical resistance to 
heaping lavish praise on rulers in al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān that is generally found in the 
juridical literature seems to have been completely ignored. Presumably, the volatility of 
the situation and the immediate need for a truce led Ibn Jamāʿa to disregard the consensus 
about modesty when praying for rulers.  
To conclude: the minbar afforded rulers the opportunity to communicate indirectly 
with their subjects and for the local elites to communicate with a foreign occupying force 
through the sermon of the khaṭīb. Two adjacent structures, however, provided a political 
platform for other actors and underlined the status of the Friday Ceremony as a socio-
political event that reached beyond the formal affirmations of allegiance within the 
sermon. We now turn to exploring the importance of these two ‘adjacent structures’ – 
the Suddat al-Muʾadhdhin (the stand of the muezzin) and the Maqṣūrat al-Khiṭāba (the 
enclosure of the khaṭībship). We discuss their function related to Mamluk 
communication and interaction with the Damascene community; with specific regard to 
the Maqṣūrat al-Khiṭāba, we also discuss how this structure provided a socio-political 
venue for Damascene citizens without the presence of state officials. 
 
                                                        
375 Ibid., 260. 
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iii. Politics beyond the minbar: the function of the sudda and the maqṣūra  
The Suddat al-Muʾadhdhin was an elevated stand located near the minbar from which 
the muezzin would pronounce the second call to prayer immediately before the 
ceremony started. Apart from its liturgical function, this stand was also the primary 
platform for publishing new decrees aimed at the broader population of Damascus that 
were read out here in connection with the Friday ceremony. It was thus from the Suddat 
al-Muʾadhdhin that the decree condemning Karāy’s behaviour and abolishing his tax 
program was announced on the 16 of Jumādā II 711/29th of October 1311.377   
The Maqṣūrat al-Khiṭāba was a wooden enclosure to the left of the minbar which 
fenced off the central miḥrāb and the shrine where the Qur’ān of ’Uthmān was kept. We 
have no detailed indications of its size in the Mamluk period, but it seems to have 
extended out into the center of the prayer hall under the Qubbat al-Naṣr.378 
On occasions when important declarations were made from the minbar or sudda, 
the governor and the high-ranking amirs would appear in the maqṣūra to witness the 
announcements. 379  Moreover, when sultans or other high-ranking military officials 
visited Damascus, they would usually attend prayer in the maqṣūra accompanied by the 
top civilian and military officials of Damascus (usually the judges [qāḍīs] and the amirs); 
sometimes these appearances were followed by appointment ceremonies inside the 
maqṣūra.380 This central space, which was fenced off from the rest of the prayer hall, 
thus had a political function as a secluded venue for negotiations and ceremonies uniting 
the higher echelons of military and civilian elites. This was, however, not the sole 
function of the maqṣūra.  
Even though the Maqṣūrat al-Khiṭāba seems to have been the primary space for 
appearances of rulers in the mosque, it was also a space with a wider religious and socio-
political function. On regular Fridays, there would be no military or sultanic presence 
there since the governor of Damascus performed the Friday noon prayer in a separate 
                                                        
377 Ibid., 1440; al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 27. 
378 Its minimum size at the end of the 6th/12th century can be deduced from two comments made by the 
Andalusian traveller Ibn Jubayr (d. 614/1217). He describes that the Maqṣūrat al-Khiṭāba was the largest 
enclosure in the mosque, and also notes that another maqṣūra, which enclosed the south-eastern miḥrāb 
known as Miḥrāb al-Ṣaḥāba (the Miḥrāb of the Companions [of the Prophet]), measured 44 x 22 spans 
(shabr), or roughly 10 x 5 metres. See Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Jubayr, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, ed. 
William Wright and M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1907), 265. 
379 See, e.g., al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 310 and al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 1, 252 for reports on the governor 
attending prayer in the maqṣūra to observe the appointment of Ibn Jamāʿa as khaṭīb in 699/1300. 
380 See, e.g., al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 1, 329 where Kitbughā attends prayer in the maqṣūra during his first 
sultanic visit to Damascus in 696/1295. 
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chamber in the north-western corner of the open courtyard called Mashhad ‘Uthmān or 
Mashhad al-Nāʾib (the Shrine of ’Uthmān or the Shrine of the Governor). Under normal 
circumstances, the Maqṣūrat al-Khiṭāba housed the Shāfiʿī law school, whose members 
used it for worship as well as teaching activities.381 Other groups of local worshippers, 
such as funeral processions, would also enter the maqṣūra to perform prayer for the 
deceased. We know of this practice primarily because the governor Sayf al-Dīn 
Qarasunqūr (d. 728/1328) unsuccessfully tried to ban it in 710/1310.382 The fact that the 
prohibition occurs only once and lasted no more than a few days indicates that the 
Mamluk authorities in general were not able or perhaps not willing to dictate the terms 
of use for this space.  
Besides teaching among the Shāfiʿīs and wider prayer ceremonies, the Maqṣūrat 
al-Khiṭāba could also be used as a space for internal arbitration and reconciliation among 
the wider scholarly community. For example, it was used for a séance of reconciliation 
within the judicial community of Damascus in 736/1335 following an incident where the 
Mālikī chief judge had indicted his Shāfiʿī colleague for moral iniquity (fisq).383 There 
are also examples where the maqṣūra seems to have functioned as a more open political 
forum accessible to a wider section of the public. This is seen most clearly in the al-
Yūnīnī/al-Jazarī’s description of the official surrender to the Ilkhān Ghazān, which took 
place in the maqṣūra the day after Ibn Jamāʿa’s ruler-free Friday sermon in Rabīʿ II 
699/January 1300. According to the Dhayl, the Ilkhān Ghazān was represented at this 
meeting by a delegation headed by one Amir Ismāʿīl, while members of the scholarly 
elite and the ordinary public of Damascus crowded inside and outside the maqṣūra, 
filling it and the adjacent floor space.384  
The combination of the minbar, the sudda and the maqṣūra thus constituted the 
physical stage for a wide range of public practices. Interactions ranging from 
affirmations of allegiance or publication of administrative decrees to more or less 
                                                        
381 The other three law schools were assigned smaller maqṣūras to the left and right along the qibla-wall. 
See Louis Pouzet, Damas Au VII/XIII S. Vie et Structures Religieuses Dans Une Metropole Islamique 
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speculate that some form of hierarchy was in place that left the people on the lower rungs of the social 
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exclusive negotiations about power, privileges and appointments were all centred around 
these three physical structures at the center of mosque, often in connection with the 
Friday liturgy. These practices further mark the spatio-temporal setting of the mosque 
on Fridays as pivotal to socio-political life in Damascus. 
 Before returning to 711/1311, we need to make a few observations about how 
political interventions in the ceremony could also come from the ordinary worshipers in 
the prayer hall. 
 
iv. Audience members’ strategic uses of the Friday ceremony 
The communication that took place in Umayyad Mosque was far from restricted to those 
who were allowed to speak from either the minbar or the sudda or within the maqṣūra. 
Apart from the political strategies of sultans and the negotiations of the local scholarly 
elites, the Friday service also afforded a platform for individual civilians to use the 
atmosphere of solemnity and piety to advance various socio-political agendas. In 
Chapter 3, for example, we encountered the case of a Christian man who was executed 
in Sūq al-Khayl in 730/1330 for declaring himself a Muslim during the Friday sermon, 
only to retract his conversion a moment later. As noted, this case resembles similar cases 
from Cairo where Christians chose to stage their conversion-retraction during Friday 
prayers as a form of public martyrium with maximal audience.385 
While the performances of these repentant converts are perhaps the most bizarre 
example of co-optation of the Friday service, there are numerous examples of individuals 
and groups exploiting the ceremony in less suicidal ways for communicating their claims 
to a wider audience, including their rulers. With reference to the 9th/15th century, Amina 
Elbendary points out that Friday sermons in both Damascus and Cairo played a pivotal 
role in urban protests and riots, both as a stage for disruptive performance and as an 
organisational platform for rallying the worshippers for wider collective action in the 
streets.386 Konrad Hirschler also notes cases where protesters prevented the muezzin 
from making the traditional call to prayer as a way of creating a momentary lapse of 
order, and James Grehan notes the use general boycotts of the Friday services in 
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Memoirs of the Toyo Bunko 63 (2005): 89–105; Fumihiko Hasebe, 'Popular Movement Al-Jaqmaq, the 
Less Paternalistic Sultan', AJAMES 20, no. 2 (2005): 26–51. 
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Damascus as a tool of protest similar to a general strike.387 While protests were nowhere 
near as common in the 8th/14th century, there are still cases where the Umayyad Mosque 
functioned as a stage for displaying dismay or organising collective protest. In the 
following section, we will see several examples where worshippers disrupted or 
boycotted the ceremony due to animosity against the khaṭīb.  
To summarise: we can say that whether it was used by ruling figures to make self-
aggrandising or conciliatory gestures towards the assembled worshippers, or by 
individuals or groups aiming to address and mobilise the congregation, the overall 
tendency is clear. On Fridays, a congregational mosque constituted a socio-political 
space of strategic interaction and even conflict wherein the ceremony could be adjusted, 
co-opted or even disrupted for multiple purposes. Against this background, we can now 
ask what specific role the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus and the Friday Ceremony 
played in structuring the 711 tax conflict and the 711 protest. 
 
v. The Umayyad Mosque and the 711 tax conflict 
The first thing we can note is that the protest itself did not evolve according to the 
‘dramaturgy’ of protest registered by Elbendary, Hirschler and others. The protest did 
not take place on Friday afternoon in direct extension of the ceremony; instead, the 
plaintifs made the strategic choice of seeking out the Monday parade in Sūq al-Khayl. 
That said, the spatio-temporal setting of the Friday ceremony seems to have played a 
role in the planning and the aftermath of the protest. First, according to al-Jazarī*, the 
order for general taxation of property was issued on a Friday, which caused the people 
to voice dismay and demand intervention from the ʿulamāʾ, specifically the khaṭīb al-
Qazwīnī.388 This could suggest that the Friday ceremony was in fact the occasion where 
the initial arrangement of the protest took place 
As for the actual protest, we know that the march began with al-Qazwīnī retrieving 
the banners and the Qurʾān of ʿ Uthmān from the mosque, and that the protesters marched 
via Bāb al-Faraj, some forty-five metres northwest of the mosque. While this suggests 
that the courtyard of the mosque functioned as the rallying point for the protesters, we 
cannot say whether any form of agitation took place here before the march.  
                                                        
387 Konrad Hirschler, 'Riten Der Gewalt: Protest Und Aufruhr in Kairo Und Damaskus (7./13. Bis 10./16. 
Jahrhundert)', in Islamwissenschaft Als Kulturwissenschaft; 1: Historische Anthropologie. Ansätze Und 
Möglichkeiten, ed. S Conermann, S. and v. Hees (Schenefeld (Hamburg): EB-Verlag, 2007), 205–233, 216; 
Grehan, 2003, 218. 
388 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435. 
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A much clearer use of the Friday ceremony can be seen on the Friday after the 
protest. As mentioned in Chapter 2, al-Jazarī* relates that the Sufi shaykh ʿAlī Ibn ʿAlī 
al-Ḥarīrī (d. 715/1315) appeared before the governor in the Mashhad ʿUthmān and 
warned him that the discontent of the population might turn into wider opposition against 
the sultan if the tax policy was not changed.389 The fact that this exchange took place at 
the mashhad should also be considered in the light of the fact that a sizeable crowd was 
either gathered in the main prayer hall or possibly leaving it at that very moment. If al-
Ḥarīrī did have a wider base of popular supporters, as suggested in Chapter 2, we can 
speculate that many of them were in fact at the mosque when this exchange took place, 
thus making the threat of another round of protest both tangible and immediate.390  
These hints at the direct physical role of the Umayyad Mosque in the protest are 
less significant, however, than the symbolic references to the Mosque and the Friday 
service imbedded in the protest march itself. The Qurʾān of ʿUthmān and the black 
banners that the protesters carried were taken directly from the minbar and the Maqṣūrat 
al-Khiṭāba. Not only did these objects constitute links to early Islamic history, they were 
also tied directly to the central space of the Friday Ceremony. In other words, we could 
say that the protesters were bringing the moveable parts of the ceremonial setting of the 
Friday Ceremony with them to Sūq al-Khayl.  
At this point, we should recall that Sūq al-Khayl was a space that the Mamluks 
tried to control as a unilateral stage for projecting the military power of the state; the 
Monday inspection parades are one example of this intention.391 By comparison, the 
ceremonial space of the mosque was, as noted above, a more dynamic space where 
political communication took on a more open and multilateral form. To be sure, the 
prayer hall was subjected to some hierarchies: the maqṣūra was at least occasionally 
sealed from the rest of the prayer hall and the khaṭīb was obliged to allot the ruler a place 
in the sermon. However, the examples cited above show that the Umayyad Mosque was 
also a public political space shared by the civilian population and their rulers. Drawing 
clear visual references to the Mosque could thus have been a way for the protesters to 
bring the culture tied to one space into another, thereby juxtaposing the military rigour, 
                                                        
389 Ibid., 1436. The exchange between the shaykh and the governor is recounted above, 43–45. 
390 See above, 43-44. 
391 By tried, I mean that the interruptions of their ceremonies or even occupations of this space showed 
that they were not always able to maintain their spatial hegemony. For a more detailed discussion of this 
see above, 108–111 and 114–118. 
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exclusivity and sultanic control of Sūq al-Khayl with the piety, interaction and shared 
control characteristic of the Umayyad Mosque. 
Beyond the use of inanimate objects as protesting-props, the fact that the khaṭīb, 
the liturgical figure who constituted the living center of the Friday Ceremony, led the 
protest should also be seen as an attempt to generate a symbolic link between the protest 
march and the ceremonial environment of the Umayyad Mosque.  
We can point to two primary categories of connotations that would have made the 
khaṭīb a powerful figurehead for a protest march. First, by way of his physical 
appearance as well as his performance, the khaṭīb draws a line backward through history 
to the prophet and the early caliphs who commanded the minbar before khiṭāba evolved 
into an office staffed by religious scholars. Shelomo D. Gotein traces the figure of the 
preacher back to the Medina period around the year 0/620, when the prophet Muhammad 
would preach to his congregation on Fridays at noon. The ritual demanded the 
suspension of commercial activity and the assembly of all adult male Muslims in what 
was effectively a statement of their allegiance to the umma of the prophet and a weekly 
reaffirmation of the existence of a unified Muslim community.392 During the Umayyad 
and early Abbasid periods, Friday preaching and leading the collective prayer remained 
part of the undifferentiated prerogatives of the caliph and his provincial deputies. The 
minbar from which the prophet preached was purportedly a simple two-step stool made 
from tamarisk wood, but in the Umayyad period, it was extended into a nine-step pulpit 
from where the caliphs and their deputies would preach and also carry out other 
leadership functions such as dispensing justice.393  
To find the origins of the khaṭīb as a separate office, we need to look to the 3rd/9th 
century at the point when the Abbasid Caliphs conferred the duty of giving the Friday 
sermon onto scholars, predominantly judges who were identified as ṣāḥib al-ṣalāt wa- 
al-khuṭba (the master of prayer and sermon).394 When the officially appointed khaṭībs of 
the following centuries addressed their congregations, their attire and performance 
underlined the origins of Friday preaching as a prophetic and later caliphal privilege. 
When they ascended the minbar, they were dressed in the black robes consistent with 
                                                        
392 Shelomo D. Goitein, 'The Origin and Nature of the Muslim Friday Worship', The Muslim World 49, no. 
3 (1959): 183–195. 
393 See Johannes Pedersen, 'Minbar', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 7, ed. C. E. Bosworth et 
al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 71–76. 
394 Arent J. Wensinck, 'Khuṭba', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 5, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 74–75. 
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the Abbasid tradition and carried a short staff or ceremonial sword, as Muhammad is 
said to have done. While many scholarly offices of medieval Islam such as the judges 
(qāḍīs) or the muḥtasibs referred back to the example of the prophet, the khaṭīb was 
perhaps the figure that expressed this connection with Muhammad and early Islamic 
history in the most visible terms through his costume, his carrying the ceremonial staff 
or sword and, of course, his ascending the minbar.395  
Second, apart the historical connotations conjured up by khaṭībs in general, we 
should also consider the particular position of the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque within 
the landscape of official appointments in Damascus. The khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque 
was not the only preacher in Mamluk Damascus; as mentioned above, each of the 
congregational mosques that sprung up in the extra-mural suburbs between the 7th/13th 
and 10th/16th centuries had their own khaṭīb who performed similar rituals. In addition, 
the figure of the itinerant wāʿiẓ (admonisher or popular preacher) should also be taken 
into account when discussing preaching in general.396 Thus, there would have been 
several people in Damascus at the beginning of the 8th/14th century who could take pride 
in ascending a minbar on Fridays or preaching in other less formal public fora.  
That said, there can be no doubt that the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque was the 
primary preacher of the city and that ‘his minbar’ was its primary pulpit. First, the khaṭīb 
of the Umayyad Mosque was one of the highest paid civilian office holders of the city, 
and unlike the khaṭībs of smaller mosques, he was appointed by sultanic decree on a par 
with the chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt).397 The khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque also had a 
special building at his disposal called Dār al-Khiṭāba, which was located behind the 
mosque.398 When a new khaṭīb was appointed, a celebratory reception would be held in 
                                                        
395 The extent to which medieval khaṭībs attempted to imitate the prophet outright has been a matter of 
some debate. Linda Jones has argued that Andalusian khaṭībs cultivated a prophetic habitus by performing 
supposed mannerisms of Muhammad when they preached, and that the congregation bought into this 
display of prophetic imitation. See Jones, 2012b, chapters 5 and 8. Jones’s idea was criticised later by 
Daniella Talmon-Heller as being ‘romanticized’ and ‘overly reliant on theorization’. See Daniella Talmon-
Heller, 'Review of Linda G. Jones: The Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World'. (Cambridge 
Studies in Islamic Civilization.) Xi, 298, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013', Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 77, no. 2 (2014): 388–90. 
396 For locations and descriptions of the suburban congregational mosques, see Rihawi, 1977. For more 
details on the wāʿiẓ, see, e.g., Jonathan P. Berkey, Popular Preaching and Religious Authority in the 
Medieval Islamic Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011). 
397 Talmon-Heller, 2007, 99. 
398 Jean-Michel Mouton, Damas et Sa Principauté Sous Les Saljoukides et Les Bourides, 468–549. (Paris: 
Institut Francais d’Archéologie Orientale, 1994). 
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the Dār al-Khiṭāba and large crowds would sometimes gather in front of it to cheer the 
new officeholder.399 
When we look to the representation of khaṭībs in the narrative sources, we can see 
that the khaṭībs of the Umayyad Mosque, unlike those of the suburban mosques, are 
often referred to simply as al-khaṭīb without other specifications. Furthermore, 
chronicles such as the Dhayl introduce each year by listing the holders of important 
imperial an local offices; the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque is usually included in the 
lists, whereas his suburban counterparts are not.400  
To summarise: we can say that the 711 protest featured not only parts of the 
physical environment that set the frame for the Friday ceremony in the Umayyad 
Mosque, but also the figure who constituted the living heart of the ceremony and evoked 
the Islamic history of preaching in his weekly performance. However, the involvement 
of the khaṭīb in the march on Sūq al-Khayl cannot be understood simply as the 
instrumentalisation by the protesters of yet another ceremonial prop from the context of 
the mosque. We also need to examine the office of the khaṭīb from an institutional 
perspective as well as the person who commanded it. This, in short, is what the second 
half of this chapter does by considering the level and quality the of the socio-political 
agency inherent in this office in combination with any personal motives that could have 
prompted Jalāl al-Dīn to use his office and the symbols attached to it in an act of street-
level political negotiation.  
 
III. The Khaṭīb as a Socio-Political Actor 
In this section, this proposed link between the khaṭīb as a liturgical figure and as a socio-
political leader is examined through a look at the khaṭībship in general and a discussion 
of whether we can regard khaṭībs as holders of socio-political authority beyond the 
minbar. 
 All of the sources cited so far agree that Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī was the leading 
figure of the procession of protesters that marched on Sūq al-Khayl in 711/1311. 
However, only al-Jazarī* explicitly foregrounds the connection between al-Qazwīnī’s 
liturgical function and his leadership of the protest through the following short dialogue:  
                                                        
399 See al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1123 for a description of the reception that followed the first sermon given by 
al-Qazwīnī in 1307/706. 
400 See, Ibid., 805. 
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By the time the khaṭīb reached the governor he [Karāy] had been filled with 
anger and malice towards him [al-Qazwīnī]. The khaṭīb greeted him with a 
‘peace be upon you’ and he said ‘may no peace be upon you’ (fa-salama al-
khaṭīb, fa-qāla lā salām ’aleikum).401  
It is impossible, of course, to determine whether this exchange took place or whether it 
was added by al-Jazarī* for dramatic effect. In any case, the scene mimics the customary 
exchange of salām greetings between khaṭīb and congregation that initiated the Friday 
sermon, which indicates that al-Jazarī* wished to present the authority with which al-
Qazwīnī approached the governor as an extension of his office and that Karāy directly 
disregards this authority through his choice of words.402  
Daniella Talmon-Heller, who discusses the role of the khaṭīb in her wider 
examination of religious life in Zangid and Ayyubid Syria, is reluctant to assign a general 
socio-political authority to the khaṭīb of this period. She argues that the combination of 
preaching and wider communal leadership can only be seen in very specific cases. One 
place where she sees a longer trend of communal leadership is among the Ḥanbalī 
preachers of the Qudāma clan who resided in the Damascene suburb of al-Ṣāliḥiyya. 
They had come to Damascus and settled on the slopes of Mount Qāsyūn at the end of 
the 6th/12th century as part of a group of emigrants fleeing villages in Northern Palestine 
that were being pressured by the Franks. Apart from preaching in the quarter’s 
congregational mosque, the Qudāmas acted as heads of their community for several 
generations. One of their functions was mediation in the internal as well as the external 
politics of their local community, but Talmon-Heller regards this as an effect of the small 
size and shared origins of the Ṣāliḥiyya community, not as an institutional trait of the 
office of the khaṭīb in general.403   
We can thus say that the idea of the khaṭīb as an intermediary figure not only 
between a congregation of worshippers and God, but also between a civilian community 
and the ruling authorities did exist in Damascus, albeit within a small and cohesive 
community of Ḥanbalī immigrants. While it lies beyond the scope of this thesis to 
determine whether the legacy of the engaged Ḥanbalī khaṭībs of al-Ṣāliḥiyya had a wider 
influence in early Mamluk Damascus, the cases that we examine below do show a 
distinct tendency for Ḥanbalīs and other traditionalist-oriented supporters of the Ḥanbalī 
                                                        
401 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1436. 
402 See, e.g., a description of a Friday sermon in 743/1342 in Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 315. 
403 Talmon-Heller, 2007a, 97–99. 
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shaykh Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) to intervene as supporters or opponents 
of the khaṭībs of the Umayyad Mosque. Ibn Taymiyya’s reactions to Mamluk tax policies 
as well as some of his fatwas on taxation were discussed in Chapter 2.404 This chapter 
shifts its focus more toward Ibn Taymiyya’s socio-political role as a uniting figure for 
Ḥanbalīs, traditionalist Shāfiʿī scholars and a wider segment of the common population 
within the appointment struggles that surrounded local scholarly positions, including the 
post of khaṭīb.  
With regard to the Umayyad Mosque in the Ayyubid period, Talmon-Heller points 
to only one exceptional Shāfiʿī scholar who combined a politicised performance on the 
minbar with active participation in the socio-political life of the city: Izz al-Dīn Abd al-
Salām al-Sulamī, who held the position of khaṭīb in 637–638/1239–1240.405 Al-Sulāmī, 
whose resistance to the tax policies of al-Muẓaffar Quṭuz (d. 659/1260) was mentioned 
in Chapter 2, is a striking example of a politically vocal khaṭīb who displayed a defiant 
and uncompromising approach to preaching in both thought and action that eventually 
drove him into exile.406 In 638/1240, the Ayyubid prince of Damascus al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl 
(d. 643/1245) had concluded a treaty with the Franks and had even allowed for the sale 
of arms to the ruler of Jerusalem, Frederick II (d. 648/1250). Mounting the minbar on a 
Friday, al-Sulamī chastised the prince for his appeasement policies and even refrained 
from pronouncing the duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān for him in any form. This naturally angered the 
prince and led him to banish al-Sulamī from the city.407  
When we move from the Ayyubid into the early Mamluk period, we encounter no 
cases of direct criticism of this kind. However, the absence of criticism and defiance in 
the Mamluk period does not mean that we should regard the performance of later 
Umayyad Mosque khaṭībs as apolitical. Instead of seeing them as provocateurs, we 
should consider them as intermediary agents who navigated a complex political field 
                                                        
404 See above, 71–75. 
405  Ibid., 99–100. Daniella Talmon-Heller, 'Islamic Preaching in Syria during the Counter-Crusade 
(Twelfth-Thirteenth Centuries)', in In Laudem Hierosolymitani - Studies in Crusades and Medieval 
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 Talmon-Heller, 2007b, 67; Humphreys, 1977, 266–67. Al-Sulamī’s refusal to accommodate the wishes 
of rulers also manifested itself in the fact that he preached in white instead of the black robes that since 
the Abbasid period had signified the connection between the khaṭīb and the political sphere. Talmon-
Heller, 2007a, 89 n. 10. 
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that more often than not required the caution of a diplomat rather than the defiance of a 
revolutionary.  
 
i. The khaṭīb as intercessor on the minbar and beyond 
Apart from occasional references to al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān, Syrian chroniclers of the Mamluk 
period do not generally report the content of the Friday sermon. But in the few cases 
when they do, their references suggest that khaṭībs were cognizant of the political weight 
of their sermons. We have a few examples that show the khaṭīb using his sermon as a 
means to secure communal cohesion and avoid conflict.  
We can see this tendency in the sermon of the khaṭīb al-Maqdisī on Friday the 20th 
of Muḥarram 694/10th of December 1294. This was the first occasion where the 
sultanate of Kitbughā was acknowledged in Damascus, and al-Maqdisī commented on 
it, emphasising that political consensus was as crucial a blessing to Muslim society as 
the winter rains.408 The same approach to political change was adopted by Jalāl al-Dīn 
al-Qazwīnī when al-Nāṣir Muḥammad abdicated for the second time in in 708/1309 and 
Baybars al-Jāshankīr took the throne as al-Malik al-Muẓaffar. On the first Friday after 
al-Nāṣir’s abdication, al-Qazwīnī directly discouraged opposition by preaching about the 
necessity of consensus and agreement among Muslims.409 While these messages are 
certainly more cautious than al-Sulāmī’s vocal condemnations of rulers in the 
640s/1240s, this does not make them any less political.  
The cautious remarks of al-Maqdisī and al-Qazwīnī should be seen in light of the 
volatility of the political situation between the death of Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl in 
693/1293 and the beginning of the third reign of al-Nāṣir in 709/1310. In a period where 
factions of Mamluk amirs competed against each other and the Mongols in Iraq tested 
the outer borders of the realm repeatedly, accepting the changing winds of imperial 
politics was most likely the wisest choice. By condemning the policies of an Ayyubid 
prince with family ties to Damascus, al-Sulamī had surely put his own health and safety 
on the line, but evidently not that of his congregation. By contrast, a refusal to recognise 
the authority of an outside power like Kitbughā, the Ilkhān Ghazān or Baybars al-
Jāshankīr could have sparked war and destruction.410 In these cases, we should view the 
                                                        
408 al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 1, 249. 
409 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1211. Once al-Nāṣir returned to power, al-Qazwīnī gave the celebratory sermon in 
the open prayer ground of al-Muṣallā south of the walled city. See al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1260. 
410 In the case of al-Nāṣir’s return to power in 709/1310, the Dhayl describes how the governor and civilian 
leaders of Damascus balanced a political tightrope when deciding on the correct moment to switch their 
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khaṭīb as the figure who negotiated the political status of his city in ceremonial form. 
Rather than an uncritical mouthpiece of the regime, he can be seen as a careful 
intercessor who attempted to steer his community safely through the often-turbulent 
waters of imperial politics. 
The role of the khaṭīb as an intercessor who acted on behalf of the Damascene 
community vis-à-vis an outside power is parallel to the intercessionary role that the 
khaṭīb played in rituals that did not take place within the mosque. These rituals did not 
deal with politics per se, but other threats to the welfare of the congregation. One 
example is the khaṭīb’s customary role as leader of the rain prayer ceremonies (ṣalāt al-
istisqāʾ), which were performed when the winter rains in Syria were delayed and famine 
loomed. In these situations, the khaṭīb would actively supplicate to avert drought through 
divine intervention.411 When the Black Death hit Damascus in 749–750/1348–49, Ibn 
Kathīr describes how the khaṭīb stepped in to instruct the population on how to perform 
special supplications for the plague to end.412  
We have already seen how Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa helped manage the surrender 
to the Mongols in 699/1299–1300 by making weekly alterations to the duʿāʾ lil-sultān. 
Once the surrender of the city had been formalised, Ibn Jamāʿa played an active part in 
mediating between the remaining Mamluk forces who were holed up at the citadel and 
Ghazān’s governor to Damascus, Sayf al-Dīn Qipjak who controlled the surrounding 
city.413  While the details are not clear, another khaṭīb, Shams al-Dīn al-Khalāṭī (d. 
706/1306), who assumed the office in 706/1306, also seems to have had some form of 
socio-political engagement during his life. Al-Jazarī* states that ‘he was steadfast in 
guarding the rights of the people […]’.414  
It would seem, then, that the office of the khaṭīb was partially tied to functions of 
speaking or acting on behalf of the congregation with the aim of securing their welfare 
and safety. Championing socio-political causes such as the 711 protest while surrounded 
by the symbols associated with the Friday ceremony could be seen as an extension of 
this intercessionary role, when the khaṭīb is called to step up and negotiate on behalf of 
the entire city. That said, it is important to note that the khaṭībs were not alone in taking 
                                                        
loyalties from Baybars al-Jāshankīr back to al-Nāṣir in order to minimise the risk of war. See, e.g., Ibid., 
1248. 
411 See, e.g., al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 1, 116–117. 
412 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 342. 
413 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 229. 
414 Ibid., 1146. 
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on the role of public intercession. Ibn Jamāʿa shared his role as negotiator in 699/1300 
with Ibn Taymiyya. As for al-Khalāṭī, the remark of al-Jazarī* could be referring to 
socio-political involvement before he was elected as khaṭīb. Therefore, we should resist 
the temptation to regard the authority of the khaṭīb as an authority sui generis tied 
exclusively to this office. Rather, we should regard the office of the khaṭīb as a privileged 
platform from which it was possible to activate a form of intercessionary authority 
attributed to influential ʿulamāʾ in general.415 With its distinct ceremonial setting and 
pivotal function in the Friday ceremony, the office of the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque 
may have increased a scholar’s opportunity to expand and use the authority which he 
derived from being a prominent member of the ʿulamāʾ, giving his actions the weight of 
the connection with the Islamic past symbolised by the minbar, the black banners and 
relics like the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān. 
Even though it was privileged, the position of khaṭīb was not an uncontested socio-
political platform: holding this office required sultanic, scholarly and broad popular 
support that under certain circumstances could turn to opposition. The next section 
discusses the contested nature of this office through a specific case study that details the 
underlying power struggles behind khaṭīb appointments.  
 
ii. Local support and opposition to the khaṭīb: the case of Ibn al-Muraḥḥil 
The khaṭībs of the Umayyad Mosque were almost exclusively Shāfiʿī scholars; most 
appointees held the office until they died or were moved to a higher office.416 Some 
khaṭībs were able to pass on the office to their offspring. This was the case with Jalāl al-
Dīn al-Qazwīnī. He was appointed chief judge of Egypt in 727/1327 and was succeeded 
as khaṭīb of Damascus first by his son Badr al-Dīn in (d. 742/1342) and then by another 
son, Tāj al-Dīn (d. 749/1350).  
Besides Shāfiʿī credentials and family connections, what were the prerequisites for 
obtaining and holding this office? As stated above, appointing a new khaṭīb required a 
sultanic decree sent from Cairo; however, we should add that the sultan’s decision often 
                                                        
415 For a more detailed discussion of intercession (shafāʿa) as a political resource for scholars, see, e.g., 
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and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī gave up the position order to take up the position of the Shāfi’ī, chief judge 
of Egypt. 
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followed local compromises made in Damascus between supporters of different 
candidates. While most appointments of new khaṭībs went smoothly, a few generated 
opposition among the local scholarly elite and a broad spectrum of the population. 
Damascenes could have strong opinions about who should hold this office and were not 
prepared to accept any khaṭīb appointed from Cairo. In fact, members of the 
congregation were prepared to boycott or disrupt the Friday service in order to 
undermine the authority of an unpopular khaṭīb and convince Cairo to change the 
appointment.  
By examining local reactions to a newly elected khaṭīb, we can identify what type 
of expectations the Damascenes had for the holder of this office and what form of 
leadership position he held within the community. 
The most detailed case of conflict over the khaṭībship in early Mamluk Damascus 
occurs in 703/1303. In this year, the khaṭīb, a senior Shāfiʿī shaykh by the name of Zayn 
al-Dīn al-Fāriqī, died after holding the office for approximately one year. A group of 
Damascenes (al-Jazarī* simply calls them jamāʿa) persuaded the governor, Amir Aqūsh 
al-Afram (d. after 720/1320-21), to accept another senior Shāfiʿī shaykh, Sharaf al-Dīn 
al-Fazārī (d. 705/1305), as a temporary replacement, expecting that he would be 
approved later by Cairo. However, their nominee was passed over, and the position was 
given instead to a younger Shāfiʿī scholar by the name of Saḍr al-Dīn Ibn al-Muraḥḥil 
(d. 716/1316). Ibn al-Muraḥḥil had gone to Egypt after al-Fāriqī’s death and had 
successfully lobbied for his own candidacy as khaṭīb and after having secured the 
appointment, he returned to Damascus to take up the position. Al-Fazārī’s deposition did 
not sit well with some sections of the local community, which organised a campaign to 
have Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s appointment revoked. The governor al-Afram eventually caved 
in and facilitated the re-appointment al-Fazārī.417  
There is some disagreement among the chronicles about what happened and who 
was involved in the campaign against Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s bid for the minbar. However, 
the general tendency of the sources is to identify Ibn Taymiyya as the central figure. 
According to al-Jazarī*, Damascus was split over the question of the khaṭībship: one 
                                                        
417 It should be noted that Ibn al-Muraḥḥil also secured command of two of teaching positions formerly 
held by al-Fāriqī. Before his return to Damascus, these posts had been distributed among other scholars, 
including individuals who are mentioned among the opponents of al-Muraḥḥil’s khaṭībship. In other 
words, the case against most likely had other facets beyond the office of the khaṭīb that is in focus here. 
For details about these appointments see e.g., al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 763–766; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, vol. 15 pt. 
32, 55. 
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faction (ṭāʾifa) accepted Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s appointment, the other opposed it. Ibn 
Taymiyya convened the opposing faction at the adjacent Madrasat al-Kalāsa where they 
agreed to take the case to the governor. Apart from Ibn Taymiyya himself, this group 
included seven other leading members of the scholarly community, including the Shāfiʿī 
chief judge Najm al-Dīn Ṣaṣrā (d. 724/1324) and Jalāl al-Din al-Qazwīnī.418 The group 
included eight scholars named by sources as members of the group; it also included 
lower ranking ʿulamāʾ such as jurists and Sufis and many common merchants and other 
ordinary people.419  
The involvement of people beyond the higher echelons of the scholarly milieu is 
also visible in several other accounts. Three chroniclers, al-Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and the 
Syrian biographer al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363) state that it was the people (al-nās) who 
complained about the dismissal of al-Fazārī.420 The most vivid and dramatic narrative of 
this event is provided by the Egyptian chronicler al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1453). According to 
this version, the crowd interrupted al-Muraḥḥil’s first sermon with angry shouts from 
the moment he ascended the pulpit while one group simply left the mosque shouting, 
‘Where is Islam? How is it permissible for this man to be the khaṭīb and imam of the 
Muslims?’421  
Despite their differences, all these accounts suggest that the resistance to al-
Muraḥḥil was more than an internal struggle among members of the scholarly 
community over the portfolio of the deceased al-Fāriqī. A larger segment of the local 
population seems to have been very passionate about the office of the khaṭīb and would 
take their passion so far as to boycott, or, if we are to believe al-ʿAynī, disrupt the Friday 
                                                        
418 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 765. The other members are identified as the Ḥanafī supreme judge Ibn al-Ḥarīrī (d. 
728/1328), the Shāfiʿī jurist and hadīth teacher Shaykh ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿAṭār (d. 724/1324), Sheikh 
Muhammad Ibn al-Qawwām (d. ?), the Shāfiʿī shaykh Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Sharīshī (d. 718/1318) and 
Shaykh ʿAlī Kurdī (d. ?). The only other source to identify the group is al-ʿAynī, but he leaves out al-
Sharīshī and replaces al-Qawwām with the Shāfi’ī jurist Kamāl al-Dīn al-Zamlakānī (d. 727/1327). In 
addition, he mistakes Jalāl al-Dīn for his brother Imām al-Dīn, who could not have participated because 
he died in 699/1299. See Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān 
5 Vols. (647-7120, ed. Muhạmmad Muhạmmad Amīn (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa-al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, 
2009), vol. 4, 310. 
419 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 765. The wider group is described as follows ‘wa-jamāʿa min al-fuqahāʾ, wa-al-
fuqarāʾ, wa-ʿāmmat al-tujjār, wa-al-nās khalqan kathīran’ (a group of jurists, and paupers [i.e., Sufis] and 
many common merchants and many [from among] the people). There seems to be a min missing between 
wa and al-nās. 
420 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 30; al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 3, 245; Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Aybak 
al-Sạfadī, Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ wa-Aʿwān al-Nasṛ 6 Vols., ed. ʿ Alī Abū Zayd et al. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), 
vol. 5, 11. 
421 al-ʿAynī ʿIqd vol. 4, 310. 
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service. Sultanic approval, it seems, did not inoculate a khaṭīb against deposition through 
local resistance.  
If we look at the case in more detail, we can also read the conflict over Ibn al-
Muraḥḥil as part of a wider struggle between two theological currents: Ashʿarism and 
traditionalism. Since the same conflict seems to come up in the case of Jalāl al-Dīn, it is 
worth pursuing it a step further.  
Ashʿarism was the late medieval form of rationalist theology in Sunni Islam or 
kalām in the tradition of Abū al-Ḥassan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936).422 In 7th/13th and 8th/14th 
centuries, Damascene adherents of Ashʿarism were mainly found within the Shāfiʿī 
school; apart from their focus on kalām, Ashʿarīs were generally characterised by an 
interest in philosophy, logic and other sciences of Greek origin (in Arabic, ʿulūm al-
Awāʾil – the sciences of the ancient). In opposition to Ashʿarism, traditionalism was in 
broad terms characterised by the rejection of kalām and a strong focus on ḥadīth 
transmission. Traditionalism was dominant within the Ḥanbalī school; however, many 
Shāfiʿī scholars of Damascus, such as the ḥadīth expert and chronicler Ibn Kathīr, whose 
work is quoted extensively in this study, also leaned strongly towards traditionalism.  
How might the scholarly profile of al-Muraḥḥil have affected his candidature as 
khaṭīb? Both Marion Katz and Talmon-Heller have noted that some traditionalist-
oriented scholars of 7th/13th century Damascus suspected that those with inclinations 
towards kalām lacked sincere piety and devotion. Talmon-Heller notes the example of 
Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), a central Shāfiʿī theologian and physician engaged 
in logic, kalām and philosophy, whose students suspected that their master did not pray 
at all because of his interest in these disciplines.423 Ibn al-Muraḥḥil is too young to have 
studied under al-Āmidī, but he did study under the latter’s students, among them al-Ṣafī 
al-Hindī (d. 715/1315), who was one of the most influential kalām scholars in Damascus 
in the latter part of the 7th/13th century.424 Moreover, besides his being trained in kalām, 
                                                        
422 George Makdisi presents al-Ashʿarī’s theology as an attempt to find a theological middle ground 
between the metaphorical interpretation (taʿwīl) of the Muʿṭazilites and anthropomorphism (mutashābiha) 
– an accusation that was often directed against the traditionalists. The central bone of contention between 
the two groups was whether the divine attributes described in the Qurʾān should be regarded as 
metaphorical or literal physical attributes. Al-Ashʿarī’s solution became known as entrustment (tafwīḍ), 
i.e., entrusting their real meaning to God. See George Makdisi, 'Ash’ari and Ash’arites in Islamic Religious 
History I', Studia Islamica 17 (1962): 37–80. 
423 Katz, 2013, 168; Talmon-Heller, 2007a, 61. In 626/1229, al-Āmidī fell victim to the rigorous anti-
Ashʿarī campaign of the Ayyubid prince al-Ashraf Mūsa (d. 635/1237). The prince let it be known that 
anyone engaged in kalām or philosophy would be exiled and had al-Āmidī removed from his teaching post 
at the ʿAzīziyya Madrasa. Pouzet, 1991, 204–205. 
424 Ibid., 202–203. 
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Ibn al-Muraḥḥil was also a poet and a master of several of the Greek sciences, such as 
medicine and philosophy, in addition to the customary disciplines of fiqh and ḥadīth.  
Meanwhile, al-Fazārī, the other candidate for the post of khaṭīb, was more closely 
affiliated with the traditionalist current. This can be as seen from his biographies, most 
of which mention that he was a specialist in ḥadīth scholarship, Arabic and Grammar. 
He was also a well-known khaṭīb who had preached for many years in the city of Jarāḥ.425 
Moreover, if we look at the biographies of al-Fazārī’s predecessor, Zayn al-Dīn al-Fāriqī 
and his eventual successor Shams al-Dīn al-Khalāṭī, we see a similar inclination towards 
traditionalism.426 Ibn al-Muraḥḥil, the very archetype of an Ashʿarī scholar, seems to 
have claimed a position that was dominated by the traditionalist camp at this time. This 
indicates that we need to regard the khaṭīb as suspended not just between the sultan and 
the local congregation, but internally between different factions of the congregation.  
This theological aspect of the conflict becomes clearer when we consider the fact 
that Ibn Taymiyya was identified as the leader of the opposition to Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s 
candidature. Ibn Taymiyya was the traditionalist and anti-Ashʿarī champion of his 
day. 427  Moreover, if we look at the wider group of scholars named as part of the 
opposition, we see that several of them were tied in one way or another to Ibn Taymiyya. 
For example, the person who pronounced the formal verdict declaring al-Murraḥḥil unfit 
to preach was the Ḥanafī judge al-Ḥarīrī, who was a supporter of Ibn Taymiyya.428 The 
official accusation against Ibn al-Murraḥḥil was that he could not lead prayer because 
he drank alcohol, but this might very well have been a traditionalist accusation against 
someone whom they saw as unhealthily consumed by non-Islamic sciences and logic 
and thus unwilling to take matters of religion very seriously. As for the wider segments 
of the population who opposed him, most are also identified as partisans of Ibn 
Taymiyya. Ibn al-Muraḥḥil would most likely have seemed to them to be an elitist 
intellectual with questionable theology and morals. Al-Qazwīnī also seems to have been 
an Ashʿarī-leaning Shāfiʿī; his very visual employment of his office and its associated 
symbols in the 711 protest might have been partially aimed at winning over anyone 
                                                        
425 See, e.g., his obituary in Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 48. 
426 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 2, 733–734. 
427 Furthermore, when Ibn Taymiyya was put on trial in Damascus in 705/1306, Ibn al-Muraḥḥil would 
prove to be one of his staunchest opponents. See Sherman A. Jackson, 'Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in 
Damascus', Journal of Semitic Studies 39, no. 1 (1994): 41–85, 46–47. 
428 Caterina Bori, 'Ibn Taymiyya Wa-Jamāʿatuhu', in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Yossef Rapoport 
and Shahab Ahmed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 23–55, 40. 
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sceptical of his suitability as khaṭīb. (This aspect of al-Qazwīnī’s involvement in the 711 
protest is addressed in more detail later in this chapter.) 
Ibn al-Muraḥḥil was not alone in having been opposed by members of the 
congregation. Three decades later, in Rajab 743/December 1342, a new conflict emerged 
when another vocal Ashʿarīte, the Shāfiʿī supreme judge of Syria Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī 
(d. 756/1355), attempted to wrest the minbar from al-Qazwīnī’s son Tāj al-Dīn (d. 
749/1350). Tāj al-Dīn was acting as temporary replacement for his brother Badr al-Dīn, 
who died in 742/1342, but his command of the office was challenged by al-Subkī, who 
had secured an official appointment as Badr al-Dīn’s successor during a visit to Cairo. 
In Damascus, local resistance rose against al-Subkī, resembling the case against al-
Muraḥḥil. According to Ibn Kathīr, a group of commoners (ṭāʾifa min al-ʿāmma) 
approached the governor during the Monday parade asking him not to hand the position 
over to al-Subkī. When this did not work, they threatened al-Subkī with harassment 
(safāha) if he ascended the minbar. Immediately before al-Subkī was to hold his first 
Friday ceremony, news spread that he had stepped down and that Tāj al-Dīn had been 
reinstalled. At this point the commoners, according to Ibn Kathīr, swarmed the mosque 
and cheered for their candidate.429  
In each of these cases, the final and decisive word seems to have been that of 
committed local Damascene actors among the scholars and ordinary worshippers, who 
rallied to the cause of their chosen candidate and pressured the governor and through 
him the sultan to accept their choice for khaṭīb. As Michael Chamberlain has shown, 
scholarly factions and households in Damascus were often engaged in intense 
competition over positions in the administrative and educational institutions, and would 
use both accusations of moral deficiency and political back channeling to further their 
own cause in this competition for prestige and resources.430  
In terms of form, the conflicts over the office of khaṭīb are no different from the 
wider disputes over salaried posts described by Chamberlain. The difference relates 
instead to the exclusivity of the position and the scale of the associated conflicts. While 
the institutional landscape of madrasas was broad and offered many senior and junior 
positions, there was only one position available as khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque, and 
while several of the Damascene suburbs had their own khaṭībs, the khaṭīb of the 
                                                        
429 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya Vol. 8 pt. 16, 314–315. 
430 See in particular Chamberlain, 1994, Chapter 3 ‘Manṣabs and the Logic of Fitna’. 
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Umayyad Mosque was the only position that seems to have generated opposition on the 
scale described here. What these conflicts demonstrate is that local Damascenes felt a 
particularly strong sense of ownership over the process of appointing the khaṭīb of the 
Umayyad Mosque, which suggests that they conceived of it as a position of local 
communal leadership. This made it both a potential political platform and a potential 
bone of contention.  
As we have seen above, it is not enough to regard the khaṭīb as another symbolic 
prop in the 711 protest. We must also take into consideration the potential for socio-
political action imbedded within this position in conjunction with the khaṭīb’s place in 
local power struggles. In the final section of this chapter, we return to the case of al-
Qazwīnī, and look at the man behind the robes of the office.  
 
IV. A Personal Perspective: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī as Khaṭīb 
There are no earlier or later examples from the early Mamluk period where we find a 
khaṭīb making the transition from liturgical to socio-political leadership in a fashion as 
dramatic as Jalāl al-Dīn did in 711/1311. Therefore, we must also consider the following 
question: What may have motivated Jalāl al-Dīn in particular to throw the weight of his 
office, including the associated objects (the banners and the Qurʾān), behind this protest 
march? In order to answer this question, the following section examines Jalāl al-Dīn’s 
background, family, socio-political connections and career path in order to situate his 
appointment as khaṭīb and his participation in the protest of 711/1311 in its proper 
context.  
 
i. From immigrant scholar to chief judge of Egypt: the life of Jalāl al-Dīn 
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī was born in 666/1268 in Mosul into a family of jurists who had 
emigrated westward from Persia around the time of the Mongol invasions under Hulegü 
in the 650s/1250s. His father and uncle were judges, as was his older brother Imām al-
Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 699/1299), who was born in 653/1255 in Tabriz. Jalāl al-Dīn started 
his juridical career as deputy judge under his father in Anatolia (bilād al-Rūm) when he 
was in his 20s.431 Around 690/1289, he arrived in Damascus with his brother, Imām al-
Dīn. The brother initially took up teaching fiqh, but his big break came in Jumādā II 696/ 
                                                        
431 Seeger A. Bonebakker, 'Al-Kazwīnī', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 4, ed. E. van Donzel 
et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 863–64. 
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April 1297, when he was appointed as Shāfiʿī chief judge of Syria by the sultan Ḥusām 
al-Dīn Lajīn, who had seized the sultanate from Kitbughā a few months earlier in Ṣafar 
696/ December 1296.432  
          According to Mathieu Eychenne, Imām al-Dīn owed his success to the fact that he 
spoke Turkish and to his background in Persia and Anatolia. As Eychenne explains, 
Lajīn had previously been the governor of Damascus, during which time he had 
cultivated ties with Damascene scholars of Turco-Persian background. When he became 
sultan, Lajīn facilitated the appointment of a number of these scholars to central positions 
in Cairo and Damascus.433 The following year, Jalāl al-Dīn was appointed as deputy 
judge under his brother. Two recent immigrants had now entered higher league of 
Damascene offices, thanks to their background and connections at court.  
Imām al-Dīn fled to Cairo when the Mongols attacked Damascus in 699/1299. He 
died during his stay in the capital, and at this point Jalāl al-Dīn lost his position as deputy. 
He regained the position shortly after, in 706/1306, when he was deputised by Najm al-
Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā, but lost it the same year when he was appointed khaṭīb of the Umayyad 
Mosque, first as replacement for the deceased khaṭīb, al-Khalāṭī, and then with 
confirmation from Cairo. During his tenure as khaṭīb, Jalāl al-Dīn continued to cultivate 
his connections with the ruling Mamluk elite in Damascus as well as in Cairo. According 
to Eychenne, it was again his command of Turkish that brought him close to the Sultan 
al-Nāṣir and later to Sayf al-Dīn Tankiz, al-Nāṣir’s governor of Damascus between 712 
and 740/1312 and 1340.434  
Apart from a temporary interruption that is addressed below, Jalāl held the office 
of khaṭīb of Damascus for 21 years. In 724/1324, when Ibn Ṣaṣrā died, al-Qazwīnī was 
appointed to the post of Shāfiʿī chief judge in addition the khaṭībship. Three years later, 
in 727/1327, he was called to Cairo to assume the position as Shāfiʿī supreme judge 
there. In Cairo, his relationship with the sultan became even closer. In 732/1332, for 
                                                        
432
 Imām al-Dīn’s new position was taken from Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa (d. 733/1333), who had held the 
office since 694/1293 and who was also the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque. Ibn Kathīr uses the term 
‘intazaʿa’ (to pull, take or wrest away) to describe how Imām al-Din got the position. See Ibn Kathīr, al-
Bidāya vol. 15, 602. Ibn Jamāʿa was reappointed after the Imām al-Dīn’s death in 699/1299 and later went 
on to hold the Shāfi’ī chief judgeship for more than 20 years. 
433 Mathieu Eychenne, Liens Personnels, Clientélisme et Réseaux de Pouvoir Dans Le Sultanat Mamelouk 
(Milieu XIIIe-Fin XIVe Siècle) (Beirut: Presse de L’Ifpo, 2013), 211. See also al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 1, 
340. Imām al-Dīn was originally offered the position of Shāfiʿī, supreme judge of Egypt. When he declined, 
he was assigned the post in Damascus instead. 
434 Eychenne, 2013, 211. 
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example, he joined al-Nāṣir on his third Hajj.435 In 738/1338, however, he fell out of 
favour with the sultan and was sent back to Damascus where he died shortly after at age 
71–72. His removal from office in Cairo was caused by corruption charges against one 
of his sons, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 743/1342).436 When Jalāl al-Dīn moved to Cairo 
in 727/1327, he had managed to pass the position of khaṭīb on to his sons Badr al-Dīn 
and Tāj al-Dīn. However, neither of them managed to regain their father’s and uncle’s 
former position as Shāfiʿī chief judge. Moreover, after Jalāl al-Dīn’s death, the Qazwīnī 
family seems to have been relatively poor and none of his descendants earned the same 
renown as their father. 
With Jalāl al-Qazwīnī’s ‘curriculum vitae’ in mind, we can see several possible 
reasons for why he chose to use his position as khaṭīb in the 711 protest. First, the fact 
that he understood Turkish could have made him the ideal candidate to approach Karāy 
and his retinue of predominantly Turkish-speaking amirs in Sūq al-Khayl. Second, al-
Ṣafadī describes Jalāl al-Dīn as a man fully committed to championing the cases of 
plaintiffs. For example, he quotes a former kātib al-sirr (chancery chief) of Egypt, who 
describes how al-Qazwīnī once presented 16 complaint cases (qiṣaṣ) to the sultan, who 
judged according to al-Qazwīnī’s opinion in all of them.437 This claim should be seen in 
light of the fact that a friendship seems to have existed between biographer and 
biographee, but it could also suggest that al-Qazwīnī was a vigorous intercessor who 
could have made a virtue out of championing causes like the 711 tax conflict.438  
In addition to the personal qualities of Jalāl al-Dīn, we should note the nature of 
the office of the khaṭīb compared to that of the other holders of important offices who 
are described as having ties to the protest: the judges of Damascus. The narratives of the 
six chronicles used for reconstruction of the 711 conflict in Chapter 2 agree that the 
                                                        
435 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 494; al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 2, 532. 
436 Jamāl al-Dīn had followed his father to Egypt in 727/1327, but had used his position to enrich himself, 
which eventually brought on the sultan’s wrath and public disgrace on the father’s name. The 9th/15th 
century Egyptian scholar ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449) relates a story on the authority of the 
chronicler al-Yūsufi’s now lost work Nuzhat al-Nāẓir, according to which Jamāl al-Dīn ‘squandered away 
money on bribery and entertainment […]’. See Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-
Kāmina fī Aʿyān al-Mīʾat al-Thāmina 4 Vols., (Beirut, 1993), vol. 4, 5. Al-Ṣafadī, who was obviously 
intending to clear Jalāl al-Dīn of any wrongdoing, describes his son in unflattering terms as greedy and 
overweight – the direct opposite of the composed and controlled ideal scholar. He also mentions that his 
scholarly talents were more modest than those of his father. See al-Ṣafadī, al-Aʿyān vol. 2, 724–727. 
437 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 494. 
438 al-Ṣafadī’s biography of Jalāl al-Dīn includes correspondence between biographer and biographee that 
is indicative of their relationship. al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 496. 
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judges of Damascus were involved in planning the protest.439 Two narratives state that 
people aggrieved by the taxes approached the judges and the khaṭīb asking for 
intervention,440 while four relate that people sought out the khaṭīb, who then met with 
the judges and decided to bring up the case.441 However, while all six narratives identify 
Jalāl al-Dīn as the leader of the protest march, the judges do not seem to participate in 
the active phase of the protest, at least not as its leaders. In fact, only Ibn Kathīr presents 
an account that seems to suggest that a judge was part of the protest march. He reports 
that ‘when the governor saw them [the protesters] he became angry with them and cursed 
the judge and the khaṭīb […]’.442  
By contrast, the narratives of al-Birzālī and al-Dhahabī mention no judges 
beyond the planning stage. Al-Jazarī*, al-Safaḍī and al-Nuwayrī also do not include 
judges among the members of the march, but they do relate that the Shāfiʿī chief judge, 
Najm al-Dīn Ṣaṣrā, was summoned to the governor’s quarters along with the khaṭīb after 
the protest. Here, the governor abused Ibn Ṣaṣrā verbally for not giving him warning of 
the morning’s protest.443 According to al-Ṣafadī, Karāy even accused Ibn Ṣaṣrā of being 
the main instigator behind the protest, a charge he denied.444 In light of these other 
versions, Ibn Kathīr, whose account is very condensed and relatively meagre in terms of 
details, could just as well have been referring to this subsequent summoning and not the 
actual protest when he states that the judge was cursed, together with the khaṭīb.  
If both the judges and the khaṭīb were involved in arranging the protest, what 
caused the khaṭīb to lead the protest alone? A possible explanation could be that the 
institutional mandate tied to the office of the judge was very concrete, while that of the 
khaṭīb was not. The primary job of the judge was to secure the correct implementation 
of sharia law among the local population, including cases that required the governor to 
implement corporal punishments. In addition, the Shāfiʿī chief judge was in charge of 
administrative functions such as overseeing the awqāf (pious endowments) designated 
for orphans and other vulnerable groups. These responsibilities also required the judges 
                                                        
439 These six are al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya; al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī; al-Ṣafadī, al-Aʿyān; al-
Nuwayrī, Nihāyat; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, 'Dhayl al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man 
Ghabar', in al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar + al-Dhuyūl (al-Dhahabī - al-Ḥusaynī) 4 Vols., ed. Abū Hājir 
Muḥammad al-Saʿīd b. Basyūnī Zaghlūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, 1985), vol. 4, 3–118. 
440 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 136. 
441 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 88; ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 27; al-Ṣafadī, 
al-Aʿyān vol. 4, 153. 
442 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 88. 
443al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 137. 
444 al-Ṣafadī, al-Aʿyān vol. 4, 153. 
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to meet with the governor frequently, for example, to discuss cases brought before the 
maẓālim (grievance) court. By contrast, the mandate of the khaṭīb was symbolic: apart 
from his liturgical role in the Friday ceremony and occasional ceremonies such as the 
eid celebrations, the position had no specified duties.  Jalāl al-Dīn’s leadership of the 
711 protest could thus be an example of how flexible a political platform his office 
offered in comparison with the office of the judge. While the judges could plan the 
protest with the khaṭīb, they may have felt that the boundaries of their office were too 
restrictive and their working relationship with the Mamluk administration too important 
to allow them to lead such a protest. The mainly symbolic mandate of the khaṭīb, on the 
other hand, allowed him to go a step further in opposing the governor. The governor’s 
rebuke of the Shāfiʿī chief judge for not warning him could be interpreted as a sign that 
he expected the judge to cooperate with the Mamluk administration in the affairs of the 
city and that Ibn Ṣaṣrā and his colleagues had to balance these expectations by keeping 
away from direct confrontation with the governor and leaving protesting to the khaṭīb. 
However, these altruistic explanations do not rule out the possibility of a more 
strategic agenda behind Jalāl al-Dīn’s involvement in the protest. As we saw in the case 
of al-Muraḥḥil, being the khaṭīb was not only a question of occupying a communal 
leadership position, but also about gaining and maintaining it. Therefore, we should also 
pay attention to the possible payoff that leading the protest could have had for al-
Qazwīnī. As we saw in the cases of both Ibn al-Muraḥḥil and al-Subkī, holding the office 
of the khaṭīb depended in large part on backing among the local congregation, which 
could force a change of khaṭībs. As his life story suggests, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, like 
his brother, was a skilled politician who understood how to manoeuvre in the political 
landscape in order to better the position of his household. We can add to this the fact that 
he was a first-generation immigrant to Damascus who apparently had caught his lucky 
break in part because of his background and the chord it struck with the Turkish-speaking 
Mamluk sultans and their deputies.  
Seen in this light, championing the cause of the local Damascene population 
opposed to fiscal demands made by the Turkish rulers could have been a way for al-
Qazwīnī to entrench himself more thoroughly in the local context and build a wider local 
following. Moreover, we should also note that al-Qazwīnī was a relatively young khaṭīb: 
he was 40 when he was appointed and 45 at the time of the protest. Many of the khaṭībs 
who had come before him were senior shaykhs with lifelong ties to Damascus and high 
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popularity among the inhabitants.445 More specifically, the three khaṭībs who preceded 
al-Qazwīnī, Shams al-Dīn al-Khalāṭī, Sharaf al-Dīn al-Fazārī and Zayn al-Dīn al-Fāriqī, 
all assumed the position after the age of 60. All three were from Damascus and had long 
careers as teachers of ḥadīth and fiqh before assuming the position of khaṭīb. All three 
are said to have been revered among the Damascene population for their baraka 
(blessing).446 In this context, we can speculate that al-Qazwīnī may have felt the need to 
assert himself as a socio-politically active khaṭīb in order to make up for his lack of 
seniority, local origins and perhaps his lack of baraka in comparison with his 
predecessors.  
 
ii. Jalāl al-Dīn the Ashʿarī? 
Assuming leadership of the 711 protest should also be interpreted as an attempt by al-
Qazwīnī to win favour with a very specific segment of the Damascene population: the 
traditionalist followers of Ibn Taymiyya. As we saw above, this group had been among 
the opponents of Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s khaṭībship in 703/1303. Al-Qazwīnī actively 
supported this complaint against Ibn al-Muraḥḥil; however, six years later, in 710/1310, 
he found his own candidature for khaṭīb disputed by the traditionalists.  
According to al-Jazarī*, the dispute began in 709/1310 when al-Qazwīnī 
temporarily left Damascus as part of the entourage of al-Malik al-Nāṣir, who was on his 
way from Karak to Cairo in order to reclaim the throne from Baybars al-Jāshankīr. Jalāl 
al-Dīn followed al-Nāṣir to Cairo and returned to Damascus in the spring of 709/1310.447  
However, during his absence al-Nāsir had appointed the amir Sayf al-Dīn 
Qarasunqūr as the new governor of Damascus, who had resorted to appointing a new 
khaṭīb. As part of his retinue, Qarasunqūr had brought the Ḥanbalī judge Saḍr al-Dīn Ibn 
al-Ḥadād al-Miṣrī al-Amdī (d. 724/1324), and in Dhū al-Qaʿda 709/April of 1310, he 
appointed Saḍr al-Dīn’s son, Badr al-Dīn (d. ?) as khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque. This 
                                                        
445 Six out of the ten scholars who held the office of khaṭīb between 689/1290 and the appointment of al-
Qazwīnī in 706/1306 held it for a few years toward the end of their lives and died in office. See Pouzet, 
1991, 420–421. 
446 For the obituary of al-Khalāṭī, see, e.g., Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 55 and al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī 
vol. 3, 338–339. For al-Fazārī, see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 48 and Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 3, 
308–309. For al-Fāriqī, see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 34 and Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 3, 241–242. 
447 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1263. See also al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 3, 437; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 
121. Al-Qazwīnī formed part of a larger delegation that also included other office holders from Damascus 
such as the Ḥanafī chief judge, Ibn al-Ḥarīrī. None of the three states the specific purpose of their journey, 
although al-Jazarī* mentions that al-Qazwīnī brought back a 200-dirhams increase of his salary as khaṭīb. 
See al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1263.  
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appointment constituted a break with half a century of Shāfiʿī command of the minbar. 
Once Jalāl al-Dīn returned to Damascus, he began working to regain the position. 
Though deposed from the pulpit of the Umayyad Mosque, he did not stop preaching: for 
two months he gave Friday sermons in a suburban mosque northwest of the walled city; 
according to al-Jazarī*, these sermons drew a crowd of regular attendants.448 Jalāl al-
Dīn’s persistence evidently paid off: in Muḥarram in 710/June 1310, he was reappointed 
as the official khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque.449  
However, according to al-Jazarī*’s account, support for al-Qazwīnī’s return was 
not unanimous:  
At the beginning of this month [Ṣafar/mid-June] the case of the khaṭīb Jalāl 
al-Dīn incurred criticism (kalām) from the companions (aṣḥāb) of the shaykh 
Taqī al-Dīn and this led him to take signed statements (khuṭūṭ) from a group 
of the elites (al-aʿyān) [witnessing] their satisfaction with his imamate and 
praise for him.450 
Al-Jazarī* ends this anecdote by stating that al-nās (the people) were eventually satisfied 
with al-Qazwīnī and that nothing further came of this criticism. Nevertheless, the fact 
that this dispute occurred one year before the tax conflict begs the question of whether 
scepticism from the adherents of Ibn Taymiyya could have contributed to al-Qazwīnī’s 
role in the 711 protest.  
First, however, a few reservations about the veracity of reports of this episode 
should be noted. First, there is no wider confirmation of this episode in other sources 
besides a partial corroboration by al-Birzālī.451 Second, it is not possible to determine 
specifically who these critical adherents were: I have found no other direct accounts of 
tensions between al-Qazwīnī and Ibn Taymiyya or any group that adhered to him. In 
previous years, al-Jazarī and Ibn Taymiyya appear in the same context several times in 
the Damascene sources without indications of hostility.452 Moreover, the three authors, 
al-Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī, who despite being Shāfiʿīs were part of the 
                                                        
448 Ibid., 1315. There is a lacuna in al-Jazarī*’s text where the name of the mosque should be. Right after 
the lacuna, there is mention of the Madrasa al-Fārukshāhiyya, a Ḥanafī/Shāfiʿī madrasa on the northern 
bank of the Barāda west of the walled city in the area known as al-Sharaf al-ʿAlāʾ. It is possible that the 
mosque in question was connected or adjacent to this madrasa. 
449 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1315–1316. 
450 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1319. 
451 al-Birzālī confirms that there was criticism, but simply states that it was from a group (min jiha jamāʿa). 
See Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 3, 458. 
452 In 693/1294, Ibn Taymiyya attended a lecture given by Jalāl al-Dīn; as noted, both men were part of 
the group that opposed al-Muraḥḥil in 705/1305. For al-Qazwīnī’s lecture, see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 
8 pt. 15, 576. For Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s case, see al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 765. 
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traditionalist circles around Ibn Taymiyya, are also very positive towards al-Qazwīnī. 
(See the next chapter.) Third, we should also consider the possibility that the criticism 
described by al-Jazarī* had less to do with al-Qazwīnī than with the fact that al-Miṣrī al-
Amdī was the first Ḥanbalī scholar to command the office of khaṭīb of the Umayyad 
Mosque.453  
Despite the lack of direct corroboration, we can identify some aspects of al-
Qazwīnī’s background that indicate that he, like Ibn al-Muraḥḥil, leaned towards 
Ashʿarism, and that this could have caused some traditionalist partisans of Ibn Taymiyya 
to protest against his reappointment. While these partisans did not include the shaykh 
himself or the traditionalist-leaning Shāfiʿīs who belonged to Ibn Taymiyya’s circle, the 
adherents mentioned by al-Jazarī* could come from the broader Ḥanbalī community or 
Ibn Taymiyya’s following among the commoners of Damascus, who were also engaged 
in resisting Ibn al-Muraḥḥil. There are two contemporaneous authors who directly 
identify Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī as an adherent of al-Ashʿarī: al-Ṣafadī and Tāj al-Dīn 
al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), the son of the aforementioned judge Taqī al-Dīn. In the 
biographical notice in al-Aʿyān, al-Ṣafadī adds the nisba al-Ashʿarī as the last of Jalāl 
al-Dīn’s epithets.454 Later in the biography, he presents 49 lines of a longer panegyric 
poem that he wrote for Jalāl al-Dīn on the occasion of his return from the Hajj in 
733/1333. The poem addresses the breadth of al-Qazwīnī’s knowledge, the soundness of 
his argumentation, and his zealous defense of Islam, but one verse also identifies him 
directly as an Ashʿarīte: 
He raised the banner of al-Ashʿarī and he did not / 
doubt on single day and never suffered from illness (al-danaf).455 
In his biographical dictionary of the Shāfiʿī school, Tabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-Kubrā, Tāj 
al-Dīn Subkī presents a lengthy biography of al-Qazwīnī. He quotes 14 verses from al-
                                                        
453 For the khaṭīb-appointments in the 7th/13th century, see Pouzet, 1991, 419–421. 
454 The full name with epithets is al-Shaykh al-Imām al-ʿIlāma, dhū al-funūn, Qāḍī al-Quḍāt Jalāl al-Dīn 
Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Qazwīnī al-Shāfiʿī al-Ashʿarī. Al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 492.  
455 Ibid. Vol. 4, 497. Four lines earlier, al-Ṣafadī also suggests that al-Qazwīnī had originally been a Ḥanafī 
and then changed to the Shāfiʿī school. Since the Ḥanafī school was more fully committed to rationalism, 
this might be another indicator of where Jalāl al-Dīn stood theologically. For Ḥanafism and Rationalism, 
see, e.g., Makdisi, 1962, 46. Bonebakker also raises the question of al-Qazwīnī’s original affiliation. See 
Bonebakker, 1997, 863. 
 160 
Ṣafadī’s poem, including the verse in question; however, he changes the last word from 
illness (al-danaf) to falsehood (al-zayyaf).456 
While other biographers of al-Qazwīnī I have consulted are less outspoken about 
his theological stance, they include other details that suggest that he was inclined towards 
Ashʿarism.457 His biographers usually mention that he studied uṣūl al-fiqh and uṣūl al-
dīn (called al-aṣlain i.e., the two uṣūls) with the Persian Shāfiʿī shaykh Shams al-Dīn al-
Aykī, who taught in Damascus until his death in 697/1298. Al-Aykī was engaged in 
Sufism and was master of kalām, logic and the ancient sciences. Apart from clearly 
belonging to the Ashʿarī wing of the Shāfiʿī school, al-Aykī also seems to have upset 
members of the traditionalist Ḥanbalī community of Damascus on at least one 
occasion.458 There is no indication that Jalāl al-Dīn pursued all of the disciplines taught 
by al-Aykī or that he was involved in his dispute with the Ḥanbalīs, but their connection 
would still suggest that the Qazwīnī brothers were closer to the rationalist than the 
traditionalist current within the Shāfiʿī school.459 Al-Aykī also seems to have had a 
deeper connection to the Qazwīnīs, which is evident in the fact that when al-Aykī died, 
it was Jalāl al-Dīn’s brother Imām al-Dīn who led the funeral prayer and burial 
procession.460 Apart from the connection to Ashʿarism, Jalāl al-Qazwīnī was also a 
specialist in rhetoric (al-bayān wa-al-maʿānī) and a lover of literature and poetry, and 
was also good friends with poets of Damascus such as Ibn Nubāṭa (d. 768/1366).461  
Returning to the dispute about the khaṭībship in 710/1310, we can say that al-
Qazwīnī was a scholar who most likely leaned towards Ashʿarism and was actively 
                                                        
456 Tāj al-Dīn Abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Taqī al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-Kubrā 
10 Vols., ed. Maḥmūd M. al-Ṭanāhī and ʿAbd al-Fatāḥ M. al-Halwa (Cairo: Dār Ihyāʾ al-Kutub al-
ʿArabiyya, 1964), vol. 9, 161. 
457 In the case of traditionalist-leaning chroniclers such as Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī, we can expect that 
their general aversion to Ashʿarism led them to exclude direct references to this theological current from 
their obituaries of al-Qazwīnī.  
458 With reference to the school’s founder, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), al-Aykī reportedly said that 
‘Ahmad was not a mujtahid’, thus denying Ahmad Ibn Ḥanbal, the school’s founder, the status of a jurist 
who is capable of using his faculties of reasoning in legal matters (ijtihad), and allowed to do so. Shams 
al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa-Wafayāt al-Mashāhīr wa-al-Aʿlām 15 Vols., 
ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, Sạ̄lih ̣Mahdī ʿAbbās, and Shuʿayb Arnaʿūt ̣ (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
1988), 865. 
459 al-Ṣafadī mentions that Imām al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī shared al-Aykī’s interest in logic (manṭiq). See al-
Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 3, 634. 
460 We should remember that al-Ayki was also an immigrant who had made the same journey from the east 
as the Qazwīnīs. 
461 Within the field of rhetoric, he wrote a work called Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ (Abridgement of the Key), a 
supplement that is identified as al-Iḍāḥ (the clarification). Bonebakker, 1997, 863. 
In addition to the literary circles of Damascus, al-Ṣafadī also mentions that al-Qazwīnī had connections to 
Persian and Turkish poets at the court of Cairo, including one Shams al-Din al-ʿAjamī (d. 731/1330), who 
al-Ṣafadī says, helped get al-Qazwīnī appointed to the judgeship of Cairo. Al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 3, 156. 
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engaged in literature, poetry and rhetoric. In short, his scholarly profile resembles that 
of Ibn al-Muraḥḥil, although al-Qazwīnī seems to have been the less belligerent and less 
overtly self-promoting of the two men.462 If the adherents of Ibn Taymiyya had reacted 
negatively to the scholarly profile of Ibn al-Muraḥḥil, the similarities with the profile of 
al-Qazwīnī could explain why they opposed him in 710/1310.  
With this incident in mind, we can now regard al-Qazwīnī’s stance in the 711 
conflict as partially motivated by a wish to position himself as an ‘activist scholar’ and 
a champion of ordinary people, as figures like Ibn Taymiyya had done since the 
690s/1290s. This may have been a way for al-Qazwīnī to divert attention away from his 
theology and background in order to win the favour of those adherents of Ibn Taymiyya 
who had criticised his reappointment. If this was the case, active participation in a public 
protest would certainly have struck a chord with this specific group of Damascenes.  
There are numerous stories of public interventions that demonstrate that Ibn 
Taymiyya and his followers did not hesitate to practice what they preached. One striking 
example of this was a protest against a Christian secretary charged with insulting the 
prophet in 693/1294. Ibn Taymiyya and Zayn al-Dīn al-Fāriqī (who was later appointed 
as preacher) led this protest and were incarcerated for it. Their followers reacted with 
anger and violence and proceeded to stone the amir, who had accused the secretary in 
his service.463  
As seen in Chapter 2, when al-Qazwīnī assumed leadership of the 711 protest, he 
brought into play the symbolic items associated with the office of the khaṭīb: the banners, 
the Qurʾān of ʿ Uthman and the Sandal of the Prophet, which epitomised the traditionalist 
culture around the Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya. By doing so, he could have been 
attempting to position himself visibly as a politically active scholar in the tradition of 
shaykhs such as Ibn Taymiyya or al-Fāriqī. In other words, he could have sought to 
present himself as a khaṭīb who did not hesitate to put his position and its associated 
symbols in play in order to censure the governor when he failed to honour the Islamic 
principles of just governance and fair taxation. 
 
                                                        
462 According to al-Ṣafadī, there was even a measure of animosity between al-Qazwīnī and al-Muraḥḥil. 
al-Ṣafadī uses al-Qazwīnī as source for a very unflattering description of Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s intervention 
in the al-Nāṣir/Baybars al-Jāshankīr conflict in 709/1310. See al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 5, 10. 
463
 Pouzet, 1991, 332–333; al-Jazarī Ḥawādith vol. 1, 203. Admittedly, this incident took place before al-
Fāriqī was appointed as khaṭīb, but it demonstrates that he was a scholar who was willing to engage in 
street politics. 
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V. Conclusion  
We started this chapter within the same thematic territory as the previous chapter: 
examining a limited section of Damascene urban space with focus on its origins, history 
and socio-political function during the early Mamluk period. We found that the 
Umayyad Mosque was a pivotal site of identification for the Damascenes and their 
Mamluk rulers because of its historical ties to the early Islamic history of Syria and its 
status within the body of legends through which medieval people connected with the 
history of pre-Islamic monotheism and imagined the end times to come. This symbolic 
status, combined with the fact that the Mosque constituted the largest assembly space 
within the walled city and housed the central weekly Friday ceremony, made it a primary 
public forum for socio-political interaction among the Damascenes. It also enabled the 
Mosque to function as a space for communication for the city’s population and its 
regional rulers. 
The term public was used at several points in Chapter 3 to describe the ceremonial 
manifestations of Mamluk power that took place in Taḥt al-Qalʿa. However, we should 
understand the term public in a different way when we apply it to the Mosque. Taḥt al-
Qalʿa was public in so far as the Damascenes were allowed to observe various 
manifestations of military power, but interference within these manifestations were 
punished or at best ignored. State control was less intense in the Umayyad Mosque: there 
was no continuous presence of military officials or attempts at regulation, and except for 
extraordinary occasions, the local community could use the space according to internal 
power relations, e.g., between the law schools.  
To be sure, the sultan demanded his weekly affirmation of allegiance from the 
khaṭīb of the Mosque. This affirmation, however, was transactional and lasted only as 
long as the sultan was deemed capable of honouring allegiance with protection. If 
interactions between ruler and ruled within the Sūq al-Khayl were aimed at instilling 
awe and respect for military force, what the chroniclers often refer to as hayba, the 
Umayyad Mosque was a space where they could meet in joint reverence for the divine 
sovereignty of God in an atmosphere charged with sacred history that presented piety, 
justice and generosity as the sound basis for earthly rule and obedience. That the 
protesters who challenged governor Karāy on his fiscal policies in 711/1311 brought the 
banners, the Qurʾān and in some sense the figure of the khaṭīb out of the mosque and to 
Sūq al-Khayl should be seen in the context of the difference between these two spaces 
of interaction, and as an appeal to the governor for honouring the pact of government 
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that was evoked within the mosque on a weekly basis and sometimes directly addressed 
through declarations and negotiations.  
The figure of the khaṭīb is at the same time the most direct reference to the spatio-
temporal setting of the Friday ceremony and the most difficult reference to pin down. 
As we have seen, his liturgical persona was highly symbolic and evocative of prophetic 
and early caliphal history. However, the khaṭīb’s performance should also be seen in the 
context of the performer and his social world. This is especially critical when the 
performer moves beyond his customary liturgical framework, as Jalāl al-Dīn did when 
he led the 711 protest.  
Being the khaṭīb of Damascus meant playing the role of admonisher, 
representative and intercessor for the congregation on and occasionally off the minbar 
through a very special position that required support by both the sultan and the local 
congregation. It was a position that could easily be affected by high politics or schisms 
between different local factions forming along theological lines or otherwise. Ultimately, 
gaining definitive clarity about why Jalāl al-Dīn assumed leadership of the protest on the 
27th of September would be too much to hope for based on the material at our disposal. 
However, we can capture at least some of the complexity of his leadership if we 
understand it as the product of the interplay between the history and the symbolic weight 
of the khaṭībship, its embroilment in local partisanship and the portrait of Jalāl al-Dīn 
conveyed by his biographers. 
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Chapter 5 - Historiography as Socio-Political Practice: Eight Accounts 
of 711/1311 Compared 
I. Introduction 
The previous three chapters of this thesis have explored the local political context of the 
711 protest, the protesters’ symbolic communication through the use of objects and 
spaces and the role and motivations of its leader. These explorations have in turn led to 
wider examinations of the role of relics and geography and ceremonial practices in 
political communication between the Damascenes and their rulers in the 7th/13th and 
8th/14th centuries. Up to this point, the contemporary narrative sources (chronicles, 
encyclopaedias and biographical dictionaries) have been used primarily as a vast corpus 
of information about events, names, objects and places. This chapter abandons this 
instrumental approach in order to examine the sources themselves.  
As noted in Chapter 1, the Damascene historians who recorded the events of 711 
were often relying on the notes, drafts or even the finished works of their colleagues.464 
This chapter argues that these and other historians writing in 8th/14th century Syro-Egypt 
did more than copy and synthesise a shared pool of facts to fit the particular format of 
their respective works. By comparing contemporary representations of the 711 protest 
and the arrest of the governor of Damascus, Sayf al-Dīn Karāy al-Manṣūrī (d. 719/1319), 
this chapter demonstrates that 8th/14th century historians were in fact creating narratives 
that reflected personal and collective views of the world in which they lived as well as 
defined socio-political agendas.  
 
i. Approach and sources 
In theoretical terms, this chapter connects with a larger shift within the study of Islamic 
historiography away from source-critical studies centred on historicity toward the study 
of historiography as the crafting of narratives by socio-political agents who acted 
through their texts (a detailed overview of this approach was sketched out in Chapter 
1).465 This chapter draws specifically on Tarif Khalidi’s approach from Arabic Historical 
Thought in the Classical Period (1994), which centred on grouping authors according to 
their socio-political background and political worldview.466 It includes excerpts from 
                                                        
464 See above, 24–25. 
465 See above, 22–24. 
466 Tarif Khalidi, Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), Chapter 5.  
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seven different chronicles as well as one biographical dictionary, each of which cover 
the events related to Karāy and his arrest in Damascus in 711/1311. These eight works 
are divided into three groups according to geographical origins and the socio-political 
background of the author.  
While Khalidi’s approach provides a useful scheme for sorting a larger number of 
historical works, its weakness lies in the fact that it does not account for intra-group 
contradictions. In order to highlight how members of each group were still able to follow 
more personalised agendas even when relying on information from other members of 
the same group, Khalidi’s scheme is combined with Konrad Hirschler’s approach from 
Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors (2006), which focuses on the 
agenda of the individual author and the ways that personal socio-political strategies 
could be pursued through the narrative framing of historical events.467 The three groups, 
which are identified as A, B and C, are presented here: 
 
Group A) Damascene historians with scholarly background 
Title Author Biography 
 
al-Muqtafī ʿalā al-
Rawḍatayn al-Maʿrūf bi-
Tārīkh al-Birzālī468 
al-Birzālī, ʿAlam al-Dīn al-
Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn 
Yūsuf 
Historian and muḥaddith, 
Shāfiʿī school  
(d. 738/1338) 
al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī 
al-Tārīkh469 
Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidāʾ 
Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar 
 
Historian, muḥaddith, jurist 
& theologian, Shāfiʿī 
school 
(d. 774/1373) 
Dhayl al-ʿIbar fī Khabar 
Man Ghabar470 
al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad 
Historian, muḥaddith, jurist 
and theologian, Shāfiʿī 
school        
(d. 749/1348) 
Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān471 al-Jazarī*, Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm.472 
Historian and legal 
notarian, Shāfiʿī school.    
(d. 738/1338) 
                                                        
467 Konrad Hirschler, Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors (London: Routledge, 2006). 
468 ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn al-Maʿrūf 
Bi-Tārīkh al-Birzālī 4 Vols., ed. ʿUmar A. S. Tadmurī (Ṣaydā - Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 2006). 
469 Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh 20 pts. in 11 Vols. 
(Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 2010). 
470 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, 'Dhayl al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar,' in al-ʿIbar 
fī Khabar Man Ghabar + al-Dhuyūl (al-Dhahabī - al-Ḥusaynī) 4 Vols., ed. Abū Hājir Muḥammad al-
Saʿīd b. Basyūnī Zaghlūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, 1985), vol. 4, 3–118. 
471 Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān: Tārīkh al-Sanawāt m1312–
1297/ h711–697, ed. Ḥamza A. ʿAbbās (Abu Dhabi: Hayʾat Abū Ẓaby lil-Thaqāfa wa-al-Turāth, al-
Majmaʿ al-Thaqāfī, 2007). 
472 As explained in Chapter 1, I subscribe to Li Guo’s theory that the 697–702 section of the Dhayl Mirʾāt 
al-Zamān is al-Yūnīnī’s synthesis of al-Jazarī’s chronicle entries for this period, while the 702–711 section 
of the Dhayl is written by al-Jazarī* and misidentified by a later copyist as belonging to the Dhayl. In the 
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Group B) Egyptian historians with military background 
Title Author Biography 
 
Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmiʿ 
al-Ghurar473 
ibn al-Dawādārī, Abū Bakr 
ibn ʿAbd Allāh 
Historian,  
Son of Mamluk amir 
(d. 736/1336) 
Kitāb al-Tuḥfa al-
Mulūkiyya fī al-Dawla al-
Turkiyya474 
 
 
al-Manṣūrī, Baybars Mamluk amir,  
Viceroy of Egypt and historian  
(d. 725/1325) 
Nuzhat al-Nāẓir fī Sīrat al-
Malik al-Nāṣir (ViaʿIqd 
al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-
Zamān475) 
al-Yūsufī, Mūsa ibn 
Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā. 
(Via al-ʿAynī, Badr al-Dīn 
Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad          
d. 855/1451).476 
 
Historian and ḥalqa officer 
(d. 755/1355) 
 
Group C) Biographer with bureaucratic/scholarly background 
Title Author Biography 
 
Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ wa-Aʿwān 
al-Nasṛ477 
al-Sạfadī,  Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 
Khalīl ibn Aybak 
Biographer, chancery secretary, 
litterateur. Born in Ṣafad, Syria. 
Studied with the ʿulamāʾ of 
Damascus. Worked in the 
chanceries of Cairo and 
Damascus, (Shāfiʿī school)  
(d. 764/1363) 
 
Section II examines the four chronicle excerpts in Group A, all of which were written 
by Damascene scholar-historians in the first and early second half of the 8th/14th century. 
This section connects with Hirschler’s Authors as Actors in more than its approach, since 
the four authors examined here constitute the 2nd and 3rd generations of the so-called 
Syrian school of historiography, whereas Abū Shāmā al-Maqdisī, one of Hirschler’s two 
cases in Authors as Actors, can be considered as part of its 1st generation along with Sibṭ 
Ibn Jawzī (d. 654/1256). (The connections between the consecutive generations of 
                                                        
main text, I identify the author of the 697–702 section as al-Yūnīnī/al-Jazarī, while author of the 702–711 
section is identified as al-Jazarī*. In footnotes, the Dhayl is referred to as al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, x in keeping 
with the Abu Dhabi edition from 2007. See above, 25-27. 
473 Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Dawādārī, Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmiʿ al-Ghurar 9 Vols., ed. Ulrich 
Haarmann (Cairo; Hans Robert Roemer, 1971). 
474 Baybars al-Manṣūrī, Kitāb al-Tuḥfa al-Mulūkiyya fī al-Dawla al-Turkiyya: Tārīkh Dawlat al-Mamālik 
al-Baḥriyya fī Al-Fatra min 648–711 Hijriyya, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Sạ̄lih ̣ Ḥamdān (Cairo: al-Dār al-
Miṣriyya al-Lubnāniyya, 1987). 
475 Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān 5 Vols. (647–712 
AH), ed. Muhạmmad Muhạmmad Amīn (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa-al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, 2009). 
476 For a discussion of the al-ʿAynī – al-Yūsufī connection, see above, 32-33 and below, 203-204. 
477 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān al-ʿAsṛ wa-Aʿwān al-Nasṛ 6 Vols., ed. ʿAlī Abū Zayd 
et al. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998). 
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Damascene chroniclers were also explored in the Chapter 1).478 Section II also takes a 
more critical look at the school-label, and explores the differences that emerge when 
comparing the 711 protest narratives of authors in Group A. Even authors within this 
school who relied extensively on each other’s work would shape their narrative of the 
711 protest and Karāy’s arrest to fit their personal authorial agenda, which should make 
us question the uniformity within the school.  
         Section III examines the three narratives in Group B, all of which come from 
chronicles written by 8th/14th century Egyptian historians tied to the military and the 
court in Cairo. The idea of a distinction between a Syrian and Egyptian tradition in 
Mamluk historiography based on the background of the authors and the structure of their 
works has been common in modern scholarship for a long time. However, Li Guo argues 
that our understanding of these seemingly separate traditions needs to rest not only on 
registering their geographical and socio-economic differences but also on analysing 
‘[…] what impact these differences might have had on Syrian and Egyptian historians’ 
assumptions and objectives in writing history’.479 The events in Damascus in 711/1311 
afford us an excellent opportunity to begin comparing the assumptions and objectives of 
Damascene scholars and Egyptian soldiers because their respective backgrounds and 
outlook permeate the very way they frame the arrest of Governor Karāy. 
Group C, the third and last group, contains only one single text. Instead of a 
description of the events of 711/1311, this is a biography of Sayf al-Dīn Karāy from al-
Ṣafadī’s biographical dictionary Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr wa-Aʿwān al-Naṣr. This biography 
includes a description of the protest and arrest, but in the context of Karāy’s general life 
story. Al-Ṣafadī does not conform to the framework of either the Damascene or Egyptian 
tradition when he describes the events of 711/1311, instead, he borrows from both. His 
account is included in the present examination because it might suggest a third position 
in the historiographical landscape that transcends the geographical and socio-economic 
distinction between the Damascene scholar and the Egyptian soldier: the Mamluk 
bureaucrat-scholar.480  
                                                        
478 See above, 24–30. 
479 Li Guo, 'Mamluk Historiographic Studies : The State of the Art', Mamluk Studies Review 1 (1997): 15–
43, 39. 
480 At its initial stage, the present chapter also included the account provided by the bureaucrat and 
encyclopaedist Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī (d. 733/1333) Nihāyat al-Arab fī 
Funūn al-Adab. Al-Nuwayrī’s account was excluded at a later stage since it proved to be a condensed 
reproduction of the version found in al-Yūnīnī’s Dhayl. See Shihāb al-Dīn Ahṃad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab 33 pts. in 15 Vols., ed. Najīb M. Fawwāz et al. (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), vol. 15 pt. 32, 136–138. 
 168 
Naturally, the breadth of this examination makes it unlikely to produce a 
conclusion as clear-cut as Hirschler’s distinction between reformism and 
accomodationism. However, what a multi-polar comparison can do is to reveal both 
broader discrepancies according to geographical and socio-political lines as well as more 
subtle disagreements and even conflicts of interpretation between authors who evidently 
knew each other and used each other’s works.  
 
ii. The political situation of 711/1311 revisited 
The question of why Governor Karāy was arrested ten days after the 711 protest was 
raised briefly in Chapter 2. As discussed there, Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (d. 741/1341) 
accused a group of high-ranking Manṣūrī amirs of treason in the fall of 711/1311 and 
had them arrested. Governor Karāy had also belonged to the Manṣūrī corps, and we 
concluded that he was most likely arrested and deported as a victim of the sultan’s purge, 
not because of his conduct as governor.  
We do not reopen the discussion of ‘what really happened’ here. Instead, we 
explore what we can learn about each author and his worldview and political agendas by 
looking at how he frames the arrest of Karāy and his alleged co-conspirators. 
In order to navigate among the eight authors’ often eclectic references to the purge 
of 711/1311, we must begin with a short summary of the most important details. This 
time, specific attention is paid to the identity of the victims of al-Nāṣir’s purge.  
In 711/1311, the internal political situation in the Mamluk Empire was defined 
first and foremost by al-Nāṣir’s second return to power in 709/1310. Between 699 and 
708/1299 and 1309, al-Nāṣir had ruled under the auspices and control of two Manṣūrī 
amirs, Sayf al-Dīn Salār (d. 710/1310), who held the title of viceroy (nāʿib al-salṭana), 
and Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Jāshankīr (d. 709/1310). Over time, relations between al-
Nāṣir and his two custodians became more and more strained; in 708/1309, he abdicated 
and left the throne to al-Jāshankīr.  
Al-Jāshankīr’s sultanate ended after a mere 10 months: in Ramaḍān of 709 
/February 1310, al-Nāṣir left the Jordanian fortress of Karak, where he had been exiled 
since his abdication, and returned to Egypt. Karāy and other Manṣūrī amirs gradually 
abandoned al-Jāshankīr and came out in support of al-Nāṣir. Once his entourage reached 
Cairo, al-Jāshankīr had very few allies left and was removed from the throne. Both al-
Jāshankīr and Sayf al-Dīn Salār were captured and killed within a year of al-Nāṣir’s 
return.  
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Once al-Nāṣir had returned to the throne, he rewarded a number of amirs for their 
support. Amir Baktamur al-Jūkandār al-Manṣūrī (d. 711/1311), the governor of Safad, 
was called back to Cairo and ordered to take over the position of viceroy of Egypt after 
Salār. Meanwhile, an amir by the name of Quṭlūbak (d. 716/1316) was sent to Safad, 
and an amir by the name of Quṭlūqtamur (d. ?) was appointed governor of Gaza. Amir 
Sayf al-Dīn Qarasunqūr (d. 1328/728) was appointed governor of Damascus and viceroy 
of Syria, but in the spring of 711/1311, he requested a transfer to the governorate of 
Aleppo. The sultan granted Qarasunqūr his wish and chose Karāy as the new governor 
of Damascus; Karāy had actively distinguished himself in 709/1310 by taking and 
holding the city of Gaza to aid al-Nāṣir’s approach on Cairo.  
The luck of Karāy and the other governors, however, would soon run out. In the 
fall of 711/1311, al-Nāṣir moved against them on suspicion of treason and in Jumādā 
I/October, Baktamur al-Jūkandār was deposed and sent to prison at Karak along with 
several of his trusted Mamluk soldiers. Almost simultaneously, arrest orders were sent 
out for the governors of Syria; Quṭlūqtamur in Gaza and Quṭlūbak in Safad were soon 
dispatched to Karak. On the 22nd of Jumādā I/6th of October, one of al-Nāṣir’s 
confidants, Amir Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn al-Dawādār (d. 730/1330-31), arrived in Damascus 
on the pretext of bringing honorary robes for the governor. However, on the following 
day, he and his men put Karāy in chains and sent him to Karak. He was temporarily 
replaced by amir Sayf al-Dīn Bahadur Aṣ (d. 729/1329), who arrived in Jumādā 
II/November. Karāy remained a prisoner at Karak for several years; he died in 719/1319. 
Qarasunqūr in Aleppo was spared imprisonment in Karak, but in 712/1312 he initiated 
a revolt against al-Nāṣir with the aid of the governor of Tripoli, Amir Aqūsh al-Afram 
(d. 720/1320). Soon after, both defected to the Ilkhānite Mongols in Iraq where they 
remained until they died.  
The official excuse for al-Nāṣir’s purge in 711/1311 was that Baktamur al-
Jūkandār had conspired with the governors of Syria, among others, to stage a coup and 
install the sultan’s cousin in his place. 481  There are different opinions among the 
contemporary authors regarding the specific details of this coup, which are discussed in 
more detail below. These differences involve the exact identification of the participants 
as well as the question of whether or not the coup was legitimate. Among the Damascene 
                                                        
481 Winslow W. Clifford, State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk Syro-Egypt, 648–741 
A.H/1250-1340 C.E., ed. S Conermann (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2013), 190. 
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scholar-chroniclers in Group A, the coup and al-Nāṣir’s purge are acknowledged; 
however, these issues play a relatively insignificant role compared to the protest, 
whereas the opposite is true for the Egyptian scholars in Group B.  
 
II. The Events of 711/1311 from a Contemporary Damascene Perspective  
The most general thing we can say about the group of Damascene narratives is that they 
give far more attention to the 711 protest and the local factors behind the arrest of Karāy 
than to the purge orchestrated by al-Nāṣir. The overarching question is why and how 
local events are foregrounded at the expense of imperial events in these sources. 
With regard to the why, the simplest (and most innocent) explanation would be to 
say that it is natural for a historian to be drawn toward dramatic local events such as the 
public display of relics, violence against ordinary citizens and the arrest of local 
dignitaries. However, I argue that we cannot simply regard the Damascene chroniclers 
as mere compilers of local news motivated by an appreciation for the colourful and 
dramatic. Instead, we need to regard them first, as stakeholders with a common vested 
interest in an event such as the 711 protest, and second, as individual authors who 
carefully selected and arranged their material in ways that indicate a certain worldview 
extending beyond the event in question.  
 
i. The Damascene chronicler as stakeholder in the 711 protest 
To consider these authors as stakeholders in the events of 711/1311 is to consider their 
relationships with the people portrayed in the 711 protest narratives. It also means asking 
whether they could have had any personal interest in the struggle over the 711 tax. We 
begin by looking at the social and personal aspect of the case since we have some specific 
information about who participated in the protest. Al-Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī 
simply describe the protest as a group made up of the people (al-nās). However, al-
Jazarī* adds more detail and describes it as a procession made up of ‘the ʿulamāʾ, the 
jurists, the Qur’ān readers, the muezzins and the common people (ʿāmmat al-nās)’.482 In 
this portrayal, a particular section of the civilian population is highlighted and 
distinguished from ordinary people, that is, those who possessed some measure of 
training within the religious sciences such as theology, law, grammar and recitation of 
the Qur’ān. We can thus say that al-Jazarī*’s narrative of the protest foregrounds the 
                                                        
482 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435. 
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members of the local community of religious scholars to which all the authors in Group 
A belonged. 
Moreover, we can see that this foregrounding of the religious scholars occurs 
across Group A when we take a closer look at the two men that these accounts present 
as the leaders of the protest: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338), the khaṭīb (Friday 
preacher) of the Umayyad Mosque who headed the protest procession and Majid al-Dīn 
al-Tūnisī (d. 718/1319), a grammarian who was arrested along with al-Qazwīnī and 
beaten in front of the governor.483  
On a general level, the 711 protest offers our authors an occasion to emphasise the 
pivotal role of the local scholarly community, a characteristic in Syrian historiography 
that reaches back to Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī and Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī’s underlining of the 
importance of the ʿulamāʾ as a class.484  
That said, we are also able to propose a narrower explanation. First, we can point 
to a partisan connection between the two leading figures in the 711 protest and the 
authors in Group A: Al-Qazwīnī and al-Tūnisī belonged to the local branch of the Shāfiʿī 
law school, as did all the authors in question. As mentioned earlier, Jalāl al-Dīn had 
immigrated to Damascus with brother in the late 680s/1280s. By 711/1311, he was a 
prominent jurist and orator and had already acted as deputy to two Shāfiʿī chief judges 
in addition to holding the office of khaṭīb.485 Majid al-Dīn al-Tūnisī did not reach as high 
a position as Jalāl al-Dīn, but he was nevertheless considered a prolific scholar in 
Damascus until his death in 718/1319. He was born in Tunis, but relocated with his father 
to Cairo and later Damascus. Since his adolescent years in Tunis, Majid al-Dīn had 
dedicated himself to studying law, grammar and recitation of the Qurʾān. It was 
primarily within the latter two fields that he established himself in Damascus. He held 
several teaching appointments, headed Qurʾān-recitation sessions in the Umayyad 
                                                        
483 As discussed in Chapter 4, al-Jazarī* also mentions that the Shāfiʿī chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of 
Damascus, Najm al-Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā (d. 724/1324), was summoned by the governor after the protest. 
However, the judge is not identified as part of the procession. Ibid., 1435. In al-Bidāya, Ibn Kathīr reports 
that al-Qazwīnī was verbally abused along with the judge during the protest. See Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya 
vol. 8 pt. 16, 88. See further discussion of the involvement of the judge above, 154-156. 
484 For the case of Abū Shāma, see Hirschler, 2006, 113. For the case of Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, see Khalidi, 
1994, 202–203. 
485 In 696–699/1297–1299 under his brother Imām al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 699/1299) and again in 705/1305 
under Najm al-Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā, who still held this position in 711/1311. 
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Mosque and also held the position of khaṭīb of the suburban mosque of al-ʿUqayba north 
of the walled city.486  
A narrative in which al-Qazwīnī and al-Tūnisī, two locally renowned Shāfiʿī 
scholars, spoke truth to a tyrannical governor and faced physical violence for their words 
would certainly reflect favourably on the protagonists themselves and by extension on 
the Shāfiʿī law school, which both they and the authors in Group A belonged to.  
Second, in addition to their formal association through the Shāfiʿī school, we can 
see a pattern of personal connections between the protagonists and several of the authors. 
Al-Birzālī studied ḥadīth with or under Jalāl al-Dīn, and both Ibn Kathīr and Al-Dhahabī 
include laudatory obituaries of him in their respective works.487 Moreover, al-Jazarī 
seems to have known Jalāl al-Dīn’s son, Badr al-Dīn (d. 742/1342), since he quotes him 
as an informant in his chronicle Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Zamān.488 As a further sign of 
respect for al-Qazwīnī, which could also simply be intra-ʿulamāʾ or intra-Shāfiʿī 
solidarity, neither the authors in Group A nor any other contemporary biographer 
mention the financial scandal involving Jalāl al-Dīn’s son that caused his father’s 
dismissal from the Shāfiʿī chief judgeship of Egypt in 738/1338.489 The only exception 
is al-Ṣafadī, but his account of the scandal exculpates Jalāl al-Dīn by shifting the blame 
onto the son.490  
As for Majid al-Dīn al-Tūnisī, both al-Birzali and al-Dhahabī praise him for his piety 
and intellect and also mention that they studied with him in Damascus.491  
                                                        
486 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 343; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Dhayl Tārīkh al-
Islām Lil-Imām al-Ḥāfiẓ Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, ed. Māzen Bin Sālim Bāwazīr (Riyyad: al-Mughnī lil-
Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 1998), 193. 
487 The term used in several obituaries is wa-kharraja lahu al-Birzālī juzʿan min ḥadīthihi. See, e.g., 
Shihāb al-Dīn ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿImād al-Ḥanbalī, Shadhrāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār Man Dhahab 9 Vols., 
(Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, n.d.), vol. 8, 216. For the obituary of al-Qazwīnī by Ibn Kathīr, see Ibn Kathīr, al-
Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 287–288; for his obituaries written by al-Dhahabī, see Dhayl Tārīkh al-Islām, 448 
and ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 112. 
488Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Abū Bakr al-Jazarī, Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Anbāʾihi 
wa-Wafayāt Al-Akābir wa-al-Aʿyān Min Abnāʾihi 3 Vols., ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Ṣaydā - 
Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1998), vol. 2, 183. Apart from this quote, there is also a close description 
of Badr al-Dīn’s inauguration as preacher in 727/1327, which could suggest that al-Jazarī was present at 
this event. Ibid., vol. 2, 185. 
489 Ibn Kathīr simply states that the sultan got angry with him for reasons that are too long to explain (bi-
sabab umūr yaṭūl sharḥuhu). See Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 287. 
490 For al-Ṣafadī’s take on the scandal, see above, 154 n. 436. The first detailed explanation is provided by 
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, an Egyptian, who lived 100 years later, in his biographical entry on Jalāl al-Dīn 
al-Qazwīnī. Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina fī Aʿyān al-Mīʾat al-Thāmina 4 
Vols. (Beirut, 1993), vol. 4, 5. 
491 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 343 and al-Dhahabī, Dhayl Tārīkh al-Islām, 193. Majid al-Dīn’s obituary 
is not mentioned by Ibn Kathīr. In al-Jazarī’s case, there is a lacuna in his work that includes the year 
718/1319; therefore, we cannot know whether he includes this obituary and what relationship he might 
have had with the shaykh. 
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 To summarise, we can say that by including the narrative of the 711 protest in 
their works, authors in Group A were also constructing a narrative of heroic conduct and 
responsible leadership that praised two of their colleagues and friends. This does not rule 
out, of course, that the historical protest might have included market vendors, artisans 
and the like, but the narratives of this group of authors foreground the scholarly 
community and especially these two Shāfiʿī’s play a leading role.  
Let us now turn to the economic aspect of the 711 protest and consider how the 
tax that provoked the protest could have affected this specific group of Damascene 
authors. As explained in Chapter 2, the 711 tax started as a claim imposed on a small 
group of wealthy locals, but after several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations, it was 
expanded to encompass both the markets and private property and also the awqāf (pl. of 
waqf – pious endowment).492 In this context, we focus on the last of these categories 
since it is the category that can be connected most directly to the authors in Group A. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the awqāf was a pivotal economic institution in pre-modern Islamic 
societies. It was a religious institution considered beyond the reach of the state; state 
encroachment on waqf assets through taxation and confiscation tended to provoke moral 
outrage and riots.493 
On this background, we can read the 711 protest narratives as echoes of the wider 
moral outrage to the taxation of awqāf that probably helped motivate the protesters 
themselves. In addition, we should note that scholars, such as al-Jazarī, al-Birzālī, Ibn 
Kathīr and al-Dhahabī, who were all part of the traditionalist, ḥadīth-oriented wing of 
the Shāfiʿī school, could have been particularly vulnerable to state encroachment on the 
awqāf. As Yunus Mirza explains, the traditionalist wing of the Shāfiʿī school of 
Damascus did not have the access to state resources that many of the rationalist Ashʿarīs 
in the Shāfiʿī school gained through state offices, e.g., in the judiciary system or the 
treasury.494 Instead, the traditionalists earned their livelihood mainly through teaching 
positions funded by the awqāf-system. The authors under examination here all fall into 
this second category. None of them seems to have held a higher position within state 
administration: Al-Dhahabī was a prominent ḥadīth teacher; Al-Birzālī at one point 
worked as a professional witness, but only for two years; Ibn Kathīr briefly held a 
                                                        
492 For more information on the taxation of waqf property, see above, 42-43. 
493 See above, 42.  
494 Yunus Y. Mirza, 'Ibn Kathir (D. 774/1373): His Intellectual Circle, Major Works and Qur’anic Exegesis' 
(Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 2012), 31.  
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position as judge.495 As for al-Jazarī, he worked throughout his life as a court notarian 
and professional witness. According to al-Birzālī, however, he refused to take any 
money for these services, subsisting instead on what he could earn from his teaching 
positions.496  
We should remember that humility and the refusal to accept salaries are two 
common tropes in the biographies of medieval ʿulamāʾ.497 Nevertheless, it seems safe to 
say that none of the authors in Group A had significant resources to draw on that were 
not tied to their teaching positions. In this light, a case where the governor attempts to 
seize funds directly from the awqāf would thus be of a direct and critical threat to the 
livelihood of these authors and their colleagues. Furthermore, the fact that the governor 
actually rolled back this taxation plan because of local pressure makes this case a 
valuable story of local agency in defence of the economic system on which large parts 
of the ʿulamāʾ of Damascus depended.  
By now we can conclude that the authors in Group A had a shared interest in the 
711 protest on ideological, social and economic grounds, which explains why they give 
this case attention in their chronicles and why some of them tie it directly to the arrest of 
Governor Karāy. The next sub-sections shift focus from the socio-economic context to 
the individual texts in order to examine their similarities and differences. They 
demonstrate that the authors’ common interests did not prevent each of them from 
assigning layers of meaning to his narrative that are quite distinct from what we find in 
the accounts of his peers. Section II ends with a short discussion of how the results of 
this examination reflect on the idea of the Syrian school of historiography.  
 
ii. With God on our side? The 711 protest and local political agency 
By now we have concluded that all authors in Group A had an interest in the 711 protest, 
in part because it demonstrated local agency. This section examines exactly how this 
agency is emphasised in the authors’ respective accounts. 
The most general comparison of the accounts in Group A suggests that we are 
dealing with two narrative strains. The first strain includes the accounts of al-Birzālī, al-
                                                        
495 Muriel Rouabah, 'Une Édition Inattendue: Le Tārīkh D’al-Birzālī', Arabica 57, no. 2 (2010): 309–318, 
312.     
496 Ulrich Haarmann, 'Quellenstudien Zur Frühen Mamlukenzeit', (Universität Freiburg, Freiburg, 1969), 
22. 
497 For example, Hirschler shows that Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī successfully created a self-image as an 
ascetic scholar who refused to accept salary while at the same time occupying a number of paid teaching 
positions. See Hirschler, 2006, 31–32. 
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Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr. Their accounts follow the same succinct pattern: in less than 10 
lines and without any dialogue, we hear of the announcement of the tax decree, the 
protest, the arrest of the protest leaders and finally, the arrest of the governor. Moreover, 
a close comparison of sentence structure and choice of words suggests that these three 
accounts are related even though we cannot talk of exact copies.498 Since al-Birzālī’s 
text is the oldest, we can speculate that two younger authors, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī, 
drew on his version of the protest, albeit without quoting him ad verbatim. 
The second strain consists of the longer and more detailed account by al-Jazarī*, 
which was inserted into al-Yūnīnī’s Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān. This account devotes 
several pages to the negotiations that preceded and succeeded the protest, and the day of 
the protest itself is described over the course of 29 lines and includes fragments of 
dialogue between the different contending parties. This account was also picked up and 
used by later writers, such as the encyclopaedist al-Nuwayrī (d. 732/1332), who presents 
an account that is almost identical to al-Jazarī*’s in his Nihāyat al-Arab fī funūn al-
Adab.499 Moreover, in the last section of this chapter we see how the biographer al-Ṣafadī 
crafts part of his biography of Karāy on the basis of al-Jazarī*’s version of the 711 protest 
narrative.500  
 
a. Al-Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī 
We begin by examining the first narrative strain that comprises the accounts of al-Birzālī, 
Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī. These authors all emphasise the agency of the protesters by 
establishing a causal relation between the protest and the subsequent arrest of governor 
Karāy. In al-Muqtafī, al-Birzālī concludes his account of the protest with the following 
words: 
Much pain befell the Muslims because of that [Karāy’s behaviour], and so 
after that God did not even give him what amounted to ten days, before he 
was deposed and chained and arrested.501  
In al-Bidāya, Ibn Kathīr presents a very similar conclusion:  
                                                        
498
 Compare al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī, 21 ll. 4–15 with Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 88 ll. 9–16 and al-
Dhahabī, ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 27 ll. 7–11. 
499 Compare al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1434–1437 with al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 136–138. As stated 
above, al-Nuwayrī’s changes in the narrative are so small that his version has not been included in the 
present examination. 
500 See below, 213. 
501
 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21. 
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The people suffered a lot because of this, and so God did not give him more 
than 10 days and then his time came suddenly and he was deposed and 
arrested […]502 
In al-Dhahabī’s version, the causality is slightly less explicit but nevertheless 
still evident:  
The people suffered and they pronounced the daʿwa against (daʿū ʿalā) 
Karayh. And so after 9 days he was taken from the governorship and 
enchained and imprisoned in Karak.503 
These three accounts all conclude that Karāy’s oppressive actions against the 
Damascenes were the direct cause of his demise. Moreover, according to the first and 
second quote, the arrest and deportation of the governor was not a question of human 
agency: it was God who directly decided to grant Karāy only ten days in office before 
punishing him for his offence against the protesters. Here, the confrontation between the 
protesting Damascene citizens and the governor is recast in theological terms as a 
confrontation between good and evil / belief and unbelief. Al-Birzālī adds further 
emphasis to this trope by identifying Karāy’s victims as the Muslims (al-muslimīn), a 
strategy that indirectly frames Karāy as an outside threat that is averted by the 
interventionist God. Meanwhile, Ibn Kathīr describes Karāy’s victims with the less 
emphatic term the people (al-nās). However, his account still makes clear that we are 
dealing specifically with a group of Damascenes on whose account God intervenes. In 
other words, his account also conveys the notion of a special proximity between his own 
local community and the divine. 
In al-Dhahabī’s version, there is no direct mention of who facilitated the arrest of 
the governor. Whether we read his account as one of divine intervention depends on how 
we interpret the expression ‘they pronounced the daʿwa against Karayh’ (daʿū ʿalā 
Karayh). To pronounce the daʿwa against (ʿalā) someone can mean to curse or invoke 
the name of God against him, as opposed to pronouncing it for (ilā) someone.504 Since 
the subsequent sentence is in the passive voice, it is difficult to determine whether he 
                                                        
502 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 88. 
503 al-Dhahabī, ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 27. Apart from the causality comment itself, al-Dhahabī’s account of the 
protest also contains strong similarities with the other two. Compare, e.g., ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 27 ll. 10–11 
with al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21 ll. 14–16. 
504 See ‘d ʿ w’ in Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J. M. Cowan (New York: Spoken 
Language Services, 1994), 326. 
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means that it was God or simply the sultan who reacted to their daʿwa. In any case, the 
complaint of the protesters still led to the arrest.   
Despite their differences, we can say that all three accounts ascribe to the local 
population, the protesters in particular, the ability to have an abusive governor removed 
and held accountable for his actions. Moreover, in the case of the accounts of al-Birzālī 
and Ibn Kathīr, we can see that this causality directly transcends the boundaries between 
what Bernd Radtke calls the innerworldy (innerweltliche) and the outerwordly 
(ausserweltliche). The explanation for the removal of Karāy is not simply the agency of 
men, but the interference of God who stands out as the real acting subject (eigentliche 
Handlungssubjekt).505  
If we look elsewhere within the work of al-Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr, we see that 
they have resorted to divine intervention before in their narratives as a solution to or 
punishment for sultanic encroachment on Damascene wealth. For example, we can look 
al-Dhahabī’s description of the dispute between the sultan Baybars (d. 676/1276) and 
the Damascenes about the rights to the orchards (basātīn) of al-Ghūṭa in 666/1267. Al-
Dhahabī states that when the sultan decided to confiscate the orchards, God burned them 
as a punishment for his greed:  
The sultan had guarded the Ghūṭa and had wanted to seize ownership of it. 
He oppressed (taʿaththara) people with injustice and confiscation, and they 
moaned and supplicated God. Therefore, when they [Baybars’s men] 
pressured the Muslims and obliged them to weigh out the fees (alzamūhum 
bi-wazn al-ḍamān) on their orchards and even reached for the awqāf, God 
burned it […]506 
This account follows the same basic logic as the 711 protest accounts of al-Birzālī, al-
Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr: when a representative of the state infringes upon property that 
is not rightfully his, the Damascenes who are identified as the Muslims supplicate God, 
who resolves the situation, in this case by destroying the property which the sultan 
coveted.507  
                                                        
505 Bernd Radtke, Weltgeschichte und Weltbeschreibung im Mittelalterlichen Islam (Beirut: Frantz Steiner 
Verlag Stuttgart, 1992), 162–163. 
506 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa-Wafayāt al-Mashāhīr wa-al-
Aʿlām 15 Vols., ed. Bashshār ʻAwwād Maʻrūf, Sạ̄lih ̣ Mahdī ʻAbbās, and Shuʻayb Arnaʼūt ̣ (Beirut: 
Muʼassasat al-Risālah, 1988), vol. 15, 21. 
507 For an overview of the dispute over the orchards of al-Ghūṭa, see Jacqueline Sublet, 'Le Sequestre Sur 
Les Jardins de La Ghouta (Damas 666/1267)', Studia Islamica 43 (1976): 81–86. 
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In Ibn Kathīr’s al-Bidāya, we find a somewhat similar comment when he describes 
a severe tax campaign in Damascus in 688/1289 ordered by Sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn, 
who died shortly after. The money was collected by the sultan’s treasurer, Amir al-
Shujāʿī (d. 1294/694), but according to Ibn Kathīr, God did not allow the sultan to enjoy 
the spoils:  
Verily this [the tax] accelerated the destruction of the tyrant and his death, for 
the wealth al-Shujāʿī had gathered for him did not benefit al-Manṣūr, for after 
this he did not live but for a short while before God chastised him, he chastises 
communities in the midst of their wrong [Qurʾān 11:102].508 
Once again, we are presented with the idea that God protects the Damascenes from fiscal 
abuse by making sure that the abuser cannot enjoy his gain, here by accelerating the 
death of the sultan. In this case, the point about divine punishment is underlined with a 
Qurʾānic quote that describes God as the historical punisher of unjust pre-Islamic rulers.  
To summarise, we can say that al-Birzālī and Ibn Kathīr use the account of the 711 
protest to present the specific idea that the people of Damascus can rely on divine 
protection against tyranny, while al-Dhahabī does so in a more indirect fashion. As we 
can see from the earlier passages in al-Bidāya and the Tārīkh al-Islām, this trope is not 
limited to the specific case of the 711 tax; the idea of a pact between God and the 
Damascenes seems to permeate the work of these scholars on a broader scale.  
 
b. Al-Jazarī* 
In al-Jazarī*’s account in the Dhayl, we find an entirely different method of 
foregrounding the importance of local political agency, which is devoid of the 
outerworldly dimension. Instead of rounding off the narrative of the tax conflict and the 
arrest of the governor with direct divine or sultanic intervention, this account presents a 
more nuanced description of the interplay between the governor and the local civilians 
in the days between the protest and the arrest. According to al-Jazarī*, the protest ended 
with the release of al-Qazwīnī on Tuesday morning without any resolution of the tax 
conflict. According to this account, the resolution came four days later during the Friday 
                                                        
508 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 15, 532. The italicised sentence is part of Qurʾān 11:102, which reads 
‘Such is the chastisement of thy lord when he chastises communities in the midst of their wrong: grievous, 
indeed, and severe is his chastisement’. The Holy Quran – Text, Translation and Commentary by Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali (Durban: Islamic Propagation Centre International, 1946), 542. The verse in question is part of 
a longer description of how God destroyed pre-Islamic people who had sinned that includes the story of 
the punishment of Pharaoh and the Egyptians. 
 179 
Ceremony at the Umayyad Mosque. According to al-Jazarī*, Governor Karāy was 
approached during prayer by the leader of the Ḥarīriyya Sufi order, Shaykh ʿAlī Ibn ʿAlī 
al-Ḥarīrī (d. 715/1315)509. During this meeting, which is also described in Chapter 2, al-
Ḥarīrī uttered what seems to be a convoluted threat of civic unrest:  
He [al-Ḥarīrī] talked to him [Karāy] about the situation of the people of 
Damascus and about lightening the claim on them and among other things he 
said: I love the House of Qalāwūn and I don’t want anyone to curse them (an 
yadʿū ʿalayhim), and he exerted himself in speech (bālagha fī al-qawl).510 
The fact that none of the other authors in Group A mention this encounter can be 
explained by their focus on the idea of divine intervention rather than on political 
negotiations. However, we can also speculate that the hostility between the Ḥarīriyya 
Sufis and traditionalist ḥadīth-scholars such as al-Birzālī, al-Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr 
could have prompted these authors to omit Shaykh ʿAlī from their narratives about the 
711 tax.511  
Let us return to al-Jazarī*, who either did not share or display any misgivings 
towards the al-Ḥarīrī that the other authors in Group A might have felt. According to his 
account, the words of al-Ḥarīrī compelled Karāy to host a new meeting that ended with 
the tax being lowered from funding 1500 troops to 400 troops. In addition, the governor 
suspended the claim until tax collectors from Cairo directly requested it.512  
Here is Karāy’s invitation and a description of the meeting as found in the Dhayl: 
He [Karāy] said to them, ask the people of the city to appear before us at the 
palace (al-qaṣr)513. When the Friday prayer had ended they went to the palace 
and he gave them the most noble welcome and rose before them and they 
kissed the ground [before him]. Then he asked them to be seated, and he said 
to them, go and set it [the tax] to 400 troops and I will not collect it unless the 
                                                        
509 Son of the founder of the Ḥarīriyya order, Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥarīrī (d. 654/1248). For the biography of 
the son, see, e.g., al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 3, 466. 
510 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1436. 
511 The hostilities between the traditionalists and the early Ḥarīriyya in the 7th/13th century are briefly 
sketched in Chapter 2. See above, 43. For Ibn Kathīr’s hostile attitude towards the Ḥarīriyya, see Henri 
Laoust, 'Ibn Kaṯīr Historien', Arabica 2, no. 1 (2016): 42–88, 72. In this context, it is important to note 
that traditionalist scholars were not hostile to Sufism in general, but specifically to those groups who like 
the Ḥarīriyya practiced excessive asceticism and self-degradation as part of their path to God. See e.g., D. 
Talmon-Heller, Islamic Piety in Medieval Syria: Mosques, Cemeteries and Sermons Under the Zangids 
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512 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1436–1437. 
513 This reference is unclear, but he could be referring to Qaṣr al-Ablaq (The Piebald Palace) – the palace 
which Sultan Baybars built in the 660s/1260s next to the Maydān al-Akhḍar (The Green Hippodrome). 
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noble riders appear, and I will strive not to extract anything from you God 
willing. Then they left him thanking him and calling his praise […].514  
While the first three accounts in Group A tell a rather simple story of how the plight of 
the Damascenes was alleviated through the help of God or the sultan, we see that al-
Jazarī* is concerned with describing how the local community is ultimately able to break 
the governor’s recalcitrance and force him to the negotiating table. This is perhaps a 
more realistic presentation of a political process than one in which God heeds the call of 
the oppressed, but it is not necessarily less ideologically charged. In fact, we could say 
that al-Jazarī*’s narrative conveys political agency onto the Damascenes in an even more 
explicit way than the other three narratives, since it states that they were able to handle 
the problem of the tax by themselves without any outside intervention. 
Moreover, this scene is reminiscent of an earlier passage from the Jazarī* section 
of the Dhayl, namely the conclusion to the story of Saḍr al-Dīn Ibn al-Muraḥḥil’s (d. 
716/1316–17) election as khaṭīb in 703/1303. As in the case of the 711 tax, the dispute 
between the governor and a faction of the local community over the appointment of al-
Muraḥḥil was ultimately solved by a group of local notables who convinced the governor 
to yield to their demands. 
Al-Jazarī* states that the team of negotiators that went to the governor in 703/1303 
consisted of ʿulamāʾ (including Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī), who enjoyed the support of a 
wider group of local merchants and commoners, whose moral character he evaluates in 
the following passage:  
[…] each of them were known for piety and determination and strength of 
spirit (maʿrūf bil-ṣalāḥ wa-al-himma wa-quwwat al-nafs). When they came 
to the governor he was most gracious to them and he took up their case and 
agreed to consult the sultan with regards to this appointment [i.e. the 
appointment of the khaṭīb].515  
Composed of Damascene ʿulamāʾ and a wider group of concerned Damascenes, the 703 
negotiation party resembles al-Jazarī*’s description of the 711 protest procession 
mentioned above. What we see in both of these situations is a concerted effort by the 
author to portray local citizens as potent political actors who are able to make a governor 
listen and heed their advice and eventually effectuate a sultanic decree that backed their 
                                                        
514 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1436. al-Nuwayrī presents a condensed version of the same story, but leaves out the 
exchange between al-Ḥarīrī and Karāy. See al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat vol. 15 pt. 32, 137. 
515al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 764–765. 
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claims. Unlike the three narratives examined above, al-Jazarī*’s account does not resort 
to transcendental solutions; instead, his account suggests that the Damascenes are able 
to effect decisions of governance through skilful negotiation and sheer determination.  
As a final observation concerning the question of political agency, we note that al-
Jazarī* is the only author in Group A who is prepared to let the Damascene protesters 
resort to violence when the Qurʾān of ʾUthmān and the Sandal of the Prophet are thrown 
to the ground by Karāy’s guards: 
They [the guards] hit the people and threw the blessed Qurʾān codex and the 
noble sandal, and so the people stoned them.516 
In the other accounts in Group A, violence is strictly reserved for the governor and his 
men, who beat and abuse the protest leaders. The protesters, however, remain calm and 
defend themselves exclusively by piously supplicating God to avert their hardship. 
Eventually, their supplications turn out to be much more powerful than the violence of 
the governor, which adds further weight to the idea that the Damascenes enjoyed divine 
protection against tyranny. We do not hear whether or not al-Jazarī* condones the 
stoning of the guards, but since his protest narrative does not cast the conflict in 
theological terms, it affords more space for the nitty-gritty details of the encounter in 
Sūq al-Khayl and the recurrent negotiation processes that preceded and followed the 
protest. 
To summarise: two narrative strains found in Group A employ different strategies 
for emphasising the political agency of the Damascene citizens who fought against the 
711 tax: either they were able to call on divine intervention or they could handle the 
problem through effective local diplomacy.  
 
iv. Weighing the local and imperial dimensions 
We now turn to the second element of the 711 case, the arrest of Governor Karāy. In the 
narratives of al-Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī, we saw that the authors presented a 
direct causal relation between the protest and the arrest of the Governor: his tax policies 
oppressed the Damascenes and following their protest, he was arrested. As noted above, 
the arrest of Karāy was by all accounts connected with a series of arrests across the 
Mamluk Empire. By presenting a direct causality between the protest in Damascus and 
Karāy’s arrest, the first three narratives in Group A foreground the local dimension over 
                                                        
516 Ibid., 1436. 
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the imperial dimension. In contrast, al-Jazarī* avoids the direct causality between the 
protest and the arrest of the governor in order to make room for the imperial dimension.  
Al-Jazarī* states that the Damascenes succeeded in alleviating the tax burden 
through protest and negotiation, but he does not state that the governor was deposed 
because of the protest. Instead, he is adamant about the imperial dimension of the affair: 
he states clearly that Karāy was connected with the coup planned by the viceroy 
Baktamur and that this connection contributed to his fall. This is laid out most clearly in 
what is presented as a quote from the sultanic declaration, which was read out to the 
amirs and judges of Damascus after Karāy’s arrest:  
On Thursday the 8th [of Jumādā II / 21st of October] a letter from the sultan 
was read out at the gate of the maydān [Maydān al-Akhḍar] to the amirs and 
the judges, containing praise of them for arresting Sayf al-Dīn Karāy, because 
he and Sayf al-Dīn Quṭlubak517 had conspired with Baktamur al-Jaukandār 
against the sultan, and more of this sort […]518  
As for the idea that Karāy was deposed because of the tax conflict, this is presented in 
the Dhayl as originating in a second sultanic declaration. This declaration was read out 
to a wider audience in Umayyad Mosque on 16th of Jumādā II/Friday the 29th of October. 
According to al-Jazarī*, these are the words of the sultan:  
Verily when we [the sultan] learned of the weakening (ḍaʿf) of the city and 
of its people we forfeited what we had demanded, out of consideration and 
kindness towards them (min al-raʿiyya wa-al-iḥsān ilayhim) and out of 
objection against what had come from Sayf al-Dīn Karāy.519  
Thus, we can say that in the case of the Dhayl, the protest and Karāy’s arrest are 
presented as a fortunate coincidence: Damascus was relieved of an unpopular governor 
and the sultan was able to frame the arrest of Karāy as a direct intervention on behalf of 
the tax-burdened Damascenes, portraying himself as the helper of the oppressed. Al-
Jazarī* does use the 711 protest as an opportunity to emphasise the agency of the local 
Damascene community. However, his account is nuanced: he depicts the fall of Karāy 
as a complex interplay between court intrigues and provincial fiscal politics, thereby 
avoiding the rather simplistic causality that we see in the other three accounts in Group 
A.  
                                                        
517 Governor of Tripoli in 711/1311 (d. 716/1316–17). 
518 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1440. Al-Birzālī does mention the reading of this declaration, but says nothing about 
the coup. Thus, the protest-arrest causality is not challenged. Al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21. 
519 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1440–1441. 
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Al-Birzālī’s account of the 711 protest underlines the protest-arrest causality. 
However, he does shift to the imperial angle later in his mention of the arrests of the 
governors of Safad and Gaza that coincided with the arrest of Karāy. 520  More 
importantly, he also quotes the sultanic declaration stating Karāy’s connection to the 
coup that was read to the amirs on the 8th of Jumādā II/21st of October. Al-Birzālī 
presents the same quote as al-Jazarī*, but there is a lacuna in the edition just before the 
word bāṭin (coup).521 Moreover, he also indirectly quotes the sultan’s second declaration 
in words that sound like a summary of the same statement quoted by al-Jazarī*.522 Al-
Birzālī’s insistence that the protest led to divine intervention on behalf of the 
Damascenes should therefore be seen as the foregrounded, but not exclusive, 
explanation.  
In the case of al-Dhahabī’s ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, the protest narrative is succeeded by 
a short reference to the other arrests of 711/1311, but no connection is made between 
Karāy and the coup of Baktamur. In this version, the causality between the protest and 
the arrest of the governor is not compromised by inclusion of an imperial dimension. 
When we turn to Ibn Kathīr’s 711 entry in al-Bidāya, we see that he mentions that the 
governors of Gaza and Safad as well as the viceroy Baktamur were arrested and 
imprisoned with Karāy at the castle of Karak, but, like al-Dhahabī, he also refrains from 
commenting directly on Karāy’s connection to the coup.  
However, while al-Dhahabī does not mention either of the two sultanic 
declarations read out in Damascus in October/Jumādā II, Ibn Kathīr displays a more 
eclectic approach. He omits the first declaration, which frames Karāy as a coup-maker, 
but includes the second declaration, which frames the arrest of Karāy as punishment for 
his abuse of the Damascenes.  
Ibn Kathīr’s description of the reading of the second declaration is very similar to 
what we find in the accounts of al-Birzālī and al-Jazarī*.523 If Ibn Kathīr did in fact copy 
this description from either of the two older chroniclers, this would also mean that he 
consciously omitted the first declaration, perhaps in order to make the protest-arrest 
causality and divine intervention more explicit. This narrative is one of the clear 
examples of the salvational character of al-Bidāya. As Mohammad Gharaibeh explains, 
                                                        
520 al-Birzālī al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 25. 
521 Ibid. vol. 4, 26. Compare ll. 13–14 with al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1440 ll. 7–9. 
522 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 27. Compare ll. 6–9 with al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1440 l. 20–1441 l. 2. 
523 Compare Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 89 ll. 15–16 with al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 27 ll. 6–9. 
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God is the true cause behind the progress of history in al-Bidāya, and therefore faith and 
good deeds result in reward, while unbelief and bad deeds are punished.524 While Ibn 
Kathīr does not explicitly accuse Karāy of unbelief, his narrative clearly states that God 
punished him for his actions, and as we have seen, this claim remains uncontested 
throughout his description of the aftermath of the protest. Of the four authors in Group 
A, we can say that Ibn Kathīr is the most unequivocal in favouring the local dimension 
of Karāy’s arrest. If we were to place the remaining three narratives on a scale according 
to the weight they give to the local and imperial dimensions respectively, al-Jazarī* 
would be placed squarely at the imperial end, al-Dhahabī at the local, while al-Birzālī 
would be closer to the middle.  
We now leave the broad comparisons across all four accounts for the moment to 
focus on some aspects of the accounts of Ibn Kathīr and al-Jazarī*. We then return to a 
final evaluation of the similarities and differences found within Group A. 
 
v. Ibn Taymiyya’s connection with the 711 protest as presented by Ibn Kathīr  
The omission of the first and inclusion of the second sultanic declaration concerning 
Karāy’s arrest is not the only case where Ibn Kathīr borrows selectively from al-Birzālī. 
As explained in detail in Chapter 1, Ibn Kathīr relied extensively on al-Birzālī’s work 
for the pre-739/1338 sections of al-Bidāya. In one passage of his chronicle, he describes 
his use al-Birzālī’s work as intiqāʾ (selection or eclecticism) 525 . We examine here 
another example of how Ibn Kathīr readjusted the material presented by al-Birzālī in 
order to fit a particular agenda. This example does not relate directly to the question of 
God as acting subject, but rather to the question of who carries out the will of God in the 
world. 
Unlike all the other Damascene narratives examined above, Ibn Kathīr adds one 
final and significant detail to the story of the protest and Karāy’s arrest. Immediately 
after explaining how God punished Governor Karāy, he notes that the sultan might have 
taken action in Karāy’s case because of the intervention of the Ḥanbalī jurist and 
theologian Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328): 
                                                        
524  Mohammad Gharaibeh, 'Geschichtsschreibung Im Dienste Des ʿabbāsidischen Kalifats – Das Al-
Bidāya Wa N-Nihāya Des Ibn Kathīr (1301–1373) – Ein Geschichtstheologisches Werk', Jahrbuch Für 
Islamische Theologie Und Religionspädagogik vol. 3 (2014), 113. 
525 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 285.  
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It was said (wa-qīla) that the shaykh Taqī al-Dīn had heard about the matter 
[Karāy’s behaviour?] from the people Syria and had informed the sultan of it, 
and so he immediately sent for him to be forcefully seized.526  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is reason to be sceptical of this account: Ibn Kathīr is 
alone in reporting it and he presents Ibn Taymiyya as directly responsible for al-Nāṣir’s 
arrest of Karāy. In that chapter, we discussed the plausibility of this intervention. We 
concluded that the encounter could have taken place, since Ibn Taymiyya was in fact in 
Cairo in 711/1311 and had contact with the sultan. Moreover, we concluded that 
intervening to prevent the exaggerated taxation and abuse of the Damascenes at the 
hands of Karāy fitted with the shaykh’s general views on just government and fair 
taxation. 
However, our interest in the present context is not so much in the plausibility of 
the situation, but rather in the function of this narrative within Ibn Kathīr’s wider 
portrayal of Ibn Taymiyya. From a very general perspective, we can say that Ibn Kathīr’s 
al-Bidāya reveals a strong attachment to traditionalism. In this light, directing some of 
the credit for the abolition of the 711 tax onto Ibn Taymiyya, the leading traditionalist 
figure of early 8th/14th century Damascus, could be seen simply as a way to foreground 
this theological current and its members.527  
However, this conclusion leaves us with another question: given that both al-
Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī were part of Ibn Taymiyya’s circle, why was Ibn 
Kathīr alone in reporting this detail? In the course of the following discussion, I argue 
that this difference is tied to a broader disagreement among the sympathisers of Ibn 
Taymiyya about how his political agency and especially his relationship to the Sultan al-
Nāṣir should be described. I also argue that Ibn Kathīr uses the report of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
involvement in the 711 tax conflict as one of many means to promote a portrayal of Ibn 
Taymiyya as a politically interventionist scholar, a portrayal that was actively resisted 
by other scholars of the traditionalist camp.  
Looking at al-Birzālī’s chronicle entries for the years around 711/1311, we find 
that he presents two brief accounts about Ibn Taymiyya and al-Nāṣir. The first account 
relates to Ibn Taymiyya’s release from prison in 709/1310. According to al-Birzālī, al-
Nāṣir ordered that the shaykh be sent from Alexandria to Cairo. Here the two met at a 
courtly gathering that also included Damascene notables who had followed al-Nāṣir on 
                                                        
526 Ibid., vol. 8 pt. 16, 88. 
527 Mirza, 2012, 103–109. 
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his return from Karak. 528  The second account relates to Ibn Taymiyya’s return to 
Damascus in 712/1313. Al-Birzālī notes that Ibn Taymiyya travelled with the Egyptian 
army to Gaza and made his way from there to Damascus, and that people celebrated his 
homecoming.529  
A comparison reveals that Ibn Kathīr quotes heavily from al-Birzālī when 
describing these two events.530 However, in the homecoming scene from 712/1313, Ibn 
Kathīr highlights the personal connection between Ibn Taymiyya and the Sultan. He 
states that Ibn Taymiyya had travelled with the sultan from Egypt to Ghaza while al-
Birzālī merely stated that he travelled with the army. Moreover, according to Ibn Kathīr, 
when the shaykh reached Damascus, he found that the sultan had been there and had 
already travelled on to the Hijaz. Thereby, Ibn Kathīr indicates that Ibn Taymiyya had 
wished reunite with the sultan in Damascus. This indication is not present in al-Birzālī’s 
text.531 In this light, Ibn Kathīr’s inclusion of Ibn Taymiyya into the narrative of the 711 
protest seems like part of a wider pattern regarding Ibn Taymiyya’s connection with the 
sultan in this period: Ibn Kathīr relies on al-Birzālī’s accounts, but he cultivates a 
stronger connection between the shaykh and the sultan.  
In the case of al-Dhahabī’s ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, Ibn Taymiyya’s meeting with the 
sultan in 709/1310 is not mentioned. As for the shaykh’s homecoming in 712, this scene 
is described in one line that does not include details about his travel arrangements.532 
This in itself suggests that al-Dhahabī does not follow Ibn Kathīr’s line when it comes 
to Ibn Taymiyya’s time in Cairo. However, in another work by al-Dhahabī that was 
published recently, we find that he does not simply tone down the connection between 
Ibn Taymiyya and the sultan, he explicitly refutes it. 
In 2004, Caterina Bori published an edited and translated excerpt from a biography 
of Ibn Taymiyya written by al-Dhahabī and titled Nubdha min sīrat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn 
Taymiyya. 533  According to Bori, here is what al-Dhahabī has to say about Ibn 
Taymiyya’s life in Cairo between his release from prison in 709/1310 and his return to 
Damascus in 712/1312:  
                                                        
528 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 3, 445. 
529 Ibid., vol. 4, 89. 
530  For the 709 meeting in Cairo, see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 75. For Ibn Taymiyya’s 
homecoming, see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 99. 
531 Ibid., vol. 8 pt. 16, 99. 
532 al-Dhahabī, ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 32. 
533 Caterina Bori, 'A New Source for the Biography of Ibn Taymiyya', Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies 67, no. 3 (2004): 321–48. I owe Dr. Bori special thanks as she has kindly helped me 
conduct the research for this section of the thesis. 
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Then, he settled in Cairo, living in a house, and met with the Sultan after that 
time. [Yet,] the shaykh was not a man of government and did not concern 
himself with [its] intrigues, so the Sultan did not repeat his meeting with 
him.534 
When comparing Ibn Kathīr’s al-Bidāya with al-Dhahabī’s Nubdha, we see two 
radically different portrayals of Ibn Taymiyya in Cairo. Ibn Kathīr goes out of his way 
to underline the influence that the shaykh had on al-Nāṣir’s political decisions: his 
narrative of the 711 protest can be seen as part of this strategy.535 Meanwhile, al-Dhahabī 
emphasises that even though the shaykh did meet with the sultan, he was ‘not a man of 
government’ and after their initial meeting was not a frequent confidant of the sultan. 
This does not seem to be a casual remark: it reads like a deliberate defence of the shaykh 
from any accusations of political involvement and association with the sultan. If we 
combine this with his exclusion of Ibn Taymiyya from the 711 protest narrative in the 
‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, it seems that al-Dhahabī was actively working against the image of the 
shaykh as political advisor that we see in the narrative of Ibn Kathīr.  
Although it is expressed less explicitly, the same defensive tendency can be seen 
in other biographies of Ibn Taymiyya written by his Damascene followers. For example, 
the Ḥanbalī author Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥādī (d. 743/1343) devotes a chapter to Ibn Taymiyya’s 
exile in Cairo in his biography of the shaykh titled al-ʿUqūd al-Durriyya min Manāqib 
Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad ibn Taymiyya. While he describes several meetings between the 
sultan and the shaykh, he does not mention any interference in the political events of 
711/1311.536  
The image of the Ibn Taymiyya created by Ibn Kathīr in the 711/1311 entry of his 
chronicle thus seems to be at odds with a number of Ibn Taymiyya’s other biographers. 
Because this chapter is a specific case study of the events in Damascus in 711/1311, we 
                                                        
534 Ibid., 345. This and all future translations from al-Nubdha are borrowed from Dr. Bori’s translation in 
Bori, 2004. 
535 Apart from Ibn Taymiyya’s involvement in the case of the 711 tax, Ibn Kathīr is also alone in reporting 
that the shaykh earlier that year advised the sultan al-Nāṣir to appoint the former governor of Damascus, 
Amir al-Afram (d. after 720/1320–21), as governor of Tripoli. While this bolsters the claim that Ibn Kathīr 
sought to promote the political image of the shaykh, it has been excluded from the present discussion since 
it is not directly related to the 711 tax conflict. See Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 86. 
536 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥādī, al-ʿUqūd Al-Duriyya Min Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Ibn 
Taymiyya, ed. Ṭalaʿat ibn Fuʾād al-Halwānī (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadītha lil-Ṭibāʿa wa-al-Nashr, 2002), 
217–228. In the Aʿlām al-ʿĀliyya fī Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya written by ʿUmar ibn ʿAlī al-
Bazzār (749/1349–50), there is also no mention of this meeting taking place, but there are several 
references to the shaykh’s disdain for sultans and the world of politics. See, e.g., the chapter ‘On his 
courage and the strength of his heart’ in ʿUmar ibn ʿAlī al-Bazzār, Aʿlām al-ʿĀliyya fī Manāqib Shaykh al-
Islām Ibn Taymiyya, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Munajjid (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1976), 63–66. 
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cannot open up a broader examination of the relationship between Ibn Kathīr and Ibn 
Taymiyya. However, we can point to the more extensive examination presented by Henri 
Laoust, who argues that Ibn Kathīr generally portrays Ibn Taymiyya as much more 
politically active than his biographers, who preferred to distance the shaykh from 
power.537  
On this background we can argue that Ibn Kathīr’s inclusion of Ibn Taymiyya in 
the 711 protest is not a curious detail, but rather part of a much wider debate about the 
shaykh’s character among the members of his circle. The two positions in this debate 
have recently been summed up by Bori as: 
 […] a contradictory trend in the biographical material about Ibn Taymiyya 
which oscillates between the topos of the wise/ascetic without any contact 
with the impurity of the world of power, along the model preferred by Ibn 
Ḥanbal, and explicit reference to cooperation with power […].538 
As Bori points out, here the image of Ibn Taymiyya as the engaged intellectual did not 
conform to the pious and non-interventionist image of the founder of the Ḥanbalī school, 
Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Part of the reason why some of his biographers, 
including Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥādī, would wish to exclude this aspect of his life could be in 
order to make him conform more to the ideal of the founder of their school.539 However, 
with particular regard to al-Dhahabī, Bori concludes that he might also have been 
motivated to actively distance the shaykh from government and intrigues because this 
aspect of his personality made him a vulnerable target for accusations of love of power. 
Such accusations would consequently have reflected badly on his associates after his 
death. Bori argues that al-Dhahabī’s Nubdha could be intended to guard himself against 
the negative effects of his own association with the shaykh.540 As we have seen in Ibn 
Kathīr’s narrative of the 711 protest, these authors clearly did not share the concerns of 
the shaykh’s biographers in this regard.  
The struggle over the portrayal of Ibn Taymiyya, however, did not stop with Ibn 
Kathīr and his contemporaries, such al-Dhahabī and Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥādī. We also find 
                                                        
537 Henri Laoust, 'La Biographie d’Ibn Taimiya D’apres Ibn Katir', Bulletin D’études Orientales 9 (1942): 
115–162, 144–145 and 162. The same argument is presented in Donald P. Little, 'The Historical and 
Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya', International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 4, no. 3 (1973): 311–327, 322. 
538 Caterina Bori, 'Ibn Taymiyya : Una Vita Esemplare Della Sua Biografìa', Revista Degli Studi Orientali 
76, no. Supplemento No. 1 (2003): 1–235, 139. NB: The quote is my translation from the original Italian. 
539 See also Bori, 2004, 325. 
540 Ibid., 326–327. 
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indications that Ibn Kathīr’s attitude towards Ibn Taymiyya was controversial to later 
copyists of al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya, specifically to one copyist whose two-volume copy 
is housed at the German National Library in Berlin. The manuscript is signed by a copyist 
by the name of Muḥammad ibn Sulṭān ibn Saʿīd ibn al-Baʿlī al-Ḥanbalī (d. ?) and dated 
805/1402.541 In this manuscript, the comment about the shaykh’s advice to the sultan on 
the 711 tax is omitted from the text, while the rest of the narrative of the 711 tax 
resembles other versions.542  
Of course, this could be an accidental omission, but a further comparison between 
the Berlin Manuscript and printed editions of al-Bidāya (in this case, vol. 16 of the Dar 
Ibn Kathīr edition from 2010) reveals a wealth of omissions in the Berlin manuscript 
specifically related to Ibn Taymiyya, whereas very few changes have been made to the 
rest of the text. While a detailed description of all of these omissions would exceed the 
scope of this thesis, we can safely say that the general tendency of the scribe is to omit 
references to Ibn Taymiyya’s socio-political role in Damascus and Cairo. 543  Some 
general themes that have been omitted are Ibn Taymiyya’s role in the negotiations with 
the Ilkhān Ghazān (d. 704/1304) in 699/1299 544 , his conflicts with contemporary 
scholars, especially the Cairo-based Sufi shaykh Naṣr al-Manbijī (d. 719/1319-20)545, as 
well as Ibn Taymiyya’s influence on the policies of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.546  
That said, the scribe does not attempt to write Ibn Taymiyya out of Ibn Kathīr’s 
chronicle; in fact, his name and the titles of his works are recurrently written in a larger 
and thicker script than the main text, even sometimes in red.547 Instead of marginalising 
                                                        
541 This two-volume copy of al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya can be found in the collection of the German 
National Library, Berlin registered as MS. OR. Sprenger 60 & MS. OR. Sprenger 61. It is a copy of the 
text of al-Bidāya covering the years 4–738 AH with some alterations and omissions. It is registered by 
Wilhelm Ahlwardt as MS. 9449, but mistakenly appropriated directly to al-Birzālī. Wilhelm Ahlwardt, Die 
Handschriften-Verzeichnisse Der Königlichen Bibliothek Zu Berlin – Verzeichnis Der Arabischen 
Handschriften von W. Ahlwardt Vol. 1–10. (Berlin: A. Asher & Co., 1887–1899), vol. 9, 56–57.  
I am indebted to the editors of the 2010 version of al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya (Dār Ibn Kathīr, Damascus) 
for alerting me in their footnotes to this manuscript and its many omissions. 
542 For the protest-narrative, Ibid., Folio 479a l., 26–30. 
543 At the present time, I am preparing to elaborate on this comparison with the aim of including it in a 
future publication. 
544 See, e.g., Ibid., Folio 486a l., 26, where the description of the meeting is omitted from the obituary of 
one Shaykh al-Ṣāliḥ al-ʿĀbid al-Nāsik, who died in 718/1318–19. 
545 See, e.g., Ibid., Folio 476a l., 25, where a comment about the divine punishment of al-Manbijī and his 
patron the sultan, al-Malik al-Muẓaffar Baybars al-Jāshankīr (d. 710/1310), is omitted. 
546 See, e.g., Ibid. Folio 479a l. 5, where his advice about Amir al-Afram’s appointment as governor of 
Tripoli in 711/1311 is omitted. See also Ibid., Folio 480b l. 8, where a comment about Ibn Taymiyya’s 
influence on new regulations for punishing murderers is omitted. 
547 See Ibid., Folio 438a, where a marginal note in red marks the birth of Ibn Taymiyya in 661/1263 with 
the words ‘mawlid al-Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya shaykh al-Islām’. See also Ibid., Folio 480a l.18, 
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the shaykh, the scribe seems intent upon ‘sanitising’ his image by removing anything 
that goes against the image of the shaykh as pious, ascetic and apolitical.  
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to locate this particular scribe within the 
relevant 8th–11th/14th–17th century biographical dictionaries.548 However, we can see that 
there were several Ḥanbalīs in Syria in the 7th–9th/13th–15th centuries with the nisba al-
Baʿlī, most of whom came from Baalbek.549 In addition, a scribe by the name Muḥammad 
ibn Sulṭān ibn Saʿīd ibn Sulṭān al-Baʿlī al-Ḥanbalī has left his signature on a copy of a 
work by Ibn Taymiyya’s student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 750/1350). In this case, 
there is a specification that the copy was produced in 774/1372.550 Assuming that we are 
dealing with the same scribe (despite the adding of the extra Ibn Sulṭān), we can conclude 
that the activist and politically engaged image of Ibn Taymiyya that Ibn Kathīr presents 
in al-Bidāya, hereunder through the account of the 711 protest, which differs from other 
contemporary and near contemporary portraits, was met with such resistance within the 
Damascene/Syrian Ḥanbalī community of the time that one of them attempted to write 
this aspect out of al-Bidāya when copying it. 
 
vi. Al-Jazarī*’s portrait of Governor Karāy: a parable about maẓālim? 
We now return to the narrative of al-Jazarī* in order to examine a particular tendency in 
his portrayal of the governorship of Karāy in 711/1311. This is the tendency to present 
Karāy’s tenure as governor as a parable about good and bad governance centred around 
the problem of the unapproachable ruler and the subjects’ right to maẓālim (court of 
grievances). In short, we can say that al-Jazarī*’s treatment of Karāy’s short-lived rule 
returns repeatedly to scenes that emphasise his authoritarian style of governance and his 
unwillingness to listen to his subjects. This problem is highlighted already in al-Jazarī*’s 
description of Karāy’s arrival in Damascus in Muḥarram 711/May 1311:  
                                                        
where the beginning of a report about Ibn Taymiyya’s return to Damascus in 712/1313 is highlighted in 
red. See also Ibid., Folio 497a l. 26 where Ibn Taymiyya’s obituary is introduced in red. 
548 According to my examination, the scribe has not left any personal trace in either of the following works: 
al-ʿAsqalānī, Durar; ibn ʿImād al-Ḥanbalī, Shadhrāt; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl 
ʿalā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanabīla 5 Vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymin (Riyad: Maktabat al-
ʿUbaykān, 2005). 
549 The use of al-Baʿlī as a marker of Baalbek-origins is noted by Li Guo. See Li Guo, Early Mamluk 
Syrian Historiography – Al-Yūnīnī’s Dhayl Mirʾāt Al-Zamān 2 Vols., (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 
1998), vol. 1, 7. The Index of Ibn Rajab’s Dhayl vol. 5 lists 10 other individuals with this nisba. See ibn 
Rajab, Dhayl vol. 5, 241. 
550  See catalogue no. Vollers 0388 in the online manuscript catalogue of the University of Leipzig 
http://www.refaiya.uni-leipzig.de. 
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[…] the people went out to meet him, and they lit candles […] He put up his 
tent in the Maydān, and did not meet with anyone from among the common 
population.551 
We know from other descriptions of sultans and governors entering Damascus that 
meeting with the population and receiving petitions on their first day in office was a way 
for rulers to project an image of themselves as approachable and attentive towards the 
plight of their subjects. 552  By including the comment quoted above, al-Jazarī* is 
portraying Karāy negatively as a ruler who flaunts the expectations of a good ruler from 
the start. Here, we should not forget that al-Birzālī is initially positive towards Karāy, 
that is, until the dispute over the 711 tax emerges. In his report on the governor’s arrival 
in Damascus, al-Birzālī paints a different picture than the one provided by al-Jazarī*: 
[…] he displayed good conduct, and did not take bribes or gifts from 
anyone.553  The people came out to meet him and lit candles, and it was a 
memorable day.554 
Returning to the al-Jazarī*, we can tie his use of the 711 tax anecdote with his initial 
portrayal of Karāy, if we see his dismissal of the protest procession led by al-Qazwīnī as 
a reiteration of his unapproachability. Despite the second delegation’s successful 
negotiation of the 711 tax, which was mentioned above, the focus on governor Karāy’s 
inaccessibility is repeated in al-Jazarī*’s final characterisation of him, which concludes 
the description of his arrest: ‘he was feeble-minded (ʿadīm al-ʿaql), of base character 
(shars al-akhlāq) and he did not listen to what people said to him’.555 The final comment 
on his rule thus invokes the initial problem, which was introduced on the day of his 
arrival and addressed throughout his reign: Karāy’s unwillingness to listen.  
Finally, the theme of approachability is addressed publicly in a declaration from 
the Sultan that encouraged plaintiffs to present any grievances to Karāy’s temporary 
replacement, Amir Sayf al-Dīn Bahādur Aṣ (d. 729/1329). According to al-Jazarī*, the 
declaration read: 
                                                        
551 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1428. 
552 The accessible approach was adopted, for example, by Sultan Kitbughā (d. 702/1302) when he visited 
Damascus in 696/1295. Yehoshua Frenkel, 'Public Projection of Power in Mamluk Bilad Al-Sham', 
Mamluk Studies Review 11 (2007): 40–53, 51. See also al-Jazarī, Ḥawādith vol. 1, 329. 
553 The Arabic reads aḥmad, not aḥad, but I choose to regard the mīm as a typing error. 
554 al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 6. 
555 al-Yūnīnī, 1439. 
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[…] he who has a need (ḥāja) should go to the honourable highness (al-janāb 
al-ʿālī) Sayf al-Dīn Bahādur Aṣ and present his case for him (yaqḍīhā 
lahu).556  
Al-Jazarī* then continues to describe how Bahādur received five or six plaintiffs in one 
session (majlis) on the same day.557 In a sense, Bahādur’s reception of the plaintiffs 
becomes a sort of restoration of the relationship between ruler and subjects that had 
suffered during Karāy’s tenure. No other Damascene source I have examined treats the 
theme of the complaints to Bahādur.  
In a final remark about al-Jazarī*’s use of the concept of lodging of complaints, 
we should note that in contrast to the inaccessibility and aggressiveness of Governor 
Karāy, the narrative casts his retinue of amirs as more sensible and compassionate. First, 
al-Jazarī* relates that a group comprising the blind, the lepers and the orphans of 
Damascus actually preceded the procession led by al-Qazwīnī and were the first to plead 
against the taxation of the awqāf from which they received assistance. According to this 
account, their pleas moved the amirs to tears and moved Karāy’s ḥājib (chamberlain), 
Amir Sayf al-Dīn Quṭlūbak (d. 729/1329) to exempt these vulnerable groups from 
taxation.558 Second, we also see the amirs who surrounded the governor acting in a 
sensible manner once again during the arrest of al-Qazwīnī, where they stop Karāy from 
beating the khaṭīb.559 The reader is thereby given the impression that it is Governor 
Karāy in particular who interrupts and distorts the relationship between the population 
and the resident Mamluk amirs.  
 To summarise: we can say that in the version presented by al-Jazarī*, the entire 
account of Karāy’s short rule in Damascus reads like an exemplary tale of bad 
governance overcome by local pressure before finally being corrected by the sultan. 
Admittedly, the Dhayl is not alone in highlighting the problem of Karāy’s 
inaccessibility: the other Damascene sources present him as equally dismissive towards 
the 711 protesters. However, the remarks about his initial refusal to meet the population 
upon his arrival in Damascus and the description of Bahādur’s accessibility are not found 
in any of the other sources that I have consulted. 
                                                        
556 Ibid., 1440. 
557 Ibid., 1440. 
558 Ibid., 1435. The dialogue between the chamberlain and the lepers et al. is treated in greater detail below, 
212–214. 
559 Ibid., 1436. 
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There is one overarching concept that looms behind this entire narrative without 
being mentioned explicitly: the institution known as maẓālim. The history of this 
institution in Damascus is discussed at length in Chapter 3; the following description 
briefly summarises that discussion. The term maẓālim is derived from the noun ẓulm 
(injustice) and describes a long-standing tradition of Islamic rulers for accepting 
complaints about grievances (sing. maẓlima / pl. maẓālim) from their subjects. From the 
6th/12th century onward, the term came to refer specifically to the weekly complaint 
courts that some rulers held in the so-called dār al-ʿadl (house of justice). Remember 
that the 711 protest coincided with governor’s Monday inspection parade, which, 
according to al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), were customarily followed by a maẓālim 
session. I have suggested previously that the protest could be understood as an attempt 
to lodge a maẓālim complaint face-to-face with the governor in circumvention of official 
screening procedures.560 What the account presented by al-Jazarī* seems to do with the 
711 protest is to integrate it within a wider narrative that highlights the problem of 
inaccessibility and the citizens’ right to lodge complaints with their rulers through the 
procedure of maẓālim, a right that was denied by Karāy but eventually acknowledged 
and restored by his successor.  
 
vii. Authorial agency and the Syrian school: conclusions from the 711 protest 
How do the findings of the preceding sections of this examination correspond with the 
concept of the Syrian school? This concept was described in detail in the Chapter 1 and 
can be summarised by the three following points: First, apart from being historians, the 
authors of the Syrian school were all trained in the science of ḥadīth and were connected 
through the local scholarly milieu. Second, these chroniclers of the late 7th/ 13th and early 
8th/14th centuries all wrote variations on the same model of historiographical 
representation, i.e., the locally focused annalistic chronicle composed of ḥawādith 
(events) and wafayāt (obituaries) introduced by Sibṭ Ibn Jawzī in the middle of the 
7th/13th century. Third, their connectedness is evident in the fact that they borrowed 
heavily from each other’s works with or without acknowledgement and often appear as 
each other’s editors and compilers.561 
                                                        
560 See above, 110-111. 
561 See above, 24–25. 
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On the one hand, it is beyond debate that the authors we examine here live up to 
the first and second criteria: they were all ḥadīth-scholars and they all subscribed to the 
ḥawādith/wafayāt scheme. With regard to their connectivity, the various narratives of 
the 711 protest contain several examples of borrowing and supposed paraphrasing 
between the accounts, which echoes the third criterion. 
On the other hand, the present examination also shows that connectivity and 
textual overlaps does not exclude individual authorial agency. The four authors in group 
A were not simply transmitting the same shared information; each of them evidently 
chose to use this information in pursuit of a specific authorial agenda, which raises the 
question of how far we should push the idea of a coherent school of historiography.  
This is perhaps most clear when we compare the account of al-Birzālī with that of 
al-Jazarī*. The relationship between these two authors was particularly close: Li Guo 
has established that al-Birzālī was a lifelong informant and colleague of al-Jazarī and he 
also edited the latter’s works posthumously.562 Nevertheless, when we compare their 
respective accounts of the 711 protest, we see that this relationship does not prevent the 
two authors from crafting two different narratives: while al-Birzālī presents an account 
of causality and divine intervention, al-Jazarī* portrays a detailed overview of both local 
and imperial politics.  
Moreover, their two junior colleagues, al-Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr, evidently chose 
to follow the account presented by al-Birzālī, even though they both knew al-Jazarī and 
his work. 563  In this regard, Ibn Kathīr apparently chose to emphasise the divine 
intervention aspect of al-Birzālī’s account by omitting all references to the coup against 
al-Nāṣir. Furthermore, regarding the question of Ibn Taymiyya’s involvement in the 
arrest of governor Karāy, we see yet another discrepancy that separates him from al-
Dhahabī. While Ibn Kathīr uses his version of the protest to promote the image of the 
politically engaged Ibn Taymiyya, al-Dhahabī is silent on this matter and seems to refute 
it actively elsewhere in his writings. In conclusion, we can say that while the social and 
textual connectivity of these authors merits the label group or school, this should not 
lead us to neglect the examination of their works as reflections of personal choices and 
agendas. 
                                                        
562 For details on this relationship see Guo, 1998, Chapter 3. 
563 Proof of their knowledge of al-Jazarī’s work can be found in their obituaries of him. See Ibn Kathīr al-
Bidāya vol. 8 pt. 16, 289, al-Dhahabī, Dhayl Tārīkh al-Islām, 453–454 and al-Dhahabī, ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar’, 
114. 
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III. The Events of 711/1311 from a Contemporary Egyptian Perspective  
The preceding section was concerned with examining the discrepancies between the 
Damascene accounts of Karāy’s arrest. While this examination shows how differing 
authorial agendas affected the narratives about the 711 protest, it also underlined that the 
authors in Group A shared a common attachment to a local understanding of 
contemporary politics. They agree that the main political challenge of the year 711/1311 
was the relationship between Karāy and the local population of Damascus, although al-
Jazarī* does acknowledge the wider political struggles in the Mamluk Empire. 
Moreover, they all highlight the agency of the Damascene citizens in alleviating the tax 
burden, albeit in different ways. In this section, we switch from a predominantly local 
to a predominantly imperial perspective on the events that took place in Damascus in 
711/1311 by looking at a group of contemporary accounts written by Egyptian authors 
with military rather than religious background.  
 The central imperial event of this year was the arrests within the officers’ corps 
that the sultan ordered in the fall of 711/1311. These arrests are mentioned with differing 
degrees of detail by all the Damascene authors, but they are clearly marginal in 
comparison to their local events perspectives. By contrast, the group of Egyptian 
sources, identified for our purposes as Group B, are much more concerned with this 
purge and its effect on Karāy’s arrest, and hardly mention the protest and the wider tax 
conflict in Damascus. In general, this is not surprising since we could expect Egyptian 
authors from the military class to be far better informed about politics on the imperial 
level as opposed to local politics in Damascus. However, because at least two of the 
three authors were in fact aware of what went on in Damascus, we must consider their 
silence on these local events as a conscious omission.  
 
i. Ibn al-Dawādārī 
We begin by examining the description of Karāy’s arrest provided by Ibn al-Dawādārī 
(d. after 736/1336) in his chronicle Kanz al-Durar fī Jamīʿ al-Ghurar. This account is 
extremely relevant as a comparison with the Damascene accounts since the author claims 
to have been present in Damascus before, during and after the arrest of the governor. Ibn 
al-Dawādārī was the son of a Mamluk amir and presumably the holder of an office 
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related to the military.564 In his chronicle, he tells us that in 710/1310 he had arrived in 
Damascus as part of the retinue of his father, Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd Allah al-Dawādārī (d. 
713/1313), who had been appointed as the city’s new miḥmandār (bearer of the 
protocol), the officer in charge of receiving and accommodating official guests.565 In a 
preface to the events of the year 711/1311, Ibn al-Dawādārī relates that he was present 
at Karāy’s arrest because of his father’s position:  
As for Karāy [his arrest] was on Thursday the 23rd of the said month [Jumādā 
I]. The servant and author of this book was present during this and saw it and 
did not hear about it.566  
Ibn al-Dawādārī’s narrative of Karāy’s rule begins with the last 24 hours before 
his arrest. He describes that the sultan’s dawādār (lit. inkwell bearer – a master of 
ceremonies), Amir Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn, suddenly arrived from Cairo without prior 
warning. Both al-Dawādārī’s father and governor Karāy were alarmed at Arghūn’s 
appearance despite their guest’s explanation that he was only bringing an honorary robe 
(khilʿa) for the governor.567 The author explains that in hindsight their fears were indeed 
justified. On the night of his arrival, Arghūn set up a secret meeting with the resident 
amirs to plan Karāy’s arrest.568 The following day, while hosting a banquet for his 
officers and guests, Karāy was surrounded by Arghūn and his allies, who put him in 
chains and send him off to prison at the castle of Karak.569  
While Ibn al-Dawādārī’s devotes three full pages to Karāy’s arrest, other details 
about the governor’s rule in Damascus, such as the protracted negotiations surrounding 
the 711 tax, are completely absent from his account. Moreover, he omits any reference 
to the protest itself, the arrests of the khaṭīb and the subsequent decrees from the sultanic 
chancery, all of which loom large in the local civilian sources. This discrepancy is 
surprising in so far as we could expect an author so close to the arrest to know about 
violent confrontations between the governor and the civilian population, especially one 
                                                        
564 Unfortunately, the biographical information on Ibn al-Dawādārī is so scarce that we cannot determine 
the exact course of his career path. 
565 See Bernard Lewis, 'Ibn Al-Dawādārī', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 3, ed. B. Lewis et 
al. (E. J. Brill, 1986), 744. According to Ibn al-Dawādārī, his father also briefly held the position shadd 
al-dawāwīn – overseer of the diwān. However, this does not fit with the information from other sources I 
have examined. 
566 al-Dawādārī, Kanz vol. 9, 213. 
567 Ibid. vol. 9, 213–214. 
568  Ibid., 215. 
569 Ibid., 216. 
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that took place in front of the governor’s entire retinue during the weekly inspection 
parade in Sūq al-Khayl.  
One explanation for the omission of this event, of course, could be that Ibn al-
Dawādārī was trying to protect Karāy from criticism; after all, the governor was the 
superior of the author’s father. However, it seems unlikely that Ibn al-Dawādārī should 
have harboured concerns for Karāy’s reputation since his general portrayal of the 
governor is more neutral than sympathetic. The more likely explanation would seem to 
be that he simply did not find these events important enough to mention. In other words, 
whatever grievances the local population of Damascus might have had with the arrested 
governor could have been ignored by Ibn al-Dawādārī because he found them either 
irrelevant or at best inferior to the imperial dramas and intrigues of intra-Mamluk 
politics, which he strove to capture in minute detail. Consequently, the story of Karāy 
becomes a parenthesis subsumed under the larger story of the sultan al-Nāṣir and the 
challenges he faced at the beginning of his third rule.  
We can see this clearly if we return briefly to the introduction of the 711 entry in 
the Kanz, where Ibn al-Dawādārī dedicates a long initial passage to describing how al-
Nāṣir decided to move against his viceroy Baktamur al-Jūkandār and his accomplices: 
 Our lord the sultan, may God perpetuate his reign, had been made wise by 
experience, and had again come to fear the poison of the scorpion […]  
Among those who were made the object of his anger he did not disgrace 
anyone who had dignity (ḥurma), except as retribution for a previous harm 
and misdeed. Anyone who is of a contrary opinion his judgement is faulty 
(ʾajaz) […] The biggest proof of this is that anyone who approached him with 
ill intend (bi-sūʾ) was destroyed […].570  
In this introduction, the author frames the events of 711/1311 first and foremost as an 
account of how the young sultan initiated his third reign with the resolve of a statesman 
rather than the complacency of a child monarch controlled by his amirs. It is only after 
these lengthy descriptions and justifications of the sultan’s concerns about mutiny that 
the narrative zooms in on the situation in Damascus during Jumādā I/September–
October.  
To summarise, we can say that despite his proximity to the situation, Ibn al-
Dawādārī presents the arrest of Karāy as the unequivocal result of the purge. However, 
the question remains: is his presentation of Karāy’s arrest simply coloured by the fact 
                                                        
570 al-Dawādārī, Kanz vol. 9, 212–213. 
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that this author was surrounded by the military aristocracy and a mere visitor in 
Damascus? In the case of the Damascene authors, we saw that unlike Ibn al-Dawādārī, 
they were in fact stakeholders in the protest and had direct reasons for focusing on it. In 
addition, we can point to two characteristics of Ibn al-Dawādārī’s work that could 
explain why he foregrounds the imperial dimensions and ignores local events.  
First, the focus on the actions of the sultan is not surprising in so far as Ibn al-
Dawādārī framed the entire final section of the Kanz (the section which covers the period 
699–735/1299–1335) as a biography of al-Nāṣir, who he portrayed as the sovereign who 
created peace and stability after century upon century of war and unrest in the Islamic 
world. Ulrich Haarmann provides two different titles for this section, the original being 
al-Nūr al-Bāṣir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir (The Clarifying Light Regarding the Life of al-
Malik al-Nāṣir). This was changed to al-Durr al-Fākhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir (The 
Splendid Pearls of the Life of al-Malik al-Nāṣir).571 What we are dealing with is a work 
centred on al-Nāṣir and possibly even presented to the sultan by the author himself.572 
This evidently affects his presentation of political events in the provinces and hereunder 
Karāy’s arrest, which is reduced to the decision of the sovereign.  
Second, we should note that Karāy’s arrest provides an ample opportunity for the 
author to present himself and his father at the centre of events. Haarmann points out that 
elsewhere Ibn al-Dawādārī tries to make his chronicle more unique and interesting by 
pretending to quote his father or another of his associates when he is really quoting from 
an existing chronicle.573 By focusing on the military aspect of Karāy’s arrest, Ibn al-
Dawādārī not only favours intra-Mamluk politics, but also highlights himself and his 
father as key witnesses and participants in the events of the day.574 Meanwhile, his 
narrative is completely devoid of any non-military actors – no judges, scholars or 
common people whatsoever are given any role.  
 In contrast to Ibn al-Dawādārī’s tendency towards self-promotion, Haarmann 
argues that the author al-Jazārī only lets himself or his friends and relatives speak ‘when 
it comes to illustrate contemporary events, which are of unquestionable objective 
relevans for historians, and to render them more concrete’.575 While it is true that no 
                                                        
571 See Haarmann, 1969, 80–81. For the portrayal of al-Nāṣir bringer of peace, see al-Dawādārī, Kanz vol. 
9, 384–387 and Clifford, 2013, 180. 
572 Haarmann, 1969, 82. 
573 Ibid., 194. 
574 Ibid., 84. 
575 Ibid. NB: I have translated the quote from the original German. 
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autobiographic references are found in al-Jazarī*’s or any of the other Damascene 
sources’ narratives of the 711 protest, it would be a mistake to acquit them completely 
of self-promotion through their narratives. If we expand the scope slightly to include not 
only the authors themselves and their immediate family, we see that they are all engaged 
in self-promotion on behalf of their own community. Moreover, they emphasise the 
significance of the 711 protest and underline the role of local religious scholars, such as 
al-Qazwīnī and al-Tūnisī, while simultaneously relegating the Mamluk military 
aristocracy to the margins. In this sense, the social world portrayed in their works is the 
inverse image of the Mamluk-centric world of Ibn al-Dawādārī. In other words, all of 
the accounts that we have examined so far can be read as self-representations either of 
the author personally or of the social milieu and world in which he lived.576  
The same can be said when we compare the descriptions of Damascene city space 
found in the narratives of Group A with those in the account of Ibn al-Dawādārī. All four 
authors in Group A, al-Jazarī*’s in particular, present their readers with a vivid picture 
of Damascus intra-muros, including the names of the madrasas and special sections of 
the Umayyad Mosque where the tax negotiations took place. By contrast, Ibn al-
Dawādārī’s Damascus as presented in the 711 entry in the Kanz is restricted to the suburb 
of barracks and amiral palaces near the Maydān al-Akhḍar on the slopes of the Barāda 
river northwest of the walled city. We have already seen in Chapter 3, that this area was 
developed by the military aristocracy of the late Ayyubid and early Mamluk periods into 
what Julien Loiseau calls ‘la ville de cavaliers’.577 What we have seen above is that this 
impression is certainly reinforced by Ibn al-Dawādārī. 
          In this sense, we can say that the authors in Group A and Ibn al-Dawādārī also 
display radically different views of where the political centre of Damascus was located. 
The Damascene scholars emphasise the mosque and madrasa district east of the citadel, 
while Egyptian officer focuses on the detached army quarters in the northwestern 
suburbs. Within the respective chronicles, the geography of narrative thus corresponds 
completely with the author’s choice of focus. In a wider perspective, we can see how the 
                                                        
576 The Syrian historian’s tendency to highlight and promote his own community is also registered in two 
studies of Syrian historiography in the 10th/16th and 12th/18th centuries, respectively. See Amina A. 
Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protests in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria (Cairo: AUC Press, 
2016), 93–94 and Dana Sajdi, 'Peripheral Visions: The Worlds and Worldviews of Commoner Chroniclers 
in the 18th Century Ottoman Levant' (Columbia University, New York, 2002), Chapter 2.  
577 Julien Loiseau, Les Mamelouks – XIIIe–XVIe Siecle (Paris: Editions du SEUIL, 2014), 216. 
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two political poles that were drawn up in Chapters 3 and 4 (the Umayyad Mosque and 
the military suburbs near the Sūq al-Khayl) are hierarchised through narration.  
 
ii. Baybars al-Manṣūrī  
We now move on to two additional accounts of Karāy’s arrest written from an Egyptian 
military perspective, but by authors who were somewhat farther away from the events 
in Damascus. What becomes evident here is that the foregrounding of the sultan’s purge 
and marginalisation of the civilian Damascene perspective is not unique to Ibn al-
Dawādārī, but shared in different degrees by other authors who resembled him in terms 
of socio-political and geographical background. Let us begin with the account provided 
by the Mamluk officer and short-term viceroy of Egypt, Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 
725/1325), who describes the events of 711/1311 in his Kitāb al-tuḥfa al-mulukiyya fi 
al-dawla al-Turkiyya. As mentioned in Chapter 1, al-Manṣūrī was an active political 
player in 711/1311 since he was appointed as viceroy of Egypt in this year following al-
Nāṣir’s purge and the arrest of Baktamur.578 We now consider how this fact influences 
his depiction of the events in question. 
Al-Manṣūri’s Kitāb al-Tuḥfa distinguishes itself from Ibn al-Dawādārī’s Kanz in 
so far that it actually acknowledges Karāy's political problems in Damascus. When 
mentioning the governor’s appointment, al-Manṣūrī makes the following remark: ‘he 
ruled it [Damascus] for a short period but the people received hardship from him none 
the less’.579 In contrast to the Kanz, we see here at least a cursory interest in the ruling 
style of the governor. Later, al-Manṣūrī even highlights that the governor’s arrest 
happened as a direct result of a complaint about his tyrannical way of governing:  
In this year he [al-Nāṣir] sent Amir Sayf al-Din Arghūn the dawādār to 
Damascus to seize Amir Sayf al-Din Karāy when the people complained 
about the weight of his oppression, his tyranny (jūr jīratihi) and the 
abusiveness of his rule. He was seized at his table after he had adorned the 
honorary robe of his sultan.580 
In comparison with Ibn al-Dawādārī, al-Manṣūrī is more attentive to the plight of the 
Damascenes and acknowledges the significance of popular feedback in the political 
changes of 711/1311 on a par with what we saw in the Damascene sources in Group A.  
                                                        
578 See above, 32. 
579 al-Manṣūrī, Kitāb al-tuḥfa, 227. 
580 Ibid., 228. 
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However, the comparison between the Tuḥfa and the Damascene chronicles should 
not be pushed too far. Unlike the Damascene chroniclers, al-Manṣūrī does not use the 
story of Karāy’s arrest to underline the agency of Damascene civilians, but rather as a 
means to highlight the benevolence and justice of al-Nāṣir and the bad character of 
Karāy. The governor is not connected explicitly to Baktamur’s coup, but his abuse of the 
Damascene population and his arrest is presented in the context of other examples of bad 
governance and nefarious stratagems that preceded al-Nāṣir’s 711 purge. Apart from 
Baktamur’s coup plans, we hear how the reigning governor of Gaza, Amir Quṭlūqtamur 
(d. ?), was dismissed for neglecting his duties:  
This was because our lord the sultan had found out that the said Quṭlūqtamur 
had neglected the safeguarding of the coastal plains to such an extent that 
Frankish pirates had begun to covet it […].581 
As in the case of Karāy, al-Manṣūrī underlines that Quṭlūqtamur was deposed due to the 
sultan’s timely and diligent intervention for the sake of his subjects. That this is the key 
message of his purge-narrative, including the arrest of Karāy, is spelled out in 
unambiguous terms in the concluding comment on the arrests of 711/1311. Here, the 
author includes two stanzas from a panegyric poem written by the 4th/10th century poet 
al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/965) to his patron the Hamdanid prince of Aleppo Sayf al-Dawla 
(d. 356/967)582:  
By the grace of God what a heroic king, he seizes the lions in their thicket 
and shows his inner qualities583 in their jumps. And this is the meaning of the 
words of al-Mutanabbī. (Poetry) 
Mighty fear deputised for you and  
/ 
awe for you wrought more than the heroes achieved584 
And when those mentioned went into the trap, they were sent to the citadel of 
Karak.585 
These concluding lines of al-Manṣūri’s account constitute a parallel to the scorpion 
parable that Ibn al-Dawādārī used in his description of the purge: it underlines that the 
                                                        
581 Ibid., 227. 
582 See the Introduction in Poems of al-Mutanabbī A Selection. Arthur J. Arberry, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1967). 
583 The Arabic word used is thanyātahu – literally, his folds. 
584 Poem 12 v. 7, 70 in Arberry (transl.), 1967. My italicization. 
585 al-Manṣūri, Kitāb al-tuḥfa, 228. 
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point of the narrative is to praise the sultan for his wisdom, courage and proficiency as 
ruler. In this context, the situation in Damascus is presented in vague terms as part of a 
larger catalogue of political problems that the sultan corrected in this year. As in the case 
of al-Dawādārī, this narrative links up with the overarching intention of the work in 
which it is incorporated. As noted by Li Guo, the slim volume that constitutes Kitāb al-
tuḥfa (219 printed pages in the 1987 edition) is not an abridged version of al-Manṣūri’s 
universal chronicle Zubdat al-Fikra fī Tārīkh al-Hijra, as Claude Cahen believes. Rather, 
it is ‘another original work on the reign of the Sultan al-Nāṣir Muhammad Ibn 
Qalāwūn’.586 Like the final volume of the Kanz, Kitāb al-tuḥfa is primarily aimed at 
depicting and praising al-Nāṣir and according to Abdelḥamīd Ṣāliḥ Ḥamdān, the editor 
of the 1987 edition, it was most likely intended as a present for the sultan himself.587 The 
story of the purge that includes Karāy’s arrest is thus employed to fit this particular 
authorial agenda.  
As in case of Ibn al-Dawādārī, we should also acknowledge that al-Manṣūrī was 
also pursuing a narrower personal goal with his work. But unlike al-Dawādārī, he had 
more than the claim to be an eyewitness to the events to hang his hat on. As mentioned 
above, al-Manṣūrī was in fact the amir who was appointed as viceroy of Egypt when 
Baktamur was arrested. In his account, he describes this process in the following words:  
He rewarded with the position of viceroy the slave of his grace, the one who 
had grown up under the charity of him and his father, Baybars al-Dawādār, 
the compiler of this sīra and the relator of these reports, and he honored me 
with the designated robe of honour [...].588 
According to the editor, Ḥamdān, al-Manṣūrī began to write Kitāb al-tuḥfa around 
709/1310 and finished it in its present form around 711/1311, the year he was appointed 
as viceroy.589 His work is not simply a tribute to the sultan, it is also a self-portrait of the 
author at the peak of his power. In this light, we can say that al-Manṣūrī had obvious 
self-serving reasons for framing the victims of the purge as negatively as possible, in 
Karāy’s case by including references to his dictatorial rule in Damascus. This would 
indirectly help him frame himself as part of a new, sound and incorrupt Mamluk 
                                                        
586 Guo, 1997, 17. 
587 al-Manṣūri, Kitāb tuḥfa, Introduction by the editor, 14. 
588 Ibid., 228. 
589 Ibid., 14. 
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leadership emerging from the political fray of the 711/1311 purge. Thus, the situation in 
Damascus remains instrumental for a purpose, one which is centred elsewhere.  
Unfortunately for al-Manṣūrī, his appointment as viceroy was short-lived. He was 
accused of treason, arrested and sent off to Karak in 712/1312, much like the victims of 
the purge. He was released and had some of his wealth restored in 716/1316, and 
according to Ḥamdān, made one abortive attempt to continue to write the Kitāb al-tuḥfa 
around 721/1321. But the work that has come down to us still ends with his glory days 
in 711/1311.590 
 
iii. al-Yūsufī (via al-ʿAynī) 
We conclude this section with a look at a third Egyptian account of Karāy’s arrest, which 
most likely stems from the Nuzhat al-Nāẓir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir (The Spectator’s 
Stroll through the Biography of al-Malik al-Nāṣir), which was most likely written by an 
Egyptian officer in the ḥalqa (non-Mamluk auxilliary forces) by the name of Mūsa Ibn 
Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā al-Yūsufī (d. after 755/1355). As explained in Chapter 1, our 
access to this work is somewhat problematic: save for a short manuscript containing 
entries for the years 737–73, the Nuzha has only survived in the form of quotations in 
later chronicles. Therefore, the descriptions of the events of 711/1311 examined here are 
edited quotations from the Nuzha presented by the Egyptian chronicler Badr al-Dīn al-
ʿAynī (d. 855/1451) in his chronicle ʿIqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān.591  
We should be aware that we are dealing with al-Yūsufī’s account as it was curated 
by al-ʿAynī, who we cannot hold accountable for his selections and arrangements of al-
Yūsufī’s material since we lack the original text. However, in the present context, there 
are two main reasons to emphasise al-Yūsufī over his curator, al-ʿAynī. First, al-Yūsufī 
appears to be al-ʿAynī’s sole source and is apparently quoted directly: the passage in al-
ʿAynī’s ʿIqd that describes Baktamur’s coup and Karāy’s arrest spans some four pages 
and consists exclusively of quotes from either ṣāḥib kitāb sīrat al-Nāṣir (the master of 
the biography of al-Nāṣir) or al-Rāwī (the relator/narrator), both of which are monikers 
by which al-ʿAynī habitually refers to al-Yūsufī.592  
                                                        
590 Ibid., 15. 
591 See above, 32-33. 
592 The excerpt in question takes up four pages in the printed edition. al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd vol. 5, 252–256. For 
more details on the al-ʿAynī/al-Yūsufī connection, see above, 32-33 and Donald P. Little, 'The Recovery 
of a Lost Source for Bahri Mamluk History: Al-Yūsufīs Nuzhat Al-Nāẓir Fi Sīrat Al-Malik Al-Nāṣir', 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 94, no. 1 (1974): 42–55. 
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Second, the account of Karāy’s arrest in the ʿIqd is, as far as I have been able to 
establish, the only version that presents a vindictive picture of Karāy while strongly 
incriminating the sultan. The attitude toward al-Nāṣir that we find in this particular 
passage corresponds with Donald P. Little’s general characterisation of the Nuzha as a 
portrayal of the sultan as ‘a tyrant, ruthless, scheming and brutal’.593 Therefore, while 
al-ʿAynī might very well have shared this conviction, we have ample reason to expect 
that what he presents are relatively direct quotes from al-Yūsufī. 
In what we can now assume with relative certainty is al-Yūsufī’s version of the 
events of 711/1311, Baktamur and the coup makers are presented as the heroes and 
governor Karāy is cast as nothing more than an innocent victim of the sultan’s paranoia. 
The narrative begins with a description of how Baktamur assembled his closest 
confidants and expressed his concern about al-Nāṣir’s treatment of the Mamluk elite 
after his return to power in 709/1310:  
Verily the Amir Baktamur al-Jūkandār, when he saw what happened with the 
amirs, and that his respect (ḥurma) had shrunken, feared for himself, and so 
he summoned Butkhās594, who had been the governor of Safad, and others 
whom he kept close, and he said to them: you know595 what the sultan did to 
the amirs, for among them are some to whom he gives what they deserve and 
some to whom he does not give what they deserve. I am afraid of him, and I 
don’t know what to do? And so they said to him: by God we all feel that way 
[…]596 
The group then rallies the support of the governors of Safad and Gaza. However, 
according to this version, Karāy disassociates himself from the plotters and actively tries 
to dissuade Baktamur from pursuing the matter:  
As for Karāy, the governor of Damascus, he sent a message to him 
(Baktamur) and said: My brother, I know what happened to others than you, 
and they were stronger than you, so do not let this enter your mind for it will 
                                                        
593 Little, 1974, 54. Little even suggests that the work was so critical that al-Yūsufī took pains to conceal 
his own identity lest he incur the wrath of one of al-Nāṣir’s sons; hence, al-ʿAynī’s lack of awareness of 
the authorship. See Little, 1974, 48. 
594 Sayf al-Dīn Butkhāṣ was governor of Safad for six years during the first decade of the 8th/14th century. 
See al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 1, 678–679. 
595 The Arabic text could be saying either ʿallamtuhum / ʿallamtahum / ʿallamtihim (’ l m in form II perf. 
1. or 2. sing. m. / 2. sing. f.) ‘I told them / you told them’. I have chosen to regard the h as typing error 
since ʿalamtum (ʿ l m in form I perf. 2. sing. m. pl.), ‘you have learned/come to know’, makes more sense 
in this context as the speaker is directing his words directly towards a group. 
596 al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd vol. 5, 252. 
 205 
destroy you and it will destroy us with you. For he [al-Nāṣir] is the son of our 
master (ustadh) and he has seized the kingdom and is afraid.597 
Karāy’s warning is followed by a long description of how al-Nāṣir learned of the coup 
and resolved to have Baktamur and the governors of Syria arrested. Whether or not al-
Yūsufī includes the 711 tax as a reason for Karāy’s fall is unclear since al-ʿAynī switches 
to the account of Ibn Kathīr when relating the actual arrest of the governor.598 But from 
the sections of the Nuzha that al-ʿAynī does quote, we get the distinct impression that 
Karāy was arrested as a suspected co-conspirator despite his active refusal to participate 
in the coup. In this regard, the account of al-Yūsufī follows the other Egyptian accounts 
in foregrounding the purge over any local problems that could have occurred as a result 
of Karāy’s rule in Damascus.  
However, unlike the previous two narratives, the purge in this narrative is not 
couched as an occasion for the author to praise the sultan – quite the contrary. The initial 
reason behind Baktamur’s coup is cast as a reaction to the sultan’s unfair treatment of 
his amirs. Tellingly, it is not loyalty or affection for al-Nāṣir but fear of the sultan’s 
reaction that prevents Karāy from joining the coup. The alleged letter from the governor 
helps to consolidate the image of the sultan as a fearful and erratic usurper. We should 
remember that al-Manṣūri depicts the fear that the sultan inspired in positive terms; 
through the use of al-Mutanabbī’s poetry, he likens this fear to the awe inspired by a 
mighty king. By contrast, the fear harboured by the amirs in al-Yūsufī’s account is not 
awe but rather fear instilled in others by a man driven by desperation and paranoia.599   
As was the case with the other two Egyptian sources, al-Yūsufī’s account of the 
purge betrays the contours of the wider scope of the work. But unlike them, he evidently 
aims to portray al-Nāṣir in a most unfavourable light. The sultan is presented as the 
erratic tyrant who has alienated the population and abused members of the Manṣūriyya 
corps by taking away their rights, although the narrative does not state what these rights 
were. Consequently, the coup is portrayed as a widely supported attempt at restoring 
                                                        
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid., 257. Interestingly, al-ʿAynī does not include the reference to Ibn Taymiyya’s involvement in the 
711protest even though he quotes from Ibn Kathīr. We can speculate that he relied on a copy of al-Bidāya, 
which, like the Berlin Manuscript mentioned above, lacked this reference. 
599  The contrast between their portrayals of the sultan can also be illustrated by comparing their 
descriptions of Baktamur’s incarceration. Al-Manṣūrī points out that al-Nāṣir made the prisoners’ stay at 
Karak as comfortable as possible; in contrast, al-Yūsufī simply states that Baktamur was kept imprisoned 
until his death. While both authors acknowledge that the sultan sent his former viceroy to prison, the 
former emphasises the sultan’s compassion, while the latter portrays the incarceration of Baktamur as an 
indirect death sentence. 
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balance. As for Karāy, he is simply caught in the crossfire between the coup makers and 
the sultan.  
 
iv. Prepared or paranoid? Debating the merits of Sultan al-Nāṣir 
For the authors in Group B, the 711 protest, to the extent that they knew about it, must 
have been an insignificant event compared with the dramatic intrigues that characterised 
the Mamluk elite, especially the circles close to al-Nāṣir in the period where he was 
consolidating his position as sultan for the third time. In this context, Karāy is cast as 
nothing more than a small piece of a large puzzle that circles around the question whether 
al-Nāṣir was a good or bad ruler. In the first two accounts presented in Group B, the 
sultan is cast as the wise sovereign who incarcerates a few ‘bad apples’ among his 
officers for the sake of stability, with wide backing among the Mamluk elite. Karāy is, 
first and foremost, one of the bad apples. In the third and final account, the situation is 
put on its head: The sultan is the villain and the coup makers are acting out of justified 
concern for their lives, while Karāy becomes an innocent victim of an autocrat’s 
increasing paranoia. All the narratives in Group B betray a view of contemporary politics 
that is permeated by a centre-periphery dynamic. The centre of most, if not all, political 
change is the imperial capital of Cairo and the decisions taken there reverberate like 
ripples, causing local change throughout the provinces. This runs counter to the general 
tendency in the Damascene narratives, which maintain a continuous focus on the 
importance of local events and portray interference from Cairo not simply as action but 
as a reaction to the request of the Damascenes.  
IV. The Perspective of the Scholar-Bureaucrat 
Until now we have seen how the story of Karāy was presented by two groups of authors 
who hailed from two different geographical and educational/occupational backgrounds: 
the Damascene scholar-chronicler vs. the Egyptian military-chronicler.  
          In this section, we regard the story of Karāy from the perspective of the learned 
civilian administrator working within Mamluk administration and confine ourselves to 
examining the account of one author, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl Ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī (d. 
1363/764). The son of a Mamluk, Al-Ṣafadī was born in 696/1296 and grew up to 
become a bureaucrat in the Mamluk administration as well as a famous litterateur and 
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biographer.600 Throughout his life he worked in the offices of the Mamluk chancery, 
including in Damascus (731–739/1331–1339 and 760–763/1360–1363). The account we 
examine here is the biography of Sayf al-Dīn Karāy found in al-Ṣafadī’s biographical 
dictionary of his prominent contemporaries, Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr wa-Aʿwān al-Naṣr. This work 
begins with people born in al-Ṣafadī’s birth year of 696/1297; he seems to have worked 
on it towards the end of his life in the late fifties and early sixties of the 8th/14th century. 
Many of the approximately 1800 biographies found in this work are revised and 
augmented versions of the entries found in al-Ṣafadī’s other and much larger 
biographical dictionary that he worked on throughout his adult life and called al-Wāfī 
bil-Wafayāt 601. Al-Wāfī does include a biography of Karāy,602 but it is far less detailed 
than the one found in the Aʿyān. This examination deals solely with the latter.  
 Al-Ṣafadī’s account of Karāy’s arrest includes a detailed description of the 711 
protest shows strong linguistic similarities with the versions of both al-Birzālī and al-
Jazarī*.603 However, after this, he includes an equally detailed description of how Karāy 
was innocently arrested in connection with the coup because of his ties with Baktamur. 
His account of Karāy’s arrest reads like a combination of the narratives found in Groups 
A and B.  
However, al-Ṣafadī’s version is not simply a cross between the Damascene and 
Egyptian perspectives. In general, he seems much less concerned with foregrounding 
either Damascus or Cairo or the agency of either the Damascene citizens (with or without 
the help of God) or the sultan. Instead, he follows his own agenda – presenting a complex 
portrait of Governor Karāy. 
 
i. Al-Ṣafadī and his local and imperial connections 
We begin by looking at al-Ṣafadī’s narrative in light of his background, which can 
partially explain his take on the story of Karāy. Around 1317/717, before the young al-
Ṣafadī joined the ranks of the chancery clerks, we find him in Damascus as a student of 
disciplines such as grammar, adab and ḥadīth. Here, he made connections with local 
                                                        
600 Donald P. Little, 'al-Ṣafadī as a Biographer of His Contemporaries', in Essays on Islamic Civilization, 
ed. Donald P. Little (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 1976), 191–210, 206–207. 
601 Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Sạfadī, al-Wāfī bil-Wafayāt 25 Vols., ed. M. A. al-Bakhīt and M. al-Hiyārī (Stuttgart: 
Frantz Steiner Verlag, 1993). 
602 al-Sạfadī, al-Wāfī vol. 24, 331–333. 
603 For similarities with other accounts of the 711 protest, compare, e.g., al-Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 21 
ll. 6–8 with al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 152 ll. 15–17 and al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435 ll. 15–1436 l. 1 with al-
Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 153 ll. 5–8. 
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scholars, including Ibn Taymiyya and the young al-Dhahabī.604 Furthermore, beyond the 
restricted case of the 711 protest, we find evidence in all parts of the Aʿyān and al-Wāfī 
that suggest that he had personal contact with al-Birzālī and al-Jazarī as well as access 
to their respective writings.605 Moreover, as was the case with the authors in Group A, 
we can also point to personal connections between al-Ṣafadī and the leader of the protest, 
the khaṭīb Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī. As explained in Chapter 4, al-Ṣafadī both 
corresponded and spoke directly with al-Qazwīnī and composed a lengthy panegyric 
poem for him around 732/1332.606 As for the other named individual involved in the 
protest, Majid al-Dīn al-Tūnisī, al-Ṣafadī seems to have arrived in Damascus too late to 
study under him, since al-Tūnisī died in 718/1318.607  
In light of his Damascene connections, it would be tempting to regard al-Ṣafadī’s 
narrative simply as an extension of the accounts in Group A. However, al-Ṣafadī’s 
narrative is clearly also influenced by his background within the state administration, 
which expands his attention beyond Damascus. He comments extensively on Karāy’s 
complex character, describing him as both a pious and zealous administrator and an 
impatient hothead. Most prominently, he draws on the testimony of a chancery employee 
from Safad called Najm al-Dīn al-Ṣafadī (d. 723/1323)608 under whose command al-
Ṣafadī worked in the early 720s/1320s. According to the author, his former boss had 
worked for Karāy in Safad and was brought to Damascus as the governor’s chief 
accountant in 711/1311. 609  He quotes Najm al-Dīn for descriptions of how Karāy 
initiated a broad evaluation of the local ledgers in Damascus as well as information on 
his relationship with other amirs in and beyond Damascus and his arrest and deportation.  
To summarise, we can say that both al-Ṣafadī’s connection to the state bureaucracy 
(including Karāy’s former secretary) and his connection to the scholars of Damascus are 
visible in his account of the events of 711/1311. He undeniably recounts the dramatic 
protest narrative found in the Damascene sources with all their attention to the amount 
of the tax requested by the governor and the relics used by the protesters, but he is also 
                                                        
604 Little, 1976, 206. Franz Rosenthal, 'Al-Ṣafadī', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 8, ed. C. E. 
Bosworth et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 759–60. 
605 al-Ṣafadī quotes al-Birzālī’s works more than fifty times in the Aʿyān and also includes alleged oral 
testimonies from him. See Little, 1976, 201–202. 
606 See above, 159. For examples of his correspondence with al-Qazwīnī, see al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 496–
498; for his use of al-Qazwīnī as a source, see al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 5, 10. 
607 The biography of al-Tūnisī in the Aʿyān does not mention any student–teacher relationship between the 
biographer and biographee. See Ibid., vol. 2, 32–34. 
608 For his biography, see Ibid., vol. 2, 232–244. 
609 Ibid., vol. 4, 152. 
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attentive to and inclusive of the perspectives of non-local observers. Apparently, he saw 
no contradiction in including both the local and imperial dimensions of Karāy’s rule and 
demise.  
That said, of course, al-Ṣafadī’s depictions of the 711 protest and the arrest of 
Karāy are not determined completely by his background and the array of sources and 
informants available to him. As with the previous authors, we must also take into 
consideration the question of his authorial agenda.  
 
ii. Temper, passion and sense of duty: a psychological portrait of Karāy 
In general terms, we can say that the chosen excerpt from al-Ṣafadī’s Aʿyān differs from 
the previous sources in so far as it does not present the account of the 711 protest as part 
of a chronological overview of the events of the year 711. Instead, the narrative of the 
protest is inserted as one anecdote among many in the biography of governor Karāy. 
When reading this particular description of these events, we need to consider first and 
foremost how al-Ṣafadī used anecdotes in his biographies. In this regard, we are fortunate 
to be able to consult and compare with a recent article by Stephan Conermann.610 This 
article examines the biography of another 14th century governor of Damascus, Amir Sayf 
al-Dīn Tankiz al-Ḥusāmī (d. 740/1340), which can be found in al-Wāfī bil-Wafayāt. On 
the background of Tankiz’s biography, Conermann writes the following about al-
Ṣafadī’s use of anecdotes: 
Within al-Ṣafadī’s Wāfī these short, entertaining, and amusing anecdotes have 
the function of emphasizing certain features and characteristics of historic 
figures […] On the one hand they give us information about al-Ṣafadī’s idea 
of Tankiz’ character. On the other hand they provide us with an interesting 
and entertaining biography of the governor. In general, one should be very 
careful when it comes to reconstructing reality from this material. We never 
know whether the picture the author draws in his text is real or just the result 
of his imagination.611 
With regard to the 711 protest, we can safely say that this event was not purely the result 
of the author’s imagination, since it is confirmed in several of the sources previously 
                                                        
610 Stephan Conermann, 'Tankiz Ibn ’Abd Allāh Al-Ḥusāmī Al-Nāṣirī (D. 740/1340) as Seen by His 
Contemporary Al-Ṣafadī (D. 764/1363)', Mamluk Studies Review 2 (2008): 1–24. 
611 Ibid., 17–18. A very similar conclusion is reached by H. E. Fahndrich with regard to the biographical 
dictionary Wafayāt al-Aʿyān of Ibn Khalikān (d. 681/1282). See Hartmut E . Fahndrich, 'The Wafayāt Al-
Aʿyān of Ibn Khallikān: A New Approach', Journal of the American Oriental Society 93, no. 4 (1973): 
432–445, 442–443. 
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examined. Even so, we should still heed this warning, since a closer examination of al-
Ṣafadī’s text shows that he arranges the anecdote in a way that departs from his sources, 
which seem to be the protest narratives of al-Birzālī and al-Jazarī*. As we shall see, these 
changes reflect on and underline the wider message inherent in his biography of Karāy. 
One of the significant changes that al-Ṣafadī makes in his protest narrative concerns the 
use of dialogue; here, Conermann’s reservations about trusting al-Ṣafadī are even more 
pronounced: 
In his biographies al-Ṣafadī often puts words into the mouths of people. 
Everything in these scenes, from their setting to the dramatis personae, can 
be an invention of the chronicler. Normally, he just wants to bring out a very 
complex and complicated relationship between two or three persons.612 
What this article suggests is that each anecdote, especially those that contain dialogue, 
should be examined in light of the biography into which it is inserted. 
Before we examine al-Ṣafadī’s presentation of the 711 protest, we need to consult 
his portrayal of Karāy as a whole in order to determine what general character traits the 
author attributes to his biographee. We should note that because the biographies of 
Tankiz and Karāy are drawn from two different biographical dictionaries written by al-
Ṣafadī, we cannot assume that the same conclusions apply to both. However, the 
following examination demonstrates that Karāy’s biography does support Conermann’s 
conclusions.  
In al-Ṣafadī’s work, the governor is not cast as the vicious tyrant we saw in al-
Manṣūri’s narrative. Nor is he presented as a man of ‘base character and meanness of 
spirit’, which we saw in al-Jazarī*’s version. 613  Instead, al-Ṣafadī gives us a more 
complex psychological portrait of a man caught between two dominant drives: his 
temper and his dedication to service.  
On the one hand, Karāy is portrayed as a man completely controlled by his 
emotions. Al-Ṣafadī mentions his propensity for anger:  
                                                        
612 Conermann, 2008, 19. 
613 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1439. 
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He was severely awe-inspiring, slow to calm down if angered and to repent, 
reckless in the pursuit of his goals, and flew up quicker than his flies.614 If he 
got angry there was no stopping his anger […]615 
Later, the author also adds a description of the amir’s insatiable appetite for intercourse, 
which underscores his impulse-driven character: 
He had 4 wives and 30 concubines, and if he went on a hunting trip he had 
his women follow him because he could not stand patiently abstaining from 
intercourse […]616 
On the other hand, the author complicates the portrait by stating that Karāy, despite his 
temper, was also a God-fearing, righteous and incorruptible man: 
Nonetheless he was strong in faith, grand in his protection (madīd al-Ṣiyāna) 
[…] and of modest spirit and he did not eat from another’s wealth as much as 
a grain, and did not accept gifts from anyone.617  
Hereafter, the positive side of Karāy’s personality is illustrated in an anecdote where al-
Ṣafadī describes how the amir entered the service of al-Nāṣir when he marched out of 
Karak in 709/1310. According to this anecdote, Karāy offered to capture and hold Gaza 
in order to aid the advance towards Cairo. Al-Ṣafadī commemorates this event in a poem 
that praises Karāy’s qualities as a ruler and strategist. The poem is composed of two 
verses, each of which contains a paranomastic pun on the name of the governor that al-
Ṣafadī spells as Karāʾī, i.e., with the insertion of a ḥamza between the alif and ya. 
Karāʾī is he who sends sleep (al-karā) to our eyelids / and gathers all the 
property after it had been dispersed 
He advised the sultan to guard Gaza / and in all my life I never saw a point of 
view like that of Karāʾī (ka-raʾī Karāʾī).618 
To summarise, al-Ṣafadī’s biography presents us with an amir who is both a stubborn 
and passionate hothead and a diligent, strategic and zealous ruler. The story of Karāy’s 
brief tenure in Damascus, to which we now turn, is in essence the story of how the clash 
                                                        
614 Aṭyār min dhabābihi. This whole passage is written in rhyming prose and the exact meaning of this 
sentence is unclear. But the imagery seems to suggest that the amir was roused to anger more easily quicker 
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615 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 150. 
616 Ibid. vol. 4, 154. 
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Birzālī, al-Muqtafī vol. 4, 6. 
618 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 52. 
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of these two sides of his character antagonised the Damascene population and brought 
about his demise. 
According to al-Ṣafadī, the problems in Damascus caused by Karāy’s combination 
of temper and sense of duty started well before the 711 protest. The first example he 
provides describes that the governor swore on divorce from his wives that all 
apprehended thieves would have their hand cut off if they stole the sharia minimum (al-
niṣāb al-sharʿī ).619 According to al-Ṣafadī, this decision weighed on the people (faḍāqa 
al-nās minhi). This anecdote has Karāy, to the dismay of his subjects, interfering with 
the dispensing of justice, and echoes two themes evoked in the character description: his 
stubbornness and diligence.620  
Al-Ṣafadī continues with a similar anecdote from Damascus. Karāy sent for a 
group of secretaries, including the aforementioned Najm al-Dīn al-Ṣafadī, from Homs, 
Gaza and Safad. Their job was to go over the ledgers of debt and credit in the city and 
highlight any inconsistencies. Without specifying how or why, al-Ṣafadī adds that the 
decision also angered the local population.621 If we are to regard al-Ṣafadī’s version of 
Karāy as a tyrant, it is not in the sense of an arbitrary ruler who bends the law to his own 
purpose, but rather in the sense of a strict and overzealous ruler who rejects local customs 
and overturns existing administrative practices in order to pursue his own idiosyncratic 
goals.622  
In the case of the 711 protest, we can see how al-Ṣafadī rearranges the narrative in 
order to underline Karāy’s stubborn determination and his anger towards anyone who 
opposed his decisions. The most evident shift in this direction can be found in the 
description of the verbal intervention of the ḥājib, Amir Sayf al-Dīn Quṭlūbak, at the 
                                                        
619 Ibid. vol. 4, 152. This anecdote requires two clarifications. Al-ḥallaf bil-ṭalāq (swearing an oath of 
divorce) denotes a practice of showing one’s determination in pursuing a certain matter. Karāy is saying 
that if he does not succeed in getting all thieves punished with amputation, he will divorce his wives, i.e. 
that he will due his upmost to get this punishment implemented. Al-ḥallaf bil-ṭalāq is still used in Arabic 
today. See e.g., Husein Almutlaq, 'A Sociolinguistic Study of Terms of Oaths in Jordanian Arabic', 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3, no. 21 (2013): 225–228, 227. As for the 
juridical aspect of sariqa (theft), al-niṣāb al-sharʿī (the sharia minimum) is the definite minimum value 
in stolen currency or goods that can be punished by amputation. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam, 
the Ḥanafī law school set the minimum at 10 dirhams, whereas the Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs set it between ¼ 
of a dinar and three dirhams. See Willi Heffening, 'Sariqa', in Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 9, 
ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 62–63. 
620  al-Ṣafadī indirectly suggests that before Karāy’s arrival, Damascus had some form of generally 
accepted practice for punishing thieves that did not include amputation when the minimum sum was 
involved. However, I have found no references in the Damascene sources to back this up. 
621 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 152. The term used for the work these secretaries did is ʿamal al-ḥisāb fī al-
zanājīr and the ledger referred to is called al-ʿalāma. 
622 Since this anecdote is not mentioned by the other sources, it is difficult to determine whether it is 
anything more than a dramatic element introduced by al-al-Ṣafadī. 
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beginning of the protest. Such an intervention is also found in the version of al-Jazarī*, 
who presents the ḥājib as the first amir to speak in Sūq al-Khayl. The first group to 
complain are a group of lepers, orphans and blind people, and the ḥājib’s response to 
them is conciliatory:  
The first to plead before their arrival [i.e., the arrival of the procession lead 
by al-Qazwīnī] were the blind because they [Karāy’s men] had registered 
their awqāf for taxation, and they complained about the four-month levy, and 
so the ḥājib said to them: your matter has been settled (qad inqadā 
shuglukum). After them came the writhing lepers and so the ḥājib replied to 
them as he dismissed them: your matter has been settled. […].623  
According to this account, it was only after this scene that the protesters led by al-
Qazwīnī arrived and were beaten by the governor’s guard. 
Al-Ṣafadī also ascribes the words ‘your matter has been settled’ (inqadā 
shuglukum) to the ḥājib, but here they are transformed into a dismissive message directed 
towards the protesters led by al-Qazwīnī, not a merciful gesture towards a vanguard of 
lepers 
He [Karāy] said: what is this? Then they [the officers] said to him: the 
beneficiaries of the awqāf and properties and the beneficiaries of salaries from 
the mosque who have come because of what has been imposed on them. He 
said: Turn them away and tell them that the matter has been settled (al-shuglu 
inqadā)”. Then came the amir Sayf al-Dīn Quṭlubak Ibn al-Jashankīr, the 
ḥājib, who knew the character (khalq) of the governor, and so he said: in the 
name of God turn back for your case has already been settled (fa-qad inqadā 
shuglukum). Then they said: the Qurʾān cannot be dismissed. Then he said: 
turn back and if not it will not be good for you […].624 
Compared to al-Jazarī*, al-Ṣafadī removes the element of pathos from his account. 
Instead of retracting part of the tax claim, the ḥājib here warns or threatens the protesters 
to give up their endeavour because he knows Karāy’s character (khalq). In light of the 
                                                        
623 al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl, 1435. […] wa-kāna min qabli wuṣulihim awal man istighātha al-ʿamiyyān kawna 
annahum katabū awqāfahum wa-shakū min jibāyyat ʿarbaʾat shuhūr, fa-qāla lahum al-ḥājib: qad inqaḍā 
shughlukum, thumma jāʿū min baʿdihim al-judhamāʾ wa-taḍawwarū faradda ʿalayhim al-ḥājib: qad 
inqaḍā shughlukum, taswīfan bihim […] 
624 al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān vol. 4, 153. […] fa-qāla: māhadhā, fa-qālū lahu: arbāb al-awqāf wa-al-amlāk wa- 
arbāb al-rawātib ʿalā al-jāmiʿ jāʿū bi-sabbab al-muqarrar ʿalayhim, fa-qāl raddūhum wa-qul lahum al-
shughl inqaḍā, fa-jāʿa al-Amīr Sayf al-Din Quṭlūbak Ibn al-Jāshankīr al-hājib wa-huwwa yaʿrif khalq al-
nāʿib fa-qāla: bismillah irjaʿū fa-qad inqaḍā shughlukum, fa-qālū: al-muṣḥaf mā yuradd. fa-qāla: irjaʿū 
wa-illā mā huwwa jayyid lakum […]. NB: The transcription in this and the preceeding footnote are 
intended to provide the reader with a more detailed picture of the similarities and differences between the 
two quotes on both the semantic and syntactic levels. 
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previous descriptions provided in the governor’s biography, we can infer that what is 
meant by his character is his combination of a fiery temper and an unwillingness to 
change his mind. 
This scene, which seems to be borrowed from the narrative by al-Jazarī*, has been 
changed in order to exemplify the psychological dynamics that permeate al-Ṣafadī’s 
entire portrayal of the governor. This is not to say that al-Jazarī*’s dramatisation of the 
ḥājib’s intervention could not be every bit as fictitious; rather, the point is that al-Ṣafadī’s 
apparent use of the former’s account shows us how malleable this anecdote is in the 
hands of an author seeking to make a different point. 
Looking at the further course of al-Ṣafadī’s narrative of the 711 protest, we can 
see that he inserts two additional dramatic passages of dialogue that are not found in any 
of the Damascene sources. First, the ḥājib’s warning provokes the following response 
from the protesters: ‘the Qur’ān cannot be disregarded (al-muṣḥaf mā yurādd)’.625 By 
letting the protesters refer directly to the Qur’ān of ‛Uthmān, which was carried as part 
of their procession, al-Ṣafadī highlights the protesters as a group presenting their 
complaint on the basis of religious authority.  
Second, Al-Ṣafadī also puts words into the mouth of the aforementioned Shāfiʿī 
grammarian and Qurʾān recital expert Majid al-Dīn al-Tūnisī. As shown above, all the 
Damascene sources agree that Karāy summoned al-Tūnisī and accused him of organising 
the protest together with al-Qazwīnī. However, only in al-Ṣafadī’s version does al-Tūnisī 
answer Karāy’s accusations with the words ‘shut up, you unbeliever (uskut, kafarta)’.626 
This quote emphasises the same theme as the protesters’ reply to the ḥājib, but in even 
clearer terms: in the eyes of the protesters, Karāy is not only dismissing the authority of 
the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān, his actions are tantamount to apostasy.  
Keep in mind that earlier in his biography of the governor, al-Ṣafadī underlined 
Karāy’s piety by saying that ‘he was strong in faith’ (ilā innahu kān shadīd al-diyāna)627 
as well as his concern for the punishments stipulated by sharia. These dialogue passages 
seem less like a direct indictment of Karāy and more as a way for the author to dramatise 
the anger which the Damascene protesters harboured against him. To be sure, the anger 
and frustration are also evident within the Damascene narratives as well as the narrative 
                                                        
625Ibid., vol. 4, 153. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid., vol. 4, 150. 
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of al-Manṣūrī. However, al-Ṣafadī’s adds and additional layer of drama to the situation 
by letting the protesters express their opposition to Karāy in such stark terms.  
As do the other authors, al-Ṣafadī continues his account of Karāy’s fate with a 
description of how Amir Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn arrested him ten days after the protest. But 
unlike the others authors, he also recounts Karāy’s fate after his incarceration. He writes 
that the governor complained about his incarceration at Karak to the sultan, who 
pardoned him with the following words: 
 He has committed no offense against me save for being the khushdāsh628 of 
Baktamur al-Jūkandār, and when I seized him I feared lest he should turn but 
verily his mind is strong (fa-inna nafsahu qawiyya) […]629  
In contrast to the accounts in Group A, al-Ṣafadī’s biography partially exonerates the 
governor by stating that he did not harbour ill will towards the sultan in the first place, 
but also lets the sultan make the final character evaluation of Karāy.  
As a final note on al-Ṣafadī’s portrayal of the governor, it is worth noting that the 
image presented here is contradicted elsewhere in his oeuvre. As mentioned above, there 
are no significant discrepancies between the presentations found in al-Aʿyān and al-Wāfī 
save for the length and detail of the former. However, there are a lot of differences to be 
found when we look at another of al-Ṣafadī’s works titled Tuḥfat dhawī al-albāb fī-man 
ḥakama Dimashq min al-khulafāʾ wa-al-mulūk wa-al-nuwwāb (The gift of the possessor 
of understanding regarding the caliphs, kings and governors who ruled Damascus).630 
The Tuḥfa is an urjūza poem spanning 708 lines631 that lists and describes the rulers of 
Damascus from the Islamic conquest in 14/635 until the late 760s/1360s. The image of 
Karāy presented here is decisively less positive than what we have seen above:  
Then came Karāy after this – to govern her and so the path became difficult 
He was most generous to the Turks – putting on the table pyramids of ḥalwā 
                                                        
628 Khushdāshiyya denotes the solidarity between Mamluks who trained and lived together as recruits. 
629 Ibid., vol. 4, 155. 
630 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Sạfadī, 'Tuḥfat Dhawī al-Albāb fī Man Ḥakama Dimashq Min al-
Khulafāʾ wa-al-Mulūk wa-al-Nuwwāb', in Umarāʾ Dimashq fī al-Islām wa-Huwwa Yataḍaman 'Dhikr 
Man Walā Imrāʾ Dimashq fī al-Islām Aw Dakhalahā Min al-Khulafāʾ wa-Ghayrihim Murtabīn ʿalā Ḥurūf 
al-Muʿajjam' wa-urjūzat 'Tuḥfat Dhawī al-Albāb Fī-Man Ḥakama Dimashq Min al-Khulafāʾ wa-al-Mulūk 
wa-al-Nuwwāb', ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, (Damascus: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī, 1955), 106–69. 
631 The name is derived from the metre rajaz. The poem is of the urjūza-type known as musdawij, which 
is a build-up of first and second halflines that rhyme. See Manfred Ulmann, 'Radjaz', in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 8, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 375–78. 
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But his character was mean – the evil of [his] maliciousness could not be 
extinguished 
And so his time ran out quickly – and his governorate did not last more than 
half a year.632 
Since the Tuḥfat dhawī al-albāb continues up to the 760s/1360s, al-Ṣafadī must have 
composed it around the same time as al-Aʿyān, but as we see here, the image of Karāy 
is changed. In this poem, we are told that Karāy’s generosity, which is praised in al-
Aʿyān, was reserved for the Turks (the Mamluks). Moreover, in contrast to the praise of 
his diligence as ruler and his strength of his faith that we found in al-Aʿyān, the author 
here describes Karāy as vicious.  
Following Conermann, we can say that in the hands of al-Ṣafadī, the 711 protest 
is first and foremost one of many tools used to emphasise certain features and 
characteristics of Governor Karāy as al-Ṣafadī chose to portray him specifically in the 
al-Aʿyān. That is, Karāy was a mixed character who was not essentially evil or 
tyrannical, but who was caught between his own choleric stubbornness and his sense of 
duty. However, this conclusion that appears in the al-Aʿyān did not stop al-Ṣafadī from 
changing this portrait for the worse elsewhere in his writings.  
 
V. Conclusion  
The contemporary sources offer widely differing explanations of why and how Sayf al-
Dīn Karāy al-Manṣūrī was arrested in Jumādā I 711/September 1311. In Group A, Al-
Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī claim that he fell because of the complaints of the 
oppressed Damascenes; however, al-Birzālī later adjusts this claim somewhat. Al-
Jazarī* agrees that Karāy was an oppressive governor, but explicitly states that he was 
arrested because of connections to the coup. This, however, does not mean that al-Jazarī* 
downplays the agency of the Damascene community in negotiating the tax; it simply 
means that he frames the tax and Karāy’s arrest as two separate events.  
In Group B, al-Dawādārī argues that Karāy fell because of his involvement in the 
coup orchestrated by the viceroy Baktamur. Al-Yūsufī agrees, but claims that the 
governor was in fact innocent. Al-Manṣūrī emphasises the repercussions of Karāy’s 
tyrannical rule in Damascus, but also associates him with the coup makers. In contrast 
to the authors in Group A, none of the writers in Group B pays much attention to the 
                                                        
632 al-Ṣafadī, ‘Tuḥfat Dhawī’, 160. 
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protest: it is either ignored or referenced in vague terms that direct no attention towards 
the political situation on the ground in Damascus. Finally, al-Ṣafadī presents the 
argument that Karāy lost control of Damascus because of his temper, but that he was 
also brought down because he was suspected of participating in the coup, a crime for 
which he was later acquitted by the sultan.  
Judging from these eight narratives, it seems safe to say that the governor was 
caught in the intersection between local and imperial politics: he apparently antagonised 
his subjects and was also associated, willingly or unwillingly, with a plot hatched by his 
old barrack comrades. It is impossible for us to get closer to the historical Karāy and 
determine which specific factor led to his fall, but through the stories of his demise we 
have instead come closer to something much more interesting, that is, the worldviews 
and agendas of the individual authors who narrated his fall from grace.  
Starting with the macro-political perspective, we can say that the Egyptian authors 
in Group B were concerned with the case from the imperial perspective. Karāy is 
interesting to them in so far that he can be connected to the coup against al-Nāṣir, and 
his fate is imbedded in the portrait of the sultan. Al-Dawādārī and al-Manṣūrī use the 
story of the governor in order to show how proficiently and fairly the sultan reacted to 
an impending coup that threatened to nip his third reign in the bud. Meanwhile, al-Yūsufī 
employs Karāy in a narrative aimed at casting the sultan as a paranoid and fearful usurper 
who incarcerates his own officers even if they actively distance themselves from any 
form of rebellion.  
Furthermore, we have seen that there is a strong degree of self-promotion inherent 
in both al-Manṣūrī’s and al-Dawādārī’s use of this narrative. The former, who replaced 
Baktamur al-Jūkandār as viceroy of Egypt, uses the arrest of Karāy and the accusations 
of tyranny raised against him as part of a strategy to present the political situation prior 
to the purge of 711/1311 as dangerous and ridden with abuse. In this way, he is able to 
position himself as part of the new and more righteous administration that emerged after 
the arrests.  
Politically speaking, al-Dawādārī was a much more marginal figure than al-
Manṣūrī: he did not, as far as we can tell, reap any personal benefit from the purge. We 
should remember, however, that this author repeatedly foregrounds himself and his 
father as eyewitnesses and participants in the political events of the day.  
Last, we have seen that in the Egyptian works the importance of Damascus, the 
site of the governor’s arrest, is downplayed. In al-Dawādārī’s narrative, the city 
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functions as a one-dimensional backdrop for internal Mamluk struggles that are 
completely detached from local society and confined to the north-western extra-mural 
suburbs. By contrast, the narrative of al-Manṣūrī does recognise and comment briefly on 
local Damascene politics. Nevertheless, the city remains a remote nondescript place 
whose inhabitants and their vaguely defined problems can be used as part of an 
indictment against Karāy and by extension the other amirs with whom he was 
incarcerated. Instead, both these narratives convey a picture of Cairo as the epicentre of 
political power personified by the sultan and those close to him. 
The relationship between Cairo and Damascus is turned on its head in the 
Damascene narratives in Group A that adopt a micro-political perspective. This is not to 
say that Damascus is portrayed as a ‘counter-capital’, but simply that the Damascene 
perspective is consequently foregrounded at the expense of a Cairene perspective. Here, 
Karāy’s primary function is to act as the antagonist to the population of Damascus. In 
all narratives in this group, the case of the protest and Karāy’s subsequent arrest are used 
to exemplify local engagement and civilian resistance against tyranny. Whereas the 711 
protest might have been but a brief display of protest against Mamluk policies, the 
chroniclers we have examined made sure to capture and retain it as a testimony to local 
political agency. By contrast, the sultan as a political agent is cast as remote sovereign 
who intervenes on behalf of his subjects when called upon and less like the epicentre 
around which all political power revolves. Politics as far as the Damascenes were 
concerned is primarily the day-to-day negotiations of the local elites in Damascus, not 
the intrigues of the court in Cairo.  
However, while all the Damascene narratives follow this general path, they differ 
with regard to the specific details pertaining to the governor’s arrest. In the work of al-
Birzālī, we see God presented as the active ally of the local population who heeds the 
call of the oppressed. The same can be said for Ibn Kathīr, but with the addition of the 
direct intervention of Ibn Taymiyya and the omission of al-Birzālī’s partial retraction of 
the divine intervention claim. In the narrative of al-Jazarī*, the causality between the 
protest and the arrest is replaced with a more complex and detailed narrative. First, his 
version shows how local actors applied gradual diplomacy and pressure to bring Karāy 
to the negotiating table. According to this version, the sultan does not arrest Karāy on 
his own volition, but only after the Damascenes had in fact solved their problems 
themselves by causing Karāy to suspend the tax claim. Second, this version offers the 
story of how the dialogue between ruler and ruled, including the civilian population’s 
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lodging of complaints, is temporarily suspended under Karāy and reestablished after his 
arrest.  
Based on this background, we see the contours of distinct Egyptian and Syrian, or 
rather Damascene, ways of writing about 8th/14th century politics that reflect a split 
between an imperial and localised angle. However, as we have also seen, this split does 
not mean that these two groups are completely coherent internally. The Egyptian sources 
in Group B are divided on the question of the legitimacy of the arrests carried out in 
711/1311. While there is no major political conflict in Group A, we still see individual 
prerogatives and disagreements come to the fore within the narratives of the Damascene 
scholars. Consequently, the authorial agency of the Damascene scholar-chronicler 
cannot be understood by treating his narrative simply as part of a larger uniform school. 
It is true that a local Damascene outlook was common to them, but this does not account 
for all aspects of their narratives.  
Finally, we have al-Ṣafadī’s biography of Karāy, in which the story of the 711 
protest and his arrest constitutes a dramatic sub-component of his psychological portrait 
of the ill-fated governor. He is clearly drawing on both local Damascene sources as well 
as inside information in the Mamluk state administration and seems less concerned than 
the previous authors with the question of the local vs. the imperial angle. Instead, we 
find here an example of how past events are placed in a literary model other than the 
chronicle. The anecdotes pertaining to Karāy’s rule and arrest are arranged side-by-side 
in order to paint a full and consistent picture of a governor who fell as a result of his 
personality and the anger that he provoked among his Damascene subjects as well as his 
connections at court. Moreover, when we compare al-Ṣafadī’s narrative of the 711 
protest with that of al-Jazarī*, we can see that al-Ṣafadī makes changes in the narrative 
in order to support the underlying claims of the biography that he is crafting. Perhaps we 
can conclude, with specific reference to al-Ṣafadī’s narrative, that the Egyptian/Syrian 
distinction within the historiography in the Islamic Middle Period needs to be expanded 
to encompass a third category—historical narratives crafted by the learned bureaucrat. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
Viewed from the age of worldwide electronic communication, when local protests can 
spread across state borders and topple governments and protesting symbols can turn 
overnight into global icons of dissent, historical protests in the pre-modern Islamic world 
and beyond might feel dull in their often modest scope and limited reach and bland in 
their use of symbols. One example that could certainly fuel this feeling is the following 
description of what the French historian André Raymond calls the ‘almost immutable 
scenario’ of urban protest in 18th century Cairo:  
The crowd rushes to the Grand Mosque, occupies the minarets from which 
inflammatory appeals to resistance are heard, to the rhythm of the beating of 
drums, forces the souqs and shops to close, gathers in the great court and in 
front of the gates, calls forth the shaykhs and vigorously demands that they 
intervene with the authorities so that the wrongs of which they complain are 
redressed; a procession is formed; the ulama are placed at its head often more 
dead than alive, and it heads for the Citadel to present the situation to the 
authorities. If a favorable response is given, the shaykhs are made its 
guarantors, and it is upon them that the task, sometimes delicate, of calming 
the demonstrators and getting them to disperse falls. Difficult moments for 
the ulama, who risk being blamed by the population for betraying its interests, 
and of being suspected by the emirs of exciting the fever of the people 
secretly.633 
While such a scenario can provide a useful framework for identifying protests within the 
vast corpus of pre-modern Arabic sources, it fails to capture the political nuances, 
symbolic meanings and complex patterns of narrative transmission that make pre-
modern protests a fascinating topic, even to the contemporaries of the Arab Spring and 
the Guy Fawkes masque.  
By privileging the dynamic aspect of protesting over the immutable and the 
specific case over the general scenario, this thesis has attempted give room to the nuance, 
variation and meanings inherent in the 711 protest. Admittedly, a cursory comparison 
between Raymond’s scenario and the 711 protest does show some similarities. First, we 
find the same pattern of movement from the Grand Mosque to the Citadel. Second, we 
                                                        
633 André Raymond, Artisans et Commerçants Au Caire Au XVIIIe Siècle (Damascus: Institut Francais de 
Damas, 1973), vol. 2, 432. NB: The translation from the original French is from a quotation in Edmund 
Burke III, 'Understanding Arab Protest Movements', Arab Studies Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 333–345, 
339. I have checked Burke’s translation against the original. 
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clearly see that local ʿulamāʾ assume the leadership of the protest on popular demand 
and put themselves at risk of punishment by the authorities. However, the analytical 
shortcomings of the ‘immutable scenario’ can be illustrated through another and slightly 
more detailed glance. First and foremost, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, the leader of the 711 
protest, is presented by contemporary sources as an active leader, not as a ‘half dead’ 
hostage. Also, the 711 protest did not erupt spontaneously: it was postponed for several 
days and carefully fit into the ceremonial calendar of Damascus as a result of careful 
planning by the ʿulamāʾ. Third, the protesters’ use of symbolic objects and their choice 
of protest route evoke broader patterns of Damascene political culture and indicate that 
the protest was a premeditated act of communication. 
In other words, what we discover by merely scratching the surface of the 711 
protest is that it was a political event endowed with a complexity that cannot be captured 
in a general scenario. Only through a careful analysis that strikes a balance between a 
narrow and a broad historical perspective can we begin to understand the acts of 
medieval protesters. This is what this thesis has sought to do.  
The previous four chapters presented a detailed analysis of the 711 protest and 
placed it in a number of different contexts—the political, ideological, religious, spatial 
and literary. Each chapter has followed one or more of the four thematic strands that 
were introduced in Chapter 1. Through this analysis, we have begun to understand the 
711 protest as a complex political event in its own right, and used it as a prism for 
observing different aspects of political culture in Damascus and in the Mamluk Empire 
at large.  
Chapter 2 was primarily concerned with combining the first and second of the four 
strands. With regard to socio-political contingency, this chapter demonstrated that the 
711 protest was not a spontaneous outburst of popular rage managed involuntarily by 
fearfulʿulamāʾ with the aim of preventing regular riots. Instead, it was a pre-meditated 
form of negotiation arranged and executed by leadingʿulamāʾ and ordinary civilians as 
part of a wider negotiation of the 711 tax. The protest was staged at a crucial point when 
the tax negotiations had reached a deadlock. While it did not result in an immediate 
solution, it conjured up the spectre of local opposition, which was used afterwards to 
pressure the recalcitrant governor to re-open the negotiations. Examining the 711 protest 
through the prism of local contingency thus demonstrates that pre-modern protests were 
not a phenomena sui generis that emerged without warning and interrupted the ‘normal’ 
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situation; they should rather be thought of as the continuation of ‘normal’ politics by 
other means.  
By contextualising the 711 protest beyond the political microcosm of Damascus 
in the early fall of 711/1311, this chapter also demonstrated that this protest was 
connected to a number of recurring conflicts over nafaqa-taxes that were imposed during 
the second half of the 7th/13th century in Damascus as well as in Cairo. The fact that none 
of these earlier conflicts provoked organised street protests, as was the case in 711/1311, 
was explained in two ways: by comparison to earlier tax campaigns in Damascus, we 
concluded that the conflict in 711/1311 was characterised by a particular lack of 
proportion between the seriousness of the situation and the amount of money demanded 
by the Mamluk state. In contrast to earlier cases from Damascus, say, the Muqarrar al-
Khiyāla of 700/1300, the sources give the impression that the threat of invasion in 
711/1311 was relatively low while the sum which was initially demanded in this 
particular year, 750.000 dirhams, was much higher than the demands in previous years.  
In comparison with the situation in Egypt, we saw that the Muqarrar al-Khiyāla 
provoked confrontations between civilians and soldiers that never amounted to regular 
protests. This difference was attributed to the difference in the intensity of sultanic power 
that distinguished the capital of Cairo from the provincial cities of Syria. Mounting a 
demonstration in the capital would most likely have been a much riskier endeavour due 
to the heavy military presence. Moreover, protesters could have run the risk of being 
seen as rebelling directly against the sultan per se, not against an administrative decision 
carried out by one of his deputies, which might have caused the sultan to take much more 
severe measures than merely jailing the protest leaders for a night, as happened with al-
Qazwīnī in Damascus. As this analysis demonstrated, we need to look not only to other 
protests to understand protests as a phenomenon. We also need to search out cases where 
corresponding situations did not amount to a full-scale protest to understand how and 
why medieval people took to the streets to express their claims and grievances.  
The emphasis on pre-meditation and conscious arrangement in the 711 protest was 
further strengthened when we moved on to the second thematic strand, the multiplicity 
of symbolic meaning. Here, we narrowed our scope to examining the symbolic objects 
that gave the 711 protest its particular visual profile: the Qurʾān of ʿUthmān, the Sandal 
of the Prophet and the caliphal banners from the Umayyad Mosque. We noted that all of 
these objects had specific ritual functions around 711/1311: the Sandal facilitated 
symbolic proximity to the prophet and the Qurʾān granted divine protection against 
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communal hardship. The banners crowned the minbar from where congregational Friday 
sermon was given, and similar black banners were used for honouring military and 
civilian elites. By choosing these objects, the protesters were connecting their claims 
against governor Karāy with the general repertoire of ceremonial practices that 
dominated the religious, social and political life of their city.  
The connection to the city was further underlined when we noted that by the 
beginning of the 8th/14th century the Sandal and the Qurʾān were primarily localised 
symbols of Damascene communal identification. In the case of the Sandal, we saw that 
this relic epitomised the specific local worshipping culture centred on the Dār al-Ḥadīth 
al-Ashrafiyya, a flagship of Damascene ḥadīth-scholarship and primary site of the wider 
cult surrounding the prophet Muhammad. In this light, the wielding of these objects 
could also be seen as appeals to a local identity or a form of pre-modern local patriotism. 
In addition, we observed that both the Qurʾān and black caliphal banners were used in 
other acts of social regulation, such as censoring wine and hashish consumption and 
corruption. The banners can even be indirectly linked to later Syrian cases where the 
idea of a politically potent caliphate was propagated as an alternative to the Mamluk 
sultanic order. The use of these objects in a protest procession also links with a broader 
conception of these objects as embodying or representing an Islamic moral order with 
social and political relevance. This concept of an Islamic moral order, expressed by the 
parading of symbolic objects, was then connected to the more general discussions about 
fiscal justice in Islam that characterised the nafaqa-conflicts of the 7th/13th century. 
According to the chronicles, the earlier demands for nafaqa taxes were resisted by a set 
of juridical arguments against discretionary taxation on civilians grounded in the 
distinction between individual and collective duties in Islam. 
As demonstrated here, appeals to sharia justice, as defined in legal terms, were the 
primary weapon against tax oppression prior to 711/1311. In this light, the protesters of 
711 could have been connecting with this wider discourse through extra-juridical appeals 
to the perceived ideal Islamic order of the early umma by singling out a set of clear 
references to the collective memory of the Islamic umma: the sandal worn by the prophet 
during his night journey (al-miʿrāj), the Qurʾān codified during the rule of the rightly 
guided Caliphs and the victorious banners from the Abbasid revolution.  
Within a wider context, we should also read the 711 protest as part of a 
fundamental process of negotiating the relationship of power between the sultanic state 
and local society. If we follow the arguments of Bourdieu, Wacqaunt and Farage, who 
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claim that shaping people into taxable subjects is one of the fundamental social practices 
of claiming state power, the 711 protest can be viewed as part of a protracted conflict 
about exactly how much ‘statelike’ behaviour the Mamluk sultans could get away 
with.634  
The conceptual approach of Chapter 3 was also based on the second thematic 
strand, the multiplicity of symbolic meaning, but here we shifted focus away from what 
the protesters did to the symbolic meaning of where they did it. The chapter 
demonstrated that the 711 protesters’ choice of route and destination was informed by a 
wish to imitate the spatial practices of the Mamluk state and its Ayyubid predecessors, 
thus making their very act of marching a symbolic challenge through imitation.  
The 711 protesters marched through the area of Taḥt al-Qalʿa (Below the Citadel) ending 
up in Sūq al-Khayl (The Horse Market) northwest of the Citadel. The same choice of 
route and destination can be observed in at least three later protests (743/1342, 749/1348 
and 754/1353) and three lynching parties (730/1330, 756/1356–57 and 799/1397). In 
order to account for the use of these spaces by more than three generations of Damascene 
protesters and lynch mobs, Chapter 3 began with a detailed comparative examination of 
how medieval sultanic rulers of Syro-Egypt presented their claims to power through 
alterations and additions to the existing urban fabric of Damascus, Aleppo and Cairo. 
This examination demonstrated that between the 6th and 8th/12th and 14th centuries these 
three cities saw a consolidation of the ruler’s symbolic presence within the urban 
landscape through the fortification of urban citadels, and equally important, through the 
development of the areas that lay immediately beneath their gates, towers, ramparts and 
moats. These adjacent areas gradually became a stage for ceremonial performances 
(military parades, polo games, executions, maẓālim courts) by which sultans and princes 
asserted their claims to power. During the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods, the Sūq al-
Khayl emerged as a specific delineated ceremonial space within Taḥt al-Qalʿa and 
gradually became the center of these manifestations of power.  
As argued in Chapter 3, choosing Taḥt al-Qalʿa and Sūq al-Khayl as a protest 
venue had the practical advantage that one could count on confrontation with the 
representative of the state, especially as the protest was tailored to coincide with a 
military parade regulated by official protocol. However, what we can conclude by 
                                                        
634 Pierre Bourdieu, Lois J. D. Wacqaunt, and Samar Farage, 'Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure 
of the Bureaucratic Field', Sociological Theory 12, no. 1 (1994): 1–18, 6. 
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looking at 8th/14th protests in light of the historical development of this space is that 
predictability alone cannot account for this choice. Instead, this choice must also be 
understood as a symbolic gesture in and of itself. When the protesters who marched 
against Karāy’s tax in 711/1311 or those who marched in 753/1354 for their right to erect 
a congregational mosque decided to march to Taḥt al-Qalʿa in formation and with 
powerful symbols (banners, relics) on display, they were expressing criticism of a 
perceived fault of the ruling establishment by co-opting the stage of state power and 
disputing the ruler’s exclusive right to control the performances that took place there. In 
several cases, the deputies of the sultan responded to these challenges by enforcing their 
control of Sūq al-Khayl with violence. 
 André Raymond rightly observed that many pre-modern Arab protest processions 
seem to repeat the movement back and forth between mosque and citadel. This thesis 
demonstrates that this habit deserves examination as more than a predictable immutable 
choreography. Indeed, Chapter 3 demonstrated that choices regarding space were 
equally deliberate and symbolically complex as the choice of props, paroles and gestures. 
The similarities in citadel formation and urban development across the region 
make it highly likely that similar dynamics between official ceremonial geography and 
protest behaviour could be found in Cairo, Aleppo and other cities in the region. A full 
regional comparison exceeded the scope of the Chapter 3 and the thesis as a whole, but 
it is a potentially fruitful subject of a comprehensive study of space, ceremony, protest 
and violence across the Medieval Muslim world.  
In the broader field of Mamluk Studies, the comparative approach to citadel zones 
that Chapter 3 presents also constitutes a viable strategy for pursuing Steenbergen’s 
processual approach to the study of the Mamluk State as a set of structural effects created 
through a number of social practices that include the creation of ‘political distinction’.635 
Although they are highly diverse, the practices of altering physical spaces and 
‘performing’ in them that this chapter analyses all work according to the logic of creating 
distinctions. Certain spaces were carved out of the urban landscape and designated as 
sultanic and/or military space; this designation was reinforced through ceremonial 
practices. In this light, the way the protesters of 711/1311 and the succeeding decades 
confronted their governors should also be seen as conscious challenges (though not 
                                                        
635  Jo Van Steenbergen, '''Mamlukisation" Between Social Theory and Social Practice: An Essay on 
Reflexivity, State Formation, and the Late Medieval Sultanate of Cairo', ASK Working Papers (Bonn, 
Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg, 2015), 34. 
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direct declarations of war) against the Mamluk cultivation of statehood by inscribing 
physical distinctions into the urban landscape and reinforcing them through repeated 
ceremonial performances.  
 Citadels and their surrounding spaces also give us the opportunity to view the 
Mamluk sultanate in a historical context that stretches beyond the period between 648 
and 922/1250 and 1517. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the Mamluk period patterns of 
urban development and ceremonial practice in Taḥt al-Qalʿa were in fact continuations 
of Zangid and Ayyubid practices that the Mamluk sultans and their deputies absorbed 
and integrated into their own language of power. Moreover, while it lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis, Julien Loiseau’s observation that the Ottoman Topkapi Palace in 
Istanbul featured a market square known as ‘Tahtekale’ suggests that citadels and citadel 
zones constitute a topic that can be studied across the entire Middle Islamic Period.636 
Chapter 4 continued the discussion of the symbolic importance of space by 
focusing on another pivotal stage for ceremonial manifestations of power and devotion: 
The Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. This chapter demonstrated that while the Umayyad 
Mosque was not as physically present in the accounts of the 711 protest as Sūq al-Khayl 
was, the protesters relied heavily on symbols associated with the mosque and the 
ceremonies that it housed: the Qurʾān of ʾUthmān and the Banners of the Caliphs, which 
were located around the mosque’s minbar and central miḥrāb. Among these symbolic 
references we also included and highlighted the figure of the khaṭīb of the mosque 
because of his pivotal liturgical performance as leader of the Friday congregational 
ceremony.  
Through an analysis of several parallel cases from the 7th/13th and 8th/14th 
centuries, the chapter demonstrated that the Umayyad Mosque was used as a stage for 
political communication by both rulers and ruled, but also frequently as a communal site 
of negotiation and social interaction. As a form of proto-public space, the mosque 
embodied a ceremonial and political culture that was centred around two-way 
communication and negotiation about the relationship between the city and its rulers. 
The Umayyad Mosque’s culture stood in stark contrast to that of Taḥt al-Qalʿa, the 
unequivocal space for manifestations of state power asserted through military might. By 
presenting symbols tied to the mosque in the Taḥt al-Qalʿa, the protesters of 711 could 
have intended to incorporate into their procession a dialogue between two spaces and 
                                                        
636 Julien Loiseau, Les Mamelouks–XIIIe–XVIe Siecle (Paris: Editions du SEUIL, 2014), 225. 
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their associated cultures, thereby adding yet another layer to this example of the complex 
symbolic practice that constitutes protesting.  
In the second part of this chapter we zoomed in on the figure of khaṭīb and shifted 
from the second to the third thematic strand—the complexity of agency. Noting that not 
only al-Qazwīnī but also earlier khaṭībs had functioned as intercessors for their 
congregation, we concluded that the al-Qazwīnī leadership of the 711 protest must have 
been partially motivated by the fact that intercession and intermediation were part of the 
un- or semi-official mandate of the khaṭībship. However, by combining these 
observations with an examination of a number of political, social and theological 
circumstances surrounding both the office of the khaṭīb and the scholar al-Qazwīnī 
personally, we demonstrated that al-Qazwīnī’s leadership of the protest was most likely 
more than an automatic (or, as Raymond suggests, involuntary) act of duty. The cases of 
the deposition of Ibn al-Muraḥḥil in 703/1303 and al-Subkī in 743/1342, and the critique 
of al-Qazwīnī in 709/1310 demonstrated that command of the khaṭībship in 8th/14th 
century Damascus was deeply affected by the wider power struggles among the ʿ ulamāʾ, 
which sometimes even included broader sections of the common population. These cases 
also suggested that the partisan boundary between the ḥadīth-oriented traditionalists and 
the adherents of Ashʿarī rationalist theology (kalām) was a recurrent fault line along 
which disputes over the khaṭībship were structured.  
That the protest in 711/1311 had the khaṭīb of the Umayyad Mosque as its leader 
should not be explained simply as a manifestation of an intrinsic protesting paradigm 
that prompted scholars to arbitrate between rulers and ruled. It should also be interpreted 
as a deliberate manoeuvre of positioning by a particular individual, Jalāl al-Dīn al-
Qazwīnī. As his biography demonstrates, al-Qazwīnī was skilled operator in the fields 
of local and imperial politics. His involving himself and his office in a very public 
struggle against fiscal tyranny would have been an excellent way to entrench himself in 
the office and ward off any criticism that might bring his suitability for the khaṭībship 
into question, as some partisans of Ibn Taymiyya had apparently done in 709/1310.  
Looking at al-Qazwīnī’s participation in the 711/1311 through a prism that takes 
into account both the institutional agency inherent in his office and his personal capacity 
to act within a socio-political field clearly demonstrates the problem in explaining 
ʿulamāʾ leadership of protests as the politics of timid reluctance or as the result of a 
veritable hostage situation. Admittedly, most ʿulamāʾ were not revolutionaries, and we 
have no indication that al-Qazwīnī had any such inclinations. Nevertheless, his decision 
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to head the protest procession must have relied on a careful consideration of his own 
position in Damascene socio-politics and of the potential advantages and dangers that 
such an endeavour could entail. By adopting this multi-faceted approach to agency, we 
are able to penetrate the layers of pre-modern protests that appear static and immutable 
and tend to reduce the actors to manipulated pawns in a fixed game. 
Like the citadel and its adjacent parade grounds, the central congregational mosque 
was an omnipresent feature in Syro-Egyptian cities of the Mamluk and broader Middle 
Islamic Period. While only a few congregational mosques were as iconic as the Umayyad 
Mosque of Damascus, they were all proto-public spaces that housed devotional 
ceremonies and socio-political negotiations like those identified and examined in 
Chapter 4. Exploring strategic alterations of liturgical elements like al-duʿāʾ lil-sulṭān 
and the appropriation of communicative platforms like the minbar would thus constitute 
another potentially fruitful area for a comparative cross-regional study of the connection 
between political culture, urban space and ceremonies. Including the space of the 
mosque in such a study could even avert the danger of ‘ruler-centrism’ inherent in 
studying citadels and military parade grounds alone.  
Chapter 5 continued the discussion around agency but in combination with the 4th 
thematic strand—partiality of representation. Unlike the previous chapters, which 
sought to examine the 711 protest through the prism of contemporary narrative sources, 
this chapter set about to examine the prism itself, starting with the local narrative sources 
and gradually expanding the scope to encompass accounts from across the Mamluk 
Empire. In this process, Chapter 5 drew on the ‘actor-centred’ approach that has 
characterised recent studies on Mamluk historical writing. To this current trend, the 
chapter adds the insight that comparison of chronicle entries related to one single year 
gives us the opportunity to observe the respective authors’ working with a set of ideas 
and imbedding them into their text. The narratives that resulted from these authorial 
processes were not simply representations of contemporary politics; they were 
contemporary politics in so far as they could support the cause of either the author 
himself, his associates or his patron.  
The first group of authors examined were those whose protest narratives provided 
most of the empirical basis for the previous three chapters: al-Jazarī*, al-Birzālī, al-
Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr. In the previous chapters, the accounts of these four authors were 
compared primarily in order to determine the plausibility of the 711 protest as a socio-
political event and to corroborate various details around the immediate context, the 
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behaviour of the protesters and the outcome of their intervention in Sūq al-Khayl. The 
examination in Chapter 5 found that while their accounts of 711 protest include the same 
basic elements, each author had shaped his particular account according to a set of 
specific ideological and religious concepts that echoed the wider scope of his work.  
The starkest contrast within this group is between the account of al-Jazarī* on the one 
hand and the accounts of al-Birzālī, Ibn Kathīr and al-Dhahabī on the other. Al-Jazarī* 
portrays the protest as part of a complicated political struggle with ties to Cairo, from 
which the Damascene civilians (the scholars in particular) emerged as skilled negotiators 
who had succeeded in navigating the tempestuous waters of imperial politics to their 
own benefit.  
The other three accounts are variations on the same account (most likely that of al-
Birzālī). The accounts in this group emphasise a more primitive causal logic in so far as 
the plight of the Damascene protesters is resolved through divine intervention on their 
behalf. Moreover, while these accounts include a transcendental component that is 
entirely missing from al-Jazarī*, they are completely silent about the connection between 
the 711 tax conflict and the wider political situation in the Mamluk empire. In these 
accounts, the events remain a local struggle between the Damascene community and 
their immediate ruler, the governor Karāy. While all four accounts show the Damascenes 
emerging victorious from the struggle over the tax, the latter three portray them as 
Muslims who were saved by faith and prayer, rather than their ability to navigate within 
a regional political landscape. The Damascene narratives can be subdivided once more 
by taking into account the final feature that sets apart Ibn Kathīr’s account from all the 
others: his insistence on involving Ibn Taymiyya in the affair of the tax. As demonstrated 
through further references to Ibn Kathīr’s work, the choice of including Ibn Taymiyya 
in the affair was consistent with Ibn Kathīr’s general tendency to emphasise the socio-
political agency of this shaykh, a tendency that was met with opposition from other 
members of Ibn Taymiyya’s circle and even, it would seem, from the later copyists of 
Ibn Kathīr’s work. 
This analysis demonstrated that the Damascene accounts of the 711 protest were 
the product of deliberate authorial processes through which the chroniclers shaped the 
event into a narrative that confirmed a set of pre-conceived notions about politics and 
supported the wider ideological and theological trajectories of their works.  
In a wider perspective, we see that even brief narrative accounts about protests, 
even when they largely confirm the same details about what the protesters did, where 
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they did it and why, should never be treated simply as ideologically innocent records of 
socio-political phenomena. Even when he is quoting earlier accounts almost ad verbatim, 
the author demonstrates his own agency through omissions, additions and his choice of 
focus. This is what makes the craft of the medieval historian into a form of political 
practice in its own right: chronicle entries make up a small component of larger 
representations of the author’s view of the world and his own place in it.  
This point was further accentuated when the chapter shifted from the strict focus 
on Damascene chronicles towards a regionally comparative examination of 8th/14th 
representations of the events of the year 711. This comparison found that the Egyptian 
accounts in the chronicles of al-Dawādārī, al-Manṣūrī and al-Yūsufī/al-ʿAynī pay almost 
no attention to the 711 protest or the matter of taxes in general. At first glance, this was 
not all that surprising since the protest seems to have been a very local event that did not 
coincide with protests in other cities. However, the omission of the protest became more 
conspicuous when we found that one of the Egyptian chroniclers, al-Dawādārī (at least 
according to his own account), was present in Damascus when the protest took place but 
apparently chose not to report on it. As for al-Manṣūrī, his 711 entry was found on further 
inspection to include general references to Karāy’s treatment of his Damascene subjects, 
but again he apparently did not think to elaborate on the exact events. The protest was a 
dramatic highpoint of the Damascene 711 entries, but in the Egyptian accounts it is 
reduced at best to a side note. The real drama in these accounts revolves instead around 
the arrest of Governor Karāy. We saw that al-Jazarī* takes into account the political 
turmoil of 711 and the Sultan al-Nāṣir’s purge among the higher ranks of his late father’s 
officers corps. The Egyptian accounts are entirely focused on this turmoil from an 
imperial perspective: here Karāy is but one among many victims of the sultan’s 
manoeuvres. Instead of evaluating the influence of Karāy on the local situation in 
Damascus, these accounts are primarily concerned with debating whether or not his 
arrest and the arrests of other governors and high ranking amirs was just, or whether the 
sultan was acting on baseless accusations with the aim of concentrating power in his own 
hands.  
In a final shift of focus, the chapter included within its scope the biography of 
Karāy written by an author whom we can place ‘in between’ the Egyptian and the 
Damascene context: the chancery secretary and biographer al-Ṣafadī. However, al-
Ṣafadī does not simply present an account that balances the local and imperial 
perspective, he unites them into a narrative that is not concerned with either the political 
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agency of the Damascenes (with or without divine help) or the justifiability of al-Nāṣir’s 
policies against his opponents (real or accused). Instead, al-Ṣafadī’s interest revolves 
around the figure of Karāy, who is rendered as an almost tragic figure who falls victim 
to his own bifurcated personality, which incorporates equal measures of responsible 
sense of duty, uncontrollable rage, passion and stubbornness.  
This thesis has demonstrated that protests are complex socio-political phenomena. 
The investigation of such protests must take into account complex political situations on 
several levels, multiple layers of meaning and the balance between individuals, their 
positions in society and the expectations of their peers. However, the enticing 
multiplicity of angles from which we can approach a protest procession must not blind 
us to the fact that the authors, through whose eyes we regard the socio-politics of the 
past, were themselves socio-political actors whose representations of events were partial 
and always in the process of instrumentalising the events we study for their own ends. 
We should be cautious, of course, when we train our analytical apparatus on, say, the 
protest behaviour, snippets of dialogues and causal connections that chroniclers present. 
For instance, the cautious approach applied in this thesis has consisted of careful and 
constant contextualisation. But partiality of representation also gives us a unique 
opportunity to examine the worldviews of these authors. In this context, protests, which 
are by nature dramatic, confrontational and permeated with symbolic meaning, might 
prove to be a particularly fruitful vantage point from which to access the mental worlds 
of medieval chroniclers.  
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Figures 1 – 7  
          
Figure 1: Damascus637 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Aleppo638 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
637 Based on ‘Damas, XIIIe siècle (Figure 2)’ in Garcin et al., 2000. Not to scale. 
638 Based on ‘Alep, XIIIe–XVe siècles (Figure 2)’ in Garcin et al., 2000. Not to scale. 
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Figure 3: Cairo639 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Aleppo, citadel close-up640 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
639 Based on ‘Fusṭāṭ-Le Caire, XIe-XIIe siècles (Figure 3)’ in Garcin et al. 2000. Not to scale. 
640 Based on Figure 2 in Rabbat, 1995, 9. Not to scale. 
 234 
Figure 5: Cairo, citadel close-up641 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Damascus, citadel close-up642 
 
 
                                                        
641 Based on Figure 3 in Rabbat, 1995, 11. Not to scale. 
642 Based on Figure 1 in Rabbat, 1995, 8. Not to scale.  
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Figure 7: Damascus, citadel with pavilion locations643 
 
 
 
                                                        
643 Based on Figure 1 in Rabbat, 1995, 8. Not to scale.  
 236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 237 
Bibliography 
I. Titles in Arabic 
Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī, Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Ismāʿīl. (2002). Tarājim 
Rijāl al-Qarnayn al-Sādis wa-al-Sābiʿ al-maʿrūf bil-Dhayl ʿalā al-Rawḍatayn. 
(Shams al-Dīn, ed.). Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya. 
 
Al-Bazzār, ʿUmar ibn ʿAlī. (1976). Aʿlām al-ʿāliyya fī Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Ibn 
Taymiyya. (Munajjid, ed.). Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd. 
 
Al-Birzālī, ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf. (2006). Muqtafī ʿalā al-
Rawḍatayn al-Maʿrūf bi-Tārīkh al-Birzālī. 4 vols. (Tadmurī, ed.). Ṣaydā–Beirut: 
al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya. 
 
Al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. (1985). al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man 
Ghabar + al-Dhuyūl (al-Dhahabī - al-Ḥusaynī) 4 vols. (Zaghlūl, ed.). Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya. 
 
Al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. (1998). Dhayl Tārīkh al-Islām lil-
Imām al-Ḥāfiẓ Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī. (Bāwazīr, ed.). Riyyad: Dār al-Mughnī 
lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ. 
 
Al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. (1985). ‘Dhayl al-ʿIbar fī Khabar 
Man Ghabar’. In al-ʿIbar fī Khabar Man Ghabar + al-Dhuyūl (al-Dhahabī – al-
Ḥusaynī) 4 vols., 3–118. (Zaghlūl, ed.). Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya. 
 
Al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. (1988). Tārīkh al-Islām wa-Wafayāt 
al-Mashāhīr wa-al-Aʿlām 15 vols. (Maʿrūf, ʿAbbās and Arnaʿūt ̣, eds.). Beirut: Dār 
al-Gharb al-Islāmī. 
 
Al-Badrī, Abū al-Baqāʾ ʿ Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad. (1980). Nuzhat al-Anām fī Maḥāsin 
al-Shām. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya. 
 
Al-Jazarī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Abū Bakr. (1998). Tārīkh 
Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Anbāʾihi wa-Wafayāt al-Akābir wa-al-Aʿyān min 
Abnāʾihi 3 vols. (Tadmurī, ed.). Ṣaydā–Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya. 
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ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar. (2010). al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh 
20 pts. in 11 vols. Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr. 
 
ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Taqī al-Dīn Abī Bakr ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. (1994). Tārīkh ibn 
Qāḍī Shuhba 4 vols. (Darwīsh, ed.). Damascus: Maʿhad al-Faransī lil-Dirāsāt al-
ʿArabiyya. 
 
ibn Rajab, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad. (2005). al-Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanabīla 5 
vols. (al-ʿUthaymin, ed.). Riyad: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān. 
 
ibn Shaddād, ʿ Izz al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿ Alī. (1983). Tārīkh al-Malik al-Ẓāhir. (Ḥuṭayṭ, 
ed.). Wiesbaden: Frantz Steiner Verlag. 
ibn Taymīyya, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm. (2004). Majmūʿ Fatāwā Sheikh 
al-Islām Aḥmad ibn Taymiyya 37 vols. (Bin Qāsim, ed.). Saudi Arabia: Wizārat al-
shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Daʿwa wa-al-Irshād. 
ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥādī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. (2002). al-ʿUqūd al-Duriyya min Manāqib 
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya. (al-Halwānī, ed.). Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadītha lil-
Ṭibāʿa wa-al-Nashr. 
ibn ʿAsākir, ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Hibat Allāh. (1959). La Description De Damas. 
(Elisséef, ed.). Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas. 
ibn ʿImād al-Ḥanbalī, Shihāb al-Dīn ibn Aḥmad. (n.d.). Shadhrāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār 
Man Dhahab 9 vols. Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr. 
 240 
II. Titles in European languages 
Ahlwardt, W. (n.d.). Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse Der Königlichen Bibliothek Zu 
Berlin – Verzeichnis der Arabischen Handschriften von W. Ahlwardt vol. 1–10. 
Berlin: A. Asher & Co. 
 
Aigle, D. (2007). 'The Mongol Invasion of Bilād al-Sham by Gāzān Khān and Ibn 
Taymīyah’s Three “Anti-Mongol Fatwas”'. Mamlūke Studies Review 11(2), 89–
120. 
 
Ali, A. Y. (1946). The Holy Quran – Text, Translation and Commentary by Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali. Durban: Islamic Propagation Centre International. 
 
Almutlaq, H. (2013). 'A Sociolinguistic Study of Terms of Oaths in Jordanian Arabic'. 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3(21), 225–228. 
 
Amitai, R. (2004). 'The Mongol Occupation of Damascus in 1300: A Study of Mamluk 
Loyalties'. In A. Levanoni and M. Winther (eds.), The Mamluks in Egyptian and 
Syrian Politics and Society, 21–40. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. 
 
Athmina, K. (1989). 'The Black Banners and the Socio-Political Significance of Flags 
and Slogans in Medieval Islam'. Arabica T. 36 Facs, 307–326. 
 
Ayalon, D. (1953). 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army I'. Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 15(2), 203–228. 
 
Ayalon, D. (1953) 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army II'. Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 15(3), 448–76. 
 
Ayalon, D. (1954) 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army III'. Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 16(1), 57–90. 
 
Ayalon, D. (1957). 'The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society'. Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient 1(1), 37–65. 
 
Ayalon, D. (1958). 'The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society (Concluded)'. 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 1(3), 257–296. 
 
Bacharach, J. L. (1991). 'Administrative Complexes, Palaces and Citadels: Changes in 
the Loci of Medieval Muslim Rule'. In I. A. Bierman, A. A.-E.-H. Rifa’at and D. 
Preziosi (eds.), The Ottoman City and Its Parts – Urban Structure and Social 
Order, 111–128. New York: New Rochelle. 
 
Behrens-Abouseif, D. (1997). 'The Mahmal Legend and the Pilgrimage of the Ladies of 
the Mamluk Court'. Mamluk Studies Review 1, 87–96. 
 
Behrens-Abouseif, D., S. Denoix and J. Garcin. (2000). Le Caire. In J. Garcin (ed.), 
Grandes villes méditerranéennes du monde musulman medieval, 177–203. Rome: 
Ecole Francaise de Rome. 
 
 241 
Berger, L. (2007). Gesellschaft und Individuum in Damaskus 1550–1791. Würzburg: 
Ergon Verlag. 
 
Berkey, J. P. (2011). Popular Preaching and Religious Authority in the Medieval Islamic 
Near East. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
 
Berthier, S. (2006). 'La Citadelle de Damas: Les Apports d’une Étude Archéologique'. 
In H. Kennedy (ed.), Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria – From the 
Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period, 151–164. Leiden: Brill Academic 
Publishing. 
 
Bianquis, T. (n.d.). 'Derrière qui prieras-tu, vendredi? Reflexions sur les espaces publics 
et privés, dans la ville arabe médiévale'. Bulletin D’études Orientales, 37/38, 7–
21. 
 
Bonebakker, S. A. (1997). 'al-Kazwīnī'. In E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, C. Pellat, and C. E. 
Bosworth (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition vol. 4, 863–864. Leiden: E. 
J. Brill. 
 
Bori, C. (2003). 'Ibn Taymiyya : una vita esemplare della sua biografìa'. Revista Degli 
Studi Orientali 76 (Supplemento No. 1), 1–235. 
 
Bori, C. (2004). 'A New Source for the Biography of Ibn Taymiyya'. Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 67(3), 321–348. 
 
Bori, C. (2010). 'Ibn Taymiyya wa-Jamā’atuhu'. In Y. Rapoport and S. Ahmed (eds.), 
Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, 23–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bori, C. (2016). One or Two Versions of al-Siyāsa al-Shar’iyya of Ibn Taymiyya? What 
do they tell us? (ASK Working Paper No. 26). Bonn: Annemarie Schimmel 
Kolleg. 
 
Bosworth, C. E., J. Lentin and V. Perthes. (1997).'al-Shām'. In C. E. Bosworth, E. van 
Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs and G. Lecomte (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd 
Edition Vol. 9, 261–281). Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
 
Bourdieu, P., L. J. D. Wacqaunt and S. Farage. (1994). Rethinking the State: Genisis and 
Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. Sociological Theory, 12(1), 1–18. 
 
Brinner, W. (1957). 'The Murder of Ibn An-Našū: Social Tensions in Fourteenth-
Century Damascus'. Journal of the American Oriental Society 77(3), 207–210. 
 
Broadbridge, A. F. (2008). Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Buresi, P. (2008). 'Une Relique Almohade: L’utilisation du Coran de la Grande Mosquee 
de Cordoue (Attribue a ‛Uthmān B. ‛Affān [644-656])'. In Lieux de Cultes: Aires 
Votives, Temples, Eglises, Mosquees – IXe colloque international sur l’histoire et 
l’archeologie de l’Afrique du Nord antique et medievale Tripoli, 19–25 fevrier 
2005, 273–280. Paris: CNRS Editions. 
 242 
Burke III, E. (1986). 'Understanding Arab Protest Movements'. Arab Studies Quarterly 
8(4), 333–345. 
 
Burns, R. (2005). Damascus. A History. London: Routledge. 
 
Calder, N. (1986). 'Friday Prayer and the Juristic Theory of Government: Sarakhsī, 
Shīrāzī, Māwardī'. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49(1), 
35–47. 
 
Chamberlain, M. (1994). Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–
1350. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chapoutot-Remadi, M. (1995). 'al-Nuwayrī'. In C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. 
Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 8, 156–
160). Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
 
Clifford, W. W. (1997). 'Ubi Sumus ? Mamluk History and Social Theory'. Mamluk 
Studies Review 1(1), 45–62. 
 
Clifford, W. W. (2013). State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk Syro-
Egypt, 648–741 A.H/1250–1340 C.E. (S. Conermann, Ed.). Bonn: Bonn 
University Press. 
 
Colin, G. S. (1986). 'Baraka'. In H. A. R. Gibb, J. H. Kramers, E. Levi-Provencal, J. 
Schacht and C. Pellat (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 1, 1032. 
Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
 
Conerman, S., G. Şen, M. Winter and P.B. Lewicka. (2017). The Mamluk-Ottoman 
Transition – Continuity and Change in Egypt and Bilād al-Shām in the Sixteenth 
Century. (S. Conermann and G. Şen, eds.). Bonn: Bonn University Press. 
 
Conermann, S. (2008). 'Tankiz ibn ’Abd Allāh al-Ḥusāmī al-Nāṣirī (d. 740/1340) as Seen 
by His Contemporary al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363)'. Mamluk Studies Review 2, 1–24. 
 
Conermann, S. and G. Şen. (2017). Introduction: A Transitional Point of View'. In S. 
Conermann and G. Şen (eds.), The Mamluk-Ottoman Transition – Continuity and 
Change in Egypt and Bilād al-Shām in the Sixteenth Century, 13–30). Bonn: Bonn 
University Press. 
 
Degeorge, G. (1994). Damas: Des origines aux Mamluks. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
 
Eddé, A. (2000). 'Alep'. In J. Garcin (ed.), Grandes Villes Méditerranéennes du Monde 
Musulman Medieval, 157–175). Rome: Ecole Francaise de Rome. 
 
El-Hibri, T. (2010). Parable and Politics in Early Islamic History: The Rashidun 
Caliphs. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
El-Leithy, T. (2005). Coptic Culture and Conversion in Medieval Cairo, 1293–1524 A.D 
. (doctoral dissertation). Princeton: Princeton University. 
 
 243 
Elbendary, A. A. (2016). Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protests in Late Medieval Egypt 
and Syria. Cairo: AUC Press. 
 
Eychenne, M. (2013). Liens Personnels, Clientélisme et Réseaux de Pouvoir dans le 
Sultanat Mamelouk (milieu XIIIe-fin XIVe siècle). Beirut: Presse de L’Ifpo.  
 
Fansa, M. (2000). Damaskus-Aleppo: 5000 Jahre Stadtentwicklung in 
Syrien;[Begleitschrift zur Sonderausstellung 'Damaskus-Aleppo. 5000 Jahre 
Stadtentwicklung in Syrien']. Mainz am Rhein: Verlag Philipp Zabern. 
 
Flinterman, W. and J. Van Steenbergen. (2015). 'Al-Nasir Muhammad and the 
Formation of the Qalawunid State'. In A. Landau (ed.), Pearls on a String: Art in 
the Age of Great Islamic Empires, 87–113). Washington, DC: The Walters Art 
Museum and University of Washington Press. 
 
Flood, F. B. (1997). 'Umayyad Survivals and Mamluk Revivals'. Muqarnas 14, 57–79. 
 
Flood, F. B. (2001). The Great Mosque of Damascus: Studies on the Makings of an 
Umayyad Visual Culture. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. 
 
Frenkel, Y. (2007). 'Public Projection of Power in Mamluk Bilad al-Sham'. Mamluk 
Studies Review 11, 40–53. 
 
Fuess, A. (2013). 'Mamluk Politics'. In S. Conermann (ed.), Ubi sumus? Quo vademus?: 
Mamluk Studies–State of the Art. Bonn: Bonn University Press. 
 
Gaube, H. and E. Wirth. (1984). Aleppo: Historische und Geographische Beiträge zur 
Baulichen Gestaltung, zur Sozialen Organisation und zur Wirtschaftlichen 
Dynamik einer Vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig 
Reichert. 
 
Geertz, C. (1980). Negara: The Theatre State in 19th Century Bali. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Gharaibeh, M. (2014). 'Geschichtsschreibung im Dienste des ʿabbāsidischen Kalifats - 
Das al-Bidāya wa n-nihāya des Ibn Kathīr (1301–1373) – Ein 
Geschichtstheologisches Werk'. Jahrbuch Für Islamische Theologie Und 
Religionspädagogik 3, 95–124. 
 
Goitein, S. (1959). 'The Origin and Nature of the Muslim Friday Worship. The Muslim 
World 49 (3), 183–195. 
 
Gonella, J. (2006). 'The Citadel of Aleppo: Recent Studies. In H. Kennedy (ed.), Muslim 
Military Architecture in Greater Syria – From the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman 
Period, 165–175). Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. 
 
Grehan, J. (2003). 'Street Violence and Social Imagination in Late-Mamluk and Ottoman 
Damascus'. International Journal of Middle East Studies 35, 215–236. 
 
 244 
Guo, L. (1997). 'Mamluk Historiographic Studies : The State of the Art'. Mamluk Studies 
Review 1, 15–43. 
 
Guo, L. (1998). Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography – Al-Yūnīnī’s Dhayl Mirʾāt al-
Zamān 2 vols. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. 
 
Haarmann, U. (1969). Quellenstudien zur Frühen Mamlukenzeit. (doctoral dissertation). 
Freiburg: Universität Freiburg. 
 
Hartmut, E . Fahndrich. (1973). 'The Wafayāt al-Aʿyān of Ibn Khallikān: A New 
Approach'. Journal of the American Oriental Society 93(4), 432–445. 
 
Hasebe, F. (2005a). 'Invocations from the Tops of Minarets : A Popular Uprising and Its 
Aftermath in Ottoman Cairo, November 1724'. Memoirs of the Toyo Bunko 63, 
89–105. 
 
Hasebe, F. (2005b). 'Popular Movement and Jaqmaq, the Less Paternalistic Sultan – 
Some Aspects of Conflict in the Egyptian Cities, 1449-52'. AJAMES, 20(2), 26–
51. 
 
Heffening, W. (1997). 'Sariqa'. In C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs, and 
G. Lecomte (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 9, 62–63). Leiden: E. 
J. Brill. 
 
Heidemann, S. (1994). Das Aleppiner Kalifat (AD 1261): vom Ende des Kalifates in 
Bagdad über Aleppo zu den Restaurationen in Kairo. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
 
Heilman, E. G. (1978). Popular Protest in Medieval Baghdad, 295–334 AH. (doctoral 
dissertation). Princeton: Princeton University. 
 
Hirschler, K. (2006a). Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Hirschler, K. (2006b). 'Umstrittene Heilige Orte im Sunnitischen Islam: Syrien und 
Agypten im Spaten Mittelalter. In K. Hirschler and A. C. Messner (eds.), Heilige 
Orte in Asien und Afrika: Raume Gottlicher Macht und Menschlicher Verehrung, 
113–137. Schenefeld (Hamburg): EB-Verlag. 
 
Hirschler, K. (2007). 'Riten der Gewalt: Protest und Aufruhr in Kairo und Damaskus 
(7./13. bis 10./16. Jahrhundert)'. In S. Conermann and V. Hees (eds.), 
Islamwissenschaft als Kulturwissenschaft; 1: Historische Anthropologie. Ansätze 
und Möglichkeiten, 205–233. Schenefeld (Hamburg): EB-Verlag. 
 
Hirschler, K. (2013). 'Studying Mamluk Historiography: From Source-Criticism to the 
Cultural Turn'. In S. Conermann (ed.), Ubi sumus? Quo vademus?: Mamluk 
Studies–State of the Art. Bonn: Bonn University Press. 
 
Hoexter, M. (2002). 'Waqf and the Public Sphere'. In M. Hoexter, S. N. Eisenstadt and 
N. Levtzion (eds.), The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, 119–138). Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
 245 
Humphreys, R. S. (1977). From Saladin to the Mongols – The Ayyubids of Damascus 
1193–1260. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Humphreys, R. S. (2009). Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry. London: I. B. 
Taurus. 
 
ibn Jubayr, M. bin A. (1907). The Travels of Ibn Jubayr. (W. Wright and M. J. de Goeje, 
eds.). Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
 
ibn Ṣaṣrā, M. I. M. (1963). A Chronicle of Damascus 1389–1397 by Muḥammad ibn 
Muḥammad ibn Ṣaṣrā – The Unique Bodleian Library Manuscript of al-Durra al-
Muḍīʿa fī al-Dawlā al-Ẓāhiriyya 2 Vols. Translated, edited and annnotated by 
William Brinner. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Ibrahim, M. (2012). 'The 727 / 1327 Silk Weavers’ Rebellion in Alexandria : Religious 
Xenophobia , Homophobia, or Economic Grievances'. Mamluk Studies Review 16, 
123–142. 
 
Islahi, A. A. (1988). Economic Concepts of Ibn Taimīyah. Leicester, UK: The Islamic 
Foundation. 
 
Jackson, S. A. (1994). 'Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in Damascus'. Journal of Semitic Studies 
39(1), 41–85. 
 
Jones, L. G. (2012a). 'Islam al-kafir fi hal al-khutba: Concerning the Conversion of 
“Infidels” to Islam during the Muslim Friday Sermon in Mamluk Egypt'. Anuario 
de Estudios Medivales 42(1), 53–75. 
 
Jones, L. G. (2012b). The Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Katz, M. H. (2013). Prayer in Islamic Thought and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Kenney, E. (2004). Power and Patronage in Mamluk Syria: The Architecture and Urban 
Works of Tankiz Al-Nasiri, 1312–1340. (doctoral dissertation) New York: New 
York University. 
 
Kenney, E. (2009). Power and Patronage in Medieval Syria: The Architecture and 
Urban Works of Tankiz al-Nasiri. Chicago Studies on the Middle East. Chicago: 
Middle East Documentation Center, University of Chicago. 
 
Kertzer, D. (1989). Ritual, Politics, and Power. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Khalidi, T. (1994). Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kister, M. J. (1995). 'Radjab'. In C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs and G. 
Lecomte (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 8, 373–375). Leiden: E. 
J. Brill. 
 246 
 
Korn, L. (1999). Ayyubidische Architektur in Agypten und Syrien - Bautatigkeit im 
kontext von politik und gesellschaft 564–658/1169–1260. (doctoral dissertation) 
Tübingen: University of Tübingen. 
 
Kramer, J. H., and C.E. Bosworth. (1997). 'Sulṭān'. In C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, 
W. P. Heinrichs and G. Lecomte (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition Vol. 
9, 849–851. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
 
Labib, S. Y. (1965). Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171–1517). 
Wiesbaden: Frantz Steiner Verlag. 
 
Laoust, H. (1939). Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques de Takị̄-d-Dīn Ahṃad 
b. Taimīya, Canoniste Ḥanbalite, né à Ḥarrān en 661/1262, mort à Damas en 
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